SECRET  AND  CONFIDENTIAL 

FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 

NOT  TO  BE  TAKEN  INTO  FRONTLINE  TRENCHES 


NOTES  ON  RECENT 
OPERATIONS,  NO.  3 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE 
AUGUST,  1917 


WASHINGTON 


GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1917 


War  Department 

Document  No.  655 

Office  of  The  Adjutant  General. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
Washington,  August  23, 1917. 
The  following  Notes  on  Recent  Operations,  No.  3,  are  published 
for  the  information  of  all  concerned. 
(062.22  A.  G.  O.) 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  : 

H.  L.  SCOTT, 
Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Official  : 

H.  P.  McCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 
(3) 


667613 


War  Department, 
The  Adjutant  General's  Office, 

Washington,  June  19, 1917. 

To  all  officers  of  the  Army: 

You  are  advised  that  this  and  all  subsequent  documents  of  a 
similar  character  which  may  be  furnished  to  you  from  this 
office  are  to  be  regarded  as  strictly  confidential.  They  are  to 
be  kept  at  all  times  in  your  personal  possession  and  are  not  to 
be  copied,  nor  are  any  parts  of  their  contents  to  be  communi- 
cated either  directly  or  indirectly  to  the  press,  nor  to  any  per- 
sons not  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United  States. 
In  Europe  these  documents  are  not  to  be  carried  into  the  front- 
line trenches,  nor  farther  to  the  front  than  the  usual  post  of  the 
officers  to  whom  issued. 

Strict  compliance  with  this  injunction  is  enjoined  upon  every 
officer  into  whose  hands  any  of  these  confidential  document! 
may  come. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

H.  P.  McCain, 
The  Adjutant  General. 
(4) 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Page. 

German  smoke-producing  apparatus 7 

The  organization  of  an  infantry  battalion  and  the  normal  for- 
mation for  the  attack • 11 

Tanks.... 27 

Notes  on  mining 33 

Machine  guns,  order  of  the  Sixth  Bavarian  Division  regarding .  59 

Methods  of  attack  of  the  German  Infantry 61 

The  construction  of  field  defences. 65 

Instructions  for  mine  warfare 71 

The  principles  of  trench  warfare 77 

Memorandum  and  letter  to  pilots  and  observers,  Second  Bri- 
gade Royal  Flying  Corps 91 

Hints  on  reconnaissance  for  mines  and  land  mines  in  the  area 

evacuated  by  the  Germans 95 

Directions  for  the  use  of  antigas  horse  respirator 105 

Patrol  and  control  of  "no  man's  land" 109 

The  employment  and  duties  of  artillery  aeroplanes  in  posi- 
tion warfare 125 

Part  6:  Communication  between  infantry  and  aeroplanes  or 

captive  balloons 144 

Hints  for  trench  mortar  officers 157 

Preliminary  notes  on  recent  operations  on  the  front  of  the 

second  army  observation  stations 161 

Notes  on  communications  during  recent  operations  on  the 

front  of  the  second  army 177 

Notes  on  the  use  of  smoke 181 

Notes  on  screens 189 

Instructions  for  the  demolition  of  hostile  guns  with  3-inch 

Stokes  trench  mortar  bombs  and  special  slow  fuse 195 

Employment  of  3-inch  Stokes  mortars  in  recent  fighting 197 

Principles  of  command  in  the  defensive  battle  in  position 

warfare 199 

Consolidation  of  trenches.    Localities  and  craters  after  assault 

and  capture,  with  a  note  on  rapid  wiring 205 

German  instructions  for  the  employment  of  flame  projectors . . .  243 

(5) 


GERMAN  SMOKE-PRODUCING  APPARATUS. 


Description. — The  Germans  use  smoke-producing  apparatus 
based  on  the  reaction  of  a  mixture  of  anhydride  and  sulphuric 
chlorydrine  (in  equal  parts)  on  quicklime,  which  produces  a 
cloud  of  heavy  white  smoke. 

There  are  three  types  of  apparatus : 


Name. 


Approximate  di- 
mensions. 

Total 
weight. 

Weight 
of  lime. 

Height. 

Diameter. 

Meter. 

Meter. 

Kilos. 

Kilos. 

0.74 
.91 

0.49 
.38 

95 
69 

28.6 
17.7 

.4 

.35 

54 

10.9 

Quantity 
of  acid. 


Nebel-trommel"N.  T.  "(smoke 
drum) 

Nebel-topf  "N.  L."  (smoke  pot). 

Nebel-kasten  "N.  K."  (smoke 
box) 


Liters. 


21.3 
12.2 


Each  generator  comprises  an  iron  container  (drum-shaped  or 
spherical)  filled  with  a  mixture  of  anhydride  and  sulphuric 
chlorydrine,  held  by  pivots  on  the  inside  or  over  the  iron  drum 
that  contains  the  lumps  of  quicklime. 

Method  of  use. — To  use  the  generator,  take  off  the  lid  of  the 
drum  holding  the  quicklime  and  draw  out  the  screw  stopper 
from  the  container  holding  the  acid.  The  latter  is  then  turned 
to  180°  by  means  of  a  crank.  The  liquid  falls  drop  by  drop  on 
a  wire  gauze,  drips  onto  the  lime,  and  the  heat  of  the  reaction 
volatilizes  the  smoky  product.  In  the  "  N.  T."  or  "  N.  L."  genera- 
tors the  smoke  escapes  through  the  holes  in  the  lid.  To  put  the 
apparatus  in  use  place  it  in  a  hole  in  the  ground,  protecting  it 
from  shells.  A  small  earth  embankment  should  be  thrown  up  in 
front  of  the  generator. 

Effect. — According  to  a  German  document,  the  smoke  is  not 
poisonous,  and  there  is  no  danger  in  passing  through  it.  It  may 
cause  a  slight  irritation  to  the  throat  and  face,  but  it  is  abso- 
lutely harmless.  The  mixture  of  anhydride  and  sulphuric  chlo- 
rydrine is  noninflammable. 

(7) 


9 

An  "  N.  L."  and  an  "  N.  K."  generator  were  tested  on  a  day 
when  the  velocity  of  the  wind  was  13  kilometers  per  hour.  The 
following  results  were  obtained : 

The  "  N.  L.  "  generator  produced  a  very  large  and  very  opaque 
cloud  of  white  smoke,  which  traveled  more  than  3.5  kilometers. 
The  emissions  of  smoke  were  reduced  to  a  quarter  of  their  origi- 
nal volume  at  the  end  of  4  minutes,  and  disappeared  practically 
entirely  at  the  end  of  8£  minutes. 

"  N.  K."  generator. — A  smaller  cloud  was  less  rapidly  formed 
than  in  the  preceding  case.  It  lost  about  one-half  its  original 
volume  at  the  end  of  4  minutes,  but  continued  for  10  minutes. 

The  "  N.  T."  generator  is  said  to  be  twice  as  effective  as  the 
"  N.  L."  generator. 

Use. — The  German  documents  say  that  this  apparatus  per- 
mits defensive  and  offensive  barrages  to  be  made  of  smoke. 
Near  the  front  operations  can  be  masked.  Works  in  the  rear  can 
be  temporarily  hidden  from  aircraft. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  AN  INFANTRY  BAT- 
TALION AND  THE  NORMAL  FORMATION 
FOR  THE  ATTACK. 


(Issued  by  the  General  Staff,  April,  1917.) 


PART    I.  ORGANIZATION    OF    AN   INFANTRY 
BATTALION. 

(Extracts  from  O.B/1919,  d/-7.2.17,  issued  by  G.H.Q.,  British  Armies 
in  Frauce.) 

1.  Necessity  of  uniformity  of  organization. — In  order  to  insure 
the  necessary  degree  of  uniformity  of  training  and  tactical 
method  throughout  the  army,  it  is  necessary  that  there  should 
be  similarity  of  organization  in  all  battalions.  The  following 
instructions  are  therefore  issued. 

2.  Battalion. — The  battalion  will  continue  to  consist  of — 

(a)    Battalion   headquarters; 

(&)  4  companies,  consisting  of  4  platoons  of  4  sections 
each. 

3.  Battalion  headquarters. — In  addition  to  the  personnel 
shown  in  war  establishments  as  forming  part  of  the  battalion 
headquarters,  certain  other  personnel  will  be  attached.  This 
personnel,  which  is  principally  employed  on  administrative  du- 
ties, will  be  temporarily  detached  from  companies  whilst  so  em- 
ployed, but  will  remain  on  the  establishment  of  the  companies 
for  accounting  purposes.  A  headquarters  company  as  such  will 
not  be  formed.  The  detail  of  the  personnel  included  in  the  bat- 
talion headquarters  is  given  in  Appendix  I.  The  total  should 
not  exceed  150  other  ranks. 

The  personnel  composing  the  battalion  headquarters  can  con- 
veniently be  divided  into  two  categories,  namely,  the  fighting 
portion  and  the  administrative  portion.  The  former  will  be 
grouped  into  sections,  each  under  a  commander.  The  strength 
of  the  latter  will  not  exceed  80  other  ranks. 

(11) 


12 

4.  Companies.— Each  company  will  consist  of — 

(a)    Company  headquarters  and 

(6)  4  platoons. 
Company  headquarters,  the  strength  of  which  should  not  ex- 
ceed 14  other  ranks,  will  be  composed  entirely  of  fighting  troops. 
and  will  be  formed  as  a  section  under  a  commander. 

5.  Platoons. — The  organization  of  a  platoon  is  given  in  S.S. 
143. 

6.  The  organization  outlined  above  is  designed  to  create  b 
fighting  machine  composed  solely  of  fighting  ranks  and  distinct 
from  the  necessary  administrative  establishment. 

7.  The  essence  of  this  organization  is — 

(a)  That  the  platoon  should  constitute-  a  unit  for  fighting 
and  training,  and  should  consist  of  a  homogeneous 
combination  of  all  the  weapons  with  which  the 
infantry  is  now  armed ; 

{by  That  specialists  should  all  be  with  their  platoons  and 
companies,  except  such  as  may  be  required  at  bat- 
talion and  company  headquarters  either  for  pur- 
poses of  fighting  or  for  instructional  duties; 

(a)  That  every  portion  of  the  battalion,  including  the 
fighting  portion  of  battalion  headquarters  and  com- 
pany headquarters,  should  consist  of  ;i  certain  Dum- 
ber of  permanently  formed  units,  namely  sections. 
each  under  its  own  commander; 

(d)  *  *  *  *  * 

(e)  That  every  man  is  available  for  working  and  carrying 

ptrties,  irrespective  of  the  weapon  with  which  he 
is  armed ; 
(/)  That  one  Lewis  uun  with  its  detachment  is  allotted 
to  each  platoon.  Although  this  will  he  the  normal 
organization,  it  may  often  he  advisable  in  dealing 
with  particular  tactical  situations  to  allot  a  second 
Lewis  gun  to  a  platoon,  or  to  withdraw  temporarily 
one.  two,  or  more  of  those  guns  from  platoons  for 
special  tactical  employment  under  the  orders  of 
Company  or  battalion  commanders.  It  is  to  be 
clearly  understood  that  the  normal  organization  is 
not    to    interfere   with    any   such    temporary   Special 

grouping    or    employment    as    circumstance    may 

render   desirable. 


13 

Note. — Paragraph  5,  page  17,  of  S.  S.  135,  "  Instructions  for 
the  training  of  divisions  for  offensive  action,"  will  be  amended 
accordingly. 

8.  In  order  to  meet  the  varying  conditions  under  which  bat- 
talions serve,  to  allow  of  more  flexibility  as  regards  the  number 
of  men  detached  for  extra  regimental  employ,  and  to  meet  the 
case  of  heavy  battle  casualties,  a  maximum  and  a  minimum 
strength  of  28  and  44  O.K.,  respectively,  have  been  laid  down 
for  the  platoon  in  S.S.  143, 

PART  II.  THE  NORMAL  FORMATION  FOR  THE 
ATTACK, 

I.  General  principles  of  the  formation. — In  the  special  circum- 
stances of  present  warfare  it  has  become  necessary  to  modify 
the  provisions  of  section  114,  Chapter  IX,  "  Infantry  training  " 
in  so  far  as  the  attack  is  concerned,  and  it  is  advantageous, 
under  existing  conditions,  to  lay  down  a  normal  formation  for 
the  attack. 

The  normal  formation  described  below  is  one  which  has  fre- 
quently been  employed  with  success  in  recent  fighting;  it  is 
simple  and  adaptable  to  the  varying  conditions  of  trench-to- 
trench  attack.  It  should  also  prove  suitable  to  most  conditions 
of  open  warfare. 

So  far  as  the  platoon  is  concerned,  the  formation  described 
should  be  applicable  to  most  circumstances  and  it  should  seldom 
be  necessary  to  depart  therefrom,  while  as  regards  the  battalion 
it  aims  at  elasticity. 

The  platoon  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  unit  in  the  assault.  The 
frontage  of  an  infantry  battalion  in  the  trench-to-trench  attack 
may  range  from  200  yards,  against  a  highly  organized  position, 
to  600  yards  or  more,  against  one  less  highly  consolidated. 

II.  Application  of  weapons. — The  weapons  now  under  the  hand 
of  a  platoon  commander  should  be  arranged  according  to  their 
various  peculiarities.  That  is  to  say.  the  rifle  and  bayonet  and 
the  bomb,  being  the  most  effective  offensive  weapons,  should  be 
placed  as  far  forward  as  possible,  closely  supported  by  the  rifle 
grenade,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  "  howitzer "  of  the 
platoon,  and  by  the  Lewis  gun,  which  is  the  weapon  of  oppor- 
tunity. 


14 

Each  platoon  will  therefore  normally  be  disposed  in  two  lines. 
bombers  end  riflemen  in  the  front  line,  rifle  bombers  and  thf* 
Lewis  gun1  in  the  second  line.  These  two  lines  will  constitute 
one  wave  irrespective  of  "  Moppers-up."      (See  PI.   "A."  I 

Further,  It  has  been  found  convenient  as  a  general  rule  for 
the  company  to  be  formed  on  a  two-platoon  frontage. 

The  platoon,  therefore,  should  normally  be  formed  in  two  lines, 
constituting  one  wave,  and  the  company  in  two  waves.  (See 
PI.  "B.") 

In  this  connection  it  can  not  be  too  often  urged,  firstly,  that 
in  the  assault  every  man  is  a  bayonet  man,  excepting  No.  1  of 
the  Lewis  gun;  secondly,  that  every  man  is  a  bomber;  and 
thirdly,  that  every  man  in  rifle  sections  is  also  trained  to  be 
either  a  Lewis  gunner  or  a  rifle  bomber,  with  a  view  to  replac- 
ing casualties  in  men  armed  with  those  weapons. 

III.  Jiitcrrals  and  distances. — Intervals  between  men  should 
usually  be  4  to  5  yards. 

The  distance  between  lines  should  be  15  to  25  yards  and  that 
between  waves  50  to  100  yards;  to  avoid  the  rear  waves  being 
caught  in  the  enemy's  barrage,  these  distances  may  be  reduced 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  moment.  Rear  waves  should 
move  in  sections  in  artillery  fori  nation. 

IV.  Moppers-up. — "Moppers-up V  should  follow  the  second 
line  of  a  wave.  (See  Pis.  "A,"  "  B,"  "C,"  "  D,"  ami  "E.") 
It  is  considered  preferable  to  find  them,  when  possible,  from 
the  platoons  and  companies  whose  objectives  they  are  to  clear. 
If,  however,  the  numbers  required  for  clearing  these  objectives 
are  so  great  as  to  deplete  unduly  the  platoons  or  companies  to 
which  they  are  allotted,  moppers-up  must  be  found  from  another 
company  or  possibly  another  battalion.  This  case  will  usually 
occur  when  attacking  a  highly  organized  position  at  the  com- 
mencement of  an  offensive. 

V.  Allotment  of  objectives. — Each  wave  must  be  allotted  a 
definite  objective,  and  each  component  part  of  each  line  should 

.have-a  definite  duty  to  perform  according  to  the  weapon  with 
which  it  is  armed.  Thus,  in  the  irench-to-trench  attack,  if  the 
l>l:ii<M»n  is  given  one  objective,  the  company  would  have  two 
objectives,  and  the  battalion  two  or  more.     In  this  way  it   is 

1  Tills  in  no  way  contravenes  the  provisions  of  paragraph  7  (f)  of 
Part  I,  or  par.  29  In  "  Notes  on  the  tactical  employment  of  marhine 
guns  and  Lewis  guns,"  dated  Mar.,  1916. 


15 

possible  to  insure  that  troops  are  distributed  in  depth  on  attain- 
ing their  objective  and  that  the  frontage  of  any  commander  is 
not  unduly  extended. 

VI.  The  assault. — The  assault  may  be  carried  out  either  by — 
(i)   the  leading  wave  going  straight  to  the  farthest  ob- 
jective, rear  waves  following  it  to  nearer  objectives 
in  succession  (see  PI.  "  C  ") ; 

or  by 

(ii)  the  leading  wave  being  directed  to  a  near  objective, 
rear  waves  passing  through  it  to  those  farther 
away,  i.  e.,  "leapfrog."    (See  PI.  "D.") 

In  cases  where  there  are  only  two  objectives  the  first-men- 
tioned method  is  usually  preferable.     ( See  PI.  "  E." ) 

In  cases,  however,  where  there  are  more  than  two  objectives 
either  method  may  be  employed. 

In  deciding  which  method  to  adopt,  a  guiding  factor  is  the 
distance  between  the  various  objectives. 

If  there  is  sufficient  room  for  our  artillery  barrage  to  halt  on, 
or  short  of,  the  farther  objective,  so  as  to  afford  time  for  the  rear 
waves  to  close  up  under  it  by  passing  through  the  leading  waves, 
the  second  method  will  be  preferable.  This  method  simplifies 
the  organization  of  "  moppers-up."     (See  PI.  "  D.") 

If  there  is  not  sufficient  room  for  our  artillery  barrage  to 
halt  as  above  indicated  it  will  usually  be  necessary  to  adopt  the 
first  method.     (See  PL  "  C") 

It  is  necessary  to  remember  the  undesirability  of  the  barrage 
crossing  an  objective  before  the  waves  told  off  for  its  capture 
have  closed  up  under  the  barrage. 

VII.  Plates  and  notes. — Five  plates  are  attached,  with  ex* 
planatory  notes,  showing — 

Plate  A. — A  platoon  in  one  wave  of  two  lines. 

Plate  B. — A  company  in  two  waves  of  two  lines  each. 

Plate  C. — A  battalion  with  four  objectives,  the  first  wave 
being  directed  to  the  farthest. 

Plate  D. — A  battalion  with  four  objectives,  the  first  wave 
being  directed  to  the  nearest  objective,  rear  waves  passing 
through ;  that  is  to  say,  "  leapfrog." 

Plate  E. — The  battalion  on  a  broader  front,  with  two  objec- 
tives, the  first  wave  being  directed  on  the  farthest  objective. 

VIII.  Carriers. — Provision  for  immediate  requirements  in 
grenades  and  ammunition  is  made  in  each  se.etion  of  platoons ; 
requirements  over  and  above  these  must  be  met  by  parties  from 
other  platoons,  companies,  or  battalions  as  best  suits  the  case. 


10 


APPENDIX  I. 

Battalion  Headquartebs. 


OTHER    RANKS. 


Fighting  portion: 
Sergeant-major. 
Clerks. 

Gas  personnel. 
Signalers. 
Runners. 
Pioneers. 

Stretcher  bearers. 
Cooks. 
Batmen, 


Administrative  portion : 
Quartermaster  sergeant 
Company-     fuartennaater 

sergeants. 
Storemen. 

Transport  establishment, 
Shoemakers, 
Tailors. 
Butchers, 
Cooks. 
Grooms. 
Batmen. 
Instructional  establishment. 

AMENDMENTS  (APRIL,  1917). 
(Issued  by  the  General  Staff,  May,  1917.) 

The  following  amendments  are  made : 

1.  Page  1  (title-page) ,  line  4  from  bottom.    For  "  O.B./1914/T." 
substitute  "  O.B./1919/T." 

2.  Page  4,  lines  6  and  7.    Delete  "  it  is  advantageous,  under 
existing  conditions,". 

3.  Page  4,  line  6  from  bottom,  and  page  9,  line  17.     After 
"  No.  1,"  insert  "  and  No.  2  ". 

4.  Pages  6  and  7.     For  Appendices  I  and  II,  xut>xtitutc  Ap- 
pendices I  (A),  I  (B),I  (C)  and  II  as  follows: 

Appendix  I    (A). 

BATTALION    HEADQUARTERS. 

Fighting  portion.  Fighting  portion — Continued. 


Officers : 

Commanding    offi- 
cer  

Second     in     com- 
mand  

Adjutant 

Lewis  gun  officer. 


Officers : 

Signalling  officer __       1 

Bombing  officer 1 

6 

Other  ranks : 

Sergeant  major 1 

Orderly  room  clerk.    _       1 


17 

Fighting  portion — Continued.         Fighting  portion — Continued 


( >ther  ranks — Continued. 

Gas 

.    Signalers 

Stretcher   bearers__ 

Runners 

Fioneers 

Cooks 

Batmen 


2 
IB 

4 

9 
11 

o 

6 

49 


Balance  to  be  made  up  by 
additional  stretcher  bear- 
ers, runners,  police,  or 
scouts,  at  the  discretion 
of  battalion  command- 
ers  : 

Total 

A  dministrati re  portion . 

( )fficers : 

Assistant  adjutant 

Quartermaster 

Transport  officer 


21 
70 


Other  ranks : 

Quartermaster        ser- 
geant and  storemen_ 
Company   quartermas- 
ter    sergeant     and 

storemen 

Transport      establish- 
ment and  groom s__ 

Shoemakers 

Tailors 

Butchers = 

Postman 

Cooks 

Batmen 


TO 


Balance  to  he  made  up  by 
additional  shoeniakers, 
tailors,  cooks,  transport 
establishment,  police,  san- 
itary men,  or  watermen, 
at  the  discretion  of  bat- 
talion commanders 10 

Total 80 


Appendix   I    (B). 


COMPANY    HEADQUARTERS. 

Company  sergeant  major 1 

Signalers 4 

Runners    (including  1   batman) 4 

Batman  or  cook 1 

10 
Balance  to  be  made  up  by  additional  stretcher  bearers,  run- 
ners, or  scouts,  at  the  discretion  of  company  commanders.  4 

Total 14 

9784°— 17 2 


18 
Appendix  I  (C). 

PLATOON    HEADQUARTERS. 

Platoon   sergeant 1 

Signaler 1 

Runner I 

Batman 1 

3 

Total -1 

Note  to  Appendices  I  (A) -I  (C). — These  numbers  do  not  include 
those  mentioned  in  S.  S.  135,  p.  58,  "  Numbers  to  be  left  behind  when 
the  battalion  takes  part  in  the  attack,"  as  it  should  always  be  possible 
to  replace  those  left  behind  by  an  equivalent  number  of  men  withdrawn 
from  classes,  extra  regimental  employ,  etc. 

Appendix  II. 

NUMBERS   TO   BE   LEFT   BEHIND    WHEN    THE    BATTALION    TAKES    PART 
IN   THE   ATTACK. 

In  each  battalion  :  Per  battalion. 

Company  sergeant  majors 2 

33  per  cent  signalers : Mo 

33  per  cent  runners J  1-"> 

(las   instructor ] 

Bombing    instructor 1 

Lewis  gun  instructors 2 

Any  other  instructors  in  special  work,  such  as 

dugouts 8 

Total 32        82 

In  each  company : 

Sergeant 1 

Corporal 1 

Lance  corporal 1 

Total 3        12 

In  each  platoon : 

Rifle  bomber 1 

Scout    and    sniper 1 

Lewis  gunners 2 

Total 4        64 


Grand  total 108 

»If  up  to  full   strength. 


m 

Other  ranks. 
Establishment  of  a  battalion,  including  attached. 


971 


1  Fighting. 

Admin- 
istrative 
and  em- 
ployed. 

Fighting. 

Admin- 
istrative 
and  em- 
ployed. 

Battalion  headquarters: 

70 

70 

80 

80 

4  company  headquarters  of  14  each 

16  platoons: 

Of  44  each   ..                           

16 
704 

56 

Of  28  each... 

448 

Sick  and  extra  regimental  employ  and 

61 

317 

830 

141 

574 

397 

971 

971 

The  above  figures  include  those  who  must  be  left  behind  when 
the  battalion  takes  part  in  an  attack.     (See  S.S.  135,  p.  58.) 


20 

Platk  "A." 
THE  PLATOON. 

Taking:  an  average  strength  of  36  other  ranks  and  headquarters  at  4  other 

ranks. 

(Showing  2  platoons  in  2  waves,  with  the  right  the  outer  flank.) 
< tOO' > 


qdddIdodo  i  ooooSoooo  Jat  Un* 

/ 

aaaaiiaaaa     2nd  Line' 


1  I 


nt  WAVE 


3rd  Lint  (Moppers-vpfor  Iht 
Objtctivt  allotted  to  the 
2nd  Wave). 


DODDBQDOO  0000180000     4th  Line 

3 

6  +  *4:a*444Daaaa!aaaa    6th  Line, 

KEY. 

£  Platoon  commander. 

(^  Platoon  sergeunt. 

jfc  Section  commander. 

O  Rifleman. 

O  T.c.vis  gunner. 

O  Pomber. 

9  Rifle  bomber. 

A  Mopper  up. 

»  Platoon  H.  Q. 


2nd  WAVE 


21 

NOTES. 

Two  platoons  are  depicted  showing  the  different  positions  of  leaders  in 
first  and  second  waves. 

The  platoon  is  the  unit  in  the  assault,  moves  in  one  wave  of  two  lines, 
and  has  one  definite  objective. 

Elvery  man  is  a  rifleman  and  a  bomber,  and  in  the  assault,  with  the 
exception  of  the  No.  1  of  Lewis  gun,  fixes  his  bayonet.  Men  in  rifle  sec- 
tions must  be  trained  either  to  the  Lewis  gun  or  rifle  grenade. 

Bombing  and  Lewis  gun  sections  are  on  the  outer  flank  of  platoons. 

In  assembly  the  distances  between  lines  and  waves  may  conveniently 
be  reduced  to  lessen  the  danger  of  rear  waves  being  caught  in  the 
enemy's  barrage  ;  the  distances  will  be  increased  when  the  advance  takes 
place. 

"  Moppers  up  "  follow  the  second  line  of  a  wave  and  precede  the  unit 
for  which  they  are  to  mop  up.  See  plates  "  C  "  and  "  D."  If  the  num- 
bers are  large,  they  must  be  found  from  a  different  company  or  bat- 
talion. Small  numbers  are  preferably  found  from  the  unit  for  which 
they  are  to  mop  up.  They  must  wear  a  distinctive  badge  and  have  their 
own  commander. 


22 


THE   COMPANY. 


Plate  "  B. 


Taking   4    platoons    at    an    average    strength    of    36    other    rank    each,    and 
company    headquarters   at    14    other    rank. 


200" 


/5\o25l 


I 


1st    WAVE 


A     A 


A        ▲        A        A       A        ▲        ▲    3rd  Line  (Moppen-vp ),., 
"     tloe  all* 
Woe*) 


50* 

too* 


\ 

'5%  25* 

1 


|  4  th  Line 


6th  Line 


K2rd  WAVE 


KEY. 

W        Company    commander. 
r^M        Company  headquarters. 

V    Platoon   (in  two  lines). 
/A.       Moppers  up. 


NOTES. 

Thf  company  moves  in  two  waves,  has  two  objectives,  and  is  dis- 
tributed in  depth. 

"  Moppers-up  "  follow  the  second  line  of  a  wave  and  precede  the  unit 
for  which  they  are  to  mop  up.  (See  Pis.  C  and  D.)  If  the  number* 
are  large  they  must  be  found  from  a  different  company  or  battalion. 
Small  numbers  are  preferably  found  from  the  unit  for  which  they  are 
to  mop  up.  They  must  wear  a  distinctive  badge  and  have  their  own 
commander. 


23 


H   2 


M 

it 


2* 


III 

<^ 

a  a  a 


©     o 
M  "5  o^  © 


S-S-S- 
S-S-S- 

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5^5= 


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,2       «N    93rJ.lo 


J  2 
<  £ 

H 

H 


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c  £  ?3  t? 

-*->  arolr> 
£©?S 
•->  £.q  o 


-    I 


o  2 

il 

& 

s 


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♦to 


-. — V- ^*  - — ^5*| 


24 

KB*. 

Battalion  Headquarters. 
Company  commander. 
Company  headquarters. 
Platoon. 
Moppers  up. 


The  battalion-  moves  in  four  waves,  each  direct  to  its  objective,  and  is 
distributed  in  depth  on  attaining  them. 

"  Moppers  up  "  follow  the  second  line  of  a  wave  and  precede  the  unit 
for  which  they  are  to  mop  up.  (See  plates  "C"  and  "  D.")  If  the 
numbers  are  large  they  must  be  found  from  a  different  company  or  bat* 
talion.  Small  numbers  are  preferably  found  from  the  unit  for  which 
they  are  to  mop  up.  They  must  wear  a  distinctive  badge  and  have  their 
own  commander. 

In  this  instance  the  organization  of  "  moppers  up  "  is  complicated. 

It  may  be  advisable  to  detail  a  company  from  another  unit  as  a  re- 
serve to  the  battalion. 

This  formation  is  capable  of  easy  modification  to  deal  with  three 
objectives. 

Battalion    headquarters  does   not  move   in   a   trench-to-trench   attack 
until  a  report  is  received  that  the  objective  has  been  captured,     i  S 
135.  "  Instructions  for  the  Training  of  Divisicns  for  Offensive  Action," 
Sec.  XIII,  par.  3.) 


25 

Plate  "  P." 
THE  BATTALION. 

Taking    16    average    platoons    of    36,    4    company    headquarters    of    14,    and 
battalion  headquarters  of  70  other  ranks. 


fBt  Battalion  headquarters. 

o  Company  commander. 

CSi  Company  headquarters. 

^  Platoon. 

A  Moppers  up. 

Four  objectives  :  First  wave  to  second  objective. 
Second  wave  to  first  objective. 
Third  wave  to  fourth  objective* 
Fourth  wave  to  third  objective, 
i.  e. — Leap  frog. 


I    '    I    I    '    I  I  '    I    I    |    I 

4   *  »                                  »*»  »  *    A 

'0-                        O&Coy.  C6  Coy. 

LA  Ei 

I'll     II  I  I     I 

I      I  .  I      I 

NOTES. 


1st  Line     \1st  WAVE 
2nd  Line.    \  to  2nd  Objective 
3rd  L{ne.      Moppers-up 
for  1st  Objective. 

4th  Line.    ~\  2nd   WAVE 
5th  line.    $  tout  Objective. 


[3rd  WAVE 

[to  4th  Objective. 


Hoppers-*  p  for 
3rd  Objective. 


4th  WAVE 
to  3rd  Objective. 


The  battalion  moves  in  four  waves,  the  first  two  waves  to  the  nearest 
objectives  and  the  last  two  waves  passing  through  to  the  two  farthest 
objectives,  and  is  distributed  in  depth  on  attaining  them. 

"  Moppers  up  "  follow  the  second  line  of  a  wave  and  precede  the  unit 
for  which  they  are  to  mop  up.  (See  plates  "  C  "  and  "  D.")  If  the 
numbers  are  large,  they  must  be  found  from  a  different  company  or 
battalion.  Small  numbers  are  preferably  found  from  the  unit  for  which 
they  are  to  mop  up.  They  must  wear  a  distincitve  badge  and  have  their 
own  commander. 

In  this  case  the  organization  of  the  "  Moppers  up  *'  is  simple. 

It  is  not  usually  necessary  to  detail  a  reserve  from  another  unit,  be- 
cause the  first  and  second  waves  can  reform  after  the  third  and  fourth 
have  passed  through  them. 

This  formation  is  capable  of  easy  modification  to  deal  with  three 
objectives. 

Battalion  headquarters  does  not  move  in  a  trench-to-trench  attack 
until  a  report  is  received  that  the  objective  has  been  captured.  (See 
S.S.  135,  "  Instructions  for  the  Training  of  Divisions  for  Offensive 
Action,"  Sec.  XIII,  par.  3.) 


26 


p 

I 


T3    •= 

C    © 
■ 

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H  ^     ' 

H  t!   « 

H  *  « 


e  a 

o    w 
^    (1 


**oi 


;-»oH 


NOTES  ON  THE  USE  OF  TANKS  AND  ON  THE 
GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THEIR  EMPLOY- 
MENT AS  AN  ADJUNCT  TO  THE  INFANTRY 
ATTACK. 

(Issued  with  special  reference  to  the  "  Mark  IV,"  1917,  pattern.) 

1.  With  tanks,  as  with  any  other  arm,  satisfactory  results  can 
only  be  obtained  by  the  close  cooperation  of  all  arms.  Although 
the  employment  of  tanks  as  an  adjunct  to  offensive  operations 
is  still  to  a  great  extent  in  an  experimental  stage,  it  is  neces- 
sary for  all  commanders  and  subordinate  leaders  of  all  arms 
to  realize  the  limitations  and  capabilities  of  tanks,  and  to  know 
the  general  principles  of  their  employment,  so  far  as  these  prin- 
ciples can  be  laid  down  at  present.  This  is  all  the  more  neces- 
sary as  occasions  will  inevitably  arise  (as  the  number  of  tanks 
in  this  country  increases)  when  troops  will  be  required  to  oper- 
ate with  tanks  without  any  previous  experience  or  training. 

2.  (a)  The  radius  of  action  of  the  Mark  IV  tank  and  the 
limit  of  endurance  of  its  crew  is  not  more  than  about  eight 
hours,  this  period  being  reckoned  from  the  time  of  departure 
from  and  return  to  a  position  where  the  crew  can  rest  and 
where  the  tank  can  be  overhauled  and  refilled. 

Its  pace  varies  from  one-half  mile  to  4  miles  per  hour,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  and  state  of  the  ground.  For  purposes  of 
calculation  its  average  pace,  when  fighting  under  favorable  con- 
ditions, may  be  taken  at  about  2  miles  per  hour. 

(b)  The  Mark  IV  tank  can  cross  trenches  9  to  10  feet  wide, 
can  surmount  a  perpendicular  obstacle  4  feet  high,  and  move 
up  or  down  a  slope  of  1  in  2. 

So  long  as  the  bottom  is  hard,  mud  or  water  to  a  depth  of 
2  feet  or  so  is  no  bar  to  its  progress ;  but,  owing  to  its  weight, 
ground  that  has  been  very  heavily  shelled  or  is  very  sodden  to 
a  considerable  depth  is  unfavorable  to  its  employment. 

(c)  Wire  entanglements  do  not  form  any  obstacle  to  tanks, 
but  the  passage  of  a  single  tank  will  only,  as  a  rule,  flatten  two 
passages  2  feet  wide  through  the  wire.  The  passage  by  infantry 
in  single  file  may  therefore  be  made  easier,  but  the  wire  remains 
more  or  less  an  obstacle. 

(27) 


28 

Tanks  can  pass  easily  through  thick  hedges  or  thick  woods 
composed  of  small  trees,  but  large  stumps  of  broken  tree 
difficult  to  see  and  form  a  serious  obstacle  to  tanks. 

In  villages  they  can  operate  with  success  so  long  as  the 
streets  are  recognizable,  but  when  the  village  is  reduced  to 
heaps  of  rubble,  tanks  are  liable  to. get  ditched  in  the  cellars. 

(d)  Although  the  Mark  IV  tank  has  an  Improved  silencer, 
it  can  still  be  heard  when  in  movement  within  250  yards  unless 
the  noise  is  covered  by  a  certain  amount  of  machine-gun  or 
artillery  fire.  The  approach  of  a  tank  to  its  final  position  pre- 
paratory to  attack  should  always,  therefore,  be  covered  by  a 
certain  amount  of  shooting. 

3.  Against  infantry  or  machine  guns  tanks  are  almost  invul- 
nerable (the  Mark  IV  tank  is  practically  proof  against  the  Ger- 
man armor-piercing  bullet)  and  have  great  moral  effect  as  well 
as  considerable  fire  power,  but  the  effect  that  each  tank  exer- 
cises is  purely  local.  On  the  other  hand,  when  stationary  they 
form  an  easy  target  for  the  enemy's  artillery,  though  bard  to 
hit  effectively  when  in  motion.  In  addition,  they  are  easily  put 
out  of  action  by  a  hostile  antitank  gun. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that — 

(i)  It  is  essential  that  the  action  of  the  artillery  and  the  em- 
ployment of  tanks  should  be  carefully  coordinated.  Tank- 
always  draw  hostile  artillery  fire,  and  counter-battery  work  is 
therefore  of  particular  importance. 

(ii)  An  artillery  barrage  will  usually  be  necessary  both  to 
assist  tanks  in  overcoming  stationary  antitank  armament  and 
to  cover  the  advance  of  the  infantry  in  the  usual  way. 

(iii)  Tanks  should  keep  constantly  in  motion  unless  they  are 
covered  from  hostile  artillery  fire,  e.  g.,  by  the  configuration  of 
the  ground  or  being  amongst  the  enemy's  troops. 

4.  The  power  of  tanks  is  considerably  limited  by  poor  vision. 
which  makes  it  difficult  to  recognize  objectives  or  to  follow  com- 
plicated routes.  As  a  general  rule,  therefore,  the  most  suitable 
objective  for  tanks  is  a  clearly  defined  line  of  trenches.  In  any 
case  the  objectives  assigned  should  be  visible  and  obvious,  and 
the  task  simple,  definite,  and  limited. 

In  detailing  tanks  to  objectives,  it  should  he  borne  in  mind 
that— 

(i)  As  far  as  possible,  the  general  direction  of  their  advance 
should  be  parallel  to  that  of  the  infantry.      .Movements  of  tanks 


29 

diagonal  to  that  of  the  infantry  have  been  found  to  draw  the 
latter  off  their  objective  or  line  of  advance. 

(ii)  The  best  moral  effect  is  obtained,  where  conditions  are 
suitable,  from  the  employment  of  large  numbers  of  tanks  attack- 
ing several  objectives  simultaneously. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  provide  for  emergencies,  and  to  replace 
tanks  which  from  one  cause  or  another  have  been  unable  to 
reach  their  objective,  a  proportion  of  tanks  should  be  kept  in 
reserve. 

These  conflicting  requirements  must  be  carefully  balanced  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances  of  each  case. 

(iii)  As  a  general  rule,  it  is  useless  to  give  tanks  the  task  of 
finding  objectives,  such  as  detailing  a  single  tank  to  look  for  a 
machine  gun  which  has  not  been  located.  If  machine  guns  have 
been  accurately  located,  tanks  are  most  useful  to  overcome 
them. 

(iv)  The  fewer  the  tanks  employed  on  a  given  front  the  easier 
it  will  be  for  the  enemy  to  concentrate  his  guns  on  the  tanks, 
and  the  greater  will  be  the  proportion  of  tanks  knocked  out. 
Also,  owing  to  accidents  of  ground  or  mechanical  trouble,  it  is 
not  safe  to  rely  on  all  tanks  reaching  their  objectives.  For 
these  reasons  it  will  seldom  be  advisable  to  detail  less  than  a 
section  of  tanks  for  any  one  objective. 

(v)  Tanks  can  force  their  way  into  almost  any  objective,  but 
can  not  halt  to  hold  them  in  the  open,  where  they  are  exposed  to 
direct  hits  by  hostile  artillery.  The  position  gained  must  be 
taken  over  by  the  infantry.  When  this  has  been  done,  tanks 
should  move  on  to  another  objective  or  to  the  rallying  point. 
If  the  infantry  are  not  able  to  reach  the  tanks,  it  will  seldom  be 
any  use  for  the  tanks  to  continue  their  advance. 

5.  The  frontage  to  be  covered  by  tanks  is  governed  by  the  par- 
ticular situation  of  objectives  and  by  the  facilities  of  approach. 
They  should  not  normally  work  less  than  100  yards  apart. 

Very  careful  previous  reconnaissance  is  essential  in  order  that 
tanks  should  not  be  deliberately  committed  to  an  impracticable 
route.  A  plentiful  supply  of  aeroplane  photographs  must  be  sup- 
plied to  the  tanks  for  this  purpose. 

In  addition,  the  routes  to  the  starting  point  require  very  de- 
tailed examination  in  order  to  insure  tanks  arriving  in  time. 

6.  It  should  seldom  be  necessary  to  employ  tanks  at  the  com- 
mencement  of  an  offensive  to  assist  the  infantry  assault  on  a 


30 

hostile  front  system  of  trenches  which  can  be  adequately  dealt 
with  and  destroyed  by  our  own  artillery  bombardment 

As  the  appearance  of  tanks  will  immediately  bring  down  a 
hostile  artillery  barrage,  they  should  not  usually  precede  or  even 
start  with  infantry  at  the  commencement  of  an  attack. 

Normally,  tanks  should  wait  concealed  at  first  and  go  out 
later : 

(i)  To  deal  with  pockets  of  the  enemy  and  strong  points  hold- 
ing out  in  the  objectives  captured. 

(ii)  To  deal  with  defenses  beyond  the  hostile  front  system 
which  are  interfering  with  the  progress  of  the  battle  by  holding 
up  the  advance  of  the  leading  troops. 

(iii)  When  the  infantry  has  reached  the  farthest  objective, 
and  there  is  sufficient  space  beyond,  to  work  with  infantry 
patrols  and  advanced  guards  and  help  them  to  deal  with  ma- 
chine guns. 

They  may  also  be  employed  for  special  tasks,  such  as — 

(iv)  Covering  the  formation  of  a  defensive  flank  by  working 
outward,  so  as  to  provide  more  room  for  consolidation. 

(v)  Flattening  sunken  or  concealed  wire  which  can  not  be  cut 
by  artillery  fire.  The  chances  of  success  are  not  great  and  their 
use  for  such  an  abnormal  purpose  should  be  rare. 

The  role  of  tanks  stated  above  will  usually  entail  their  pass- 
ing through  the  hostile  barrage.  This  can  be  affected  without 
undue  loss,  so  long  as  the  tanks  keep  moving. 

7.  From  the  foregoing  the  general  principles  of  the  employ- 
ment of  tanks  may  be  summarized  as  follows  j 

(i)  Each  tank  formation  should  be  disposed  in  depth  so  that 
if  the  leading  tanks  become  casualties  others  c:m  move  up  to 
carry  out  the  task. 

(ii)  The  tanks  should  follow  the  infantry  immediately  after 
the  first  assault  with  a  view  to— 

(a)  Assisting  Hie  Infantry  to  mop  up  pockets  of  the  enemy. 

(b)  To  push  on  to  special  objectives  or  carry  out  suitable 
tasks  which  will  usually  be  found  in  and  beyond  the  second  ob- 
jective of  the  main   infantry  attack. 

(iii)  The  tnsks  and  role  of  the  tanks  should  be  worked  out 
by  the  Commanders  concerned  in  the  same  way  and  in  coordina- 
tion with  the  artillery  program,  and  each  tank  attack  should  be 

supported  by  mopping-up  parties  and  sufficient  infantry  to  con- 
solidate and  hold  the  objectives  when  gained. 


31 

8.  Both  for  the  reason  that  a  tank  draws  fire  and  on  account 
of  its  liability  to  lose  direction,  infantry  should  not  as  a  rule 
immediately  follow  tanks  (except  for  the  purpose  of  passing 
through  wire  entanglements),  and  any  tendency  to  bunch  behind 
the  tank  should  be  checked. 

From  the  limited  experience  available,  it  would  appear  at 
present  that  the  most  suitable  formation  for  the  infantry  to 
adopt  is  to  follow  tanks  in  small  groups  in  the  intervals  between 
•the  tanks.  The  advance  of  the  infantry  to  the  objective  being 
controlled  in  the  ordinary  manner,  independent  of  any  devia- 
tion of  route  taken  by  the  tanks. 

9.  For  purposes  of  administration,  tanks  are  general  head- 
quarters troops,  and  will  be  allotted  in  brigades  to  armies  for 
certain  operations. 

The  army  will  allot  tanks  in  brigades  or  battalions  to  the 
corps  in  accordance  with  the  general  plan.  The  tank  units  so 
allotted  become,  for  purposes  of  the  battle,  corps  troops,  and 
their  objectives  will  be  decided  by  the  corps.  The  details  of 
the  movements  of  tanks  to  gain  these  objectives  will  be  worked 
out  in  conjunction  with  the  division  under  whose  orders  they 
are  placed  for  the  specific  operation. 

10.  The  signal  arrangements  of  the  heavy  branch,  machine- 
gun  corps,  are  not  yet  completely  organized,  but  are  being 
framed  with  a  view  to  providing  communication  between — 

The  O.  C.  tank  brigade  and  the  army  or  corps  commander. 

The  O.  C.  tank  battalion  and  the  corps  or  divisional  com- 
mander. 

The  O.  C.  tank  company  and  the  divisional  or  brigade  com- 
mander under  whose  orders  he  is  operating. 

The  O.  C.  tank  section  and  the  infantry  commander  on  the 
spot. 

The  fighting  tanks  and  the  forward  troops  (and  by  pigeons 
to  the  commander  of  the  operations). 


NOTES  ON  MINING. 

(From  the  French.) 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 

I. — General '__.: 33 

II. — General  principles  of  the  employment  of  mining •__.  34 

ill. — Attack : 37 

Execution  of  the  attack 39 

IV. — Defence ___. 41 

APPENDICES. 

I. — Arrangement  of  a  mine  system _._. 43 

Role  of  the  different  parts  of  the  system____ ,  43 

Mine    dugouts , „ 44 

Entrances  to   mines 44 

II. — Execution  of  the  work  : 

Documents 45 

Organization  of  work- __: _ 45 

Types  and  construction  of  galleries- 46 

III. — The  underground  struggle  : 

Lookout  for  the  enemy 47 

Effects  of  mines-, ! 48 

Destruction  of  hostile  galleries '. '. 48 

Continuation  of  work  after  an  explosion 50 

Unexpected  meeting  with  the  enemy 50 

Danger  of  isolated  attacks.     Necessity  for  protection  of 

flanks :___ \ __-__  51 

Mining  in  cooperation  with  a  general  offensive —  52 

IV.— Methods  of  the  GermanS-___ 53 

Methods  of  attack 54 

Types  of  galleries  and  tools_ , 57 


I.  GENERAL. 


l.  As  soon  as  the  opposing  forces  became  stationary,  mine 
warfare  was  inevitable.  With  the  enemy  entrenched  only  a  few 
dozen  yards  away,  the  idea  naturally  occurred  that  his  works 
might  be  .destroyed  from  below  and  that  by  mining  not.  only 
could  casualties  be  inflicted,  but  a  very  serious  moral  impression 
caused.  l    - 

9784°— 17 3 

(33) 


34 

At  first  the  operations  were  very  elementary.  A  single  gallery 
or  Russian  sap  was  driven  to  the  point  desired,  a  salient  in  the 
enemy's  trench,  a  listening  post,  etc.,  so  that  a  charge — it  was 
always  a  small  one — could  be  laid  there. 

The  enemy  soon  became  aware  of  our  proceedings  and  was  on 
the  alert  underground  ;  to  our  mine  attacks  he  replied  by  mining. 

Thence  onward  systems  of  mining  and  countermining  were 
gradually  developed,  absorbing  a  considerable  number  of  men 
and  large  quantities  of  explosives.1 

2.  The  attacks  are  sometimes  undertaken  only  to  demolish  a 
portion  of  a  hostile  trench,  sometimes  in  view  of  a  local  operation  ; 
sometimes  they  form  part  of  a  large  offensive  movement.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  the  results  hitherto  obtained  have  not  been  pro- 
portionate to  the  efforts  expended  on  them. 

There  is  no  reason,  however,  to  conclude  that  mining  should  be 
abandoned.  A  study  of  the  facts  shows  that  where  an  under- 
ground attack  has  been  properly  used  it  has  been  of  great  serv- 
ice, but  that  when  attacks  have  been  without  result  they  have 
almost  invariably  been  so  because  they  were  conducted  under 
unfavorable  conditions  which  from  the  first  made  their  su* 
doubtful. 

Mining  is  an  effective  weapon,  but  it  must  be  applied  to  suit- 
able objectives  and  its  use  restricted  by  certain  rules  which  have 
been  deduced  from  experience. 

II.  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF 
MINING. 

3.  Prior  to  this  war  mining  was  only  thought  of  in  connection 
with  siege  warfare.  Works  which  could  not  be  destroyed  by  gun- 
fire were  attacked  by  mining.  The  besieged  replied  by  counter- 
mining. 

But  in  the  underground  struggle  thus  initiated  the  besieger 
with  superior  personnel,  material,  and  explosives  at  his  disposal 
was  bound  in  the  end  to  win.    Each  of  his  successes  meant  a 

1  The  state  of  our  front  lines,  which*  continually  suffer  from  hostile 
artillery  and  trench  mortar  fire,  now  necessitates  greater  activity  on 
our  part  than  in  the  past.  The  engineers,  in  almost  all  the  sectors,  are 
completely  absorbed  in  the  mining  struggle.  The  number  of  men  already 
drown  from  infantry  to  assist  them  is  no  longer  sufficient.  (Extract 
from  an  order  of  the  German  VIII  Reserve  Corps  toward  the  end  of 
1915.) 


35 

grave  setback  to  the.  besieged — the  loss  of  an  important  work  or 
of  a  valuable  piece  of  ground. 

In  siege  warfare  the  factors  which  gave  mining  its  special 
character  were: 

(i)  The  objectives  were  important  and  clearly  defined.   , 

(ii)  Every  inch  of  ground  gained  was  of  value. 

(iii)  The  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  besieger  insured  su- 
periority. 

It  is  otherwise  in  this  war : 

(i)  The  enemy's  works  do  not  offer  objectives  of  vital  im- 
portance. 

(ii)  The  loss  of  a  few  yards  of  ground  does  not  matter;  the 
line  can  easily  be  reestablished  in  rear. 

(iii)  Tlie  two  sides  have  equal  resources. 

4.  Under  these  conditions,  what  henceforth  will  be  the  r61e  of 
mining?  It  may  be  said  at  once  that  when  the  objectives  in  the 
zone  of  possible  operations  are  not  sufficiently  important  to 
warrant  mining  operations  on  a  large  scale  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
destroying  them,  mining  offensives  should  always  be  associated 
with  more  or  less  extensive  operations  above  ground. 

The  objectives  will  naturally  be  such  points  as  can  not  properly 
be  engaged  by  artillery:  Flanking  positions  on  which  a  suffi- 
ciently accurate  fire  can  not  be  brought  to  bear;  strong  points 
in  the  enemy's  first  line  which  can  not  be  completely  destroyed 
by  shells  alone,  such  as  villages,  areas  organized  with  very  deep 
dugouts,  etc. 

It  is  only  by  careful  study  of  the  defensive  value  of  different 
points  in  the  enemy's  line  of  defense  which  it  is  proposed  to 
attack,  and  of  the  possibilities  of  an  attack  on  each  of  these 
points,  that  a  decision  can  be  arrived  at  as  to  where  the  em- 
ployment of  mining  will  be  of  value. 

5.  There  are,  however,  other  considerations  which  affect  the 
choice  of  objectives. 

The  chances  of  a  successful  mining  attack  vary  with: 
(a)  The  nature  of  the  ground,  which  will  in  varying  degrees — 
(i)  Present  difficulties  to  the  construction  of  galleries  (rocky 
ground  or  wet  soil). 

(ii)  Favor  rapid  progress,  by  the  suitability  of  ground  for 
mining  (strata  easy  to  work).  Rapidity  of  execution  is,  in 
mining  as  in  every  operation  of  war,  one  of  the  elements  of  sue- 


36 

(iii)  Allow  of  an  attack  in  force  (a  considerable  depth  of 
suitable  ground  where  galleries  can  be  made  at  different  levels. 
which  is  of  great  value  should  the  enemy  be  met  with). 

Underground  fighting  is  not  the  object  aimed  at;  but  if  the 
enemy  is  met,  and  this  must  always  be  reckoned  with,  be  must 
be  engaged  under  the  most  favorable  conditions,  defeated,  and 
passed. 

(iv)  Enable  progress  to  be  made  without  attracting  the  at- 
tention of  the  enemy  (ground  where  it  is  not  easy  to  listen,  or 
where  the  work  can  be  carried  on  at  deep  levels). 

(o)  The  contour  of  the  ground,  which  will  in  varying  de- 
grees give  facilities  for — 

(i)  Gaining  a  good  depth  (the  conditions  are  obviously  better 
if  the  gallery  can  be  started  on  the  side  of  a  hill  rather  than  the 
side  of  a  valley). 

(ii)  Removing  the  spoil  and  hiding  it  (the  proximity  of  the 
mine  head  to  defiladed  approaches,  woods,  etc.,  is  an  advan- 
tage in  this  respect). 

(c)  The  probability  of  reaching  the  objective  without  attract- 
ing the  enemy's  attention. 

It  is  better  not  to  encounter  the  enemy  en  route.     If  it  becomes 
absolutely  necessary  to  fight  him  underground,  it  is  quite 
sible,  even  though  he  is  worsted,  that  his  opposition  may  80  in 
terfere  with  our  plans  as  to  deprive  us  of  the  power  to  fire  the 
mines  when  desired. 

For  this  reason,  other  things  being  equal,  ground  where  min- 
ing has  as  yet  not  been  carried  on  is  preferable  to  plaros  where 
mine  fighting  is  already  in  progress,  and  where  the  enemy,  in 
consequence,  is  on  the  alert.1 

(d)  The  distance  which  separates  the  opposing  li 

The  difficulties  of  mining  (removal  of  soil,  ventilation,  etc.) 
increase  very  rapidly  as  the  distance  of  the  working  face  from 
the  mouth  of  the  shaft  lengthens.     For  this  reason  the  rang 
attacks  has,  until  this  campaign,  rarely  exceeded  100  to  150 
yards. 

This  limitation  of  range  had  lew  drawbacks  in  siege  warfare. 
In  this  war,  on  the  contrary,  the  production  of  explosions  Ins 
the  enemy's  linos  has  a  very  definite  effect.     It  is  there,  now 
that  the  enemy  has  reduced  the  number  of  troops  in  his  front 

1  Sop  the  example  of  ( 'iirency.  May.  1015   (par.  49). 


37 

line,  that  the  best  results  will  be  obtained ;  and  there  also  the 
moral  effects  of  the  explosion  will  be  greatest. 

Although  there  are  attendant  difficulties,  it  is  not  impossible 
to  attain  distances  which  considerably  exceed  those  which  hith- 
erto have  been  regarded  as  the  maxima. 

It  must,  however,  be  clearly  understood  that  long  tunneling 
operations  should  be  undertaken  only  when  the  objective  is  of 
special  importance  and  when  the  conditions  are  very  favorable. 

Lastly,  the  large  amount  of  personnel  and  material  required 
for  each  attack  must  naturally  limit  the  total  number  of  attacks 
that  can  be  undertaken. 

6.  To  sum  up,  the  decision  as  to  which  parts  of  the  fronts  shall 
be  the  objectives  of  mining  attacks  must  be  based  on  the  follow- 
ing considerations : 

(a)  Which  places  in  the  enemy's  lines  it  is  specially  impor- 
tant to  attack  by  mining  on  account  of  their  nature  and  of  the 
difficulties  which  would  be  experienced  in  attacking  them  above 
ground  in  the  ordinary  manner. 

(b)  Which  of  these  places  (after  a  technical  study  of  the 
nature  and  contour  of  the  ground  has  been  carried  out)  offers 
the  best  chance  of  success  to  a  mining  attack. 

7.  It  is  quite  evident,  of  course,  that  all  the  conditions  con- 
sidered favorable  to  mining  will  only  very  rarely  be  present 
together,  and  it  will  therefore  be  necessary  to  select  those  places 
which  combine  most,  and  to  exploit  these  to  the  fullest  extent. 
As  mining  is  a  slow  process,  it  can  only  be  employed  in  the  first 
phase  of  a  combined  offensive  for  the  capture  of  the  enemy's 
front  system. 

Nevertheless,  where  the  ground  is  suitable,  bored  mines  can 
bo  used  to  advantage  for  the  attack  of  certain  parts  of  the 
enemy's  second  positions  where  the  obstacles  can  not  be  reached 
by  our  artillery  fire.  Applied  by  "batteries"  on  certain  parts 
of  the  front,  they  would  produce,  simultaneously,  gaps  in  the 
wire  entanglements,  and  defiladed  commiinications  by  means  of 
which  the  enemy's  position  can  be  reached. 

III.  ATTACK. 

i 

8.  Project  of  attack.— The  commander,  after  having  indicated 
the  objectives,  will  order  a  scheme  of  attack  to  be  drawn  up  by 
the  engineer  officers  who  will  be  in  charge  of  the  work.  This, 
when  approved  by  him,  will  be  the  working  plan. 


38 

It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  have  a  scheme  of  attack.  Numer- 
ous attacks  have  failed  on  account  of  there  being  no  clearly 
thought-out  plan.  The  commonest  mistake  (at  least  in  the 
early  days  of  mining)  has  been  failure  to  anticipate  possible 
counter-mining  by  the  enemy,  and  to  commence  the  attack  with- 
out guarding  against  it. 

9.  The  project  of  attack  will  include — 

( i )  The  plan  of  the  work  to  be  carried  out. 

(ii)  List  of  personnel,  material,  and  tools  required. 

(iii)  The  method  of  carrying  out  the  work  (order  of  urgency 
of  the  work  and  the  allotment  of  the  means  available). 

It  will  be  based  on — 

( i )  A  detailed  study  of  the  objective  and  the  ground. 

(ii)  Knowledge  of  the  properties  of  the  means  available  <  what 
can  be  effected  with  the  tools  and  the  power  of  the  explosives). 

(iii)  A  consideration  of  the  principles  which  govern  every 
operation  in  war  (concentration  on  the  points  of  attack  of  all 
means  available  which  can  usefully  be  employed,  the  taking  of 
every  precaution  to  insure  that  the  objective  will  be  reached  in 
spite  of  the  resistance  of  the  enemy,  etc.). 

10.  From  a  study  of  the  objective  on  the  map  and  from  aero- 
plane photographs,  supplemented  by  actual  observation  on  the 
ground,  the  following  points  can  be  settled: 

(i)  The  limits  of  the  front  to  be  attacked  in  order  to  cooperate 
in  the  combined  offensive. 

(ii)  The  exact  objectives  to  be  attacked. 

(iii)  The  possibility  of  countermining  by  the  enemy. 

From  a  study  of  the  subsoil  (borings  being  made  if  necessary  ) 
the  undermentioned  facts  can  be  established  : 

(i)  The  limits  in  depth  of  the  strata  in  which  mining  is  pos- 
sible, and  in  which  consequently  it  is  necessary  t<>  take  precau- 
tions. It  must  be  noted  that  the  enemy,  when  warned,  may  take 
the  counter-offensive  and  establish  a  system  of  counter-mines. 
not  only  against  our  attacks  but  also  against  neighboring  por- 
tions of  our  systems  which  offer  suitable  objectives  within  rea- 
sonable distance.    This  has  happened  on  several  occasions. 

(ii)  The  strata  in  which  work  can  be  carried  on  with  the 
greatest  rapidity  or  security. 

11.  Study  of  the  objective  and  the  ground  will,  therefore,  fur- 
nish the  information  necessary  to  settle  the  essential  elements 
of  the  scheme;  that  is  to  say,  the  preparatory  operations  of  the 
attack  (galleries,  branches,  etc.),  as  regards  those  partis  of  the 
objective  which  it  is  proposed  to  destroy. 


39 

It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  enemy  may  intervene,  and 
the  attacks  must  be  arranged  so  as  to  reach  the  objective  in  spite 
of  anything  that  he  may  do.  The  vulnerable  parts  are  the  flanks ; 
that  is,  both  the  flanks  of  galleries  or  branch  galleries  which  are 
first  made,  and  also  the  flanks  of  the  combined  scheme. 

It  will  thus  be  necessary — 

(i)  To  make  the  scheme  so  that  the  galleries,  etc.,  will  be  close 
enough  together  as  regards  the  front  (and  as  regards  depth, 
if  the  depth  available  makes  it  necessary  to  have  galleries  on 
different  levels)  that  the  enemy  can  not  get  through  without 
being  destroyed ;  or,  in  other  words,  to  ensure  that  the  whole  of 
the  ground  suitable  for  mining  is  within  the  radii  of  the  rupture 
of  the  mines. 

(ii)  To  cover  the  flanks  by  galleries  or  branch  galleries 
echeloned  back. 

12.  The  judicious  placing  of  the  different  branches,  so  that  they 
support,  without  running  the  risk  of  damaging  each  other,  must 
be  the  subject  of  a  special  study  based  on  the  knowledge  of  the 
effects  of  underground  charges. 

Time  being  of  capital  importance  in  a  mining  attack,  especially 
when  the  enemy  counters,  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  progress 
steadily  and  at  the  maximum  pace — 

(a)  To  estimate,  before  starting  work,  the  amount  of  per- 
sonnel (engineer  units,  infantry  parties),  material,  tools,  and 
explosives  required. 

(h)  To  settle  the  employment  of  the  available  means  on  a 
detailed  working  plan. 

EXECUTION  OF  THE   ATTACK. 

13.  The  execution  of  the  attack  as  regards  mining  does  not 
present  any  particular  ditticulties  in  suitable  ground,  as  long  as 
the  enemy  is  not  met  with.  If  the  enemy  is  not  already  on  the 
lookout,  endeavor  must  be  made  to  pass  without  his  knowledge, 
and  consequently  avoid  doing  anything  which  might  attract  his 
attention  (as  hiding  of  the  spoil,  making  as  little  noise  as  pos- 
sible, etc.). 

But  it  is  absolutely  indispensable  to  be  always  ready  to  take 
the  offensive  if  the  enemy  is  encountered. 

There  must,  therefore,  from  the  very  first,  be  an  organized 
lookout  service,  including : 

(i)  A  watch  above  ground.  If  the  enemy  does  not  take  very 
careful  precautions,  it  may  be  possible  to  recognize  from  certain 


40 

signs  (p.  g.,  spoil  heaps)  that  he  has  commenced  mining,  and 
sometimes  actually  to  locate  his  shafts. 

(ii)  A  watch  below  ground  (listening  galleries,  etc.).  Even  if 
the  shafts  are  at  a  relatively  long  distance  from  the  enemy,  lis- 
tening must  be  arranged  from  the  very  first,  in  order  to  train 
good  listeners  and  to  accustom  them  to  the  particular  ground. 
The  maximum  distances  at  which  mining  can  be  heard  are  very 
variable  (from  a  few  yards  in  ground  in  which  sound  travels 
badly,  such  as  clay,  up  to  50  yards,  and  even  more,  in  soil  like 
chalk,  where  it  travels  easily). 

14.  If  the  enemy  tries  to  bar  the  way  by  counter-mining,  a 
breach  must  be  made  in  his  system,  so  that,  in  spite  of  him.  the 
galleries  may  be  driven  to  their  objectives  and  the  charges  may 
be  placed  in  accordance  with  the  scheme. 

The  underground  struggle  which  will  then  ensue  must  aim  at 
clearing  the  ground  by  blowing  in  the. enemy's  galleries,  and  at 
holding  him  to  one  part  of  the  front  whilst  the  attack  passes 
elsewhere  (to  one  side,  above,  or  below)  by  working  quicker. 

To  do  this  successfully  it  is  necessary : 

(i)  To  get  ahead  of  the  enemy  and  strike  before  he  can  strike. 
This  requires  an  accurate  plan  of  the  mines,  a  well-organized 
system  of  information,  and  decision  and  rapidity  in  execution. 

(ii)  To  go  for  the  flanks  of  the  enemy's  galleries,  which  will 
thus  be  put  out  of  action  for  a  greater  length  than  if  the  attack 
was  directed  head  on;  all  the  more  so  because  the  sides  of 
branches  and  galleries  offer  less  resistance  to  the  explosion. 

(iii)  To  strike  as  hard  as  possible.  Generally  speaking,  in  the 
course  of  an  underground  struggle  there  is  no  advantage  in 
producing  effects  above  ground  (craters),  ('raters,  in  fact. 
have  the  disadvantage  of  producing  an  obstacle  on  the  surface 
over  which  the  attack  must  move.  Camonllets  with  maximum 
charges  should  be  used,  which  will  vary  with  the  depth  at  which 
they    are   placed. 

(iv)  To  Strike  only  when  within  good  range.  This  requires 
great  coolness.  Every  explosion  necessarily  causes  a  temporary 
delay  in  the  attack,  hecause  it  will  damage  pari  of  the  gallery 
leading  to  the  charge,  A  mine  should  only  he  tired  when  it  is 
considered  that  it  is  likely  to  do  more  damage  to  the  enemy 
than  to  ourselves. 

jr..  on  reaching  a  suitable  distance  from  the  objective  the 
mine  chambers  must  be  formed.  Their  number  and  the  charges 
used   will  depend  on  the  effect   that    is  to  he  produced      Results 


41 

above   ground    now'  being   required,    common    and   even    over- 
charged mines  will  be  used. 

IV.  DEFENSE. 

16.  The  usual  measures  of  precaution  employed  in  ordinary 
warfare  above  ground  must  be  taken  below  ground  whenever  the 
distance  of  the  enemy  and  the  nature  of  the  soil  do  not  exclude 
all  possibility  of  a  mining  attack.  With  this  in  view,  it  is 
necessary  to  have — 

(i)  A  lookout  service  (observation  of  enemy's  works  above 
ground,  listening  posts). 

(ii)  Means  of  defense  (counter-mines). 

17.  Close  observation  of  the  enemy's  works  above  ground  will 
sometimes  give  useful  indications  (an  abnormal  amount  of  spoil 
or  spoil  of  a  different  color  to  that  of  the  surface  strata).1  It 
will  sometimes  even  establish  the  positions  of  his  shafts.  Cer- 
tain characteristic  noises  (such  as  the  rumbling  of  trollies)  will 
also  indicate  tunneling  in  the  area  where  .they  are  heard. 

18.  More  reliable  reports  can  be  obtained  by  the  listeners 
(engineers  or  infantrymen)  placed  in  the  listening  posts  at  the 
end  of  galleries  constructed  for  this  purpose.  Their  duties  are 
to  note  the  underground  noises  that  they  hear  and  to  judge 
their  direction  and  distance.2 

When  the  listeners  have  found  indications  of  the  enemy's 
activity,  their  observations  will  be  tested  and  interpreted  by 
officers. 

19.  The  systems  of  counter-mining  are  based  on  the  same 
principles  as  offensive  mining,  because  they  must  insure  the 
possibility  of  counter-attacking  with  success  if  the  euemy  attacks. 

They  will,  however,  be  pushed  out  only  to  such  distance  as 
may  be  necessary  to  arrest  the  enemy  before  he  is  in  a  position 
to  reach  our  lines,  and  only  the  portions  of  the  scheme  essential 
for  this  purpose  will  be  made  beforehand.  Prudence  must  be 
exercised  in  making  them,  for  they  may  be  interpreted  by  the 
enemy  as  an  offensive  and  thus  lead  to  a  mine  warfare  which 
is  not  desired. 

1  This  lookout  is  one  of  the  duties  of  the  infantry  (Instructions  of 
Dec.  4,  1915,  on  Liaison  I. — B.).  Add  the  examination  of  aeroplane 
photographs. 

2  Engineer  units  will  not  usually  be  able  to  provide  sufficient  listeners. 
It  is,  moreover,  easy  to  give  the  infantryman  enough  instruction,  before 
mine  warfare  is  commenced,  to  make  use  of  him  as  a  listener. 


42 

If  the  enemy  attacks,  the  best  method  of  stopping  him  is  to 
undertake  the  destruction  of  his  mining  system  by  a  resolute 
counter-offensive.  It  is  only  in  this  manner  that  decisive  blows 
can  be  struck  at  him. 

A  consistent  system  of  establishing  a  barrage  of  mines  and 
waiting  till  the  enemy  is  at  close  range  before  using  them  may 
have  local  and  temporary  results  ;  but  its  employment  should  not 
be  a  matter  of  course.  As  in  the  attack,  the  camouflet  will 
generally  be.  employed.  Cases,  however,  will  occur  where  it  may 
bo  advantageous  to  employ  heavy  charges  (common  or  even  over- 
charged mines)  in  order  to  clear  the  ground  on  as  extended  a 
front  as  possible.  Craters  between  the  two  lines  of  trenches  are 
not  open  to  the  objections  in  defensive  which  they  are  in  offensive 
operations. 

20.  If  the  enemy's  shafts  have  been  located,  they  should  be 
attacked  with  artillery  and  trench  mortars.  Even  if  they  are 
not  seriously  damaged,  an  appreciable  delay  in  the  enemy's 
working  may  be  anticipated. 

Local  attacks  must 'also  be  taken  into  consideration.  The  ob- 
ject of  these  may  be  either  to  put  an  end  to  mine  warfare  by 
gaining  possession  of  the  ground  where  the  enemy's  operations 
begin,  or  simply  to  attack  the  entrances  of  the  enemy's  shafts 
with  explosives. 

In  this  latter  case  the  importance  of  the  destruction  which  can 
be  done  must  not  be  exaggerated. 


APPENDICES. 


APPENDIX  I. 

Arrangement  of  a  Mine  System. 

21.  Depth. — The  maximum  offensive  or  defensive  power  is 
reached  when  the  whole  of  the  ground  in  which  mining  is  pos- 
sible is  secured.  As  mining  absorbs  a  large  number  of  men,  in- 
genuity must  be  exercised  to  secure  this  condition  with  as  much 
economy  as  possible;  that  is  to  say,  the  development  of  works 
which  are  not  likely  to  be  indispensable  must  be  avoided.  There 
may  be  galleries  at  one,  two,  or  even  three  levels,  according  to 
the  depth  of  ground  that  is  suitable.  At  certain  points  on  the 
front  there  actually  are  galleries  on  three  levels. 

r6les  of  the  different  parts  of  the  system. 

22.  The  different  parts  of  the  system  must  mutually  support 
each  other.     The  flanks  must  be  guarded. 

These  conditions  have  been  secured  in  attacks  during  the 
present  war  by  following  well-established  methods : 

(i)  Galleries  placed  at  such  distances  apart  as  to  be  mutually 
supporting.  The  distance  depends  on  the  depth ;  the  greater 
the  depth  the  greater  the  radius  of  rupture  that  the  mines  may 
have.  In  a  system  at  several  levels,  galleries  on  the  lower  ones 
will  therefore  be  less  numerous  than  those  on  the  higher  levels. 

(ii)  Galleries  at  wider  intervals,  the  intervening  ground  be- 
ing held  by  branch  galleries  off  the  main  galleries  or  off  the 
cross  galleries  joining  up  the  latter. 

(iii)  Protective  arrangements  for  the  flanks,  made  either  by 
branch  galleries  off  the  flank  main  galleries  or  by  special  gal- 
leries from  which  branches  or  borings  are  driven  outward. 

(43) 


44 

23.  Although  they  have  incontestable  advantages,  croM 
leries  have  proved  disadvantages — danger  of  affecting  the  whole 
system  for  quite  an  appreciable  time  if  successfully  damaged  by 
the  enemy  and -great  vulnerability  when  too  close  to  the  enemy. 
It  should  be  laid  down,  therefore,  that  there  should  be  cross 
galleries  connecting  all  parts  of  the  system,  but  a  sufficient 
margin  should  be  kept  between,  them  and  the  limit  of  possible 
action  of  the  enemy's  mines. 

24.  Mine  dugouts. — Mine  dugouts  or  lodgments,  as  they  are 
also  called,  must  be  made  behind  the  first  line,  in  spite  of  the 
extra  work  entailed.  Their  establishment  in  front  of  the  first 
line — an  arrangement,  however,  rarely  met  with — has  led  to 
disappointing  mistakes.  Trenches  normally  in  occupation  are 
to  be  avoided  (interference  with  the  movement  of  troops  occu- 
pying them  and  with  removal  of  spoil  by  working  parties). 
Starting  from  the  front-line  trench  will  be  exceptional,  and  will 
only  occur  when  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  gain  ground  to  the 
front  rapidly  (when  an  enemy  attack  has  nearly  arrived  within 
dangerous  distance). 

25.  In  the  case  of  an  important  attack  a  good  arrangement  is 
to  establish  the  mine  dugout  in  an  inclined  great  gallery  at  suffi- 
cient depth  to  be  proof  against  heavy  shells.  Large  boring  ma- 
chinery could  be  used  for  this.  Shelter  for  ;i  portion  of  the 
men  on  duty  and  the  various  offices  and  stores  necessary  (com 
mand  post  for  the  officer  on  duty,  with  a  telephone  room:  first- 
aid  post;  stores  for  life-saving  apparatus  and  explosives)  can 
be  provided  there. 

26.  Entrance  to  mines. — The  inconvenience  of  shafts  (difficul- 
ties of  bringing  men  and  material  to  the  surface,  ventilation,  the 
feding  of  insecurity  which  they  Inspire  in  the  miners)  has  been 
definitely  reported  in  the  majority  of  the  cases  in  which  this 
form  of  entrance  has  been  used.  To  these  disadvantages  must 
be  added  groat  vulnerability,  particularly  in  the  case  where 
shafts  are  made  within  the  galleries  (winzes  or  staple  pits)  in 
order  to  gain  depth  rapidly  when  quite  near  the  enemy. 

Shafts  are  only  a  last  resource  (pis-aller)  and  should  be  em- 
ployed only  if  conditions  make  it  absolutely  necessary  to  ge! 
quickly  to  a  greal  depth  or  the  ground  is  sloping  toward  the 
enemy,  etc.  An  inclined  gallery  should  always  be  made  alter- 
wards  if  possible.  Depth  ran  always  be  gained  by  giving  tin' 
galleries  a  steep  slope   (2/5  and  even  more  has  been  used). 


45 

APPENDIX  II. 
Execution  of  the  Work. 

27.  Documents. — The  opening  and  keeping  up  to  date  of  the 
books,  etc.,  mentioned  in  "  L'Ecole  de  Mines  (Livre  de  l'Offi- 
cier)" — mining  diary,  listening  diary,  plan  of  galleries — are 
obviously  as  indispensable  in  trench  as  in  siege  warfare,  but 
this  has  often  been  lost  sight  of.  It  is  convenient  to  use  the 
conventional  signs  laid  down  in  "L'Ecole  de  Mines  (Livre  de 
KOfficier),"  Mining  exercises  295. 

28.  It  is  important  to  have  as  accurate  as  possible  a  plan  of 
the  galleries  (levels,  base  carefully  measured),  so  as  to  obtain 
the  best  results  from  the  means  available  and  leave  as  little  to 
chance  as  can  be  helped,  and  to  put  down  with  sufficiently  ac- 
curate approximation  what  is  known  of  the  enemy  (results  of 
listening,  craters,  etc.),  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  strike 
him  with  certainty.  It  is  also  necessary,  when  a  relief  occurs, 
to  be  in  a  position  to  furnish  the  units  which  take  over  with  as 
accurate  and  detailed  information  as  possible.  It  is  of  course 
necessary  to  begin  by  fixing  the  objective  to  be  reached  as  ac- 
curately as  possible.  The  existing  maps  are  not  always  suffi- 
ciently exact  and  must  be  corrected  and  completed ;  assistance 
should  be  obtained  if  necessary  from  the  topographical  sections. 

ORGANIZATION    OF    WORK. 

29.  The  organization  of  the  work  has. considerable,  influence, 
on  the  rapidity  and  efficiency  of  its"  execution.  For  an  opera- 
tion of  any  importance  careful  study  is  required  in  order  to 
decide  what  personnel,  tools,  material,  and  explosives  are  neces- 
sary and  how  to  get  the  fullest  value  out  of  them.  (Arrange- 
ment of  the  various  working  parties  so  that  they  work-  in  with 
each  other  and  that  no  time  is  lost. ) 

Here,  again,  guidance  can  be  obtained -from  "  L'Ecole  de  Mines 
(Livre  de  rOffieier)/'  particularly  as  regards — 

( i )  Organizing  the  reliefs  in  such  a  manner  that  working 
parties  always  return  to  the  same  job  (gallery,  branch,  or 
shaft). 

( ii )  Organizing  the  regular  supply  of  tools,  materials,  and 
explosives  and  regulating  their  transport  so  as  never  to  be 
stopped  by  lack  ofl.  material  or  by  damage  to  tools, 


4G 

(iii)  Establishing  as  soon  as  possible  the  various  offices  and 
depots  required  to  insure  smooth  working — command  post  for 
the  officer  (or  officers),  telephone  office,  first-aid  post,  depots 
of  materials  and  tools,  and  small  depots  for  explosives. 

TYPES   AND   CONSTRUCTION    OF   GALLEB1ES. 

30.  Experience  has  proved  that  our  various  types  of  under- 
ground communications  meet  the  requirements  of  the  war  and 
that  there  is  no  advantage  in  limiting  ourselves,  as  the  Germans 
do,  to  a  very  small  number  of  types. 

It  is  difficult,  moreover,  to  imagine  any  scheme  of  attack 
without  some  galleries  of  large  section. 

It  is  true,  as  some  officers  have  noticed,  that  speed  is  not 
gained  by  decreasing  the  section  below  the  size  of  the  "  small 
gallery."  *  But  the  "  charging  gallery," 2  which  has  much  more 
resistance  than  the  larger  types  and  allows  of  much  more  rapid 
tamping,  is  none  the  less  very  useful  and  effective  in  the  attack. 

31.  In  ground  where  it  is  easy  to  work  and  difficult  to  listen. 
Russian  saps  have  sometimes  been  used  with  success.  Progress 
is  rapid;  ventilation  can  be  obtained  or,  at  any  rate,  assisted 
by  air  holes  bored  to  the  surface.  In  some  cases  these  saps  have 
been  lined  with  ogival  frames.  On  some  occasions  the  roof  was 
blown  in  by  long  charges  at  the  same  time  as  the  mine  was 
fired,  and  by  this  means  communication  trenches  were  formed 
which  permitted  the  enemy's  position  to  be  reached  under  cover. 

32.  Earth  borers  have  given  good  results  where  the  ground 
was  sufficiently  hard.  "Cumbrous  and  noisy,  these  machines  can 
hardly  be  employed  close  to  the  enemy.  It  has,  however,  some- 
times been  noticed  (in  the  Vosges  and  Champagne)  that  the 
noise  of  the  borer  has  thoroughly  scared  the  enemy  and  caused 
him  to  fire  a  number  of  mines  prematurely. 

In  any  case  in  an  important  attack  earth  borers  can  be  very 
usefully  employed  to  excavate  portions  of  the  main  galleries  at 
a  distance  from  the  enemy. 

Bore  holes,  which  have  the  reputation  of  being  difficult  to 
make  and  not  very  effective,  have  been  used  with  success  in  a 
certain  number  of  ca^es  (for  listening  or  placing  a  camoufiet). 

i "  Demi  gallerie." — Width.  1  meter  (3  feet  4  inches)  ;  height,  1.30 
to  1.50  meters  (4  test  3  inches  to  4  feet  11  inches). 

> "  Rameau  de  Combat." — Width,  0.60  to  0.65  meter  (23  to  25 
inches)  ;  height.  0.70  to  0.80  meter   (27  to  31   inches). 


47 

33.  There  iarno  objection  to  the  use  of  blasting  after  the  mine 
fighting  has  begun  and  when  there  is  no  longer  any  fear  of  it 
attracting  the  enemy's  attention ;  besides,  it  is  difficult  to  locate 
where  blasting  charges  are  fired. 

34.  The  rapid  removal  of  spoil  is  of  first  importance,  for  this 
almost  always  regulates  the  rate  of  progress.  The  ample  provi- 
sion of  suitable  plant  is  indispensable  when  an  important  at- 
tack is  undertaken  (narrow-gauge  tram  lines,  trollies  with 
noiseless  wheels,  winches,  moving  platforms,  according  to  cir- 
cumstances ) . 

The  concealment  of  the  spoil  is  an  equally  difficult  problem. 
Sometimes,  when  there  is  lack  of  places  which  fulfill  the  neces- 
sary conditions  (abandoned  trenches,  quarries,  wooded  ravines), 
special  trenches  must  be  dug  into  which  to  put  the  excavated 
earth. 

35.  Electric  lighting  and  noiseless  ventilating  apparatus  are 
indispensable  for  carrying  out  large  mining  operations  under 
favorable  conditions. 

APPENDIX  III. 

THE  UNDERGROUND   STRUGGLE. 

36.  Lookout  for  the  enemy. — From  the  moment  work  is  com- 
menced the  nature  of  the  ground  must  be  studied,  particularly 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  detection  of  underground  noises. 
For  this  purpose  listening  schools  must  be  organized,  so  that 
listeners  may  be  trained.  They  will  prove  most  valuable  when 
the  enemy  is  eventually  met  with. 

This  measure  is  recommended  in  "  L'Ecole  de  Mines,"  but  it  is 
just  as  well  to  call  attention  to  it. 

The  interpretation  of  the  sounds  heard  by  listeners  is  the 
business  of  the  officers.  The  results  obtained  will  be  of  greater 
value  if  the  officers  possess  long  mining  experience,  and  have  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  methods  and  ruses  of  the  enemy  to 
whom  they  are  opposed. 

37.  As  has  been  said  above,  it  is  not  enough  to  confine  the 
lookout  to  below  ground.  Observation  of  surface  works  and 
photographs  will  sometimes  be  of  assistance  in  locating  the  en- 
trances of  the  enemy's  mines.  His  craters,  if  he  makes  any, 
must  be  plotted  on  the  plan  wTith  great  care. 

In  certain  cases  (Artois)  the  Russian  saps  made  by  the  enemy 
were  accurately  located  by  the  vapor  which  rose  in  the  morn- 


48 

ing  from  the  ventilation  holes.  In  Champagne* (Bote  Sabot) 
enemy  gallery  entrances  were  detected  by  means  of  the  smoke 
which  escaped  by  them  after  an  explosion. 

The  better  the  plan  of  the  mines  the  more  certain  will  be  the 
deductions  that  can  be  drawn  from  scraps  of  information 
obtained. 

38.  Effects  of  mines. — Every  engineer  officer  should  know 
what  is  stated  in  the  "  L'Ecole  de  Mines  (Livre  de  roffirieri" 
as  regards  the  effects  of  mines.  He  should  make  it  a  rule  to 
note  down  whenever  possible  the  effects,  of  the  service  explosives 
in  the  particular  ground  where  operations  are  being  carried  out. 

It  should  be  noticed  that  the  figures  given  in  "  L'Ecole  de 
Mines  "  may  possibly  be  found  to  be  incorrect,  especially  in  rela- 
tion to  the  huge  charges  which  are  now  frequently  used. 

The  special  precautions  to  be  taken  in  firing  large  mines  should 
not  be  overlooked.  (See  the  notice  of  July  19,  1915,  on  the  firing 
of  overcharged  mines. ) 

39.  Destruction  of  hostile  galleries. — It  is  always  a  rule  to  try 
and  strike  the  enemy  in  flank.  This  can  be  done  either  by  mov- 
ing in  the  right  direction,  or  by  drawing  on  the  enemy  to  expose 
his  flank.  If  the  listeners  carefully  follow  the  enemy's  move- 
ments,1 there  is  little  danger  in  allowing  him  to  come  quite  close. 
The  following  is  an  example :  In  front  of  Frise  the  enemy  got 
between  two  galleries  "A"  and  "  B,"  joined  by  a  cross  gallery 
"  T,"  passing  within  range  of  the  head  "  C  "  of  a  branch  "  II." 


1  "  Des  6eoutos  suivies."  This  phrase  conveys  the  idea  :hat  the  lis- 
teners move  as  the  enemy  advances  and  also  keep  up  continuous  listen- 
ing.—(Translator.) 


49 

"  C  "  was  charged,  listeners  in  "  T  "  and  M  B  "  followed  the 
enemy's  work  closely.  As  the  enemy  was  about  to  reach  the 
cross  gallery  "  E  "  a  camouflet  was  fired  in  "  C"  The  wall  of 
the  cross  gallery  was  then  cut,  and  the  hostile  miners  who  were 
shut  up  in  the  head  of  their  branch  by  the  explosion  were  made 
prisoners. 

40.  Impressed  by  the  inconvenient  effects  of  badly  placed 
camouflets,  some  officers  have  thought  that  it  is  better  to  let  the 
enemy  fire  them  than  to  do  so  oneself,  and  that  the  ideal  would 
be  not  to  fire  any,  but  to  entice  the  enemy  to  make  premature 
blows.  It  is  in  fact  easy  to  conceive  that  in  the  presence  of  an 
enemy  who  is  not  quite  sure  of  himself  and  a  bit  demoralized 
progress  can  be  made,  although  only  a  very  restricted  number 
of  camouflets  are  fired.  In  most  cases,  however,  the  way  must 
be  opened  up  by  force,  and  to  do  this  one  must  be  able  to  strike 
heavily  and  opportunely. 

It  will,  of  course,  often  be  desirable  to  entice  the  enemy  to 
explode  his  charges  prematurely  or  to  get  him  to  place  mines 
at  points  where  he  will  cause  only  a  small  amount  of  damage. 
For  this  purpose  noise  and  silence  can  be  made  use  of,  varying 
them  with  the  circumstances  of  the  moment. 

41.  In  mining  warfare  it  is  of  first  importance  to  understand 
the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  knowing  when  to  be  noisy  and 
when  silent.  Generally  speaking,  it  is  desirable  that  the  sounds 
of  work  should  be  as  imperceptible  as  possible. 

In  the  clay  of  Artois,  in  ground  where  listening  is  difficult, 
numbers  of  cases  have  occurred  of  contact  being  established,  and 
even  the  enemy's  galleries  penetrated  without  his  attention 
having  been  attracted.  The  mining  was  done  with  "  Sabres 
Serie  Z  "  or  sharpened  grafting  tools ;  the  clay  was  cut  off  in 
small  blocks  and  placed  on  canvas  squares  stretched  on  a  light 
frame ; *  the  sappers  wore  sandals  or  sandbags  on  their  feet. 
Analogous  results  have  been  obtained  in  the  chalk  of  Champagne, 
where  sound  travels  easily,  but  if  precautions  are  taken  blocks 
can  be  cut  out  almost  noiselessly. 

42.  In  most  ground  mining  can  not  be  done  in  absolute  silence, 
but  every  effort  must  be  made  to  reduce  noise  to  a  minimum 
(tools  that  can  be  used  quietly,  rigorous  discipline,  increased 
precautions   as   the   enemy   is   approached).     For   instance,    in 

1  "  Carries  fie  toile  legerement  tendus."     This  may  also  mean  squares 
of  canvas  lightly  stretched  by  men  holding  them. —  (Translator.) 
9784°— 17 4 


50 

certain  units  screws  have  been  used  with  advantage  in  place 
of  nails  for  fixing  the  frames. 

Noise  may,  however,  be  made  with  advantage — 

(i)  To  mask  an  attack  which  it  is  desired  to  make  without 
the  enemy  having  notice  of  it. 

(ii)  To  draw  the  enemy  in  such  a  direction  that  he  exposes 
his  flank  to  our  camouflets  (by  laying  a  charge  in  a  branch  gal- 
lery and  continuing  work  at  the  face  of  it  without  any  precau- 
tions as  to  noise).  The  tendency  of  the  enemy  to  work  toward 
noise,  which  has  often  been  noted,  can  thus  be  exploited. 

(iii)  To  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  distance  and  make  him  be- 
lieve the  heads  of  our  attacks  are  very  near,  and  thus  induce  him 
to  fire  his  mines  prematurely. 

A  pretense  of  charging  can  be  made  so  as  to  induce  the  enemy 
to  charge  in  a  hurry  and  to  fire  before  he  is  within  range. 

44.  If  a  gallery  is  in  imminent  danger  of  being  blown,  it  should 
be  abandoned  after  having  been  shored  up  so  as  to  reduce  the 
effects  of  the  explosion.  Pretense  of  continuing  work  should 
be  made  by  operating  a  pickax  from  a  distance  against  the  head 
of  the  gallery. 

45.  Continuation  of  work  after  an  explosion. — Work  must  be 
restarted  as  soon  as  possible  after  an  explosion.  To  permit 
this  energetic  measures  must  be  taken  to  restore  ventilation. 
Whichever  side  can  recommence  attack  first  after  an  explosion 
Avill  have  a  marked  advantage  over  the  other.  Deviations  should 
if  possible  be  avoided,  as  they  delay  progress.  In  some  casee  it 
may  be  possible  to  make  a  start  from  the  part  of  the  gallery  that 
was  tamped  and  to  find  the  compression  chamber,  and  then 
ground  may  be  gained  rapidly.  In  others,  on  the  contrary,  the 
amount  of  ground  broken  up  and  affected  by  a  camoullet  will 
constitute  an  obstacle,  and  there  is  no  alternative  but  to  work 
round  it. 

Knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  ground  in  which  the  work  is 
being  carried  out  will  allow  of  a  forecast  being  made  as  to 
whether  there  is  any  likelihood  of  being  able  to  utili/.e  the  com- 
pression chamber  or  not. 

-id.  /  neapeeted  meeting  with  the  enemy. — As  soon  as  contact 
is  gained  measures  should  always  be  taken  to  be  in  a  position 
to  prepare  a  camOUflet  qUteWy;  a  certain  amount  of  explosives 
and  materials  for  tamping  must  be  at  hand. 

To  deal  with  the  enemy's  galleries,  should  they  be  broken  into, 
there  should   be  available — 


51 

(i)  Means  of  blocking  (chevaux  de  frise,  sandbags  lashed  to- 
gether with  wire,  screens  that  can  be  quickly  placed  and  fixed 
on  our  side  of  the  breach). 

(ii)  Daggers  and  automatic  pistols  and  a  small  supply  of 
asphyxiating  grenades  (employed  by  miners  of  old  and  several 
times  used  in  the  course  of  this  war). 

DANGER  OF  ISOLATED  ATTACKS  ',    NECESSITY  FOB  PROTECTION   OF   THE 

FLANKS. 


47.  To  make  an  isolated  attack  is  to  invite  almost  certain 
failure;  this  mistake,  which  occurs  very  frequently,  has  in- 
variably met  punishment. 

The  operations  at  La  Pompelle  furnish  an  interesting  example. 
Toward  the  end  of  1914  the  Germans  ran  a  gallery  at  a  deep 
level  against  the  fort  of  La  Pompelle  and  exploded  a  very  heavily 
charged  mine  inside  the  French  lines  (Dec.  31,  1914).  Distance 
between  opposing  trenches,  about  150  yards;  subsoil,  chalk. 

The  French  defensive  system,  which  was  at  a  high  level,  was 
of  no  use.  It  was  at  once  deepened  and  developed.  The  course 
of  these  operations  (extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Cussenot)  is 
shown  in  the  following  rough  sketch : 


German  Trenches 


French   Trenches 


The  enemy,  finding  himself  blocked  at  "A"  on  February  27, 
abandoned  "A  B  "  for  "  B  C."  While  he  was  working  in  "  B  C  " 
the  French  branch  "  F  D  "  struck  "A  B  "  (depth  82  feet).  The 
captain  in  charge  of  the  attack  with  a  small  detachment-  en- 


52 

tered  it,  explored  this  part  of  the  enemy's  works  without  being 
discovered,  and  exploded  a  mine  of  1,433  pounds  of  cheddite  at 
"D"  just  at  the  moment  that  the  enemy's  miners,  attracted 
by  the  noise,  were  attempting  to  take  possession  of  the  charge. 
The  enemy  was  evidently  much  shaken  by  the  destruction  of  his 
gallery  and  the  asphyxiation  of  a  number  of  men,  for  when  he 
returned  to  work  at  "  B,"  the  head  of  the  part  not  destroyed,  he 
fired  a  mine  (March  8)  which  was  outside  the  French  line  and 
did  no  damage  wmatever. 

-  The  enemy's  gallery  was  again  cut  by  French  camouflets  on 
March  22  and  April  30,  after  which  the  enemy  abandoned  the 
struggle. 

On  April  2  the  French  again  penetrated  into  the  enemy's  gal- 
leries, this  time  at  "  H,"  where  the  effects  of  the  mine  on  March 
22  could  clearly  be  seen. 

The  gallery  in  question  had  been  made  by  professional  miners, 
not  by  pioneers;  it  had  no  sheeting,  only  frames  made  of  logs 
and  railway  sleepers  at  about  a  yard  interval.  Owing  to  the 
absence  of  sheeting,  the  effects  of  our  "blows"  had  been  con- 
siderable, especially  in  the  upper  portions.  The  enemy  had 
lacked  prudence,  and  judged,  owing  to  the  depth  of  his  galleries 
(65  to  80  feet),  that  he  could  work  absolutely  undisturbed.  Be 
took  no  precautions  to  guard  his  right  or  left,  and  this  led  to  his 
undoing.  It  must  be  added,  however,  that  the  French  attack  was 
carried  out  with  remarkable  vigor  and  decision. 

MINING  IN   COOPERATION    WITH   A   GENERAL  OFFENSIVE    IN    NIMH!   OV 
THE  ENEMY'S  RESISTANCE  UNDERGROUND. 

48.  The  ideal  to  seek  is  obviously  to  trot  within  range  of  the 
objectives  without  exciting  the  enemy's  attention,  and  for  this 
reason  it  is  desirable  to  select  objectives  in  ground  where  no 
mine  warfare  has  taken  place.  But.  whatever  precautions  are 
taken,  one  can  never  be  sure  of  not  meeting  the  enemy.  It*  he 
is  encountered,  however,  it  is  not  sufficient  merely  to  heat  him: 
he  must  be  beaten  in  such  a  way  that  the  final  "blows"  can  he 
made  at  the  proper  moment.  This  is  difficult  to  accomplish,  hut 
it  has  been  done  on  several  occasions. 

It   is  not  a  question  here  of  small  operations  which  have  as 
their  principal  object  the  employment  of  mines.     In  such 
the  time  of  attack  is  subordinated  to  that  of  the  "  blows  "' 


53 

49.  In  this  connection  the  brilliant  mining  attacks  made  before 
Carency  in  May,  1915  (report  of  Lieut.  Col.  Lebatier),  may  be 
quoted. 

At  Carency  mine  warfare  had  begun  in  the  early  part  of  1915. 
When  a  general  offensive  was  decided  on,  the  enemy  was  very 
active  underground.  Six  mining  companies  were  opposed  to 
the  French.  The  Germans  fired  mines  almost  daily,  sometimes 
several  on  one  day.  The  French,  it  may  be  said,  replied  to  them 
with  interest. 

Nevertheless,  on  May  7,  the  French  had  17  new  mines  ready, 
with  charges  varying  from  660  to  3,300  pounds  of  cheddite. 
They  were  blown  on  May  9,  the  day  of  the  attack.  Their  effect 
was  considerable;  the  wire  entanglements  were  flattened,  and 
the  German  trenches  filled  up  for  lengths  varying  from  50  to 
80  yards.  Communication  to  the  rear  was  cut,  and  prisoners 
were  made  in  the  isolated  portions  of  the  enemy's  trenches. 
Flanking  works,  armed  with  machine  guns  and  trench  mortars, 
were  destroyed.  Flanking  fire  from  works  which  remained  in- 
tact and  from  rifles  was  rendered  valueless  by  the  lips  of  the 
craters  and  by  the  general  upheaval  of  the  ground.  At  the  same 
time  the  underground  works  of  the  enemy  were  destroyed.  The 
mine  chambers,  for  the  most  part  charged  and  fuzed,  were 
smashed,  or  the  mines  rendered  innocuous  by  the  interruption 
of  the  fire  arrangements.  Numbers  of  tunnelers  were  buried 
in  their  galleries,  others  surrendered  to  the  French  miners  or 
infantry.  Thus  the  fear  of  having  to  cross  an  area  checkered 
with  mines,  which  affects  even  the  best  of  soldiers,  was  dispelled 
from  the  minds  of  the  attacking  columns. 

APPENDIX  IV. 

Methods  of  the  Germans. 

50.  The  following  information  has  been  collected  for  the  most 
part  from  reports  furnished  by  engineer  officers  who  have  taken 
part  in  mining  operations.  The  German  methods  have  naturally 
developed  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  They  have  also  varied 
in  different  sectors,  according  to  the  energy  of  the  commander 
and  the  standard  of  efficiency  of  the  personnel.  For  instance, 
one  German  army  advocates  the  employment  of  camouflets,  while 
another  considers  they  should  only  be  used  in  exceptional  circum- 
stances. This  must  be  borne  in  mind  when  studying  the  infor- 
mation given  below. 


54 

51.  Methods  of  attack. — At  Fontenelle  (rocky  ground)  the 
Germans  have  employed  the  following  procedure: 

(a)  They  pushed  several  saps  to  within  about  50  yards  of 
our  trenches,  joined  up  the  heads,  so  as  to  form  small  works, 
by  a  cross  trench  which  served  as  a  starting  point.  At  the  same 
time  they  started  galleries  from  the  sapheads. 

(b)  They  first  made  Russian  saps  for  a  length  sometimes  of 
80  yards.  Manholes  stopped  up  by  day  were  used  for  watching 
at  night.  From  the  heads  of  the  Russian  saps  two  or  more 
branch  galleries  were  commenced.  A  system  of  this  kind  was 
found  and  explored  by  a  French  patrol.  It  was  destroyed  by  a 
charge  of  1,100  pounds  of  cheddite. 

52.  At  the  Croix  des  Cannes  the  enemy  always  tried  to  extend 
his  attacks  at  the  flanks.  He  even  got  so  far  as  to  cut  the  ex- 
treme right  French  branch  gallery;  but  this  the  French  turned 
to  their  advantage,  as  they  were  able  to  penetrate  into  a  hostile 
gallery  which  led  into  an  abandoned  compression  chamber. 

53.  At  Eparges  "  the  Germans  seem  to  have  been  working  on 
the  principle  of  a  close  system  of  counter  mines  comprising  sev- 
eral lines  of  charges."  A  striking  change  of  tacties  was  noticed 
after  a  little  time.  Instead  of  operating  with  small  charges  <>n 
their  most  advanced  line,  as  at  first,  the  Germans  began  to  use 
very  large  mines.  As  the  depth  was  increased,  so  the  size  of  the 
mines  increased. 

54.  The  German  pioneer  often  seems  to  adopt  waiting  tactics. 
He  arrives  near  oue  of  our  attacks,  prepares  a  charge  there,  and 
then  disappears  completely  for  quite  a  long  time  without  any 
listening  post  being  able  to  detect  him.  He  thus  allows  our  real 
attack  to  pass  him,  and  when  it  arrives  near  enough  to  menace 
the  gallery  which  leads  to  the  mine  chamber  he  charges  it  and 
blows,  thus  cutting  our  attack  far  in  and  for  a  great  length. 

55.  in  Champagne  (region  of  Perthes  les  Burins)  the  Germans 

had  galleries  Oil  two  levels.     While  they  attracted  the  attention 
and  efforts  of  the  French  to  the  upper  level,  which  W8J3  ."><>  to  50 

feet  deep,  they  constructed  deep  galleries  at  so  feet,  which  they 
pushed   under  the  front  line.1    The  French  got  wind  of  this 

'This  is  an  application  of  the  teethed  Suggested  b$  the  Oennan  "  In- 
structions tor  engineer  duties  in  siege  warfare"  (art.  lit;?).  (This  lias 
been  translated  into  French  under  the  title  of  "Instruction  Mir  lc 
Service  du  Pionnier  dans  la  Ouerre  de  Siege.") 

"In  such  a  case  (attack  of  a  part  of  the  enemy's  position  defended  by 
counter  mines)  it  Is  desirable  to  push  several  galleries  toward  the  ob- 
jective as  quickly  as  possible  and  without  trying  to  avoid  attracting  at 


55 

through  the  particular  resonance  of  the  chalk  soil  of  Champagne 
and  were  able  to  evacuate  their  galleries  in  time. 

56.  After  the  offensive  of  September-October,  1915,  the  Ger- 
man system  of  mines  in  the  Bois  Sabot  and  at  Souain  was 
explored : 

(a)  At  the  Bois  Sabot  10  mines,  disposed  on  a  salient  about 
150  yards  in  length,  were  pushed  out  directly  from  the  first  line. 
There  were  no  mine  dugouts.  The  entrances  were  either  by 
deep  shafts  (4  by  2  feet  7*  inches)  or  by  inclined  galleries 
(4  by  2  feet  7i  inches),  with  a  very  steep  slope  (t7tt  to  &),  or 
with  an  average  slope  of  -&.  The  mines  were  connected  In 
pairs  by  means  of  cross  galleries.  They  comprised  a  high-level 
system,  23  to  26  feet  in  depth,  and  a  low-level  system,  39  to  42 
feet  deep. 

Certain  galleries  had  shafts  a  good  distance  in  from  the  mine 
entrance,  placed  in  branch  galleries  3  feet  4  inches  by  2  feet 
3A  inches.  The  enemy,  no  doubt  had  been  anxious  about  our 
work,  and  judging  his  depth  was  insufficient  had  desired  to 
increase  it  rapidly. 

(b)  At  the  salient  of  Souain,  19  branch  galleries,  arranged  in 
groups,  appeared  to  cover  portions  of  trenches  which  were  of 
importance,  either  because  of  their  position  or  because  of  works 
which  they  included  (concrete  observation  posts,  for  example). 

The  greater  part  of  the  branches  seemed  to  have  been  hastily 
constructed  ;  their  walls  were  irregular.  It  appeared  as  if  there 
had  been  no  fixed  method  of  gaining  depth.  There  were  mine 
chambers^ at  the  ends  of  some  branch  galleries. 

(e)  At  the  salient  B  (northeast  of  St.  Hilaire-le-Grand),  the 
system  was  composed  of  11  branch  galleries  starting  from  the 
front  line.  There  were  no  dugouts  at  the  points  of  departure? 
Average  slope  ■&  to  r<x.  Length  of  branches  almost  uniform 
(40-50  yards).  Maximum  depth  was  about  65  feet.  There  were 
shafts  16  to  20  feet  deep  at  the  ends  of  most" of  the  galleries. 
The  German  attack  enveloped  the  French  system  on  both  flanks. 

57.  At  Troyou  (north  of  Fismes)  the  enemy  pushed  galleries 
well  spaced  apart  toward  our  lines   (depth  20  to  26  feet,  rock 

tention  ;  while  other  galleries,  off  which  it  is  intended  to  lay  charges 
for  the  decisive  action,  are  dug  to  follow  up  the  others  and  form  a  kind 
of  second  attack. 

"  The  first  series  will  induce  the  enemy  to  fire  his  camouflets  pre- 
maturely, the  second  will  then  be  pushed  forward  as  quickly  as  possible, 
:iiid  the  mines  fired  before  the  enemy  has  had  time  to  get  rid  of  the  foul 
air,  clear  his  galleries,  and  put  other  charges  in  his  counter  mines." 


56 

underneath).  Each  infantry  company  is  said  to  have  been  re- 
sponsible for  two  attacks,  under  the  direction  of  engineer  ofllceis. 

The  enemy  worked  intermittently  and  at  different  hours, 
which  sometimes  made  it  difficult  to  interpret  the  results  of 
listening,  but  he  stuck  to  the  same  work  for  several  months. 
His  efforts  were,  it  may  be  said,  often  out  of  proportion  to  the 
object  in  view  (for  instance,  a  gallery  about  BO  yards  long, 
in  very  hard  rock,  which  must  have  taken  six  months  of  work. 
proved  useless,  for  the  trenches  threatened  were  evacuated  in 
consequence  of  the  noises  heard). 

It  may  be  noted  that  the  enemy  on  many  occasions,  after  one 
of  our  camouflets  had  been  fired,  came  back  at  once  fej  the  head 
of  his  gallery  and  fired  a  camouflet  in  his  turn — this  was  obvi- 
ously of  no  use  because  of  the  increase  of  distance  resulting 
from  the  first  camouflet. 

58.  At  the  Bois  de  la  Mine  (region  of  Berry-au-Bac  i  the 
enemy  camouflaged  their  spoil  dumps  very  cleverly. 

As  soon  as  they  were  detected  they  mined  only  very  irregu- 
larly, working  very  quickly  without  stopping  for  sever*]  hours, 
then  stopping  work  altogether  for  one  or  more  days. 

The  characteristic  noises  of  charging  and  tamping  were 
masked  by  continuous  blows  on  the  wooden  casings  of  the  gal- 
leries, along  the  whole  front  of  attack  at  the  same  time,  up  to 
the  moment  of  firing 

59.  In  the  region  of  Troyon  (north  of  Fismes)  it  was  observed 
that  the  majority  of  the  German  camoullets  left  a  trace  on  the 
ground.  Perhaps  this  result  was  aimed  at  to  Insure  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  gases.  Even  if  it  is  objectionable  to  betray  the  pres- 
ence of  galleries,  it  is  an  advantage  to  be  able  to  return  to  the 
•head  without  delay. 

The  enemy  sometimes  fired  two  camoullets  at  a  few  urinates 
interval  against  the  same  "antenna1." 

60.  The  Germans  sometimes  placed  a  small  auxiliary  mine 
between  their  trenches  and  the  principal  mine  in  such  a  way 
that  when  fired  it  opened  a  gap  on  their  Bide  in  the  lip  Of  the 
main  crater  and  tints  facilitated  its  occupation  (Observed  in 
Argon  ne). 

61.  At  Careney,  at  the  beginning  of  1915,  the  German  mine 
entrances    were    in    the    front    Ijne.     The    attacks    consisted    of 

branch  galleries,  8  feet  -i  indies  by  2  feet  7\  Inches,  at  w  steep 
slope,  traced  in  a  straight  line.  From  these  the  secondary 
branches  started.     The  system  was  on  a  single  level,  and  the 


57 

depth  of  the  mine  chambers  did  not  exceed  about  30  feet.  Ac- 
cording to  notes  found  in  a  Mine  Diary,  only  small  charges  were 
used  (for  example,  a  mine  24  feet  deep  had  only  286  pounds  of 
explosive).  This  explains  to  a  certain  extent  the  limited  action 
of  ..German  mines  on  the  French  galleries. 

On  the  other  hand  the  German  engineers  fired  a  considerable 
number  of  their  mines  prematurely.  The  number  and  certain 
effect  of  the  French  mines  must  have  made  them  lose  presence 
of  mind,  which  is  specially  necessary  in  mining  warfare. 

Later  on,  in  the  same  region,  the  Germans  gradually  increased 
the  depth  of  their  mines  and  the  charges  used. 

62.  According  to  reports  furnished  by  a  sapper,  taken  pris- 
oner near  Hill  119  (north  of  Arras),  the  galleries  started  from 
the  front  line  at  a  gentle  slope.  The  first  section  served  as 
mine  dugouts  and  shelter  for  the  miners  and  sappers.  At  the 
end  of  the  mine  dugouts  a  deep  shaft  was  made  (depth  in  some 
cases  exceeding  50  feet)  from  which  the  real  mining  attack 
started. 

63.  The  Germans  have  often  made  attempts  to  damage  the 
French  mine  entrances  by  gun  or  trench  mortar  fire.  Some- 
times, but  more  rarely,  they  have  made  local  attacks  for  the 
same  purpose. 

In  September,  1915,  in  the  sector  of  Fay  (region  of  Bray-sur- 
Somme),  after  a  violent  bombardment,  an  attack  by  a  small 
body  of  infantry  and  engineers  was  launched.  The  engineers 
carried  eight  boxes  of  fuzed  explosives  (about  3  feet  of  safety 
fuze,  detonator  with  percussion  cap).  They  placed  their  charges 
at  the  entrances  of  the  galleries;  only  one,  however,  exploded, 
and  that  caused  very  little  damage  (the  part  blown  up  was 
repaired  in  48  hours).  The  Germans  were  driven  back  into 
their  trenches  by  a  strong  counter  attack. 

64.  Types  of  galleries  and  tools. — The  Germans  generally  use 
for  their  branch  gallery  or  shafts  the  regulation  cases  (large 
cases,  4  by  2  feet  74  inches;  small  cases,  3  feet  4  inches  by  2 
feet  1£  inches;  both  9.8  inches  wide.)  (See  the  German 
"  Sprengvorschrift.") 

They  often  increase  the  depth  as  they  advance,  either  by 
sjnking  shafts  or  by  inclined  galleries  at  a  steep  slope,  or  stepped. 
They  have  often  made  use  of  Russian  saps.  In  some  cases  they 
have  worked  without  lining  or  with  a  lining  formed  of  a  few 
planks  supported  on  extemporized  frames. 


58 

65.  Boring  machines  of  large  power  do  not  seem  to  have  been 
in  general  use  by  the  Germans ;  it  has  been  definitely  stated  on 
corf  an  parts  of  the  front  that  they  are  using  ordinary  miners' 
tools  exclusively.  They  are  believed,  however,  to  have  employed 
electric  boring  machines  in  the  Vosges  and  ratchet  borers  in 
the  Argonne;  the  latter  made  listening  very  difficult.  In  Ar- 
gonne  they  have  sometimes  employed  large  earth  augers,  with 
cutters  about  2  feet  long  and  8  inches  in  diameter.1 

66.  The  Germans  have  a  handy  pattern  of  silent  ventilating 
apparatus,  with  winch  they  seem  to  be  well  provided.  It  has 
sometimes  been  noticed  that  they  return  fairly  quickly  to  the 
heads  of  their  galleries  after  an  explosion,  thanks  no  doubt  to 
the  energetic  use  of  their  blowers.  It  should  be  noted,  however, 
that  certain  German  instructions  recommend  that  some  time 
should  be  allowed  before  restarting  work,  vide  Order  of  Vlllth 
Reserve  Corps,  July  17,  1915.  "  Experience  has  shown  that  in 
limestone  soil  it  is  dangerous  to  enter  mine  galleries  near  which 
there  has  been  an  explosion.  The  danger  is  not  entirely  over 
for  several  weeks.  The  greatest  prudence  must  be  ob- 
served    *     *     *." 

In  Champagne  numerous  and  very  efficient  apparatus  for 
breathing  in  foul  air  were  found  in  the  enemy's  mine  galleries 
that  were  explored  after  the  offensive  of  September,  1915. 

67.  The  employment  of  electricity  to  light  the  galleries  is  said 
to  be  far  from  general. 

68.  It  does  not  seem  as  if  the  Germans  have  any  first-class 
apparatus  for  removing  spoil  or  water.  They  often  use  sacks 
with  handles  to  carry  earth;  it  is  no  doubt  their  trick  of  fre- 
quently altering  the  direction  and  inclination  of  their  galleries 

which  has  led  them  to  employ  this  method  generally. 

1  Tins  is  a  regulation  tool.  (See  "  gprengvorschrUt,"  0|  231  (a). — 
Translator. 


ORDER  OF  THE  SIXTH  BAVARIAN  DIVISION 
REGARDING  MACHINE  GUNS. 


MACHINE   GUNS. 


The  Battle  of  the  Somrae  has  again  shown  the  decisive  value 
of  machine  guns  in  defense.  If  they  can  be  kept  in  a  service- 
able condition  until  the  enemy's  infantry  attacks  and  are  then 
brought  up  into  the  firing  position  in  time  every  attack  must 
fail.  The  greater  the  efforts  the  enemy  makes  in  the  future  to 
destroy  our  trenches  before  his  assault  by  an  increased  expendi- 
ture of  ammunition,  the  greater  the  extent  to  which  we  must 
rely  on  the  employment  of  machine  guns  for  repulsing  attacks. 
These  should  be  brought  into  action  unexpectedly  and  continue 
the  fight  when  the  greater  part  of  the  garrison  of  the  front-line 
trenches  is  out  of  action  and  the  enemy's  barrage  fire  renders  it 
difficult  to  bring  up  reinforcements.  In  view  of  the  above,  all 
improvements  to  existing  works  and  all  new  construction  must 
be  carried  out  on  the  following  principles: 

1.  In  regular  trench  system,  the  accurate  trace  of  which  is 
known  to  the  enemy  by  aeroplane  photographs,  and  which  he 
is  therefore  able  to  destroy,  as  regards  the  greater  part,  at  least, 
of  the  foremost  trenches,  the  employment  of  machine  guns  is 
only  permissible  when  they  can  be  kept  in  serviceable  condition 
in  deep  dugouts  with  several  exits  and  when  it  is  possible  to 
bring  them  into  position  in  time,  owing  to  the  existence  of  strong 
obstacles  which  can  not  be  completely  destroyed  by  bombard- 
ment, or  to  the  possibility  of  close  observation  of  the  enemy's 
movements. 

The  first  trench  and  the  ground  between  it  and  the  second 
trench  are  therefore  quite  out  of  the  question,  for  even  if  they 
contain  excellent  dugouts,  there  is  no  certainty  that  the  enemy's 
assault  can  be  seen  in  time.  Machine  guns  should  therefore  be 
placed,  as  a  rule,  behind  the  second  or,  better  still,  behind  the 
third  trench.  The  methodical  fire  by  which  the  enemy  seeks  to 
destroy  our  trenches  is  considerably  less  effective  here,  and, 
further,  the  obstacles  erected  in  front  of  the  second  and  third 

(59) 


60 

trenches  and  around  the  machine-gun  emplacements  themselves 
make  it  possible  to  see  the  enemy's  assault  in  time.  Command- 
ing positions  with  a  very  wide  field  of  fire  or  positions  which 
can  at  least  flank  the  trench  system  should  be  selected.  About 
half  the  machine  guns  should  be  allotted  to  such  positions. 

2.  The  remainder  should  be  sited  behind  the  trench  system 
and  on  grouud  farther  in  rear,  in  deep  pits  which  are  usually 
covered  over  and  also  on  platforms  concealed  in  trees,  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  enemy  is  caught  in  an  unexpected  cross-lire 
if  he  breaks  through.  The  important  point  is  that  the  machine 
guns  should  not,  in  any  circumstances,  be  detected  beforehand. 
They  must  not,  therefore,  be  too  close  to  trenches  which  can  be 
photographed  or  to  well-defined  woods  which  the  enemy  will 
suspect  in  any  case.  The  best  sites  are  in  the  open,  in  or  under 
clumps  of  trees  and  bushes,  or  in  hedges.  All  the  earth  exca- 
vated must  be  removed  or  concealed  under  hedges,  etc.  A  low 
network  of  trip  wires  has  proved  to  be  the  best  form  of  obstacle. 
To  each  machine  gun  there  should  be  allotted  a  certain  number 
of  infantrymen  armed  with  hand  grenades,  who  can  also  work 
the  gun  if  necessary. 

3.  The  construction  of  special  machine-gun  emplacements  is 
not  advisable.  If  sited  in  the  position  itself  they  arc  destroyed 
and  if  farther  in  rear  they  disclose  their  positions.  The  guns 
should  either  be  fired  from  Improvised  mountings  or  from 
sandbags. 

4.  In  cases  where  the  ground  which  the  enemy's  attack  has  to 
cross  is  not  covered  by  machine  guns  sited  in  retired  positions 
it  is  necessary  to  hold  machine  gtths  in  readiness  even  in  the 
first  trench,  particularly  by  night  or  during  misty  weather,  as 
;i  means  of  defense  against  surprise  attacks  made  without  ar- 
tillery preparation,  though  these  can  only  he  of  local  and  minor 
Importance,    The   machine   guns   mentioned    in   paragraph   *J 

should  he  employed  for  this  purpose.  l>y  day.  however,  or  at  the 
very  latest  as  soon  as  intense  artillery  fire  begins,  they  should 
be  taken  back  to  their  proper  positions. 

."».  Machine  guns  may  always  be  sited  in  the  front  trench  in 
thick  woods  or  under  other  exceptional  conditions.  The  decision 
in  such  cases  will  rest  with  me:  suggestions  should  be  submitted. 

(Signed)  v  Hokhn. 


METHODS  OF  ATTACK  OF  THE  GERMAN 
INFANTRY. 


In  all  the  general  actions  which  took  place  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Verdun  between  February  21  and  April  15  the  German 
corps  attacked  with  their  divisions  side  by  side.  In  exceptional 
cases,  when  the  extent  or  importance  of  the  zone  of  action  allotted 
to  a  corps  only  allowed  of  the  engagement  of  a  single  division, 
the  other  division  remained  resting  behind  ready  to  relieve  the 
division  in  the  front  Line. 

I.  Zone  of  Action  and  Dispositions  of  the  Division. 

The  extent  of  the  zone  of  action  of  a  division  of  three  regi- 
ments (7,200  rifles)  varied  from  1,000  to  2.500  meters,  accord- 
ing to  the  importance  and  number  of  the  successive  objectives, 
e.  g.— 

(1)  On  April  11  the  twenty-first  division,  starting  on  a  front 
of  about  1.000  meters  (Douaumont  Fort  (exclusive)  to  the 
southern  branch  of  the  Fausse  Cote  Ravine),  was  required  to 
attack  in  the  general  direction  of  Verdun. 

Its  zone  of  action  had  an  average  width  of  800  to  1,000  meters, 
the  successive  objectives  being  Bois  de  la  Caillette,  Fleury- 
devant-Douaumont.  Fort  St.  Michel. 

(2)  On  March  6  the  twenty-second  reserve  division  started 
on  a  front  of  about  2.500  meters  from  Forges  Brook  (500  meters 
in  front  of  Forges)  to  the  Meuse. 

Its  zone  of  action  had  an  average  width  of  2,000  to  3,000  meters, 
the  objective  being  the  line  Bois  des  Corbeaux-Bois  de  Cumieres- 
Point  265  (east  of  the  Bois  de  Cumieres). 

(1)  Is  an  example  of  an  action  with  a  distant  objective  (nar- 
row zone  of  action,  successive  objectives). 

In  this  'case  the  twenty-first  division  had  two  regiments  side 
by  side  in  the  front  line  with  one  in  reserve. 

(2)  Is  an  example  of  an  action  with  a  limited  objective  (wide 
zone  of  action,  a  single  objective).  In  this  case  the  twenty- 
second  reserve  division  had  its  three  regiments  side  by  side  in 
the  front  line. 

(61) 


62 

in  both  cases  the  density  of  the  frontage  of  attack  was  almost 
the  same,  the  front  of  a  regiment  varying  from  500  to  800  meters. 

II.  Dispositions  of  the  Regiment  for  the  Attack. 

Whatever  the  disposition  of  the  division  might  be,  the  regi- 
ment was  generally  disposed  in  depth  in  successive  battalions: 
One  battalion  in  the  front  line,  two  battalions  in  the  reserve, 
echeloned  in  depth  at  distances  varying  with  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  the  nearest  battalion  being  ready  to  move  up  either  to 
support  the  attack  on  the  first  objective  or  to  undertake  a  fresh 
attack  beyond  that  objective,  the  farthest  battalion  often  rest- 
ing, and  in  such  eases  destined  for  the  relief  of  exhausted  units. 

III.    Dispositions    for    a.xd    Method    of    Attack    uy    THE 
Battalion. 

dispositions. 

The  Infantry  battalion  was  nearly  always  deployed  in  two 
lines. 

The  first  line  was  generally  composed  of  two  companies  side 
by  side,  which  deployed  either  in  the  departure  trench  or  in 
the  last  cover  from  which  the  assault  was  to  be  launched. 

The  second  line  remained  in  the  support  trench  in  shelters  or 
behind  cover. 

METHOD    OF   ASSAULT WAVES.      GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 

(1)  Each  attacking  line  was  always  given  a  definite  and 
limited  objective  (its  width  being  equal  to  the  Croat  of  attack 
and  its  depth  seldom  exceeding  that  of  two  successive  lines  of 
trenches). 

(2)  The  assault  was  not  launched  until  tin4  artillery  had  com- 
pletely wrecked  the  trenches,  destroyed  (he  obstacles,  and  ren- 
dered the  defenders  incapable  of  resistance. 

(3)  The  actual  assault  was  preceded  by  reconnaissances 
pushed  forward  toward  the  objective  with  a  view  to  ascertaining 
whether  the  artillery  had  achieved  the  desired  effect    These 

reconnaissances  in  reality  formed  the  first  wave  of  the  assault. 

It  appears  that  the  Other  waves  did  not  start  unless  the  first 
made  progress.      What    has  often  been  regarded   as  an  ordinary 

reconnaissance  Intended  as  b   feeler  against  our  lines  has  in 
reality  been  the  beginning  of  an  attack  nipped  in  the  bnd. 


63 

EXECUTION    OF   THE   ASSAULT. 

The  attacking  line  debouched  in  several  successive  waves.  The 
various  methods  noticed  resembled  more  or  less  the  following 
type : 

Three  successive  waves  at  20  or  30  paces  distance. 

First  wave  (reconnaissances). — One  or  two  squads  from  each 
platoon,  accompanied  by  some  pioneers  and  bombers,  in  skir- 
mishing order  and  at  very  wide  intervals. 

Second  ivave. — A  dense  line  of  skirmishers  composed  of  the 
main  body  of  each  platoon.    This  line  seized  the  trenches. 

Third  wave. — Composed  of  the  remainder  of  each  platoon  and 
forming  an  echelon  which  filled  up  gaps  and  carried  a  reserve 
of  ammunition  and  material  (tools,  sandbags,  etc.)  in  order  that 
the  captured  trenches  might  be  converted.  . 

e6le  of  the  second  attacking  line. 

This  line  was,  in  principle,  reserved  for  a  second  assault  be- 
yond the  objective  captured  by  the  first  line.  In  exceptional 
circumstances  it  might  be  employed  to  reenforce  the  first  line 
or  rally  the  latter  in  case  of  failure. 

Note. — The  assaulting  waves  were  always  deployed.  Prisoners  were 
unanimous  in  stating  that  they  have  never  seen  the  employment  of 
columns  in  the  assault.  It  may  so  happen,  however,  that  the  two  waves, 
debouching  in  dense  lines,  may  sometimes  have  had  a  number  of 
stragglers  behind  them,  thus  giving  the  impression  of  small  columns 
following  the  first  waves. 

PRACTICE    ATTACK    CARRIED    OUT    DY    THE    SECOND    BATTALION.    TWO 
HUNDRED  AND  EIGHTH  RESERVE  REGIMENT  (XXII  RESERVE  CORPS). 

This  battalion  recently  carried  out  the  following  exercise 
whilst  at  rest  behind  the  front  line. 

The  company  formed  three,  four,  or  even  five  waves,  which 
all  left  the  trench  in  skirmishing  order. 

The  object  of  the  first  wave  was  to  cross  the  first  French 
trench  and  to  push  forward  to  within  bombing  distance  of  the 
second  trench.  There  the  men  lay  low,  threw  their  grenades, 
and  leapt  into  the  trench  as  soon  as  these  exploded. 

Each  man  carried  six  grenades  and  a  small  pair  of  wire 
cutters. 


64 

The  object  of  the  second  wave  was  to  reach  the  first   1 
trench.    It  acted  in  the  same  way  as  the  preceding  nave,  starl- 
ing as  soon  as  the  latter  had  crossed  this  trench. 

The  third  wave  carried  tools,  shovels,  picks,  large  wire  cutters, 
and  portable  obstacles. 

The  fourth  wave  carried  tools  and  rations. 

The  attack  was  launched  at  a  fixed  hour,  watches  wer 
and  the  waves  were  started  by  means  of  whistle  blasts. 

The  men  were  told  off  by  name  to  the  different  waves. 


THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  FIELD  DEFENSES.1 

The  varied  conditions  under  which  defensive  positions  have  to 
be  prepared  (before  or  during  a  battle,  in  the  course  of  an  ad- 
vance or  a  retreat,  etc.)  prevent  definite  rules  for  their  con- 
struction being  laid  down.  It  is  only  possible  to  establish  the 
general  principles  underlying  it. 

1.  A  stubborn  defense,  organized  by  sectors,  must  be  abso- 
lutely assured.  This  calls  for  several  successive  positions — at 
least  two — and,  in  addition,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
extending  after  the  partial  capture  of  the  front-line  position, 
the  provision  of  switch  lines  from  which  the  enemy  can  be  taken 
in  flank. 

2.  The  distance  between  positions  must  be  sufficient  to  exclude 
the  possibility  of  the  rearward  position  being  attacked  simul- 
taneously with  the  one  in  front.  Each  successive  position  must 
entail  a  completely  fresJi  attack,  and  above  all  oblige  the  enemy 
to  push  forward  his  observation  posts  and  at  least  a  portion  of 
his  batteries.  Depending  on  the  ground,  this  distance  will, 
therefore,  be  from  1  to  2  or  more  kilometers. 

3.  Each  position  will  consist  of  at  least  two  continuous  lines, 
one  behind  the  other.  As  a  rule,  the  front  line  will  be  the 
main  fighting  line.  This  principle  may  only  be  deliberately 
abandoned  when  the  first  line  is  unfavorably  situated.  Support 
lines  ought  not  to  lie  within  the  zone  of  artillery  fire  directed 
on  the  front  line.  On  the  other  hand,  their  distance  from  the 
front  line  must  not  be  too  great,  as  this  might  prevent  a  rapid 
advance  from  the  support  line  to  repel  an  assault,  to  counter 
attack,  etc.,  it  will  thus  vary  between  50  and  100  meters.  (See 
also  par.  8,  "  Communication  trenches.") 

4.  A  field  of  fire  of  a  few  hundred  meters,  or  even  less  in  cer- 
tain circumstances,  is  sufficient  for  the  front  lines  of  an  infantry 
position.  •  The  greater  the  extent  of  our  own  field  of  fire  and  the 
more  extended  the  view  from  our  own  position,  the  easier  it  will 
be  for  the  enemy  to  observe  and  carry  out  counter  battery  work. 


'Issued  by  general  s+aff  (Intelligence),  general  headquarters,  October 
16,   1916. 

9784  »_17 5  (65) 


66 

On  the  other  hand,  a  very  limited  view  from  the  position 
necessitates  an  increased  state  of  preparedness  for  attack,  which 
In  time  will  wear  down  the  troops.  It  is  of  still  greater  im- 
portance that  support  lines,  in  which  further  resistance  may  be 
offered  after  the  loss  of  the  front  lines,  should  be  screened  from 
hostile  reconnaissance  and  observation,  and  consequently  from 
artillery  fire.  They  will  therefore  be  traced,  in  certain  circum- 
stances, along  reverse  slopes,  through  woods,  etc. 

5.  The  entire  circumference  of  natural  strong  points  (villages, 
farms,  small  woods)  will  be  organized  for  defense  and  excep- 
tionally strongly  fortified.  Where  no  such  points  exist  dotted 
works  will  be  constructed  as  required.  Strong  points  and  dosed 
works  may  be  sited  with  advantage  either  within  a  position  or 
between  two  positions  and  formed  by  organizing  sections  of  the 
front  and  support  line  and  their  corresponding  communication 
trenches  as  redoubts,  capable  of  all-round  defense. 

6.  Reliable  obstacles  will  be  erected  in  front  of  all  lines  of 
defense,  switch  lines,  strong  points,  and  closed  works.  As  they 
will  be  very  heavily  bombarded  by  artillery  and  trench  mortars, 
it  is  advisable  to  construct  them  in  several  rows  with  intervals. 
Electrified  wire  entanglements  are  only  of  value  as  long  as  they 
are  not  exposed  to  heavy  fire.  In  quiet  times  they  permit  of  the 
garrison  being  reduced  with  safety.  Where  electrified  entangle- 
ments are  used  precautions  must  be  taken  for  the  safety  of  our 
own  troops. 

7.  Skillfully  traced  communication  trenches  must  be  liberally 
provided  to  connect  the  various  lines  of  each  position.  They 
considerably  facilitate  the  execution  of  counter  attacks,  and 
when  it  is  otherwise  tactically  feasible,  they  enable  a  large  part 
of  the  garrison  to  be  kept  in  the  support  and  reserve  trenches. 
This  diminishes  casualties  and  spares  the  troops. 

In  addition,  there  must  be  a  sufficient  number  of  approach 
trenches  leading  up  to  the  position,  if  sufficient  cover  is  not  pro- 
vided by  the  form  of  the  ground.  When  constructing  com- 
munication and  approach  trenches  they  must  be  organized  ac- 
cording to  requirements,  to  serve  at  the  same  time  either  as 
switch  lines  or  as  the  flanks  of  closed  works. 

8.  Deep  and  narrow  trenches  afford  good  cover  but  circulation 
in  them  is  difficult  and  they  soon  fall  in.  A  certain  ratio  must. 
therefore,  be  observed  between  depth  and  width.  High  para- 
pets  are  to  be  avoided  if  possible,  as  they  are  very  visable,  are 


67 

easily  destroyed,  and  then  fill  up  the  trenches.  As  a  general 
rule,  as  a  protection  against  enfilade  fire,  infantry  trenches 
should  be  well  traversed,  while  a  zigzag  trace  should  be  given 
to  communication  and  approach  trenches. 

9.  Shellproof  dugouts  (mined  and  concreted)  have  proved  of 
great  value.  Their  occupants,  when  not  overcrowded,  have 
lived  through  repeated  bombardments  of  long  duration  and  of 
the  greatest  intensity.  It  is  advisable  to  construct  numbers  of 
small  dugouts  (for  20  men  at  the  most),  each  provided  with 
several  convenient  and  safe  entrances.  In  the  main  fighting 
line,  or  close  behind  it,  a  garrison  capable  of  repelling  a  sur- 
prise attack  must  be  accommodated  in  shellproof  dugouts,  the 
rest  of  the  garrison  being  in  similar  dugouts  in  the  support  and 
reserve  lines  of  the  position.  Previous  to  operations  of  our 
own,  in  which  large  masses  of  troops  will  be  employed,  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  shellproof  dugouts  must  be  constructed  in  the 
front-line  trenches.  It  is  essential  to  provide  underground 
shelters  for  troops  held  in  reserve  close  behind  the  infantry 
position,  in  order  to  protect  them  as  long  as  possible  from  the 
fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 

10.  With  a  view  to  the  rapid  detection  of  a  hostile  attack, 
observation  of  the  enemy's  position,  both  from  the  front  and  sup- 
port lines,  even  under  the  heaviest  fire,  must  always  be  possible. 
In  the  front  line  the  most  suitable  means  of  observation  are 
periscopes  passing  through  the  roofs  of  the  dugouts.  Observa- 
tions from  loopholes  is  certainly  preferable,  but  since  it  is  hardly 
possible  to  hide  them,  most  of  the  loopholes  in  the  front  line 
will  be  destroyed  or  buried  by  the  enemy's  fire. 

Similarly,  infantry  sentries  posted  without  shelter  in  the  front 
line  will  soon  be  put  out  of  action,  and  do  not  therefore  insure 
timely  warning  of  a  hostile  attack. 

In  the  second-line  position  observation  will  be  mainly  carried 
out  through  loopholes.  Observation  posts  must  be  hidden  and 
made  as  shellproof  as  possible. 

11.  Frontal  infantry  fire  to  repel  an  assault  will  be  delivered 
over  the  parapet  from  rifles,  machine  guns,  and  automatic  rifles. 

When  the  distance  to  the  enemy's  position  is  very  small,  before 
allotting  machine  guns  to  the  front  line  for  frontal  fire  it  must 
be  considered  whether  they  can  be  brought  into  action  with 
sufficient  rapidity ;  if  not,  they  must  be  posted  farther  in  rear, 
and,  whenever  possible,  in  commanding  positions. 


68 

12.  After  frontal  lire  the  chief  consideration  is  flanking  tire. 
The  latter  enables  an  extended  front  to  be  defended  with  a 
minimum  of  effectives.  It  may  be  brought  to  bear  from  the 
position  itself,  the  trace  of  which  should  be  suitably  broken,  or 
from  flanking  positions,  situated  to  a  flank  and  slightly  retired. 

Automatic  rifles  and  machine  guns  are  particularly  suitable 
for  this  work. 

Flanking  fire  from  a  position  to  a  flank  and  slightly  retired 
(from  the  second  line  or  from  special  flanking  positions)  pre- 
sents the  advantage  that  the  emplacements  are  not  so  liable  to 
be  out  of  action  by  the  enemy's  fire.  In  positions  with  a  good 
command,  in  certain  circumstances  concrete  emplacements  with 
suitably  masked  loopholes  can  be  constructed  and  will  be  of 
great  utility.   . 

Light  quick-fire  guns  are  also  suitable  weapons  for  flanking 
fire. 

13.  Infantry  positions  must  be  selected,  wherever  conditions 
permit,  with  an  eye  to  the  deployment  of  artillery.  The  artil- 
lery require — 

(a)  Suitable  positions  for  main  observation  posts. 
Observation  posts  must  be  covered  by  the  infantry  positions. 

and,  whenever  feasible,  must  be  sited  so  far  back  that  they  are 
not  exposed  to  fire  directed  on  the  infantry  lines.  In  addition, 
they  should  afford  a  view  of  the  whole  of  the  ground  in  front 
of  the  infantry  position. 

(b)  Concealed  battery  positions  at  a  suitable  distance — i.  e., 
a  distance  at  which  the  artillery  can  carry  out  its  task — from 
the  enemy.  The  long  range  of  our  guns  should  not  lead  to  their 
being  kept  as  far  in  rear  as  possible.  The  length  of  the  tele- 
phone lines  entailed  by  this  is  a  reason  for  avoiding  it.  On 
the  other  hand,  batteries  should  not  be  placed  in  positions  which 
are  in  the  zone  of  artillery  fire  directed  against  the  infantry. 

(c)  Cover  that  blends  with  the  landscape,  in  particular,  shell- 
proof  shelters  for  both  the  personnel  and  the  ammunition. 

Suitable  arrangements,  in  accordance  with  the  above,  will  be 
made  for  the  artillery  reserves,  when  these  are  engaged. 

14.  To  enable  commanders  to  exercise  their  command,  even 
during  a  hostile  attack,  the  battle  headquarters  of  sector  (regi- 
mental) and  subsector  (battalion)  commanders  will  be  shell 
proof  and  situated  sufficiently  far  forward  and  so  sited  that  the* 
commanders  concerned  can  maintain  constant  communication, 


69 

even  by  means  of  runners,  with  each  other  and  with  the  most 
advanced  points  of  the  fire  line.  They  should  thus  be  in  a 
position  to  throw  in  their  reserves  at  will  at  decisive  points. 
Touch  between  commanders  and  their  troops  and  their  personal 
influence  on  the  fight  must  be  insured  in  all  circumstances.  It 
is  most  desirable  that  battle  headquarters  should  command  a 
view  of  the  battle  sector  concerned  and  of  the  surrounding  coun- 
try.    (See  par.  10.) 

The  same  remark  applies  to  the  battle  headquarters  of  the 
higher  commanders.  Where  this  is  out  of  the  question,  owing 
to  the  nature  of  the  ground  or  on  account  of  the  zone  swept  by 
the  enemy's  artillery  fire,  a  sufficient  number  of  observation 
officers  from  the  staff  concerned  will  be  pushed  forward  to  suit- 
si  ble  points.  Communication  with  these  officers  and  with  other 
important  observation  posts  must  be  insured. 

15.  Reliable  transmission  of  information  from  the  front  to  the 
higher  commanders  and  vice  versa  is  of  special  value  and  re- 
quires most  careful  organization. 

Large  numbers  of  telephone  lines  are  required;  nevertheless 
they  can  not  be  counted  upon  during  a  heavy  bombardment. 
Other  means  of  communication  (light-signal  apparatus,  other 
methods  of  signaling,  carrier  pigeons)  must  therefore  be  always 
available  and  their  efficiency  frequently  tested. 

Sound  signals  (gongs,  bells,  sirens,  etc.)  have  proved  very 
useful  for  alarming  garrisons. 

16.  Speaking  generally,  the  improvement  of  conditions  of  liv- 
ing among  the  troops  should  be  considered  in  the  organization 
of  defensive  positions.  This  includes  hutting^  water  supply, 
the  improvement  and  construction  of  roads,  bridging,  and  cut- 
ting tracks.  Of  especial  urgency  is  the  development  of  a  field 
and  light  railway  system  for  bringing  up  ammunition,  supplies 
(dumps  in  second  or  third  line,  if  required),  building  material, 
etc. 

17.  Positions  will  be  constructed  in  accordance  with  definite 
working  plans  drafted  after  careful  reconnaissance. 

The  rainy  season  will  be  taken  into  consideration  in  both  the 
construction  and  the  improvement  of  positions ;  for  example,  an 
approach  trench  will  not  be  taken  along  the  bottom  of  a  depres- 
sion but  along  the  side.  Drainage  arrangements  must  be  com- 
pleted during  the  dry  season. 

18.  The  maintenance  of  extended  positions  requires  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  labor.     In  the  case  of  retired  lines  and  po- 


70 

sitions,  owing  to  a  scarcity  of  labor,  the  construction  of  the 
main  framework  must  frequently  suffice;  that  is  to  say,  the 
construction  of  dugouts,  obstacles,  observation  posts,  tlankiim 
positions,  ammunition  stores,  drainage  system,  etc.  Fire 
trenches  and  communication  trenches  will  be  marked  out,  but 
their  execution  either  entirely  or  partially  postponed.  The 
maintenance  of  such  positions  must  be  taken  in  hand  periodically 
unless  completion  is  to  be  abandoned. 


INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  MINE  WARFARE. 


TACTICS. 

1.  Objects  of  Mine  Wabfare. 

Attack. — To  drive  galleries  under  the  enemy's  works  in  order 
to  destroy  them  and  their  garrisons. 

Defense. — To  drive  galleries  to  intercept  those  of  the  enemy 
and  to  destroy  them  at  such  a  distance  from  the  defender's 
works  that  the  latter  are  not  damaged  when  the  mines  are 
sprung. 

Mine  warfare  commences  when  the  attack  and  defense  meet 
underground.  Every  mine  sprung,  including  his  own,  blows 
the  miner  back ;  therefore  after  fighting  has  begun  the  defender 
is  forced  to  engage  in  active  mining.  The  limit  of  length  of 
galleries  driven  by  hand  is  100  meters ; 1  beyond  this  machines 
must  be  employed ;  neither  we  nor  the  enemy  have  yet  got-  a 
satisfactory  machine. 

Mining  is  slow  and  exhausting  work ;  this  means  of  warfare 
should  therefore  be  regarded  as  a  last  resource  by  which  to 
capture  a  position.     . 

A  defensive  system  should  be  made  round  every  point  of  tacti- 
cal value  for  flanking  fire  or  observation  situated  within  100 
yards  of  the  enemy.  When  the  opposing  lines  are  very  close 
the  defensive  systems  of  both  sides  meet  underground.  Active 
mine  warfare  then  ensues. 

2.  The  Principles  of  Mining  Schemes. 

Offensive. — The  plan  of  attack  must  provide  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  enemy's  position  at  several  points  simultaneously 
on  a  broad  front  and  assist  in  the  isolation  and  capture  of  his 
troops. 

The  infantry  position  must  first  be  advanced  by  sapping  as 
close  to  the  enemy  as  possible.  If  opposition  is  expected,  sev- 
eral shafts  must  be  sunk,  which  must  be  connected  by  a  lateral 

(71) 


72 

gallery,  from  which  the  offensive  galleries  will  start.  Theme 
galleries  must  be  deep  enough  to  pass  under  the  defense,  It  i> 
sometimes  best  to  advance  on  two  levels,  engaging  the  defender's 
attention  on  the  upper  level  while  the  galleries  on  the  lower 
level  are  driven  at  the  greatest  possible  speed. 

Defensive. — The  galleries  must  be  driven  straight  toward  the 
enemy,  at  such  a  distance  apart  that  a  maximum  camouilet  from 
one  gallery  will  not  destroy  the  next  one  to  it.  If  the  enemy 
is  also  mining,  the  distance  apart  must  be  such  that  he  can  not 
pass  between  any  two  without  being  heard;  this  distance  varies 
with  the  ground,  and  is  from  20  to  40  meters. 

The  galleries  must  be  pushed  forward  until  their  faces  are  at 
least  30  meters  from  the  front  trench. 

When  these  are  completed,  or  as  soon  as  there  are  men  avail- 
able, a  lateral  gallery  must  be  made  connecting  the  main  gal- 
leries at  such  a  depth  (6  to  10  meters)  as  will  render  it  sale 
from  heavy  high-angle  fire  and  not  so  far  forward  that  it  is 
liable  to  be  destroyed  by  mines  of  either  side  (about  20  meters 
in  front  of  the  front  trenches  and  30  meters  from  the  headings 
of  the  galleries). 

As  soon  as  the  defender  is  aware  of  the  enemy's  approach  on 
the  deep  level,  he  must  follow  his  example,  and  this  process  may 
be  continued  until  the  permanent  water  level  is  reached  or  the 
depth  of  the  galleries  is  prohibitive. 

The  attack  can  also  be  countered  by  an  outflanking  movement. 

3.  Minks. 

The  object  of  the  attacker  being  to  destroy  the  enemy's  works 
and  personnel,  this  can  bo  done  either  by  firing  simultaneously 

as  'many  mines  as  possible  on  a  broad  front,  or  by  tiring  a  num- 
ber of  overcharged  mines  at  intervals  of  half  an  hour,  so  as  to 
form  large  craters  and  to  overwhelm  the  garrison  with  stones, 

debris,  etc.  The  formation  of  craters  enables  the  attacker  to 
advance  his  position.     Camoutlets  should  be  used  to  destroy  the 

defender's  galleries.     The  defender.,  on  the  other  hand,   win 

avoid  making  craters  which  interfere  wilh  his  field  of  lire,  and 
will  destroy  the  attacker's  galleries  by  blowing  them  in  from  a 
Hank  by  camoutlets.1 

l  This  is  not  borne  out  by  the  enemy'l  mining  on  our  front;  his  gal- 
leries  hav«  often  been  of  much  greater  length. —  ((}.  S.  I.) 


73 

The  defender  should  always  have  a  number  of  galleries  ready 
charged. 

4.  Cooperation  of  Various  Arms. 

The  enemy's  mining  operations  can  be  sensibly  delayed  by 
keeping  his  mine  heads  and  trenches  leading  to  them  under 
artillery,  trench  mortar,  rifle,  and  machine-gun  fire,  with  special 
reference  to  flanking  and  enfilading. 

The  cooperation  of  all  arms  is  of  special  importance  when  it 
is  decided  to  form  craters. 

Immediately  the  mine  has  been  fired,  the  artillery  will  open 
on  the  enemy's  position.  The  effect  of  this  will  be  greater  if  it 
has  been  possible  to  induce  the  enemy  to  man  that  portion  of  his 
line  in  greater  strength,  by  driving  the  men  inwards  by  trench 
mortar  fire,  or  by  any  ruse  to  make  him  suspect  an  attack  in 
force.  The  danger  area  of  the  attacker's  trenches  will  be 
cleared  of  troops,  and  the  garrison  will  take  shelter  in  their  dug^ 
outs.  If  the  enemy  fires  a  mine,  the  garrison  of  the  sector  will 
"  stand  to  "  in  their  dugouts,  but  will  not  man  the  parapet 

The  occupation  of  craters,  which  are  blown  under  the  enemy's 
front  line,  may  form  either  (1)  a  local  enterprise  or  (2)  a  part 
of  a  general  attack  on  a  broad  front. 

As  regards  (1),  the  mine  may  be  of  assistance  when  the  ob- 
ject of  the  enterprise  is  to  destroy  shaft  heads,  ammunition 
stores,  machine  guns,  or  trench  mortars,  or  to  secure  identifica- 
tions, but  otherwise  the  concentration  of  the  enemy's  fire  on  the 
small  section  of  the  front  captured  renders  its  occupation  and 
organization  too  costly  to  be  of  value. 

Craters  made  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  the  attacker's 
position  must  not  be  occupied  on  the  far  side  until  the  position 
is  secured  underground  by  pushing  forward  galleries  to  cover 
it.  A  proper  system  of  backing-up  galleries  should  be  arranged 
before  the  crater  is  blown.  The  organization  of  the  interior 
of  a  crater  is  a  difficult  operation,  especially  the  construction 
of  a  parados,  owing  to  the  crater  being  a  good  target  for  artil- 
lery and  trench  mortars,  by  which  the  defender  will  endeavor 
to  prevent  the  attacker  from  organizing  the  craters  or  forming 
up  for  an  assault.  To  do  this  effectively,  the  defender  must 
have  observation  of  the  craters;  consequently  he  must  sap  out 
and  establish  listening  posts  on  them;  permanent  sentries  are 
not  necessary.  The  obstacle  formed  by  the  crater  should  be 
improved  by  knife  rests  and  rolls  of  wire. 


74 

As  the  cratered  area  Increases,  the  importance  of  protection 
by  flanking  and  machine-gun  fire  increases  In  proportion. 

5.  Chain  of  Responsibility. 

The  divisional  commander  lays  down  general  instructions  for 
mine  warfare  and  is  responsible  for  the  cooperation  (ft  artillery, 
engineers,  and  infantry. 

His  engineer  commander  is  responsible  for  the  initiation  of 
suitable  offensive  or  defensive  mining  schemes  and  for  the  prepa- 
ration of  estimates. of  time  and  labor. 

The  divisional  commander  decides  (1)  whether  the  position- 
to  be  gained  are  in  proportion  to  the  effort  required,  (2)  whether 
to  become  involved  in  mine  warfare,  or  (3)  to  abandon  volun 
tartly  his  position  as  soon  as  the  enemy's  galleries  are  under  his 
trenches. 

In  either  case  he  submits  his  decision  for  approval  of  the 
corps. 

When  the  mining  schemes  have  been  finally  approved,  the  divi- 
sional commander  issues  the  necessary  orders  to  the  regimental 
commanders  of  the  artillery  and  infantry  concerned,  and  allots 
to  infantry  regiments  the  requisite  engineers  and  trench  mor- 
tars (complete  units,  if  possible). 

The  senior  engineer  officer  in  each  infantry  regiment  is  the 
commanding  officer  of  all  engineers  attached  to  the  regiment  and 
of  the  permanently  attached  working  parties  from  infantry  or 
labor  battalions. 

The  regimental  commander,  on  the  advice  of  the  senior  engi- 
neer officer,  issues  orders  to  the  latter  and  to  battalion  com- 
manders, who  control  the  trench  mortars  in  their  subsoctors. 
He  also  arranges  direct  for  artillery  support  from  the  artillery 
formation  in  his  sector.  s 

Bach  mine  system  is  in  the  charge  of  an  engineer  officer,  under 
the  orders  of  the  senior  engineer  officer  of  the  regiment. 

This  officer  can  spring  mines  on  his  own  authority,  in  cases  of 
emergency. 

He  must  be  in  the.  closest  touch  with  battalion  and  company 
Commanders,  and  all  information  regarding  the  mine  system  or 
inferences  drawn  from  observation  on  the  surface  will  be  mutu- 
ally exchanged.  Battalion  and  company  commanders  have  no 
authority  over  the  engineer  officer,  except  that  they  ma\  order 
him  to  spring  such  mines  as  have  been  prepared  to  repel  an 
assault.     (End  id' translation.) 


75   ' 
NOTES  BY  GENERAL   STAFF   (INTELLIGENCE). 

1.  The  general  principles  enunciated  are  not  different  from 
our  own,  but  since  this  article  was  written  the  enemy's  limit 
of  length  of  galleries  has  been  greatly  increased. 

2.  Our  experience  is  that  these  principles  have  been  followed 
fairly  closely,  especially  the  attack  on  two  levels. 

3.  The  enemy  has  frequently  made  craters  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  improving  defilade  flanking  fire  or  advancing  his  position. 

4.  The  description  of  the  role,  of  artillery  and  trench  mortars 
for  delaying  enemy  mining  activity,  and  in  conjunction  with 
firing  mines,  is  important. 

The  enemy's  opinion  about  the  value  of  craters  has  changed 
considerably  since  this  note  was  written.  His  persistent  and 
successful  holding  of  craters  is  very  marked. 

5.  Prominence  is  again  given  to  trench-mortar  fire  in  the,  al- 
lotment of  troops  for  a  mining  scheme. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE,  AS 
LAID  DOWN  IN  THE  FOURTEENTH  RESERVE 
CORPS. 


Note  by  General  Staff  (Intelligence),  General  Headquarters. — 
These  are  the  "  Corps  orders  "  referred  to  in  "  Lessons  drawn 
from  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  by  Stein's  Group."     (Ia/20767). 


CONTENTS. 

I.  Infantry  positions  :  Page. 

1.  Trenches 78 

2.  First-line  position 78 

3.  Intermediate  and  second-line  positions 79 

4.  Third-line  position 80 

5.  Responsibility  for  construction 80 

6.  Dugouts 80 

7.  Revetment  and  drainage : 80 

"  8.  Wire   entanglements 80 

9.  Concrete 80 

10.  Villages 81 

II.  Alarm  : 

11.  Alarm 81 

III.  The  infantry  combat : 

12.  Sentries 81 

13.  Garrison  of  the  trenches 82 

14.  Supports 83 

15.  Sector    reserves 83 

16.  Divisional  reserves 83 

17.  Means  of  communication 84 

18.  Machine  guns 84 

19.  Minenwerfer _. —  84 

20.  Hand  grenades _ 84 

21.  Light    pistols 85 

22.  Ammunition „ — , 85 

IV.  Artillery  positions  : 

23.  General.^ 86 

24.  Ammunition : 86 

25.  Battery  positions 86 

26.  Observation  posts 87 

27.  Telephones 87 

(77) 


78 

IV.  Artillery    positions — Continued  :  Page. 

28.  Counter-battoiy  work 87 

29.  Survey  sections 88 

30.  Balloons 88 

31.  Aeroplanes , 88 

32.  Methods  of  engaging  the  enemy's  infantry 89 

33.  LTght  signals 89 

34.  Practice  in  fire  control 90 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE. 

The  principles  Laid  down  in  the  XIV  Reserve  Corps  for  the 
conduct  of  trench  warfare  are  once  more  set  forth  in  concise 
form  in  the  following  pages  : 

I.  Infantry  Positions. 

1.  Trenches. — All  trenches  must  he  designed  to  allow  of  their 
use  as  fire  trenches.  Communication  trenches  must  permit  of 
tire  to  both  sides.  Except  in  the  case  of  sentries,  every  man 
must,  as  a  rule,  use  his  rifle  over  the  parapet. 

It  must  be  possible  to  climb  out  of  every  trench,  either  by 
means  of  ladders  or  sortie  steps.  This  is  particularly  impor- 
tant for  communication  trenches,  which  otherwise  become  traps. 

2.  First-line  position. — The  first-line  position  will  be  held  if 
the  enemy  attacks.  It  must,  therefore,  be  repaired  Immediately 
before  any  other  work  is  undertaken.  It  consists  of  the  first, 
second,  and  third  trenches,  and  should  have,  if  possible*  two 
rows  of  wire  entanglements  in  front  of  each  trench.  There 
should  be  at  least  two  communication  trenches  in  each  com- 
pany sector  from  the  third  trench  to  the  first  trench,  but  the 
points  at  which  they  enter  and  leave  the  second  trench  should 
not  be  opposite  one  another.  The  number  of  dugouts  should  he 
increased  until  there  are  sufficient  to  accommodate  the  infantry 
garrison  that  the  division  considers  necessary  for  the  repulse 
of  a  prepared  attack.  Accommodation  should  be  provide!,  first 
of  all,  for  the  present  garrison  and  supports  in  the  first  trench, 
and  for  the  present  sector  reserves  in  the  second  and  third 
trenches.    Further  construction  may  then  be  taken  in  hand. 

Each  battalion  sector  must  have  at  least  two  through  com- 
munication trenches.  When  fighting  is  in  progress,  it  may  be 
advisable  to  use  one  for  up  and  the  other  for  down  traffic.  The 
men  must  know  this  beforehand. 


79 

Each  company  will  mark  its  front-line  trench  with  a  red  and 


white  l^J  screen  or  board  about  20  inches  square,  painted 
some  inconspicuous  color  on  the  side  toward  the  enemy.  This 
will  be  set  up  on  the  parapet,  or  the  parados,  in  such  a  position 
that  the  enemy  can  not  see  it  either  from  in  front  or  from  the 
flanks.     By  this  means  the  artillery  can  locate  our  front. 

It  has  repeatedly  happened  that  important  letters  and  sketches 
have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  French  and  English.  The 
troops  will  be  warned  of  the  grave  nature  of  the  offense  caused 
by  such  negligence.  Letters  must  not  contain  matter  of  mili- 
tary importance.  The  number  of  documents  of  military  impor- 
tance taken  into  the  first-line  position  must  be  restricted  as 
much  as  possible.  An  officer  is  responsible  for  any  document 
which  he  carries  on  his  person. 

As  soon  as  a  document  has  served  its  purpose — information 
to  the  troops,  etc. — it  will  either  be  destroyed  or  taken  away 
from  the  first-line  position.  Maps  which  show  the  position  of 
trenches  may  be  taken  into  the  first-line  position  only  when  our 
own  trenches  are  merely  approximately  shown.  It  is  forbidden 
to  take  maps  into  the  first-line  position  which  show  in  detail 
both  our  own  and  the  enemy's  trenches.  Patrols  will  carry  no 
papers  and  wear  no  badges  by  which  they  can  be  identified. 

Rations,  water,  and  illuminating  materials  sufficient  for  at 
least  three  days  will  be  stored  in  the  dugouts  of  the  first  trench 
of  the  first-line  position.  The  rations  will  consist  of  iron  ra- 
tions, coffee,  salt,  sugar,  rum  or  an  equivalent,  and  cigars.  The 
water  supply,  to  which  particular  attention  will  be  paid,  will  be 
made  up  of  water  in  barrels  and  mineral  water.  Lighting  will 
be  assured  by  means  of  an  iron  ration  of  candles  sufficient  for 
three  days.  In  addition,  electric  light,  paraffin,  acetylene,  or 
candle  lamps  may  be  used. 

3.  Intermediate  and  second-line  positions. — The  intermediate 
and  second-line  positions  each  consist  of  at  least  two  trenches, 
each  provided  with  two  rows  of  wire  entanglements,  which 
should  be  on  pickets,  and  with  the  same  number  of  communica- 
tion trenches  as  in  the  first-line  position.  Each  of  the  present 
regimental  sectors  must  be  provided  with  sufficient  accommoda- 
tion for  at  least  one  battalion. 

There  must  be  emplacements  in  all  three  positions  for  ma- 
chine guns  and  Minenwerf er  and  artillery  and  infantry  observa- 
tion posts. 


80 

4.  'f'hinl-linr  position— \\i  I  bo  third-lino  position,  which  Is 
dug  only   to  the  depth   of  a   spade  blade,   stmiiL:  ]M.ints   will   be 

constructed  when  instruction  in  entrenching  is  being  given  and 
when  recruits  are  being  trained. 

5.  Responsibility  for  construction. — Regimental  commanders 
will  direct  the  construction  of  the  first-line  position;  divisions 
will  be  responsible  for  that  of  the  second-line  position,  and  will 
make  their  own  arrangements  with  regard  to  the  intermediate 
position. 

6.  Dugouts. — The  construction  of  dugouts  and  observation 
posts  in  the  first  trench  of  the  intermediate  and  second-line  po- 
sitions will  take  precedence  of  work  on  the  second  trench  of 
these  positions.  In  view  of  the  heavy  guns  which  the  enemy  is 
employing,  the  thickness  of  earth  above  dugouts  should  be  in- 
creased for  any  new  ones  that  are  constructed.  It  may  be  as 
much  as  19^  feet,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  soil,  but  the 
depth  below  ground  must  not  prevent  a  quick  response  to  an 
alarm.  All  dugouts  must  have  at  least  two  entrances.  To  close 
the  passage  between  the  entrances  stultifies  the  object  of  having 
two  entrances.  Divisions  must  direct  special  attention  to  this 
point.  Dugouts  should  be  constructed  under  the  parapet,  not 
underneath  the  parados,  and  the  entrances  should  be  in  the 
front  slope  of  the  trench. 

7.  Revetment  and  drainage. — Revetment,  and  drainage  are 
essential.  Revetting  a  trench  with  wire  netting  and  corrugared- 
iron  sheeting  is  forbidden ;  fascines,  also,  are  not  suitable,  as 
they  form  impassable  obstacles  if  the  revetment  is  destroyed. 
On  the  other  hand,  brushwood  well  secured  by  pickets  and 
pegged  into  the  sides  of  the  trench  may  be  employed.  The 
pioneer  commander  of  the  XIV  Reserve  Corps  will  send  up  as 
much  brushwood  and  thin  pickets  as  he  possibly  can,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  requirements  of  divisions. 

In  arranging  drainage,  only  technically  qualified  personnel 
sbould  be  employed,  as  the  form  of  the  ground,  nature  of  the 
soil,  surface  and  subsurface  water  conditions  must  be  taken  into 
account. 

8.  Wire  cntanglcmcnt*.-^\n  the  wire  entanglements  of  the 
second-line  position,  passages  which  are  clearly  marked,  easily 
closed,  and  not  too  wide,  must  be  left  for  the  use  of  troops  ad- 
vancing and  retiring.  The  points  where  roads  traverse  the 
trenches  must  be  left  open,  but  be  easy  to  close. 

0.  Concrete. — The  greater  distance  of  the  second-line  position 
from  the  enemy  will  permit  of  a  more  extended  use  of  concrete. 


81 

On  principle,  observation  posts  and  important  machine-gun  em- 
placements will  be  built  of  concrete. 

10.  Villages. — Villages  in  the  intermediate  and  second-line  po- 
sitions will  be  fortified  so  as  to  permit  of  their  defense  in  sectors. 
During  a  battle,  however,  they  will  not  be  packed  with  troops 
scattered  about  in  cellars  and  dugouts. 

Any  conspicuous  excavated  earth  will  be  disguised. 

II.  Ala  km. 

11.  Alarm. — Conditions  vary  so  much  on  the  extended  front 
held  by  the  XIV  Reserve  Corps  that  I  refrain  from  issuing  a 
general  order  dealing  with  alarms  which  would  hold  good  for 
all  the  divisions.  Divisions  will  issue  orders  individually  and 
the  corps  will  undertake  the  printing  of  them.  These  orders 
will  be  posted  up  in  all  dugouts,  even  those  temporarily  unoc- 
cupied. 

It  will  generally  be  advisable  to  distinguish  between  an 
"  ordinary  alarm  "  and  a  "  gas  alarm,"  as  in  each  case  the  pro- 
cedure differs.  It  is  recommended  that  the  signal  for  an  ordi- 
nary alarm  should  be  given  by  mouth  (shout,  policeman's  whis- 
tle, foghorn,  etc.),  and  for  a  gas  alarm  by  hand  (ploughshare, 
motor  horn,  etc.).     Orders  for  alarms  will  be  submitted  to  me. 

III.  The  Infantry  Combat. 

12.  Gentries. — Our  entire  system  of  defense  depends  on  the 
trustworthiness  of  the  sentries  in  advanced  listening  posts  and 
in  the  fire  trenches.  Sentries  must,  in  most  cases,  remain  in 
the  listening  posts  even  during  a  heavy  bombardment.  The 
sentries  in  the  fire  trenches-  must  clearly  understand  that  on  a 
dark  night  they  must  not  rely  on  the  sentries  in  the  listening 
posts  or  on  patrols  sent  out  in  front.  Every  sentry  must  be 
convinced  that  the  safety  of  the  position  and  of  his  comrades  de- 
pends on  his  vigilance  and  his  endurance.  His  task  will  pre- 
sent great  difficulties  under  an  intense  bombardment,  when  he 
will  frequently  be  forced  to  take  cover.  With  regard  to  the 
latter  point,  he  must  be  given  definite  instructions  as  to  whether 
he  should  stand  at  the  entrance  to  the  dugout,  whether  he  should 
lie  down,  etc.  In  no  circumstances  may  observation  of  the 
front  suffer  interruption.  There  will  nevertheless  be  casualties 
among    the    sentries.     For    this    reason    the    garrisons    of   the 

9784°— 17 6 


82 

trenches  concerned  must,  be  in  ;i  state  oi  Instant  readin- 

the  dugouts,  and  the  commander  will  immediately  replace  any 
sentry  who  falls.  Sentries  will  carry  the  gas  mask  hang  00  the 
chest  or  in  the  box,  with  the  slings  of  the  mask  and  of  the  box 
around  the  neck. 

13.  Garrison  of  the  trenches. — The  garrison  of  the  first  trench 
of  the  first-line  position  should  be  strong  enough  to  repulse  the 
enemy's  attack,  assuming  that  the  men  reach  the  parapet  in 
time,  but  no  stronger.  The  better  the  first  trench  is  defended 
by  flanking  fire,  especially  that  of  machine  guns,  the  more  can 
the  infantry  garrison  be  reduced.  To  man  the  parapet  promptly 
requires  constant  observation,  good  alarm  arrangements,  suit- 
able construction  of  the  entrances  to  the  dugouts,  practice  of  the 
alarm  in  the  form  of  a  regular  drill,  and,  most  important  of  all, 
observation  of  the  fall  of  the  enemy's  artillery  fire  (lift  of  bar- 
rage). 

Above  all,  every  group  commander  and  every  man  must  realize 
that  the  success  or  failure  of  an  assault  depends  on  his  timely 
appearance  at  the  parapet.  It  must  be  made  clear  to  the  men 
that,  once  in  the  trench,  the  enemy  will  throw  hand  grenades 
into  the  dugouts.  Everything  depends,  therefore,  even  when 
the  alarm  signal  is  not  heard,  on  not  missing  the  instant  at 
which  the  enemy's  fire  lifts,  and  immediately  hurrying  to  the 
fire  line.  Experience  has  justified  the  practice  of  posting  sen- 
tries, armed  with  hand  grenades,  at  the  entrances  to  the 
dugouts,  to  deny  approach  to  the  enemy  and  to  facilitate  the 
task  of  ejecting  him. 

Machine  guns  which  are  left  in  breastworks  or  trenches  (lur- 
ing the  enemy's  intense  bombardment  will  be  destroyed  unless 
they  are  covered  by  very  strong  concrete  emplacements.  It  will 
generally  be  impossible  to  erect  such  concrete  structures  in  the 
first  trench.  Machine  guns  must,  as  a  rule,  be  kept  in  the  dug- 
outs of  their  crews  until  the  enemy  assaults,  and  must  then  he 
placed  rapidly  in  position  at  suitable  points  on  the  parapet  with- 
out making  use  of  the  sledges,  as  these  are  too  heavy  for  trench 
warfare.  It  is  taken  for  granted  that  the  crews  are  trained  in 
tiro  without  the  sledge,  on  a  pedestal  built  up  of  sand  bags. 
This  method  of  fire  must  be  learned.  The  resulting  disper- 
sion, which  is  known  to  be  the  disadvantage  of  this  method,  is 
of  no  account  -'it    assaulting  distance. 

In  order  to  make  the  enemy  disperse  his  tire  and  prevent  him 
locating  the  positions  really  employed  for  thinking  tire,  the  latter 
must  be  masked  and  a  number  of  (lummy  positions  constructed. 


83 

14.  Supports. — The  second  trench  of  the  first-line  position  is 
garrisoned  by  the  supports,  one  portion  of  which  is  specially  de- 
tailed to  defend  the  trench  itself  and  in  particular  the  entrances 
to  communication  trenches,  while  the  other  portion  consists  of 
strong,  specially  formed  bombing  parties,  which  are  held  in 
readiness  to  rush  forward  at  once  to  the  support  of  the  foremost 
trench.  This  maneuver  must  be  practiced  as  if  it  were  a  regular 
drill.  Local  conditions  may  make  it  necessary  to  station  part 
of  the  supports  in  the  third  trench. 

15.  Sector  reserves. — The  fighting  strength  of  both  the  front 
trenches  would  be  soon  exhausted  if  the  sector  reserves  were  not 
put  in.  They  must  therefore  be  brought  close  up  in  good  time, 
either  into  the  third  trench  or  into  special  reserve  trenches.  In 
case  of  an  attack,  they  should  be  moved  forward  into  the  second 
(or  third)  trench,  to  replace  the  reinforcements  which  have 
already  gone  forward  (.the  supports)  and  continue  the  task 
allotted  to  the  latter.  Should  the  enemy's  fire  permit  of  an  ad- 
vance across  the  open,  this  is  always  preferable  to  an  advance 
along  the  communication  trenches. 

The  sector  reserves  must  not,  therefore,  be  saved  up  too  long, 
but  must  be  thrown  in  early.  Otherwise  they  will  arrive  too 
late.  Every  battle  has  shown  that  trenches  which  are  either 
lost  or  in  dispute  may  be  comparatively  easily  cleared  or  recap- 
tured when  this  is  undertaken  immediately.  I  expect  leaders  to 
show  the  greatest  determination  and  initiative  in  such  cases. 

16.  Divisional  reserves. — The  sector  commander  must  be  re- 
lieved of  anxiety  as  to  his  forces  being  exhausted  too  soon  by 
moving  up  the  divisional  reserves.  They  should  not  be  left  be- 
hind in  villages  in  the  rear,  but  should  be  brought  up  to  re- 
serve trenches  on  the  battle  field  as  soon  as  the  threatened  sector 
can  be  ascertained  from  the  direction  of  the  enemy's  artillery 
fire.  Whether  they  stay  there  one  day  or  several  days  is  a  mat- 
ter of  indifference.  The  divisional  commander  must  rely  on  re- 
serves being  passed  on  to  him  by  the  corps  commander,  just  as 
the  latter  expects  them  from  the  army  commander.  In  critical 
situations  it  is  not  sound  to  quarter  reserves  in  villages  immedi- 
ately behind  the  front.  It  has  nearly  always  proved  impossible 
to  assemble  the  troops  quickly  when  they  are  scattered  in 
numerous  cellars,  etc.,  in  a  village  which  is  being  heavily  shelled. 
In  such  cases  the  reserves  should  be  in  the  trenches. 

Reserves  can  not  be  rapidly  moved  forward  without  practice. 
This  operation  must  therefore  be  practiced  in  suitable  weather. 


84 

The  distribution  of  the  division  and  the  improvement  of  th«> 
position  also  will  he  decided  in  the  light  of  the  experience  gained 
in  practicing  this  operation.  Routes  will  he  marked  out.  They 
must  lead  around  villages,  which  are  certain  to  be  heavily 
shelled.  Caw-dry  officers  will  he  trained  to  guide  troops  Into 
l)ositions  which  are  unknown  to  the  latter.  The  Second  lie- 
serve  Ulanen  Regiment  will  find  guides  for  the  Second  Guard 
Reserve  Division;  the  Fourth  Squadron.  Sixteenth  Dlanen  Regi- 
ment, those  for  the  Fifty-second  Division;  and  the  Wiirtteni- 
berg  Reserve  Dragoon  Regiment,  those  for  the  Twenty-sixth 
and  Twenty-eighth  Reserve  Divisions. 

17.  Means  of  communication. — Communication  with  the  front 
must  not  be  interrupted.  Consequently  several  means  of  com- 
munication must  be  available  and  kept  thoroughly  tested  (tele- 
phones, light  pistols,  light-signal  sections,  runners,  etc.).  The 
principle  of  metallic  circuits  will  be  adopted 'for  the  front  line 
in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  "listening."  (For  the 
method  of  laying  buried  cable  see  par.  27,  "  Telephone 

18.  Machine  guns. — When  the  ground  permits  of  ma  dune 
guns  being  employed  on  commanding  points  in  the  second  and 
third  trenches  with  a  view  to  firing  over  the  first  trench,  every 
advantage  should  be  taken  of  it.  It  is  advisable  to  employ  the 
bulk  of  the  machine  guns  not  in  but  behind  the  first  trench. 
WhfiB  fixing  their  siting  the  possibility  of  delivering  both 
frontal  and  flanking  fire  must  not  be  forgotten. 

Vsed  as  an  emergency  garrison  for  the  Intermediate  or  second- 
line  position,  they  may  prevent  a  break  through  if  the  enemy 
succeeds  in  overrunning  the  first-line  position. 

.Machine-gun  units  are  particularly  suitable  for  employment 
as  ;i  commander's  mobile  reserve. 

19.  Minenirerfer. — As  soon  as  a  hostile  attack  is  imminent  it 
is  advisable  to  withdraw  the  Minonwer  for  Prom  the  first  trench 
and  place  theni  in  prepared  positions  in  the  second  or  third 
trenches.  Light  Minonworfer  in  particular  will  be  site^l  in 
such  a  manner  thai,  by  making  full  use  of  their  range  and  mo- 
bility, all  points  where  the  enemy  may  be  expocted  to  concen- 
trate his  infantry  can  be  brought  under  lire,  which  should  bo 
Hanking  tire  whenever  possible. 

20.  Hand  orcnatlcs.  -Training  in  grenade  fighting  will  be  car- 
ried to  the  point  of  thoroughly  instructing  all  officers,  noncom- 
missioned officers,  and  men  of  the  infantry  and  pioneers,  Minen- 
werfer companies,  searchlight  sections,  gunners,  and  opoctvctb 


85 

of  the  field  and  foot  artillery,  as  well  as  those  detachments  of 
cavalry  which  take  their  turn  in  the  trenches,  and  the  field  com-  - 
panies  of  ammunition  columns  and  trains.  Officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  must,  in  addition,  know  how  hand  gre- 
nades should  be  tested  and  stored.  Our  hand  grenades  are  not 
weatherproof,  and  in  this  respect  their  design  leaves  much  to 
he  desired.  When  storing  them  particular  stress  must  therefore 
be  laid  on  protection  against  wet.  Corps  headquarters  will  en- 
deavor to  maintain  the  stocks  of  hand  grenades  with  the  units 
of  the  reserve  corps  on  the  following  scale : 

Infantry  regiment 8,  000 

Independent   infantry   battalion    (and   fourth   battalion 

ninety-ninth  reserve  infantry  regiment) 3,000 

Pioneer  company . 750 

Battery 50 

In  divisional  reserve i 8,  000 

In  corps  reserve , 30,000 

Rifles  and  hand  grenades  will  be  kept  in  the  dugouts,  not  at  the 
entrances  to  the  dugouts  or  in  special  stores. 

21.  Light  pistols. — Only  white  lights  will  be  used  for  illuminat- 
ing the  foreground.  On  dark  nights,  ample  use  will  be  made  of 
them.  On  occasions  when  small  enterprises  undertaken  by  the 
enemy  have  led  to  our  first  trench  being  raided  and  the  garrison 
surprised,  this  has  always  coincided  with  a  lack  of  illumination 
of  the  foreground.  The  second  army  has  been  asked  to  increase 
the  supply  of  light  pistols. 

(For  light-signal  cartridges  for  barrage  fire,  etc.,  see  par.  33, 
"  Light  signals." )  ^ 

22.  Ammunition. — Iron  ration:  Rounds. 

Infantry,  per  man,  carried  in  the  pouches 150 

In  every  battalion  sector,  per  man 150 

300 
Machine  guns : 

With  each  gun -. in  belts_     5,  000 

Reserve  for  each  gun loose__     5,  000 

10,000 
The   small-arms   ammunition   carts    of   the   infantry   and   of 
maehine-gun  units  will  always  be  kept  filled. 

The  expenditure  of  light-signal  cartridges  and  of  material  for 
Close-range  lighting  (grenades,  etc.),  should  be  in  no  way  re- 
stricted by  the  figures  laid  down  in  the  instructions  issued  by 


the  corps.  Expenditure  in  the  front-line  trenches  will  be  regu- 
lated only  by  requirements  and  will  be  Immediately  replaced  from 

the  rear.  Thus,  as  in  the  case  of  ammunition,  there  will  be  a 
constant  stream  of  supply  from  rear  to  front.  The  resulting 
drain  on  the  reserves  in  the  rear  will  be  covered  by  further 
indents. 

IV.  Artillery  Positions. 

23.  General. — Each  divisional  sector  must  have  at  least  twice 
as  many  battery  positions  as  the  number  of  batteries  present. 
Batteries  are  responsible  for  keeping  these  positions  in  repair. 
A  battery  position  is  net  complete  until  it  is  provided  with  ob- 
servation posts,*  gun  emplacements,  dugouts  for  the  men,  and 
dugouts  for  ammunition.  These  latter  must  contain  the  in- 
creased "  iron  ration  "  required  for  repelling  an  attack.  The 
amount  of  this  "  iron  ration  "  is  shown  in  the  following  para- 
graph : 

24.  Ammunition. — Iron  ration  :  Rounds. 

Field  gun  battery 2,000 

Light  field  howitzer  battery 1,  500 

10-centimeter  gun  battery 1,  500 

Heavy  field  howitzer  battery 1,  (KM) 

21-centimeter  mortar,  each KM) 

German  12-centimeter  gun  battery j 

German  15-centimeter  gun  (Ringkanooe)  battery 1  BOB 

Russian  15-centimeter  gun  battery J 

Belgium  8.7-centimeter  gun,  each 80 

9-centimeter  gun,  each 190 

In  addition  each  field  gun  must  be  provided  with  12  ease  shot 
and  each  9-centimeter  gun  with  5  case  shot 

A  guide  to  the  construction  of  battery  positions  is  given  in  the 
appendix  (not  received). 

25.  Battery  positions. — I  forbid  any  gun  being  placed  in  posi- 
tion in  the  first  trench  of  the  tirst-line  position.  Belgian  5.7- 
centimeter  and  8.7-centimeter  guns  may  be  employed  in  the  de- 
fense of  the  second-line  or  Intermediate  positions,  in  excep- 
tional cases  they  may  be  employed  to  defend  heavy  batteries  or 
the  rearmost  trenches  of  the  tirst-line  position.  None  of  the 
other  guns  will  be  sited  in  advance  of  the  Intermediate  posi- 
tion. Every  battery  position  will  he  protected  against  attacks 
at  close  quarters  by  a  special  wire  entanglement.  Hand  gre- 
nades. 50  for  each  battery,  will  be  kept  in  the  battery  position)1! 


87 

in  separate  recesses.  A  supply  of  demolition  explosives  will  be 
kept  ready  near  the  old  guns  for  which  there  are  no  teams,  and 
the  personnel  will  be  instructed  in  their  use.  If  the  enemy  ad- 
vances and  it  is  not  possible  to  withdraw  these  guns,  they  will 
be  destroyed.  Should  it  be  found  impossible  to  destroy  the 
ammunition,  it  will  be  rendered  useless  by  unscrewing  and  re- 
moving the  fuzes. 

In  cases  where  the  battery  possesses  only  one  of  the  topo- 
graphical section  battery  plans,  it  will  be  kept  in  the  battery 
position. 

26.  Observation  posts. — It  is  advisable  for  each  battery  to 
have  at  least  two  observation  posts.  Where  conditions  permit 
it,  the  main  observation  post  will  be  close  to  the  battery.  All 
observation  posts  will  be  shell  proof.  The  enemy's  attention 
must  not  be  attracted  to  observation  posts  by  movement  to  and 
from  them ;  notice  boards  must  be  placed  on  paths  leading  to 
them,  pointing  out  the  necessity  for  proceeding  with  caution. 

Auxiliary  observation  posts  will  be  situated  in  or  close  behind 
the  infantry  position.  From  them  will  be  observed  the  fire  of 
individual  batteries  on  special  targets,  such  as  sectors  of  trench, 
trench  mortars,  and  machine  guns. 

The  artillery  liaison  officer  attached  to  the  infantry  must  be 
at  the  infantry  commander's  battle  headquarters  or  in  its  im- 
mediate vicinity. 

27.  Telephones. — Buried  cables  have  proved  very  successful  in 
the  reserve  corps.  When  crossing  the  open  they  are  buried  to  a 
depth  of  at  least  5f  feet,  and  in  trenches  they  are  laid  at  least 
1\  feet  below  the  surface  of  the  sole  of  the  trench.  When  laying 
new  lines,  a  greater  depth  is  advisable  (6i  feet  and  3 \  feet). 
Further,  when  cables  are  led  into  dugouts,  command  posts,  etc.. 
they  must  be  laid  underground.  The  most  important  messages 
sent  back  from  the  front  and  to  the  artillery  are  "  Barrage  " 
and  "  Gas  attack."  The  line  will  be  cleared  for  them,  and  they 
will  take  priority  over  every  other  conversation. 

28.  Counter-battery  work. — Our  artillery  is  registered  on  all 
known  artillery  positions  of  the  enemy,  and  each  battery  on 
every  artillery  target  within  range.  Preparations  for  a  hostile 
attack  include  the  deployment  and  registration  of  a  very  large 
number  of  batteries.  During  this  period  the  enemy's  artillery 
must  be  constantly  weakened  by  shelling  individual  battery  po- 
sitions which  are  known  for  certain  to  be  occupied ;  the  proce- 
dure should  be  based  on  the  following  principles: 


88 

Evidence  of  the  battery  position  being  occupied  will  be  ob- 
tained by  means  of  aeroplanes,  captive  balloons,  or  bearings 
taken  by  the  survey  sections. 

29.  Survey  .sections. — The  survey  sections  take  bearin 
night  on  the  flashes  from  the  enemy's  guns  and  report  the  results 
to  the  artillery  commanders.  Only  cases  in  which  three  or  four 
bearings  are  obtained  will  be  taken  into  consideration.  For 
purposes  of  observation  by  day  the  sector  of  the  enemy's  front 
will  be  divided  into  groups.  The  survey  stations  will  observe 
which  groups  are  firing,  the  number  of  rounds  fired,  and  the 
targets. 

When  a  battery  is  registering  by  means  of  the  artillery  plan 
auxiliary  points  lying  as  nearly  as  possible  in  the  line  of  fire 
will  be  selected,  on  which  the  survey  sections  will  register.  Fire 
will  then  be  corrected  in  accordance  with  the  measurements,  on 
the  plan,  of  the  distance  between  the  point  registered  and  the 
target. 

30.  Balloons. — Registration  by  balloon  can  usually  only  be 
carried  out  in  very  clear  weather  and  on  a  calm  day. 

31.  Aeroplanes. — An  aeroplane  which  is  registering  must  be 
escorted  whenever  possible  by  a  battle  plane.  This  is  quite 
feasible  under  present  conditions,  if  the  aeroplane  keeps  over 
our  lines  while  registering,  for  it  can  then  be  protected  by  a 
Fokker.  Over  his  own  lines  the  enemy  enjoys  superiority  over 
us  by  reason  of  the  number  and  design  of  his  battle  planes. 

.  A  number  of  batteries,  winch  have  been  selected  for  bombard- 
ment, must  be  indicated  to  the  aeroplane  observer,  l.attery 
commanders  must  arrange  with  the  aeroplane  observer  before 
Ihey  shoot  with  regard  to  target,  tire  procedure)  and  method  of 
transmitting  the  results  of  observation.  On  a  day  previous  to 
Hie  shoot,  the  aeroplane  observer  must  have  flown  over  tbe 
batteries  concerned  in  order  to  decide  wbicb  batteries  are  easily 
and  which  are  not  easily  observed  from  the  air. 

Registration  will  close  when  at  least  two  groups  or  salvo*  have 
been  observed  to  fall  correctly. 

Aeroplane  observation  will  also  be  Continued  during  the  first 
part  of  the  fire  for  effect.  Should  tbe  shots  fall  correctly  at  tin4 
beginning  of  this,  the  aeroplane  observer  has  fulfilled  his  task 
and  is  free  to  return  home.  The  battery  commander  must  be 
told  how  long  the  aeroplane  can  tly  over  the  enemy's  battery 
(petrol  capacity,  outward  and  homeward  flight).  The  survey 
stations  must    take  bearings  during  the  first    portion  of  the  fire 


89 

for  effect,  so  that  the  tire  may  also  be  controlled  after  the 
departure  of  the  aeroplane. 

The  enemy's  battery  should  be  not  merely  silenced  but  de- 
stroyed. This  will  require  about  150  rounds  from  a  (15  centi- 
meter) heavy  field  howitzer  or  100  rounds  from  a  (21  centi- 
meter)  mortar. 

As  soon  as  possible  after  the  shoot,  the  target  should  be  photo- 
graphed from  another  aeroplane  in  order  to  ascertain  its  condi- 
tion and  the  effect  of  the  rounds  fired. 

32.  Method  of  engaging  the  enemy's  infantry. — When  an  infan- 
try attack  is  threatening,  intense  artillery  fire  will  be  directed 
on  the  enemy's  trenches  (Corps  Orders,  la.  693,  Secret,  of 
12/5/16,  par.  7). 

When  the  assault  is  launched,  barrage  fire  will  be  opened 
(Corps  Orders,  la.  693,  Secret,  of  12/5/16,  par.  7). 

33.  Light  signals. — Cartridges  which  produce  a  red  light 
breaking  into  "pearls,"  will  be  used  as  a  signal  for  barrage  fire. 
Should  our  fire  be  too  short  and  fall  on  our  own  trenches, 
the  range  must  be  increased.  In  this  case  cartridges  which 
produce  a  green  light  breaking  into  "pearls,"  will  be  used.  It 
is  advisable,  where  the  ground  is  suitable,  to  have  observers  in 
lookouts  placed  high  up  a'nd  near  the  batteries,  who  can  see 
the  light  signals  sent  up  from  the  front  line,  in  spite  of  smoke 
and  clouds  of  gas.  AH  light-signal  cartridges  must  be  preserved 
from  the  damp  as  much  as  possible-  (packed  in  wooden  cases, 
etc. ) .    These  cartridges  will  be  issued  on  the  following  scale  : 

For  the  company  furnishing  the  garrison  of  the  trench 
and  the  supports,  100  red  and  70  green. 

For  each  division  for  instructional  purposes,  150  of  each. 

As  divisional  reserve  to  replace  unserviceable,  100  of  each. 
Light  signals  are,  however,  only  one  of  the  signs  used  to  de- 
note the  necessity  for  opening  barrage  fire  or  for  lifting  artillery 
fire.  The  artillery  should  never  delay  in  opening  fire  when  the 
intensity  of  the  enemy's  artillery  fire  leads  to  the  supposition 
that  an  attack  is  imminent.  When  the  artillery  fire  in  any 
particular  sector  is  already  fairly  heavy,  the  right  moment  may 
easily  be  missed.  In  such  cases  the  artillery,  so  far  from  wait- 
ing for  light  signals  or  telephone  messages  from  the  infantry 
(both  means  of  communication  may  fail),  should  shell  the  en- 
emy's trenches  with  an  intensity  increasing  in  proportion  to  the 
enemy's  fire,  in  order  to  prevent  his  infantry  from  leaving  its 
trenches.     Immediately   it  becomes  evident  from  the  enemy's 


90 

artillery  fire  at  what  point  he  intends  to  break  through  the 
fire  of  every  battery,  with  the  exception  of  the  (-1  centimeter  t 
mortars,  will  be  directed  onto  the  portion  of  the  enemy's  front- 
line trench  which  is  opposite  the  sector  threatened.  Battery 
commanders  have  necessarily  to  act  on  their  own  initiative  in 
this  matter.  The  (21  centimeter)  mortars  will  shell  the  enemy's 
assembly  trenches,  which  have  been  previously  located.  Should 
the  enemy  launch  an  assault,  barrage  tire  will  be  opened. 

34.  Practice  in  fire  control. — The  rapid  concentration  of  fire 
on  the  enemy's  points  of  assembly  is  difficult  to  achieve  and 
must  be  most  carefully  practiced  in  every  detail.  Divisional 
artillery  commanders  will  test  the  smooth  working  of  the  meth- 
ods of  indication  of  targets  and  transmission  of  orders  by  car- 
rying out  fire-control  drill.  This  should  be  based  on  the  various 
possible  schemes  of  attack.  The  various  distributions  of  fire 
will  be  noted  in  the  fire-distribution  books  of  the  batteries.  As 
a  check,  each  battery  engaged  will  fire  a  round  at  its  allotted 
sector.  Every  possible  contingency  will  be  dealt  with  at  fire- 
control  drill.  Divisions  will  cooperate  with  this  object.  The 
senior  artillery  commander  will  direct  the  fire-control  drill 
when  practicing  against  sectors  requiring  the  cooperation  of  the 
artillery  of  two  divisions.  Fire-control  drills  must  be  treated 
from  a  tactical  point  of  view.  Information  of  the  enemy's 
movements  may  suddenly  reach  the  rear  from  the  front  line  or 
t  he  signals  may  be  observed  in  rear. 

The  limits  of  the  artillery  sectors  correspond  more  or  less 
to  those  of  divisions.  In  a  divisional  area  the  artillery  fire 
control  is  in  the  hands  of  the  artillery  commander.  The  latter 
directs  the  artillery  groups,  which  are  usually  composed  of  field 
and  heavy  guns. 

(Signed)  v.  Stkin, 

(General  Officer  ('ommundino. 


MEMORADUM. 

TO  BE  GIVEN  WITH  ATTACHED  LETTER  TO  ALL 
PILOTS  AND  OBSERVERS  IN  SECOND  BRIGADE, 
ROYAL  FLYING  CORPS. 

It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  and  comment  that,  since 
the  war  began,  measures  for  the  purpose  of  denying  the  enemy 
information  about  our  military  and  naval  operations  have  be- 
come more  stringent  and  numerous  as  the  necessity  to  obtain 
it  has  become  more  urgent  and  vital  to  him. 

The  magnitude  and  issues  of  the  war  seem  almost  too  vast 
for  one  man  to  contemplate,  and  to  this  is  due,  in  all  prob- 
ability, the  continued  indiscretions  of  officers  and  men  in  dis- 
closing information,  for  they  find  it  hard  to  believe  how  many 
details  learned  by  the  enemy  of  the  movement  and,  location  of 
an  individual  man  or  unit  can  in  any  way  affect  the  result  of 
operations  and  consequent  duration  of  the  war.  They  fail  to 
realize  that,  although  one  such  instance  as  an  isolated  fact 
would  not,  in  all  probability,  be  of  as  much  value  to  the  German 
great  general  staff,  yet  the  ramifications  of  the  enemy's  intelli- 
gence system  are  purposely  wide  in  order  to  collect  such  small 
details,  and  "on  dits,"  the  accumulations  of  which  enable 
hypotheses  to  be  verified  and  deductions  to  be  confirmed. 

The  average  flying  corps  pilot  or  observer  has  great  oppor- 
tunities of  knowing  the  program  of  operations,  the  disposition 
of  troops,  and  the  material  available  not  only  of  the  royal  flying 
corps  but  of  the  corps  and  army  with  which  he  is  working.  This 
knowledge  is  a  sine  qua  non  of  his  work.  The  enemy  knows  this 
well,  and  hence  the  capture  of  a  pilot  or  observer  is  an  oppor- 
tunity for  obtaining  information  which  he  spares  himself  no 
pains  to  take  advantage  of  without  scruple  as  to  the  method  he 
employs  or  the  trouble  he  spends. 

What  is  written  on  attached  is  in  the  form  of  an  open  letter 
addressed  to  every  pilot  and  observer  in  the  second  brigade,  in 
the  hope  that  he  will  bring  himself  to  realize  that  he  may  be 
placed  one  day  in  circumstances  where  personal  honor  will 
make  it  incumbent  on  him  to  act  in  a  manner  which  discipline 
would  be  powerless  to  enforce. 

(91) 


92 

OPEN     LETTER     TO    OFFICERS     AM)     PILOTS     OF    THE     SECOND     BRIGADE. 

If  you  are  unfortunate  enough  to  be  compelled  to  land  behind 
the  German  lines  you  may  be  agreeably  surprised  by  the  appar- 
ent hospitality  and  generosity  of  your  welcome  there.  The  Ger- 
man officers  will  probably  have  you  to  stay  with  them  as  their 
guest  for  a  few  days  at  one  of  their  squadrons,  and  will  make 
you  most  comfortable.  You  will  probably  be  extremely  well 
entertained  with  the  very  best  of  everything  they  can  offer. 
An  abundance  of  good  champagne  from  France  will  oil  the 
wheels  of  conversation  between  the  officers  of  the  German  Flying 
Corps  and  one  whom  they  will  probably  term  a  brother  officer 
of  the  English  Flying  Corps.  They  will  appear  to  be  very  good 
fellows — straightforward,  cheerful,  and  keen  on  the  scientific 
side  of  flying,  apart  from  their  ordinary  work,  with  which  they 
may  say  they  are  quite  fed  up.  They  will  probably  lead  you 
to  talk  about  the  possibilities  of  aviation  after  the  war,  and 
profess  little  interest  in  aviation  as  actually  applied  to  the  war. 
It  may  not  take  much  wine  to  gladden  your  heart,  and  to  induce 
you  to  lay  aside  your  suspicions  and  reserve,  and  forget  the 
guile  which  lies  behind  their  artless  questions. 

And  so,  unaccustomed  as  you  are  to  this  form  of  deceit,  you 
may  fall  another  victim  to  this  clever  combination  of  cunning 
and  hospitality.  But  though  they  may  succeed  for  the  moment 
in  making  a  favorable  impression,  you  will  afterwards  have 
every  reason  to  remember  that  during  this  war  the  Germans 
have  proved  themselves  to  be  a  cruel  and  unscrupulous  enemy. 
but  they  are  sound  financiers,  and  have  an  eye  to  good  invest- 
ment. It  does  not  cost  them  much  to  entertain  you  well,  and 
even  if  it  did,  they  expect  to  get  an  adequate  return  for  their 
money  in  the  form  of  information  unwittingly  imparted  by  you. 

That  is  why  they  will  give  you  all  the  delights  of  the  "Carl 
ton  7  and  "  Savoy  "  with  none  of  the  regrets  of  an  overdraft  at 
Cox's,  and  that  is  why  you  will  be  treated  as  an  honored  guest. 
instead  of  being  half  starved  in  one  of  their  now  notorious 
prison  camps;  a  treatment  which  is  in  fact  only  postponed  until 
they  have  squeezed  every  ounce  of  useful  information  out  of 
you.  The  work  is  done  by  experienced  men.  Quite  unknown 
to  yourself,  one  or  more  of  the  seemingly  irresponsible  Hying 
men  ;ire  highly  trained  intelligence  Officers,  who  will  sift  hits 
of  useful  information  from  your  most  brilliant  "  b<>n  mots"" 
received  with  the  keenest  amusement  and  gratification. 


93 

On  the  other  hand,  different  methods  may  be  employed, 
though  these  are  not  so  common  with  prisoners  of  the  flying 
corps  as  with  others.  You  may  be  browbeaten  and  ordered  to 
disclose  information  on  the  pain  of  suffering  severe  penalties 
if  you  refuse.  Remember  this  is  only  a  ruse,  and  that  they 
will  not  carry  out  their  threats.  It  is  more  probable  that  they 
will  respect  you  for  your  patriotism  and  discretion. 

It  is  quite  possible  that  you  may  be  placed  in  a  hut  with  an 
officer  alleged  to  be  an  English  prisoner,  speaking  English 
fluently,  and  knowing  many  people  in  England  well,  and  wish 
ing  to  have  news  of  everyone  and  everything;  or  perhaps  he 
will  ask  no  questions,  relying  only  on  your  confidences.  It  will 
be  difficult  for  you  to  believe  that  he  is  not  a  companion  in  mis- 
fortune, but  this  is  a.  common  trick  of  all  intelligence  services, 
and  a  very  profitable  one. 

Therefore  be  on  your  guard,  and  remember  that  in  a  show 
like  this  it  is  impossible  for  any  individual  not  at  the  head  of 
affairs  to  say  what  is  of  use  to  the  enemy  and  what  is  not.  Re- 
member that  any  information  you  may  inadvertently  give  may 
lengthen  the  war  and  keep  you  longer  in  Germany ;  may  cost  the 
lives  of  many  Englishmen;  may  strain  the  country's  resources 
even  more  than  they  are  being  strained  at  present.  Don't 
think  this  is  all  imagination  and  needless  caution.  The  need 
of  it  has  been  bought  by  experience.  No  careless  or  irresponsible 
feelings  ought  to  weigh  with  us  against  anything  we  can  do  to 
hasten  the  conclusion  of  the  war. 


HINTS  ON  RECONNAISSANCE  FOR  MINES  AND 
LAND  MINES  IN  THE  AREA  EVACUATED  BY 
THE  GERMANS. 

(Compiled  chiefly  from  notes  forwarded  by  Inspector  of  Mines.) 


The  greatest  care  must  be  taken  when  reconnoitering  ground 
evacuated  by  the  Germans  for  mines  and  land  mines. 

A  cursory  examination  is  not  sufficient,  as  the  mines  are  often 
extremely  well  concealed. 

The  following  suggestions,  compiled  from  various  sources, 
may  be  of  use  to  officers  making  these  reconnaissances : 

CROSSROADS. 

Crossroads  are  often  mined  and  the  charges  have  been  known 
to  explode  as  long  as  48  days  after  our  occupation.  The  surface 
of  the  road  should  be  carefully  examined  for  signs  of  fresh 
work.  Any  found  should  be  at  once  opened  out  to  insure  that 
there  is  no  contact  mine  there.  ( Sketches  of  typical  examples — 
Nos.  1,  2,  3.) 

The  ground  should  be  cleared  for  25  yards  in  every  direction 
from  the  crossroads  and  carefully  inspected  for  signs  of  the 
entrance  to  any  gallery  which  may  pass  under  the  road. 

The  entrance  may  be  blown  in  or  covered  in  by  the  debris 
from  another  explosion  after  the  charge  has  been  laid.  Any 
small  craters  should,  therefore,  be  carefully  investigated. 

The  following  examples  have  been  found : 

1.  In  Noyon  galleries  had  been  driven  from  under  the  paving 
stones. 

2.  Gallery  driven  under  road  and  excavated  till  only  a  thin 
crust  remained ;  8-inch  shell  in  position  with  the  fuze  portion 
on  but  loose  and  in  contact  with  the  roof. 

3.  Shell  holes  on  a  road,  apparently  filled  up  with  bricks,  etc., 
have  been  found  to  contain  land  mines  fitted  with  instantaneous 
fuze  and  friction  fuze  lighter,  with  safety  pin  attached  to  trip 
wire  (which  had  broken  off). 

(95) 


96 

DUGOUTS. 

Any  dugouts  left  undestroyed  should  be  carefully  examined. 

Look  for  any  sols  from  which  the  tomms  have  been  cut  and 
replaced  by  wedges. 

Loose  boards  in  floor,  sides,  or  roof  often  locate  the  smaller 
variety  of  charges. 

Apparent  dead  ends  should  always  be  inspected  carefully ; 
the  two  biggest  charges  were  found  behind  such  places,  complete 
even  to  the  pick  marks  one  would  naturally  expect. 

Every  alternate  set  should  be  removed  and  replaced. 

The  following  examples  of  what  have  been  found  may  serve 
as  a  guide  to  what  may  be  expected : 

1.  Grenades  liable  to  explode  when  trodden  on. 

2.  Dozen  stick  bombs,  arranged  to  be  fired  by  wire  attached 
to  sandbag  which  had  to  be  removed  to  open  a  dugout  floor. 

3.  Wires  to  fire  charge  attached  to  handrail  in  entrance  of 
dugout.  (In  dugouts  constructed  with  casing,  mortise,  and 
tenon  joints  the  position  of  a  charge  is  sometimes  indicated  by 
the  wedging  of  the  timber,  where  sides  have  been  cut  and  re- 
moved.) 

4.  Charges  of  2,000  pounds  with  20  feet  of  tamping  in  wall 
of  dugout  connected  with  a  pair  of  fire  leads  amongst  a  number 
of  telephone  wires.     (Intended  method  of  fire  not  discovered.) 

5.  In  two  cases  charges  of  a  few  hundred  pounds  left  in  un- 
damaged dugouts,  which  were  attractively  equipped  so  as  to 
Induce  early  occupation,  exploded  about  eight  days  after  enemy 
evacuation,  presumably  by  clockwork  or  other  delay-action 
device. 

6.  A  shovel  stuck  in  the  side  of  a  dugout  between  timbers. 
The  wires  from  battery  of  three  dry  cells  were  one  attached  to 
metal  and  the  other  to  contact  plate.  The  shovel  stack  out  as 
an  obstruction  and  would  in  the  ordinary  way  have  been  re- 
moved. 

7.  A  false  step  in  the  stairway  of  dugout  of  thin  planking  -nuk- 
ing contact  when  trodden  on. 

8.  A  blown-in  entrance  to  a  dugOUJ  is  not  always  a  safety  simi. 
Charges  may  he  concealed  in  the  unblown  portion,  They  are 
generally  crudely  arranged  contact  charges, 

9.  An  elaborate  and  neat  trap  has  been  discovered  under  the 
Achiet-le-Grand-Bapaume    Railway   embankment,   southeast   of 


07 

Bihucourt,  Above  the  timber  ceiling  of  a  tunneled  stairway 
leading  to  dugouts  under  the  embankment  was  a  mine,  to  which 
access  was  obtainable  only  by  removing  three  of  the  setts 
(frames)  of  the  stairway.  Every  sett  was  intact  and  carefully 
wedged,  there  were  no  gaps,  and  the  hand  rails  were  continuous. 
(Sketch  4.) 

10.  A  window  weight,  suspended  by  a  fine  cord  crossing  en- 
trance, arranged  to  drop  into  a  box  of  detonators  in  connection 
with  charge. 

11.  One  of  the  pieces  of  timber  on  the  side  of  the  stairs  leading 
down  into  a  dugout  projected  slightly  inward  at  the  top,  though 
it  was  in  place  at  the  bottom.  It  was  pulled  out  for  investiga- 
tion, and  a  nail  was  found  driven  through  its  lower  end,  the 
point  of  which  was  placed  against  the  cap  of  a  cartridge  which 
had  a  charge  of  explosive  behind  it.  Had  the  plank  been  forced 
into  its  correct  position,  the  nail  would  have  struck  the  cap  and 
exploded  the  charge. 

12.  Branch  placed  over  entrance  to  dugout  as  if  to  conceal  it, 
when  removed  caused  an  explosion  2  minutes  later,  completely 
destroying  dugout. 

13.  Trip  wires  in  entrances  of  dugouts,  etc.,  arranged  to  ex- 
plode charges  or  grenades. 

14.  Charges  have  been  found  in  chambers  on  each  side  of  the 
entrance,  in  chambers  off  the  dugout  itself,  in  the  ventilating 
shafts. 

15.  Charges  are  usually  found  to  be  80  to  150  pounds  of  Perdit 
placed  in  small  chambers  at  a  height  of  5  feet  from  the  floor,  and 
in  the  ventilating  shafts  10  feet  or  11  feet  below  ground  level, 
and  in  every  case  at  the  end  of  a  little  gallery  4  feet  long  by  18 
inches  square.  The  charge  is  tamped  with  a  wooden  panel, 
backed  by  loose  stones  cemented  over  at  the  end.  Firing  is  elec- 
tric by  armored  cable. 

HOUSES. 

A  house  of  any  size  left  standing  should  always  be  looked 
upon  with  suspicion.  The  cellar  especially  should  be  carefully 
examined  and  the  surface  inspected  and  ground  around  the 
house  cleared  of  debris,  as  mines  are  sometimes  sunk  against  the 
wall  of  cellar. 

The  following  examples  have  been  found : 

1.  A  box  of  explosives  buried  in  a  cellar,  timed  to  go  off  by 
the  corrosive  action  of  acid  on  a  steel  wire.     (Sketch  7.) 
9784°— 17 7 


98 

2.  Charges,  with  fuse  and  detonator,  in  chimney. 
8.  Detonators  in  lumps  of  coal. 

4.  Book  on  table,  with  wire  down  leg  of  table.  Charge  would 
fire  if  book  were  lifted. 

5.  A  mechanical  fuse  igniter  attached  by  wire  to  an  explosive 
charge  fixed  in  the  walls  of  a  house  has  been  found  in  Neuville- 
Bourjonval. 

6.  In  the  paving  of  a  house  in  Roye  the  Germans  had  sunk  a 
hole  from  the  ground  floor  to  a  stone  drain  5  meters  below  the 
ground  level ;  under  this  drain  there  was  a  concealed  shallow 
well ;  from  this  they  had  driven  out  two  small  galleries  and 
charged  them  each  with  150  pounds  Perdit.  The  hole  to  the 
drain  had  been  filled  in  again  and  repaved. 

7.  The  French  experimented  successfully  for  clockwork  de- 
vices by  means  of  the  geophone. 

8.  Grenade  under  loose  brick  in  floor  of  stable  covered  with 
straw.    Pressure  on  brick  would  explode  grenade. 

RAILWAYS. 

Especial  care  should  be  taken  with  the  investigation  of  the 
following  places  for  signs  of  enemy  work : 

Bridges. — Charges  are  often  placed  on  the  girders,  or  holes 
are  sunk  in  the  abutments  behind  the  girders. 

The  approaches  to  a  bridge  which  has  been  destroyed  should 
be  examined.  Trap  charges  have  been  discovered  which  were 
laid  with  a  view  of  destroying  the  temporary  structure  over 
the  gap. 

Level  crossings. — In  some  cases  mines  have  been  driven  under 
the  crossing  by  means  of  an  inclined  gallery  from  the  think. 

Embankments. — Charges  have  been  discovered  at  the  ends  of 
galleries,  driven  into  the  embankment.  A  land  mine  was  dis- 
covered fixed  inside  a  rectangular  box  8-inch  by  8-inch  see 
tion,  10  feet  long.  This  box  was  sunk  vertically  in  the  em 
banUment  between  the  rails.  One  foot  of  earth  was  rammed 
in  on  top  of  the  explosive,  which  was  to  be  fired  by  electrical 
means. 

WKIX8. 

Wells  are  often  destroyed  by  boring  a  6-inch  hole,  10  to  'J'1 

feet    deep,   a    few    feet    to  0WB  shle  of  the  well,   filling  this   with 
explosive,  and  blowing  It.    (Sketches  Q  ami  6.)     The  following 

tips  for  locating  wells  blown  in  this  manner  may  be  of  use ; 


99 

1.  The  German  sign  for  a  well  is  a  white  board  bearing  a  red 
ring  with  a  red  disk  in  center,  or  the  word  "  Briinnen." 

2.  The  locality  of  a  well  is  usually  a  crater  in  the  yard  of  a 
building.  The  charges  are  usually  placed  about  12  feet  from 
side  of  well,  10  to  20  feet  deep,  so  that  the  well  is  never  in  the 
center  of  crater. 

3.  Men  employed  reclaiming  a  well  should  work  with  a  life 
line  on.  Novita  sets  should  be  handy  in  case  of  any  men  be- 
coming gassed  from  fumes  of  explosive  which  was  burnt. 

4.  Wells  and  ponds  have  been  rendered  unfit  for  drinking  by 
means  of  creosol,  dung,  and  all  sorts  of  filth.  Wells  should  be 
labeled  "  Not  to  be  used  "  until  the  water  has  been  tested  by 
the  local  expert. 

BATHING   PLACES. 

Pointed  stakes  have  been  found  driven  in  with  their  points 
below  water  level  and  interlaced  with  barbed  wire. 

Bathing  places  should  be  examined  before  being  taken  into 
use  by  the  troops. 

GENERAL. 

The  following  remarks  may  be  useful  as  regards  the  search  for 
and  destruction  of  an  enemy's  land  mines.  Great  skill  and  care 
are  required.  Suspected  localities  should,  first  of  all,  be- studied 
with  good  field  glasses.  The  following  signs  should  be  looked 
for :  Freshly  turned-up  earth,  settlement  of  the  ground,  oval 
marks  on  the  ground  after  rain,  patches  of  grass  that  stand 
out  conspicuously,  narrow  strips  wThere  the  earth  has  been 
disturbed  which  may  mark  where  leads  have  been  laid,  ends 
of  wire,  cord,  and  canvas  sticking  up,  numerous  foot  tracks  on 
a  confined  space,  litter  of  materials,  such  as  powder,  guncot- 
ton,  shavings,  paper.  Suspicious  places  in  soft  ground  can  be 
investigated  with  a  probe.  If  a  contact  mine  is  discovered,  it 
should  be  marked  and  destroyed  later  by  firing  a  slab  of  gun- 
cotton  on  top  of  it.  Trip-wire  mines  can  be  destroyed  by  at- 
taching a  guncotton  primer  to  the  wire  and  detonating  it  or 
by  firing  the  mine  by  means  of  a  long  cord  made  fast  to  the 
trip  wire.  When  the  leads  of  observation  mines  are  discovered 
they  should  be  cut  singly  and  the  ends  turned  up.  Contact 
mines  have  sometimes  been  exploded  by  driving  cattle  over 
them.    The  following  devices  have  also  been  discovered: 

1.  Barricades  interlaced  with  wires  attached  to  stick  bombs. 

2.  Hand  bombs  buried  in  trench  with  telephone  wires  attached. 


100 

3.  Trench  boards,  new  in  every  case,  on  several  Are  steps, 
which  detonated  bombs  when  trodden  on. 

4.  Seven-inch  shells  with  fuze  removed  and  replaced  by  det- 
onator. 

5.  Cap  badges,  artificial  flowers,  bits  of  evergreen,  pieces  of 
shell,  and  other  articles  likely  to  be  picked  up  as  "  souvenirs  " 
attached  to  charges. 

6.  The  preparations  for  blowing  up  Fort  de  Conde  appear  to 
have  involved  charges  of  2,600  to  3,000  pounds,  to  be  fired  inde- 
pendently after  the  fort  was  captured.  The  electric  lends  were 
duplicated,  one  being  apparent  and  the  other  buried  1$  to  2 
feet  below  it. 

EXPLOSIVES. 

The  explosives  used  by  the  Germans  are  Westphalite,  Perdit, 
and  Donarit.  They  are  all  hygroscopic.  Charges  found  by  the 
troops  may,  therefore,  be  rendered  reasonably  safe,  in  the  first 
instance,  by  being  saturated  with  water.  They  should  be  left 
in  situ  to  be  removed  by  men  accustomed  to  handle  explosives. 

The  withdrawal  of  charges  must  be  done  with  care,  as  detona- 
tors are  frequently  found  distributed  throughout  them.  This  is 
specially  the  case  with  portable  charges  made  up  in  tins.  Deto- 
nators have  been  found  in  the  middle  packets  of  one  of  these. 
Each  charge  should  be  opened  for  examination. 

Exploration  for  charges  leads  to  the  accumulation  of  a  forge 
amount  of  loose  explosive,  Which  is  unfit  to  return  to  store. 
This  should  be  destroyed  as  soon  as  possible  in  one  of  the  fol- 
lowing ways : 

1.  By  detonating  it  in  small  quantities,  in  consultation  with 
troops  in  the  vicinity. 

2.  By  scattering  it  broadcast  &ver  w;iste  ground.  It  Should 
be  remembered  that  if  the  ground  is  subsequently  occupied  In- 
animate as  picket  lines  they  run  some  risk  of  being  poisoned. 

3.  By  burning,  the  explosive  being  laid  out  in  long  parallel 
lines  about  6  inches  high.  This  is  the  beet  and  safest  \v;iy. 
provided  all  detonators  have  beea  removed.  The  fames  are  un- 
pleasant, and  the  explosive  should  he  burnt  after  consultation 
with  the  troops  in  the  neighborhood,  and  carried  out  When  the 
wind  is  in  the  direction  which  will  cause  least  inconvenience. 

4.  Ignition  of  the  explosive  is  facilitated  by  mixing  with  it  a 
little  cordite  or  the  charge  of  German  howitzers. 

Charges  must  not  be  destroyed  by  throwing  them  into  ponds 
or  down  wells. 


101, 


SKtTCH  N?7 


GERMAN  AUTOMATIC  DETONATING  DEVICE 

UJED     IN    CONNECTION    WITH    EXPLOSIVE     CHARGEJ 
LEFT     IN     DUC-OUTJ,    BILLET*      &      ELJBWHgRE. 


Copper  Ming  " — 

CaP »-r"~i[s  <s| 


Copper- 


Tinned  brasJ 


Bbck 


Steel  mre  attached 
to  Striker 

Clamp  for  wire 


Screwed  cap  holding 
Detonator  jn  place 

Locking  ring 


/llluminium  case 
containing  Primer 
(Pamtid  dlatk) 


ELEVATION. 


SECTIONAL  ELEVATION. 


The  device  shown  above  is  exceedingly  dangerous  and  explodes 
automatically  after  a  certain  length  of  time,  owing  to  the  chemi- 
cal action  of  the  acid  severing  the  piece  of  fine  wire  and  thus 
releasing  the  striker. 

The  device  should  be  handled  as  little  as  possible  after  it  has 
been  removed  from  a  charge,  as  it  is  liable  to  explode  at  any 
moment.  It  should  be  carried  horizontally  at  arm's  length, 
holding  it  by  the  copper  head,  with  the  other  end  away  from 
the  body,  and  buried  at  least  1  foot  deep  or  thrown  into  a  well. 


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DIRECTIONS  FOR  THE  USE  OF  ANTIGAS 
HORSE  RESPIRATOR. 


ALERT   POSITION. 


When  horses  are  being  sent  into  the  neighborhood  of  the 
trenches,  the  transport,  or  other  officer  responsible,  should  have 
the  respirators  adjusted  into  the  "  alert "  position  before 
moving  oil".     This  is  done  as  follows : 

(a)  The  flap  of  the  respirator  case  is  unbuttoned  and  slipped 
under  the  noseband  of  the  headcollar  from  below  upward 

{b)  The  straps  on  either  side  of  the  case  are  also  passed 
under  the  noseband  and  secured  to  the  cheek  pieces  of  the  head 
collar  above  the  metal  D  on  each  side. 

(c)  The  small  unbleached  calico  patch  on  the  upper  side  of 
the  opening  of  the  respirator  is  buttoned  onto  the  noseband  so 
that  the  respirator  is  ready  to  be  slipped  on  immediately. 

(d)  The  cover  of  the  case  is  then  closed  over  the  noseband  and 
the  respirator  thus  protected  from  rain,  etc.     (See  Fig.  1.) 

Note. — Should  it  be  found  that  the  respirator  carried  in  the  "  alert  " 
position  galls  the  nose,  it  may  be  carried  as  an  alternative- 
fa)    On  the  saddle,   for  riding  horses. 

(6)  On  the  breastplate  attached  to  the  rings  of  the  supporting  strap 
<<r  on  the  supporting  strap  itself,  for  draft  horses. 

WEARJNO   IN   GAS. 

The  respirator  carried  in  the  "  alert  "  position  can  be  rapidly 
adjusted  when  necessity  arises,  as  follows: 

(1)  Unbutton  case  and  remove  respirator,  leaving  the  case 
attached  to  the  cheek  pieces  of  the  head  collar  and  lying  flat 
on  the  face. 

(2)  Holding  the  lower  side  of  the  opening  of  the  respirator 
with  one  hand  on  each  side  of  the  canvas  mouthpiece,  draw  it 
down  over  the  upper  lip  and  upper  incisor  teeth  into  the  mouth. 
Gently  enlarging  the  opening  of  the  respirator,  adjust  it  well 
up  into  the  angle  of  the  mouth  (the  linen  portion  which  is  but- 
toned onto  the  noseband  will  prevent  the  bag  from  slipping  off 
the  nose). 

(105) 


106 

(3)  Then  take  the  elastic  band  on  either  side  close  to  the 
mouthpiece  and  pull  outward  so  as  to  tighten  the  mouth  of  the 
bag  over  the  upper  jaw  above  the  nostrils.  This  is  most  im- 
portant, to  permit  of  sufficient  length  of  loop  of  the  elastic  to  go 
over  the  horse's  poll,  and  also  to  insure  the  respirator  being  gas- 
proof. 

(4)  Slip  the  elastic  loop  over  the  horse's  poll  (vide  Fig.  2), 
or,  in  the  case  of  a  restive  horse,  or  when  the  attendant  is  a 
very  small  man  and  unable  to  reach  the  horse's  poll,  draw  the 
elastic  loop  taut  from  each  side  of  the  mouth,  thence  under  the 
lower  jaw,  and  fix  securely  to  the  lowest  portion  of  the  throat 
lash.  (Vide  Fig.  3.)  The  respirator  is  then  in  position,  and 
the  animal  may  be  worked  in  it  without  difficulty  or  undue  dis- 
tress. The  bit  and  reins  are  not  interfered  with  in  any  way. 
(See  Figs.  2  and  3.) 

REPLACEMENT   IN    CASE. 

In  folding  the  respirator  and  replacing  it  in  the  case  the  fol- 
lowing points  should  be  observed : 

(1)  The  canvas  mouthpiece  should  be  wiped  as  clean  as 
possible. 

(2)  The  bag  should  be  held  with  the  canvas  mouthpiece  down- 
ward and  the  elastic  band  looped  round  the  bag. "  Commencing 
at  the  sack  end,  roll  tightly  over  the  elastic  band.  Afterwards 
insert  into  the  case  with  the  linen  flap  uppermost 

J.   Mookk. 
Brigadier  Oowgrot, 
Director  of  Ycteriiuiry  fifert 
Headquarters,  D.  V.  S., 

June  1,  ion. 


107 


PATROL  AND  CONTROL  OF  "  NO  MAN'S  LAND/' 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


1.  There  should  be  drawn  a  more  or  less  arbitrary  line  be- 
tween observation  and  reconnaissance.  Both  duties  are  per- 
formed by  the  battalion  intelligence  sections,  but  by  entirely 
different  sets  of  men. 

By  observation  is  meant  the  method  of  obtaining  data  from 
stationary  observation  posts,  while  by  reconnaissance  is  meant 
the  method  of  obtaining  data  by  means  of  patrols. 

2.  At  the  very  outset  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  the  vital 
importance  of  this  work.  Even  the  highest  authorities  have  no 
means  of  obtaining  information  about  the  enemy's  front  line, 
except  through  our  own  front-line  troops.  Without  accurate 
information  it  is  practically  impossible  to  plan  any  operation. 

A  great  deal  of  very  valuable  information  goes  to  waste 
simply  because  the  ordinary  man  in  the  line  does  not  know  what, 
to  do  with  it,  or  is  simply  too  lazy  to  tell  what  he  has  seen  or 
heard.  For  instance,  a  sentry,  at  night,  may  distinctly  see  the 
flash  of  an  enemy  trench  mortar  or  machine  gun.  If  he  at 
once  notifies  his  officer,  and  this  officer  passes  it  on  to  the  intel- 
ligence officer,  there  is  every  chance  that  the  enemy  gun  will  be 
quickly  located  and  put  out  of  action.  In  all  cases  the  correct 
procedure  is  to  get  the  information  to  the  intelligence  officer  at 
once.     He  will  know  the  best  use  to  make  of  it. 

3.  The  organization  of  the  intelligence  section  varies  in  dif- 
ferent battalions,  but  the  following  is  one  that  has  proved  suc- 
cessful : 

1  intelligence  officer  (O.  C). 

1  scout  officer. 

1  sergeant  (scout). 

1  corporal  (observer). 

1  corporal  (sniper). 

2  lance  corporals  (scouts). 
4  snipers. 

(100) 


110 

12  scouts. 
10  observers. 

1  cook. 

1  batman. 

35  total  all  ranks. 

4.  Under  the  heading  of  "  Reconnaissance,"  the  only  parts  of 
the  above  dealt  with  are  the  scout  officer,  scout  sergeant,  and 
lance  corporals,  and  the  12  scouts.  These  men  are  divided  into 
two  reliefs  of  8  men  each,  one  commanded  by  the  officer  and  one 
by  the  sergeant.  This  number  is  ample  for  all  ordinary  pur- 
poses. It  can  handle  any  ordinary  German  patrol  of  from  12 
to  iS  men,  due  to  the  better  moral  training  and  bombs  poss 

by  our  men.  A  larger  patrol  than  this  is  difficult  to  conceal 
properly  and  can  not  get  as  close  to  the  enemy  without  being 
seen. 

If  for  any  reason,  such  as  offensive  work,  a  larger  patrol  is 
needed,  the  two  reliefs  can  be  joined,  or  bombers  borrowed  from 
the  companies. 

In  order  that  these  men  shall  be  properly  trained  they  should 
be  excused  from  all  duties  except  those  actually  pertaining  to 
their  work.  For  training  and  discipline  they  should  be  under 
the  direct  command  of  the  scout  officer. 

During  training  special  attention  must  be  paid  to  the  follow- 
ing subjects :  N'ight  tiring  with  revolver  and  bomb,  map  read- 
ing, use  of  prismatic  compass,  and  the  perfection  of  patrol  for- 
mations and  signals.  Besides  the  above,  they  should  be  trained 
in  reporting  what  they  have  observed.  It  must  be  Impressed 
on  all  that'it  is  far  better  to  be  not  able  to  report  anything  at 
all  than  to  give  information  that  is  not  absolutely  accurate. 
(See  Appendix  "A"  for  typical  syllabus  of  training  for  an  intel- 
ligence section  covering  two  and  one-half  weeks,) 

5.  Upon  entering  a  new  sector,  it  is  imperative  that  the  scour 
officer,  after  a  careful  study  of  bis  ordnance  map  and  air  photo- 
graphs, decide  on  a  definite  plan  for  bis  patrols  to  work  upon.' 
The  plan  should  be  so  devised  that  a  thorough  map  of  "No 
Man's  Land"  can  be  drawn  up.  only  too  often  patrols  are  sent 
out  on  the  spur  of  the  moment  with  only  a  hazy  idea  of  where 
they  are  going,  or  what  to  look  for.  As  a  result,  they  - 
many  things  that,  not  having  definite  orders  to  pay  particular 
attention  to  certain  features,  their  report  is  as  hazy  as  their 
impressions,  and  of  no  value  whatever. 


Ill 

At  present  there  is  a  real  need  in  France  of  maps  of  "No 
Man's  Land."  Each  battalion  gets,  in  time,  a  fairly  accurate  idea 
of  local  conditions,  but  this  information  is  not  put  down  in  map 
form,  and  is  carried  away  in  the  heads  of  the  battalion  being 
relieved ;  as  a  result  each  battalion  is  forced  to  duplicate  work 
already  done  any  number  of  times  before,  and  has  not  time  to 
really  do  the  work  properly.  If  each  scout  officer  would  put  on 
a  map,  specially  constructed  for  the  purpose  (scale  1/2500), 
all  information  he  gathers,  with  the  date,  progressive  work 
could  be  done,  and  in  a  very  few  weeks  accurate  maps  could  be 
obtained  of  all  the  "  No  Man's  Land  "  in  France. 

The  following  is  a  scheme  worked  out  and  found  satisfactory 
as  far  as  the  limited  time  of  a  single  tour,  say  seven  days,  would 
allow.  The  work  to  be  done  was  roughly  divided  into  three 
parts : 

(a)   Our  own  front  line,  support  lines,  and  communica- 
tion trenches. 
(6)   Our  front-line  parapet,  wire,  and  "No  Man's  Land" 

as  far  as  the  enemy  wire, 
(c)  The  enemy  wire,  location  of  his  saps,  bombing  and 
listening  posts,  etc. 
The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  prepare  a  large  piece  of 
tracing  paper  by  drawing  in  the  map  squares  to  a  scale  of 
1/2500.     Then,  after  studying  the  ordnance  map  and  air  photo- 
graphs, a  certain  amount  of  time  was  allotted  to  each  of  the 
above  divisions  according  to  the  difficulty  of  the  work  in  each 
case. 

Under  ordinary  conditions  it  worked  out  about  as  follows : 

6.  During  the  first  and  second  days,  three  observers  make  a 
detailed  study  of  our  lines  as  far  back  as  battalion  headquar- 
ters. During  this  time  the  battalion  has  the  use  of  three  ob- 
servers from  the  outgoing  battalion,  as  explained  under  partial 
reliefs,  and,  therefore,  has  three  spare  men.  During  the  same 
time  all  scouts  make  a  complete  tour  of  all  our  lines  and  study 
the  observers'  maps.  This  is  necessary,  as  the  scouts  are  guides 
for  the  battalion  and  visiting  staff  officers. 

The  scout  officer  compares  the  observers'  maps  with  the  latest 
ordnance  maps  and  notes  any  differences  of  which,  after  per- 
sonal investigation,  he  notifies  the  brigade.  It  often  happens 
that  the  ordnance  maps  are  wrong,  or  that  new  work  has  been 
done  since  they  were  printed. 

7.  First  night. — On  the  first  night  in  a  new  sector  the  scouts 
go  no  farther  out  than  our  own  wire,  and  working  from  one 


112 

tlank  make  a  thorough  investigation  of  our  wire,  front-line 
parapet,  and  prominent  objects  in  the  back  country.  This  may 
appear  trivial  work,  but  it  is  of  great  importance  in  the  work 
to  be  done  later.  Before  a  patrol  can  go  into  the  enemy  wire  it 
must  know  all  gaps  in  our  wire  for  purposes  of  exit  or  entry,  must 
be  able  to  recognize  prominent  features  in  our  parapet  and  back 
area,  so  as  to  be  able  to  locate  themselves  by  bearings  when  out 
in  "  No  Man's  Land."  It  does  no  good  for  a  patrol  to  be  located 
at  gap  in  the  enemy  wire,  or  a  post,  if  it  does  not  know  where 
it  is  itself;  unless  exact  map  locations  of  points  seen  on  patrol 
can  be  given,  the  information  is  of  little  or  no  value.  If  a  patrol 
knows  all  the  marks  in  our  parapet  (usually  a  sky  line),  such 
as  piles  of  sand  bags  from  a  mine  sap,  high  points  in  the  parapet, 
isolated  wooden  posts,  etc.,  or  knows  the  outlines  of  buildings, 
mine  shafts,  haystacks,  hills,  clumps  of  trees,  etc.,  in  the  back 
country,  it  can  take  bearings  on  two  or  more,  and  these  when 
plotted  will  show  exactly  where  the  patrol  was  at  the  time. 
This  is  the  reason  for  spending  the  first  night  close  to  our 
front  line.  Besides  this,  an  accurate  report  of  our  own  wire  is 
always  very  welcome  at  battalion  headquarters. 

Company  commanders  often  complain  that  this  close  patrol  is 
of  no  protection  to  the  line,  and  this  brings  up  a  much-discussed 
question  as  to  whether  a  patrol  is  responsible  for  the  defense 
of  the  line  or  not.  This  question  was  finally  settled  by  Gen. 
Sir  Julian  Byng  when  he  very  definitely  stated  to  a  meeting  of  all 
the  intelligence  officers  of  the  Canadian  corps  that  battalion 
scouts  were  to  be  used  for  obtaining  Information  only,  and  that 
the  company  commanders  were  responsible  for  the  protection  of 
their  own  frontage. 

Another  objection  company  commanders  raids  is  that  the 
patrol  masks  the  fire  from  the  trench.  This  is  true,  but  can  be 
reduced  to  a  minimum  by  having  a  scout  stay  OB  tile  parapet 
exactly  abreast  of  the  patrol.  He  shows  where  the  patrol  is  at 
the  time,  and  other  parts  of  the  line  are  at  liberty  to  fire.  The 
patrol  itself  can  defend  the  point  it  is  on,  if  necessary. 

When  working  down  our  wire  it  is  necessary  to  nave  a  Hank- 
ing party  of,  say.  three  men  about  20  yards  out  in  "No  Man's 
Land  "  to  prevent  surprise. 

8.  Second  night. — On  the  second  night  The  patrols  examine  all 
craters  and  determine  the  following  points  : 

1.  Whether  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

2.  If  so,  strength  and  location  of  post. 


113 

3.  State  of  wire  protection. 

4.  Whether  it  would  be  practical  to  raid  the  post. 

5.  Height  of  crater  lip. 

6.  Size  of  crater,  depth  and  diameter. 

7.  Condition  of  interior  with  view  to  use  as  an  assembly 

post  for  a  raid  or  general  attack. 

8.  Whether  it  would  be  practical  to  place  a  post  of  our 

own  on  the  near  lip. 

It  is  a  very  difficult  and  dangerous  piece  of  work  to  investigate 
a  crater,  and  it  is  hard  to  say  what  is  the  best  way  of  doing  it. 
It  is  usually  impossible  to  crawl  right  around  the  lip,  as  it  is  a 
sky  line.  Besides,  parties  manning  a  crater  sap  are  usually 
very  wide-awake.  About  the  only  way  to  approach  is  from  the 
rear,  but  enough  to  one  flank  to  keep  away  from  a  sap  running 
from  the  crater  to  the  enemy  front  line.  These  saps  often  are 
manned  by  connecting  files,  and  if  seen  the  patrol  will  get  fire 
and  bombs  from  three  sides  at  once.  The  patrol  should  start 
well  out  to  one  flank  and  across  "  No  Man's  Land  "  until  very 
near  enemy  wire,  and  then  work  along  the  wire  toward  the 
crater,  until  within  about  20  yards  of  where  the  sap  should  be. 
From  this  point  head  straight  toward  the  crater.  The  advan- 
tage of  approaching  from  this  direction  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
crater  party  will  be  looking  in  the  opposite  direction,  and  that  if 
seen  from  the  front  line  they  will  hesitate  to  use  a  machine 
gun  for  fear  of  hitting  their  men  in  the  crater. 

Upon  getting  to  within  about  30  yards  of  the  crater  the  patrol 
should  be  placed  in  shell  holes  and  only  the  officer  and  lance 
corporal  advance.  Two  men  can  go  much  closer  than  an  entire 
patrol.  When  as  close  as  they  can  get  with  safety,  these  two 
men  get  into  a  shell  hole  and  wait  for  a  flare  to  go  up.  What 
constitutes  a  safe  distance  can  only  be  determined  by  experience 
and  depends  on  the  enemy's  vigilance,  the  night,  the  nature  of 
the  ground,  etc.  Sometimes  it  is  possible  to  approach  to  within 
5  yards,  and  sometimes  a  bomb  is  thrown  when  the  patrol  is  30 
yards  away.  If  once  seen  and  bombed,  go  back  if  possible,  for 
it  is  useless  to  try  to  approach  for  hours,  if  at  all,  that  night. 

When  the  flare  goes  up  and  it  is  possible  to  observe  the  crater, 
great  care  must  be  used.  The  flare  lights  up  the  observer  as 
well  as  the  enemy.  In  order  to  observe  from  a  shell  hole,  take 
off  the  cap  and  place  one  cheek  on  the  ground  and  observe  with 
one  eye.  This  breaks  the  outline  of  the  head  and  shoulders, 
9784°— 17 8 


114 

which  is  what  the  enemy  is  looking  for,  and  can  see  for  quite 
a  distance  Tt  is  surprising  how  much  closer  it  is  possible  to 
get  if  no  definite  outline  is  shown. 

If  no  enemy  post  can  he  seen,  bring  up  the  remainder  of  the 
patrol  and  with  the  officer  well  in  the  lead,  say,  10  yards, 
start  making  a  circuit  of  the  crater.  Care*  must  he  taken  not  to 
show  on  the  lip,  which  is  usually  a  sky  line.  Tt  is  hotter  to  keep 
well  away  from  the  crater  so  as  to  be  certain  to  be  off  the  lip. 
The  officer  can  crawl  to  the  edge  when  necessary  to  observe  the 
inside,  though  that  can  be  done  from  our  own  side.  When  mov- 
ing, the  leader  should  advance  one  shell  hole  and  then  each  of 
the  remainder  advance  one.  After  each  move  quite  a  pause 
must  be  made  in  order  to  be  certain  that  no  enemy  is  around, 
and  also  to  allay  suspicion  if  the  last  move  Avas  uncertainly 
detected.  By  quite  a  pause  is  meant,  say,  two  or  three  minutes. 
There  is  always  plenty  of  time  and  such  matters  can  not  be 
hurried  without  detection. 

Each  crater  must  be  treated  in  the  same  manner  and  the 
results  put  on  the  map  being  made. 

When  a  number  of  craters  are  joined  together  and  are  close 
to  the  enemy's  line,  it  is  practically  impossible  to  get  any  infor- 
mation about  their  far  lip.  They  have  to  be  considered  :  B  part 
of  his  front  line,  and  the  only  indication  as  to  whether  they  are 
held  or  not  is  to  be  obtained  from  air  photos,  which  would  show- 
as  sap  leading  to  the  crater,  though  that  is  no  certain  sicrn  that 
the  lip  is  manned ;  another  sign  is  the  firing  of  flares  from  the 
lip,  and  is  a  better  indication  than  the  air  photo. 

9.  Third  nit/lit. — During  the  third  night  the  patrols  examine 
Mil  old  trenches  running  across  "No  Man's  Land."  The  points 
to  be  observed  are: 

1.  Whether  trench  is  passable  for  our  own  of  enemy  raid- 

ing parties. 

2.  Its  direction,  point  of  entry  into  our  lines  and  enemy's. 

if  possible 

3.  Its  branches. 

4.  Whether  it  is  orcupiod  by  enemy  outside  his  own  win-. 
fi.  Whether   it    or    its  branches   are   fit   to  be   used    for   an 

assembly  trench  for  a  raid  or  general  attack. 

This  information  is  also  put  on  the  scout  officer's  map,  which 
is  now  beginning  to  be  of  some  value,  and  even  if  carried  no 
further  would  save  the  next  battalion  a  great  deal  of  time  and 
labor. 


115 

In  following  a  trench  of  this  kind  it  is  usually  best  to  place 
half  the  patrol  on  each  side,  with  one  man  actually  in  the 
trench.  If  the  trench  can  not  be  readily  crossed,  it  is  better  to 
keep  the  entire  patrol  on  one  side  except  for  the  one  man  in  the 
trench.  The  officer  should  be  well  ahead,  as  usual.  This  is 
comparatively  easy  and  sale  work,  as  cover  is  always  handy 
and  no  enemy  likely  to  be  met.  except  from  the  front. 

Remainder  of  the  tour. — The.  remainder  of  the  tour  is  spent 
investigating  the  enemy  wire.  This  should  be  done  in  a  syste- 
matic manner,  working  steadily  from  one  or  both  flanks  inward. 
It  is  best  to  work  from  both  Hanks,  as  each  relief  will  then  do 
a  continuous  piece  of  work  and  won't  be  starting  where  Hie 
previous  relief  left  off.  The  starting  point  should  be  deter- 
mined by  means  of  a  compass  bearing  from  some,  saphead,  in 
our  line,  that  is  shown  on  the  ordnance  map.  This  bearing  is 
measured  on  the  map  and  then  the  patrol  crawl  on  it  from  the 
sap  and  can  strike  the  desired  point  within  a  few  yards.  On 
returning,  the  stopping  point  should  be  located,  when  possible, 
by  bearing  on  prominent  objects  in  our  back  area  or  the  enemy 
back  area.  As  soon  as  the  patrol  returns  its  leader  must  re- 
port to  the  scout  officer,  who  will  put  the  information  on  his 
map. 

When  reporting  on  wire  the  following  points  should  be  ob- 
served : 

1.  Strength: 

(a)  Height. 

(b)  Depth. 

(c)  Thickness  or  density. 

(d)  Number  of  lines  of  wire. 

2.  Position : 

{a)  Of  inner  ^ne  from  enemy  front  line. 

(b)  Distance  between  lines. 

(c)  Map  location  of  portion  examined. 

3.  (laps : 

(a)  Map  location. 

(b)  Width. 

(c)  Whether  straight  or  zigzag. 

(a)  Whether  left  purposely  for  enemy  patrols 
or  cut  by  our  gunfire. 
{d)    Whether  it   is  clean  or  just  weak  spot  witli  some 
wire  left. 

(e)  Accurate  report   of  effect  of  our  recent  gunfire  or 

trench-mortar  fire. 


116" 

4.  Composition: 

(a)  Knife  rests  (metal  or  wood) 

(b)  Apron  wire. 

(c)  Loose,  wire. 

{d)   French  or  barbed. 

(e) Whether  wooden  or  metal  screw  stakes  are  used. 

5.  New  work : 

(a)  Position. 

(b)  Extent. 

(c)  Probable  time  since  put  in. 

Under  ordinary  circumstances  it  is  best  for  two  men  to  actu- 
ally investigate  the  wire  while  the  remainder  move  along  abreast 
of  them  and  about  15  yards  out.  One  man  should  never  go  alone, 
for  a  stray  shot  might  knock  him  unconscious  and  the  remainder 
of  the  patrol  not  know  it  and  lose  his  body. 

When  investigating  a  gap  end  for  a  raid  it  is  imperative  that 
the  patrol  officer,  and  usually  the  officer  taking  over  the  raid, 
go  completely  through  this  gap.  being  certain  that  they  have 
passed  all  wire  and  that  no  obstacle  remains  between  them  and 
the  enemy  front  line.  There  is  often  a  row  of  wire  just  a  few 
feet  from  the  parapet  and  it  must  be  ascertained.  s<»  that  not 
the  slightest  doubt  remains  that  this  has  been  cut.  The  Uvea  of 
the  men  going  over  hang  on  the  absolute,  accuracy  of  the  scout 
officer's  report,  and  on  this  occasion  no  risks  are  i"«.  great  for- 
him  to  take  until  he  is  completely  satisfied.  He  should  observe 
the  width  of  the  gap  and  whether  the  gap  is  tilled  with  piles  of 
broken  wire  or  has  been  swept  clean  by  our  high-explosive 
shrapnel. 

If  when  moving  down  the  wire  an  enemy  advanced  post  is 
located,  a  wide  detour  out  into  "  No  Man's  Land  "  must  be  made 
in  order  to  avoid  it.  % 

If  all  the  information  secured  thus  far.  supplemented  by  that 
gained  by  the  observers.,  has  been  put  on  the  map  a  very  valuable 
document  has  been  built  up  that  can  be  given  to  the  relieving 
battalion,  who  can  work  at  putting  in  details  left  out  during  the 
first  tour. 

12.  Gimeral  remark*.— It  is  Often  a  great  help,  when  investi- 
gating enemy  wire.  t<>  post   a  man  in  our  front   line,  opposite  the 

point  where  our  patrol  is  working,  with  Instructions  to  Ore  1J- 

inch  Very  llglltfl  at  tixe.l  finite.  s:iy.  every  .">  minutes,  after  the 
first  46  minutes.  During  this  tirst  three-quarters  of  an  hour" 
no  lights  should  be  fired,  as   the  patrol    is  getting  into  position 


117 

to  observe.  When  the  time  comes  for  the  flare  to  be  fired  the 
entire  patrol  must  be  in  shell  holes  and  no  one  allowed  to  look 
out  except  the  officer  and  noncommissioned  officer.  One  should 
look  to  the  right  and  one  to  the  left  and  conceal  themselves  as 
described  under  crater  investigation.  It  is  necessary  that  the 
Officer's  watch  and  that  of  the  man  firing  the  flares  should  be 
exactly  the  same  and  that  an  understanding  be  reached  that  if 
the  first  flare  is  a  dud  a  second  or  third  be  fired  at  once,  the 
time  for  the  next  being  reckoned  as  if  the  first  had  not  failed. 
The  light  must  be  fired  high  and  go  over  the  heads  of  the  patrol. 
On  no  account  must  it  fall  behind  them,  as  this  would  throw 
them  into  relief  and  be  fatal.  A  light  dropping  just  in  front 
of  the  enemy  front  line  blinds  him  and  shows  up  the  wire  very 
plainly  to  the  patrol.  If  the  light  goes  over  the  enemy  trench 
it  does  not  blind  him,  but  still  shows  up  the  wire  during  its  fall. 
The  best  time  to  observe  is  while  the  light  is  still  in  the  air  and 
before  it  has  passed  over  the  enemy  front  line.  During  this  time 
it  is  shining  in  the  faces  of  the  enemy  and  from  behind  the 
patrol,  whose  eyes  are  not  blinded.  After  it  has  struck  the 
ground  it  often  shows  up  the  heads  of  the  enemy  sentinels  and 
some  idea  of  how  he  holds  his  line  may  be  determined.  These 
lights  are  of  great  assistance  but  are  dangerous  and  can  only  be 
used  after  making  certain  that  the  man  doing  the  firing  knows 
his  instructions.  While  the  patrol  is  out  no  other  flares  must  be 
fired  anywhere  near  where  they  are  working,  or  any  at  all,  if  it 
can  possibly  be  helped.  Usually  the  most  dangerous  kind  of  a 
flare  is  one  fired  way  off  to  one  flank,  maybe  half  a  mile  away. 
Always  be  quiet  when  a  flare  goes  up,  no  matter  how  far  away 
it  is. 

Warning. — Although  patrols  are  more  or  less  independent, 
there  must  always  be  perfect  cooperation  between  them,  the 
infantry,  and  the  artillery. 

Every  afternoon  the  scout  officer  should  make  it  a  point  to 
see  the  officers  commanding  battalion  and  all  company  com- 
manders to  determine  whether,  they  desire  anything  particular 
done,  and  if  not,  to  tell  them  what  the  plans  are  for  the  patrol 
during  that  night.  If  the  companies  are  going  to  send  out 
wiring  parties  they  have  a  right  to  expect  that  the  scout  officer 
furnishes  leaders  for  the  covering  parties.  No  matter  what 
kind  of  work  the  companies  intend  to  do  in  front  of  the  parapet, 
the  scout  officer  must  be  notified  beforehand.  He  is  absolute 
officer  commander  of  "  No  Man's  Land,"  and  no  man,  from  the 


118 

battalion  commander  down,  has  the  righl  to  Step  over  the  para- 
llel without  notifying  him.  One  man  must  ho  in  charge  Of 
"  ]No  Man's  Land,"  and  the  scout  officer  is  the  logical  man  for 
the  position.  If  any  officer  can  go  roaming  around  our  wire  he 
will  he  killed  sooner  or  later  by  our  own  patrols  or  kill  some 
of  the  pfttrols.  A  large  number  of  casualties  have  been  caused 
in  this  manner,  for  a  man  out  In  "  No  Man's  Land  "  can  not 
stop  to  ask  questions,  and  if  anyone  is  seen  when  no  warning 
has  been  given  ho  is  presumably  an  enemy.  Conversely  it  is  just 
as  important  that  the  scout  officer  notify  all  parties  concerned 
before  any  of  his  men  go  out. 

It  is  not  sufficient  to  simply  notify  the  company  commanders 
in  the  afternoon  that  a  patrol  is  going  out.  Every  man  on  the 
front  affected,  the  battalion  on  the  Hank,  aiid  the  trench  mortar 
and  artillery  liaison  officer  must  be  given  the  following  facts: 

(a)  Time  of  departure. 

(b)  Place  of  departure, 

(c)  Size  of  patrol. 

(d)  (Ground  to  be  covered, 
(c)  Time  of  return. 

(/)    Place  of  return. 

(<i)  Name  of  officer  sending  warning, 

Every  man  should  be  told  the  above  by  some  member  of  the 
patrol.  Usually  the  officer  goes  in  one  direction  and  the  non- 
commissioned officer  in  the  other.  Not  only  the  sentinels  are  to 
be  told,  but  their  reliefs  also.  The  officer  OB  trench  duty  should 
be  present  to  see  that  no  saps  or  listening  posts  are  omitted. 
The  warning  must  ncrcr  be  pfltwd  down  the  trench,  as  this  is 
a.  certain  way  to  make  mistakes.  Upon  return  the  trench  must 
be  notified  of  the  fact. 

Before  going  out  the  artillery  and  trench  mortars  must  be 
notified  not  to  fire  on  a  certain  front  during  the  time  the  patrol 
is  there,  except,  of  coarse,  in  case  of  emergency,  when  the  patrol 
must  be  sacrificed. 

Whenever  possible  the  scout  officer  should  arrange  to  take  out 
as  many  officers  and  men  of  the  battalion  a>  possible  so  as  to 
giVfl  them  some  experience  in  "  No  Man's  Land.'*  The  confidence 
thus  gained  COfneS  in  very  useful  when  the  men  are  sent  on 
wiring  parlies  or  when  they  -  go  ever  the  top"  in  an  otTensive. 

Company  pahols  r<rsiis  Uttmimg  posts,—  There  is  much  di- 
vergence of  opinion  amongst  different  staffs  on  the  use  of 
company  patrols  for  the  defense  of  the  front  line,  hut  very  little 


119 

amongst  line  officers  who  don't  want  these  patrols.  Still  it  is 
very  common  to  receive  orders  to  keep  them  out  all  night,-  with 
the  result  that  the  line  is  in  serious  danger. 

These  patrols  are  supposed  to  move  up  and  down  the  outer 
side  of  our  wire  and  protect  our  line  from  sudden  raids  without 
artillery  preparation.  Of  course  if  there  is  artillery  fire  that  is 
all  the  warning  necessary. 

These  patrols  are  both  useless  and  a  menace  to  the  line.  There 
are  a  number  of  reasons  for  the  above  statement.  A  man  mov- 
ing in  "  No  Man's  Land  "  can  do  no  observing ;  all  his  attention 
must  be  concentrated  on  picking  his  way  and  keeping  quiet. 
An  untrained  body  of  men  blundering  along  can  be  heard  for 
a  long  distance,  and  any  enemy  party  that  is  out  would  simply 
be  quiet  in  shell  holes  until  they  have  passed  and  then  either 
enter  the  trench  or  take  up  positions  and  destroy  the  patrol 
on  its  return.  The  only  time  this  patrol  is  doing  any  good  is 
when  lying  still  in  shell  holes  and  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
acting  as  a  listening  post.  Besides  being  useless,  these  patrols 
are  a  menace,  as  they  mask  the  tire  of  the  trench  and  cause 
uncertainty  on  the  part  of  sentinels.  The  sentinels  are  never 
certain  whether  a  body  of  men  is  their  patrol  or  an  enemy  raid- 
ing party.  In  one  brigade  enemy  raiding  parties  got  into  the 
front  line  and  secured  prisoners  on  two  nights  running.  In  both 
cases  they  were  plainly  seen,  but  due  to  uncertainty  as  to  identity 
were  not  fired  upon.  In  one  case  the  raid  occurred  between  two 
Lewis  guns,  which  were  both  trained  on  the  party,  and  neither 
were  fired.  As  a  result  the  brigade  staff  ordered  double  the 
number  of  patrols,  and,  much  against  the  advice  of  the  line 
officers,  just  doubled  the  danger. 

If  plenty  of  listening  posts  arc  thrown  out,  they  can  give  all 
the  warning  necessary.  Little  can  be  seen  in  "  No  Man's  Land  " 
at  night,  and  the  best  way  to  detect  the  approach  of  the  enemy 
is  to  hear  them.  Listening  posts  are  best  for  this,  as  they  are 
perfectly  quiet,  with  their  ear  near  the  ground.  Besides,  they 
are  in  communication  with  the  front  line  by  means  of  tug  wires, 
while  patrols  have  no  communication  whatever. 

Equipment  of  patrols. — Patrols  should  never  wear  steel  hel- 
mets, as  they  click  when  they  hit  a  piece  of  barbed  wire,  show 
an  unmistakable  outline,  prevent  crawling  with  the  face  on  the 
ground,  and  it  is  seldom  that  a  patrol  is  bothered  with  shrapnel. 
Revolvers  and  bombs  are  the  only  arms  carried.  Rifles  are  too 
unwieldly.  noisy,  and  in  a  few  moments  are  unfit  to  use  due  to 


120 

the  mud.  The  best  revolver  is  the  .49  (\>lt  automatic.  If  care 
is  taken,  no  mud  gets  into  the  working  parts,  and  the  rapidity  of 
action  and  reloading  offset  the  disadvantages.  In  tiring  at  night 
so  many  shots  una  wasted  in  misses  that  quick  reloading  is  essen- 
tial.  Two  Mill's  bombs,  carried  in  the  hip  pockets,  is  about  all 
that  can  be  carried  with  any  comfort.  All  members  of  the 
patrol  should  be  equipped  with  rubber  suits  that  tie  around  the 
ankles  and  wrists  and  lace  up  the  hack.  They  must  not  fasten 
in  front,  as  the  strings  would  get  tangled  in  hits  of  broken  wire 
on  the  ground,  and  the  opening  let  in  the  mud.  The  material 
is  soft  and  does  not  rustle.  Before  going  out  each  man  should 
-roll  in  the  wet  mud,  for  the  mud  from  the  previous  night  lias 
dried  and  is  of  much  lighter  color  than  the  wet  mud.  Hands 
and  faces  should  also  be  covered  with  mud  and  also  the  outside 
of  revolvers,  if  it  is  a  moonlight  night  and  the  gun  metal  glistens. 
A  very  important  thing  is  to  have  each  man  carry  gum  or  pep-, 
permint  to  use  in  case  he  has  to  cough.  Most  scouts  have  colds 
due  to  being  wet  every  night,  and  the  strain  of  patrol ing  breeds 
a  desire  to  cough  that  it  is  impossible  to  overcome.  A  cough 
close  to  the  enemy  means  certain  detection. 

All  forms  of  identification  must  be  removed  from  scouts,  such 
as  identity  disks,  patches,  regimental  buttons,  cap.  collar,  and 
shoulder  badges,  pay  books,  and  all  letters.  No  article  of  cloth- 
ing or  equipment  can  have  the  battalion  number  on  it,  for  even 
a  handkerchief,  with  the  number  on  it,  if  it  is  captured,  gives 
all  the  information  that  a  successful  raid  gives. 

Patrol  formation*. — There  are  a  large  number  of  different 
formations,  but  the  best  for  general  purposes  is  the  -  wedge 
formation." 

The  main  advantage  of  the  "wedge  formation  n  is  that  it  ban 
be  formed  into  a  defensive  formation  facing  any  direction  in  the 
shortest  possible  time.  The  best  defensive  formation  for  bomb- 
ing of  this  nature  is  a  line  facing  the  enemy  ;  first  you  have  all 
your  men  in  action  ;  second,  it  is  the  most  ditlicult  target. 

The  drawings  explain  themselves.  The  otlicer  simply  calls  out 
which  formation  to  take,  and  then  orders  an  advance  or  retreat 
according  to  circumstances. 

It  is  often  advisable  to  take  a  man  from  one  of  the  Hanks 
of  the  wedge  and  have  him  follow  in  rear  to  prevent  surprise 
from  that  direction. 

If  any  enemy  patrol  is  met.  the  best  policy  is  to  form  line 
facing  them,  lire  one  bomb  apiece,  and   rush  after  your  bombs 


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have  exploded.    The  enemy  bombs  are  nearly  always  time  bombs, 

and  by  rushing  in  close  with  revolvers  you  usually  pass  or  leave 
their  bombs  before  they  explode.    Another  advantage  of  a  quick 

rush  is  that  If  any  of  the  enemy  have  been  wounded  or  killed 
their  comrades  will  not  have  time  to  remove  them  and  Important 
Identifications  may  be  secured. 

As  a  rule,  a  German  patrol  will  not  face  a  discharge  of  Mills 
bombs  and  a  determined  rush  of  even  half  their  number.  There 
Is  little  danger  at  2  yards  From  a  German  u  potato  m.isher."  while 
it  is  nearly  certain  death  to  be  standing  12  yards  from  a  Mills 
bomb.  Immediately  on  throwing  the  Mills  the  patrol  should  lie 
down  and  start  revolver  fire  until  the  bombs  have  exploded.  To 
he  standing  is  to  court  danger  from  our  own  bombs,  which  may 
kill  at  100  yards. 

Method  of  (uawling. — It  is  difficult  to  describe  the  way  to 
crawl  without  giving  a  demonstration.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
get  down  and  crawl  until  within  125  yards  of  the  enemy  lines, 
unless  it  is  a  very  bright  night  or  an  unusual  number  of  lights 
are  being  fired.  To  do  so  wastes  too  much  time  and  needlessly 
tires  the  men.  Up  to  within  this  distance  the  patrol  can  move 
by  crouching  or  on  its  hands  and  knees.  After  passing  the  100- 
yard  mark,  Increasing  care  mast  be  taken  until  when  within 
15  or  20  yards,  when  movement  is  only  possible  by  inches.  Only 
highly  trained  men  can  hope  to  escape  detection  at  this  distance. 

When  crawling  the  main  thing  to  avoid  is  any  sudden  move- 
ment or  the  showing  of  any  outline  of  the  head  or  shoulders.  The 
body  should  never  be  raised  a  particle  from  the  ground  so  as  to 
let  any  light  between  the  two.  For  the  same  reason  it  is  neces- 
sary to  be  very  careful  not  to  allow  the  bent  elbows  or  the  feet 
to  leave  the  ground.  The  legs  should  be  kept  as  close  together 
as  possible,  and  the  arms  not  allowed  t<>  be  spread  out  any  more 
than  necessary.  Before  starting  to  crawl  the  caps  should  be 
turned  around  with  the  visors  to  the  rear.  There  are  two 
reasons  for  this;  first,  that  with  the  visor  in  front  it  is  impos- 
sible to  get  the  face  close  enough  to  the  ground,  and.  second,  that 
it  gives  the  German  appearance  to  the  head.  For  the  latter 
reason  the  caps  must  be  turned  around  again  before  entering  our 

own  lines.  When  on  the  move  never  lift  the  head  to  see  where 
you  are  going.  The  face  must  be  touching  the  ground.  If  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  look.  Wep  one  cheek  on  the  ground  while 
doing  it  and  use  just  oue  eye. 


123 

When  a  light  goes  up  every  man  must  remain  absolutely  still, 
no  matter  in  what  position  he  is  in.  Even  if  he  is  standing  up 
in  the  enemy's  wire,  the  chances  are  that  he  will  not  be  seen 
if  he  doesn't  make  a  move.  It  is  instinctive  to  take  cover  when 
in  snch  a  position,  but  it  is  certain  death  to  move  even  an  arm. 
While  a  light  is  up  it  is  harder  to  see  a  still  object  than  when 
there  is  no  light,  because  there  are  so  many  shadows  thrown  that 
a  man  may  be  easily  mistaken  for  one.  If  while  you  are  in  a 
badly  exposed  position  a  machine  gun  opens,  it  is  natural  to 
think  that  it  is  firing  at  you.  and  the  desire  for  cover  is  almost 
irresistible,  but  the  chances  are  that  you  are  not  being  tired  at, 
and  if  you  remain  cool  and  quiet  you  will  escape  unhurt.  This 
is  one  reason  that  it  takes  long  training  to  make  a  good  scout. 
Without  practice  hardly  any  officer  or  man  can  stand  up  in  ap- 
parently plain  view  of  the  enemy  without  crouching  slightly. 
and  that  is  sufficient  to  give  the  [tarty  away. 

As  soon  as  seen,  lights  are  sent  up  and  kept  in  the  air  to  hold 
you  to  your  position,  and  then  machine  guns  and  bombs  com- 
mence their  work. 

The  instant  a  patrol  is  certain  it  is  discovered  it  must  get  out 
of  bomb  range.  It  is  always  a  few  moments  before  the  Germans 
can  bring  their  machine  guns  to  bear  and  get  bombs  off.  During 
those  few  moments  the  patrol  must  get  out  of  bomb  range  and 
into  shell  holes,  where  they  must  stay  until  the  excitement  is 
over.  When  things  quiet  down  a  bit.  don't  move  at  once,  for 
often  the  machine  guns  open  again  suddenly  in  the  hope  that  the 
patrol  has  done  that  very  thing.  During  the  initial  retreat  there 
will  most  likely  be  a  rapid  rifle  tire  going  on,  but  that  must  be 
risked,  and  is  usually  not  very  effective  at  night. 

Capture  of  isolated  posts. — There  is  very  little  to  be  said  on 
this  subject,  except  that  it  is  a  very  difficult  and  dangerous  piece 
of  work.  The  capture  must  be  made  without  any  noise,  for  if 
the  main  trench  is  alarmed  lights  go  up.  and  you  are  held  in  the 
advanced  post  and  bombed  out  at  leisure.  The  only  time  when 
this  kind  of  thing  is  practicable  is  when  there  is  no  wire  around 
the  sap  leading  back  to  the  front  line,  and  you  can  slip  up  the 
sap  into  the  post.  It  is  almost  impossible  to  approach  close 
enough  above  ground  to  force  a  surrender  without  a  bomb  being 
thrown  or  the  alarm  given.  In  most  cases  it  is  simpler  to  chance 
hitting  a  post  and  endeavor  to  enter  the  front  line  and  then  re- 
main hidden  behind  a  traverse  until  some  one  comes  along,  and 
put  a  gun  in  his  back.    If  discovered  and  alone  or  with  one  man. 


124 

try  to  get  over  the  parados  and  hide  there.  The  enemy  will  not 
expect  you  there.  If  a  party  is  with  you,  make  a  rush  foj?  "  No 
Man's  Land."  Some  may  escape*  These  stealth  raids  have 
censed  to  be  a  success  lately,  as  after  a  year's  experience  the 
Germane  are  beginning  to  he  more  alert.  The  only  pra<ti<al 
niel  hod  now  of.getting  prisoners  is  to  organize  a  real  raid  with 
artillery,  as  described  in  Minor  Operations  and  Recent  Trench 
Raids. 


MANUAL  OF  POSITION  WARFARE   FOR   ALL 

ARMS. 


Part  5. 


THE  EMPLOYMENT  AND  DUTIES  OF  ARTILLERY 
AEROPLANES  IN  POSITION  WARFARE. 

(Issued  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Field  Army.) 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 
I.  Importance  and  first  principles  of  cooperation  between  artillery  and  air- 
craft   - 125 

II.  Employment  and  command  of  aviation  units  in  support  of  the  artillery 127 

III.  Duties  of  the  artillery  aeroplane  observer: 

(1)  Reconnaissance  of,  and  keeping  watch  on  artillery  targets , 127 

(2)  Observation  of  fire 128 

IV.  Aeroplane  observation  for  artillery: 
(A)    General  preparations— 

(1)  Organization  of  the  wireless  fighting  stations *  129 

(2)  Call  signals 129 

(3)  Ground  signals 129 

(4)  Telephone  communications ' 130 

(5)  Aviation  intelligence  officer 130 

fB)    Artillery  duties— 

(1)  Duties  of  the  artillery  commander,  or  of  the  heavy  artillery  com- 

mander    130 

(2)  Duties  of  the  artillery  subgroup  commander 130 

(3 )  Fire  control 131 

(C)  Necessary  qualifications  and  duties  of  the  artillery  aeroplane  observer— 

(1)  General  knowledge  of  artillery 132 

(2)  Knowledge  of  the  ground 132 

(3)  Knowledge  of  the  position  and  nature  of  our  own  batteries,  and  of 

the  wireless  fighting  stations 132 

(4)  Conferences  before  and  after  shoots 133 

(5)  Notifyingthe  battery  commander  and  the  wireless  fighting  stations.  133 

(6)  Zone  and  height  of  flight 133 

(7)  Protective  aeroplanes  and  protection  by  antiaircraft  guns 133 

(8)  Method  of  observing  fire 133 

(a)  Indication  of  target 133 

(6)  Registration  and  battery  fire 134 

(c)  Fire  for  effect 134 

(d)  Photographing  after  fire 135 

(c)  Ranging  several  batteries 135 

(125) 


126 

Page. 

V.  Training  at  the  front 135 

VI.  Trench  mortar  shoots 136 

Appendix  1.  Code  signals,  ground  signals,  methods  of  indicating  target,  and 

method  of  signaling  the  results  of  a  shoot 13  v  13!» 

Appendix  2.  Diagram  showing  dispersion  zones  for  various  guns  (100  per  ci  nt 

zones),  and  times  of  flight I  10 

Appendix  3.  Light  signals  from  aeroplanes  When  ranging  artiller  .  |  ;  j 


I.  Importance  and  Fikst  Pki\(  ii'i.i.s  oi-  <  'ooi'kuation  Between 
Artili.krv  AND  Aircraft. 

Aerial  reconnaissance  and  observation  have  become  more  and 
more  important  for  the  artillery  in  both  the  attack  and  the 
defense.  If  aerial  support  is  Lacking  and  ground  observation  is 
impossible  or  bad,  the  artillery  can,  in  the  main,  only  carry  out 
searching  and  sweeping  tire,  and  this  means  a  large  expenditure 
of  ammunition  with  poor  results. 

Aerial  observation  makes  concealed  targets  visible.  The  left* 
plane,  and  the  balloon  also,  are  therefore  aids  to  shooting  which 
the  artillery  can  not  do  without.  By  their  activity  the  result 
of  the  battle  wrill  be  considerably  influenced.  The  artillery 
airmen  must  always  realize  this. 

The  task  of  reconnoitering  targets,  keeping  a  check  on  them. 
photographing  them,  and  observing  fire  takes  the  artillery  aero- 
plane as  far  over  the  enemy's  lines  as  any  other  aerial  observer 
sent  out  on  a  minor  tactical  reconnaissance.  The  actual  ob- 
serration  of  lire  can.  as  a  rule,  be  carried  out  from  our  side  of 
the  line,  hut  not  always  so  far  back  as  to  escape  the  action  of 
hostile  aircraft  or  antiaircraft  lire.  The  efforts  Of  the  enemy 
to  interfere  wit  It  the  activity  of  our  artillery  aviators  may  also 
force  the  latter  to  accept  battle.  They  must  always  remember, 
however,  thai  for  them  artillery  observation  is  the  essential  task. 

Close  liaison  between  the  artillery  and  the  airmen,  mutual 
Confidence,  and  the  fact  that  snch  cooperation  has  been  re- 
hearsed are  the  primary  conditions  for  success.    The  observer 

must  he  personally  acquainted  with  the  battel  y  commanders  of 
his  sector,  and  must  he  familiar  with  the  method  of  work  of 
their  batteries,  while  artillery  commanders  must  he  thoroughly 
conversant  with  what  the  Hying  service  can  do,  and  especially 
must  have  a  clear  knowledge  of  the  dnt  ies  of  art  illery  aeroplanes. 

Personal  experience  gained  by  taking  part  in  flights  is  of  especial 

value  for  this  purpose, 


127 

II.  The  Employment  and  Command  of  Aviation  Units  in 
Support  of  the  Artillery. 

An  army  has  primarily  at  its  disposal,  for  cooperation  with 
the  artillery,  artillery  flights,  each  consisting  of  six,  or  sometimes 
still  of  four,  aeroplanes  fitted  with  wireless.  These  flights  are 
specially  trained  and  equipped  for  artillery  registration  work. 

On  the  principal  fighting  fronts  the  artillery  of  a  divisional 
sector,  or  the  artillery  under  the  direct  command  of  a  corps 
commander,  must  have  at  least  one  artillery  flight  at  its  dis- 
posal. This  flight  is  generally  best  placed  under  the  command 
of  the  artillery  commander  of  the  division,  or  of  a  divisional  or 
corps  artillery  group  commander,  as  the  most  important  tasks 
to  be  carried  out  with  aeroplane  observation,  in  particular  the 
silencing  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  come  into  their  sphere.  In 
order  that  these  flights  may  carry  out  their  tasks  even  when 
threatened  by  hostile  aircraft,  a  certain  number  of  protective 
aeroplanes  (Schutzstaffeln)  will  be  attached  to  them  and  placed 
under  their  control.  Efforts  should  always  be  made  to  house 
them  in  the  same  aerodrome. 

Every  observer  must  be  so  acquainted  with  the  whole  of  the 
fighting  ground  of  his  flight  that  he  can  be  employed  for  any 
artillery  task.  A  flight  would  not  be  employed  to  the  fullest 
extent  if  an  observer  made  a  rule  of  always  only  working  with 
the  same  battery.  Observers  should  only  be  employed  in  accord- 
ance with  the  importance  of  the  work  in  hand. 

If  one  flight  only  is  employed  in  a  very  large  sector,  and  it  is 
desired  temporarily  to  provide  certain  artillery  units  with  aero- 
planes fitted  with  wireless,  in  order  to  carry  out  special  tasks, 
the  organization  of  these  flights,  when  they  have  protective  aero- 
planes attached,  permits  of  the  aeroplanes  being  employed  in 
sections  (two  aeroplanes).  When  the  special  tasks  have  been 
accomplished,  the  sections  return  to  the  flights.  It  is  not  ad- 
visable to  employ  the  flights  continually  thus  split  up,  as  it  robs 
the  flight  commander  of  his  influence  on  further  training,  on  the 
best  technical  employment  of  the  materia]  and  its  maintenance. 

III.  Duties  of  the  Artillery  Aeroplane  Observer. 

The  observer's  principal  tasks,  which  are  to  be  allotted  by  the 
artillery  commander  under  whom  he  is  placed,  are  : 

(1)   Reconnaissance  of  and  keeping  a  watch  on  artillery 
targets, 


128 

(2)  Observation  of  fire. 

1.  Reconnaissance  comprises  the  location  of  all  targets  which 
can  be  engaged  by  the  artillery,  such  ;is — 

(a)  Gun  positions,  observation  and  command  posts. 

(o)  Antiaircraft  guns. 

(c)  Position  of  fire,  communication  and  cable  trenches. 

(d)  Trench  mortar  and  machine-gun  positions. 

(e)  Assembly  places  for  reserves  and  concentrations  of 

troops  in  the  fire  trenches. 
(/)  Dugouts  and  camps. 

(g)  Ammunition  dumps  and  railway  works. 
(h)  Roads  on  which  the  principal  traffic  of  vehicles  and 
troops  takes  place. 
In  order  to  aid  such  reconnaissance,  cooperation  is  necessary 
with  the  other  reconnaissance  units  (artillery  survey  sections, 
captive  balloons,  wireless  observation  posts,  officers  of  the  higher 
staffs  who   supervise  the  intelligence  service  and   maps)  ;   this 
should  be  arranged  through  the  artillery  commander  or  the  com- 
mander of  the  troops. 

The  best  method  of  reconnaissance  is  by  photography,  as  visual 
proof  is  provided  of  the  correctness  of  the  reconnaissance. 

Large  scale  photographs  of  the  neighborhood  are  useful  for 
artillery  work,  the  results  of  the  reconnaissance  being  sketched 
or  pricked  on  them  during  the  flight.  In  this  way  errors  are 
avoided  which  must  creep  in  if  the  observer  afterwards  tries 
to  transfer  what  he  saw  to-an  ordinary  map. 

2.  Observation  of  fire. — Registration  by  aeroplane  is  useful 
against  all  targets  which  can  not  be  observed  from  the  ground 
or  from  a  captive  balloon,  and  also  when  aeroplane  registration 
offers  advantages  over  these  methods  of  observation.  Regis- 
tration  by  aeroplane  is  most  indispensable  when  silencing  hos- 
tile artillery  and  engaging  distant  targets;  it  should,  however. 
be  employed  against  all  targets  as  much  as  possible. 

Field  and  foot  artillery  must  have  practice  in  aeroplane 
registration.  It  is  just  the  simple  tasks  of  the  field  artillery 
(such  ;IS  observing  the  position  of  the  barrage,  observation  of 
annihilating  fire  against   hostile  assault  and  assembly   trenches. 

etc.),   which   can   be   accomplished   very   much   more   quickly 

and   accurately  with  aeroplane  observation   than   with   ground 
observation. 


129 
IV.  Aeroplane  Observation  for  Artillery. 

A.    GENERAL    PREPARATIONS. 

1.  Organization  of  the  wireless  fighting  stations. — Communi- 
cation from  the  aeroplane  to  the  ground  is  established  by  means 
of  wireless  (for  wireless  signals  and  messages,  see  Appendix  1). 
Light  signals  can  also  be  used  (see  Appendix  3). 

For  the  reception  of  wireless  signals  from  the  aeroplanes, 
wireless  fighting  stations  will  be  erected  by  the  flight  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  artillery  command  posts. 

Field  wireless  stations  may  also  be  used  for  communication 
between  aeroplane  and  artillery  commander. 

On  a  battle  front  the  following  aerials  should  be  available : 
1  aerial  at  the  aerodrome. 

1  aerial  with  the  divisional  artillery  commander  or,  in 
some  cases,  with  the  group  commander   (headquarters 
aerial ) . 
1  aerial,  if  possible,  with  each  subgroup  of  heavy  and  field 
artillery  (subgroup  aerial). 
During  fire  the  wireless  fighting  stations  of  the  subgroups 
are  each  to  be  occupied  by  an  antennen-offizier   (mast  officer), 
who  must  be  an  artillery  officer.     This  officer  is  responsible  for 
the  efficiency  of  the  station,  the  quick  and  correct  transmission 
of  the  wireless  messages,   and   the  correct  laying  out  of  the 
ground  signals.     (See  par.  3.) 

Should  telephone  communication  break  down,  he  must  see  that 
the  observations  are  passed  on  by  signals  (flags,  lamps),  or  by 
runners  and  mounted  orderlies.  Before  firing  begins  it  must  be 
ascertained  that  these  communications  are  ready. 

The  firing  will  best  be  directed  from  the  wireless  station. 

2.  Call  signals. — Every  flight  is  allotted  wireless  call  signals 
for  Its  receiving  stations,  and  the  observer  calls  up  with  them 
at  the  beginning  of  each  message.  These  call  signals  consist  of 
several  letters;  sometimes  they  also  include  figures  for  purposes 
of  concealment. 

3.  Ground  signals. — For  signaling  from  the  ground  to  the  aero- 
plane, ground  signals  (strips  of  cloth)  are  laid  out  at  the  sub- 
group stations.  They  have  the  disadvantage  that  the  aero- 
plane, in  order  to  see  them,  must  fly  near  the  station  in  question. 
Thus  in  those  cases  in  which  observations  of  fire  makes  distant 

9784°— 17 9 


130 

and  high  flying  necessary,  time  is  lost,  especially  in  strong  winds. 
(For  the  meaning  of  ground  signals,  sec  Appendix  1.) 

4.  Telephone  communications. — The  following  direct  telephone 
communications  are  necessary: 

(a)   From  the  aerodrome  to  the  artillery  commander  or 

artillery  group  commander. 
(&)   From  the   wireless  fighting  stations   to   the   battery 

commander  of  the  tiring  hattery. 

(c)  From  the  artillery  commander  of  the  subgroup  to  the 

wireless  fighting  stations. 

(d)  In  addition,  communication  between  the  wireless  sta- 

tions themselves  is  desirable. 
The  construction  of  these  communications  is  a  matter  for  the 
telephone  troops  or  for  the  artillery.     Their  faultless  working 
is  the  primary  condition  of  success  when  firing  with  aerial  ob- 
servation. 

5.  Aviation  intelligence  officer. — On  days  specially  suitable  for 
aeroplane  registration  it  may  be  advisable  to  despatch  an  avia- 
tion intelligence  officer  in  a  motor  car  to  the  artillery  commander 
or  commander  of  the  heavy  artillery. 

B.   ARTILLERY  DUTIES. 

1.  Duties  of  the  artillery  commander. — The  artillery  com- 
mander in  each  case  allots  the  aeroplanes  to  the  subgroups  in 
accordance  with  tactical  requirements.  The  choice  of  the  ob- 
server is  left  to  the  flight  commander.  Under  present  conditions 
only  one  aeroplane  at  a  time  can  use  wireless  for  a  subgroup, 
as  each  of  these  has  only  one  aerial  at  its  disposal. 

In  cases  where  subgroups  have  very  narrow  sectors  and  are 
situated  close  together,  training  can  and  must  reach  such  a 
pitch  that  ranging  by  aeroplane  can  take  place  simultaneously 
in  neighboring  subgroups,  without  it  being  necessary  for  the  sub- 
groups to  make  previous  arrangements  with  each  other. 

2.  Duties  of  the  artillery  subgroup  commander. — Shoots  ar- 
ranged by  the  superior  artillery  commanders  are  the  general 
rule,  as  it  is  only  in  that  way  that  the  wishes  of  the  higher  com- 
mand can  be  made  effective,  especially  as  regards  systematic 
counter-battery  work.  The  artillery  subgroup  commander  ar- 
ranges the  shoot  by  issuing  instructions.  These  instructions 
should,  when  the  target  is  a  difficult  one,  be  sent  out  in  good 
time,  if  possible  the  day  before ;  it  must,  however,  also  be  pos- 


131 

sible  to  carry  out  orders  to  tii'e  with  aeroplane  observation  at 
short  notice.     This  is  especially  important. 

The  choice  of  targets  may  only  in  exceptional  cases  be  left 
to  the  observer,  and  only  within  limits  previously  arranged. 
This  does  not  mean  that  he  should  not  report  fleeting  targets, 
the  immediate  engagement  of  which  seems  to  him  of  importance. 
The  decision  and  order  to  engage  such  targets  is,  however,  a 
matter  for  the  artillery  commander,  or  the  commander  of  the 
troops.  For  the  engagement  of  such  targets,  batteries  may  be 
detailed  to  be  in  Readiness  to  open  tire  immediately  on  receipt 
of  a»  wireless  call. 

The  artillery  subgroup  commander's  orders  must  state: 

(a)  To  whom  the  observer  is  to  be  allotted. 

(b)  The  targets  which  are  to  be  observed;  these  will 
best  be  described  by  reference  to  a  photograph  or,  over 
the  telephone,  by  reference  to  a  map. 

(c)  A  consecutive  list  of  targets  to  be  engaged,  or  an 
agreement  that  the  choice  will  be  left  to  the  observer 
according  to  what  he  can  see  best,  that  is,  if  more  than 
one  target  is  to  be  engaged  during  the  flight. 

(rf)  The  order  in  which  batteries  are  to  take  part,  and 
the  distribution  of  targets  to  these  batteries. 

(e)  Any  special  arrangements  regarding  sequence  of 
fire,  ammunition,  and  nature  of  fuze. 

These  orders  must  go  simultaneously  to  the  battery  and  to  the 
flight. 

The  time  to  open  fire  will  be  ordered  by  the  artillery  subgroup 
commander,  and  depends  on  weather  and  light  conditions. 
Everyone  must  be  informed  in  good  time  of  any  change  in  this 
time. 

3.  Fire  control. — The  battery  commander  (compare  IV,  A.  1) 
controls  the  fire  of  his  battery.  The  observer  only  sends  down 
his  observations.  It  must  be  clearly  understood  by  all  artillery- 
men* and  aeroplane  observers  that  registration  with  aeroplane 
observation  is  to  be  carried  out  exactly  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  registration  with  ground  observation. 

The  method  of  fire  adopted  by  the  battery  commander  should 
therefore  be  in  accordance  with  the  gunnery  regulations. 

Batteries  with  guns  which  shoot  differently  must  take  care 
that  any  known  plus  or  minus  corrections  for  the  various  guns 
are  made  before  ranging  begins,  and  that  the  mean  point  of 
impact  for  each  gun  is  Close  to  the  target.  Only  when  this  has 
been  done  will  it  be  possible  to  change  to  fire  for  effect. 


132 

It  must  be  the  battery  commander's  aim  to  get  his  battery 
ranged  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible.  Every  effort  should  be 
made  to  place  the  first  round  as  close  to  the  target  as  possible, 
or  at  least  on  ground  where  it  can  be  seen.  This  can  be  facili- 
tated by  previously  firing  rounds  to  test  the  error  of  tin-  day. 
The  battery  (four  guns  If  possible)  must  fire  as  quickly  as  con- 
siderations of  material  and  good  laying  permit.  Only  in  this 
way  will  the  services  of  an  observer  in  a  flight  of  two  to  throe 
hours  be  fully  utilized. 

It  is  an  essential  condition  for  the  success  of  a  shoot  that 
every  round  which  is  to  be  observed  separately  by  the  observer 
is  only  fired  when  he  calls  for  it,  and  that  the  battery  tiros 
immediately  on  receipt  of  the  signal  "Fire!"  The  battery 
commander  must  know  that  the  observer  can  not  keep  the  target 
continually  in  view,  and  that  the  moment  when  "  Fire"  is  asked 
for  is  the  most  favorable  moment  for  observation.  WPh  regard 
to  fire  for  effect,  compare  C,  8  (c).  As  a  rule  fire  for  effect, 
with  sufficient  ammunition,  must  immediately  follow  registra- 
tion. The  order  to  cease  observing  is  not  given  by  the  observer, 
but  by  the  battery  commander,  by  laying  out  the  ground  signal 
(see  Appendix  1). 

C.    NECESSARY   QUALIFICATIONS  AND  DUTIES  OF  THE  ARTILLERY 
AEROPLANE    OBSERVER. 

1.  General  knowledge  of  artilleni. — For  the  artillery  aeroplane 
observer  the  principal  thing  is  to  be  able  to  see  correctly.  For 
this  he  requires  natural  aptitude  and  much  practice.  Only  a 
limited  general  knowledge  of  artillery  is  necessary.  Tie  must. 
however,  have  a  knowledge  of  the  artillery's  general  method  of 
fire.  He  must,  too,  be  acquainted  with  the  zones  of  dispersion 
of  the  various  guns  (100  per  cent  zones),  the  different  kinds  of 
ammunition,  the  possibilities  of  observing  them,  and  the  times 
of  flight  of  the  projectiles  (see  Appendix  2 ) .  It  is  not  absolutely 
necessary  that  the  observer  should  be  an  artillery  officer. 

2.  Knowledge  of  the  ground. — The  observer  must  know  accu- 
rately, as  a  result  of  his  own  reconnaissance,  the  ground  In 
which  the  target  lies.  and.  if  possible,  have  taken  photographs 
of  it  himself.  He  must  have  an  exact  Idea  of  the  targets  and 
of  their  composition  and  surroundings. 

8.  Knowledge  of  the  position  and  nature  of  our  ovn  hnttrriex 
and  of  the  irireless  fighting  stations. — The  observer  must  keep 
himself  up  to  date  in  his  knowledge  of  the  organization  of  the 


133 

artillery  of  his  sector,  the  position  of  our  own  batteries,  the 
caliber  and  number  of  guns  in  the  batteries,  and  the  positions 
of  the  wireless  fighting  stations. 

4.  Conferences  before  and  after  shoots. — A  personal  interview 
with  the  battery  commander  is  not  possible  before  every  shoot 
on  a  battle  front  and  is  usually  unnecessary.  The  order  of 
the  artillery  commander  must  therefore  contain  everything 
necessary  for  carrying  out  such  shoots.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  consultation  over  the  telephone  is  always  necessary  after 
these  shoots  in  order  to  complete  the  general  picture  and  to 
gain  experience. 

5.  Notifying  the  batter}/  commander  and  the  wireless  fighting 
station*. — The  artillery  commanders  of  the.subgroups  in  question, 
the  battery  commanders,  the  wireless  fighting  stations,  and  the 
antiaircraft  sections  must  be  notified  when  a  machine  leaves  the 
ground. 

(>.  Zone  and  height  of  flight. — The  zone  and  height  of  flight  are 
matters  for  the  observer.  He  must  fly  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
be  able  to  carry  out  his  instructions,  and  must  bear  the  follow- 
ing in  mind: 

(a)  The  higher  and  the  farther  away  he  flies,  the 
more  uncertain  becomes  communication  with  the  battery 
that  is  firing,  and  the  best  observation  becomes  worthless 
if  communication  breaks  down.  This  applies  principally 
to  ground  signals,  but  it  is  also  true  for  communication 
by  wireless. 

(b)  Errors  during  observation  will  be  most  easily 
avoided  if  the  observer  flies  approximately  over  the  line 
of  fire. 

(c)  In  order  not  to  disturb  ranging  by  wireless  in 
neighboring  sectors,  the  observer  must  fly  within  a  limited 
area  during  observation. 

7.  Protective  aeroplanes  and  protection  by  antiaircraft  guns. — 
Protection  by  means  of  special  aircraft  is  necessary,  when 
attacks  by  enemy  aeroplanes  are  to  be  expected.  Antiaircraft- 
gun  protection  is  desirable.  Warning  rounds  from  the  anti- 
aircraft guns  against  the  enemy's  aeroplanes  are  of  great  value. 

8.  Method  of  observing  fire — (a)  Indication  of  target. — When 
a  target  lias  to  he  described  from  the  aeroplane  (see  IV,  B.  2), 
it  can  be  done : 

1.  By  means  of  the- map  squares  or  battery  numbers  in 
the  artillery  map,  or 


134 

2.  By  means  of  the  target's  position  relative  to  a  refer- 
ence point  (see  Appendix  1). 
Wireless  "in  clear"  is  only  to  be  used  in  the  most  exceptional 

cases. 

(b)  Registration  and  battery  fire. — Rounds  with  percussion 
fuze  are  the  general  rule.  It  is  important  for  the  very  first 
rounds,  if  possible,  to  be  seen  by  the  observer.  Should  single 
rounds  be  difficult  to  see,  then  ranging  will  be  done  by  section 
salvos  or  battery  salvos.  This  will  be  ordered  beforehand  (see 
B.  2  e),  but  can  also  be  asked  for  by  the  observer  during  the 
flight. 

The  method  of  signaling  the  rounds  in  ordinary  fire  is  with 
correction  by  deflection  and  by  short  or  over  (+,  — ,  r,  1.)  (see 
Appendix  1).  The  observer  reports  first  the  correction  for  de- 
flection and  then  for  short  or  over.  The  amount  Of  the  short 
or  over  correction  is  only  to  be  given  in  the  case  of  the  first  few 
rounds  observed.  The  supposition  that  quicker  results  would  be 
obtained  by  giying  the  correction  in  meters  sent  by  the  aero- 
plane to  the  guns  direct  than  by  orthodox  ranging  by  bracket 
and  battery  fire  has  proved  to  be  wrong.  The  constant  zone  of 
dispersion  of  our  guns  makes  it  necessary  that  the  well-founded 
principles  of  our  gunnery  regulations  should  always  be  adhered 
to.  During  ranging  and  battery  fire  all  rounds  are  to  he  ob- 
served and  reported  by  the  observer  one  by  one. 

When  ranging  special  guns,  the  method  of  reporting  remits  of 
rounds  given  in  Appendix  1,  No.  4  (b),  may  he  used. 

(c)  Fire  for  effect. — The  opening  of  fire  for  effect  is  decided 
by  the  battery  commander   (ground  signals,  see  Appendix  1). 

From  then  onward  the  battery  tires  without  being  asked  to  do 
so  by  the  observer;  the  latter  should  only  report  now  and  again 
the  fall  of  a  number  of  consecutive  rounds  (about  6  to  12), 
Tf  some  of  the  rounds  are  noticeably  short  or  over,  or  fall  very 
much  to  a  flank,  then  the  observer  again  asks  for  single  rounds 
and  again  corrects  for  each  round. 

It  is  desirable  that  important  cases  of  tire  for  effect  should  be 
observed  to  the  finish,  as  the  error  of  the  day  often  causes  con- 
siderable changes  in  trajectory  in  quite  a  short  time,  making  all 
shooting  worthless  unless  these  changes  are  observed  and  re- 
ported.   As.  however,  it  is  not  always  possible  for  the  aeroplane 

to  fly  so  long,  and  as  one  flight    must   often  he  used  for  Several 

consecutive  shoots,  one  must  often  be  satistied  with  observing 

only  a   pari    of  the  tire   for  effect.      In  such   a   case  the  tire   for 


135 

effect  can  occasionally  be  continued  with  advantage  by  other 
means  of  observation  (captive  balloon,  survey  sections),  if  the 
latter  have  also  been  observing  since  the  beginning  of  the  shoot. 
It  is  a  matter  of  principle  that  they  may  not,  during  registration 
by  aeroplane,  take  part  in  reporting  results  of  rounds. 

(d)  Photographing  after  fire, — After  fire  for  effect  a  photo- 
graph of  the  target  is  to  be  taken ;  that  is,  if  the  vicinity  of  the 
target  has  not  been  too  badly  shot  about  by  previous  bombard- 
ments, and  if  it  is  supposed,  from  the  amount  of  ammunition 
used,  that  the  results  will  be  seen  on  the  photographs. 

(e)  Ranging  several  batteries. — Ranging  several  batteries 
simultaneously  by  one  aeroplane  is  forbidden,  as  this  generally 
leads  to  errors  and  consequently  to  waste  of  ammunition.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  simply  a  question  of  time  and  practice, 
and  of  the  artillery  and  aeroplanes  working  together  well,  for 
an  aeroplane  to  range  several  batteries  on  different  targets  one 
after  the  other. 

V.  Training  at  the  Front. 

Every  artillery  shoot  must,  as  far  as  possible,  especially  on 
quiet  fronts,  be  used  for  training  purposes.  Ranging  purely 
for  training  purposes  can  usefully  be  carried  out  with  quite  a 
small  expenditure  of  ammunition. 

VI.  Trench  Mortar  Shoots. 

Aeroplane  observation  for  trench  mortars  can  be  carried  out 
in  the  same  way  as  artillery  registration,  and  the  above  direc- 
tions will  still  hold  good. 

APPENDIX  1. 

I.  CODE  SIGNALS. 

1.  Instructions  for  the  use  of  wireless : 

(a)  Every  wireless  message  will  be  transmitted  on  the  mini- 
mum power  necessary  for  communication.  The  speed  of  "  send- 
ing "  will  be  as  quick  as  possible. 

(h)  The  following  procedure  will  be  used  when  establishing 
wireless  communication : 

(1)  Call.    Station  call  of  receiver  from  station  call  of 

gender. 

(2)  Message. 

(3)  "End   of   message"   or   "change  over"   signal 

( Umschaltezeichen ) . 


136 


(c)  After  communication  has  been  established  the  following 

procedure  will  be  adopted : 

(1)  Station  call  of  the  receiving  station. 

(2)  Message. 

(3)  Station  call  of  the  sending  station  or  "change 

.over  "  signal. 

(d)  A  wireless  message,  if  of  considerable  length,  will  be  pre- 
ceded and  followed  by  a  "  break  "  signal. 

(e)  All  wireless  stations  and  aeroplanes  are  allotted  wireless 
calls  of  two  letters  each. 

(/)  These  wireless  calls  will  be  so  chosen  that  they  <1«>  not 
coincide  with  any  abbreviations  under  paragraph  2. 
2.  Abbreviations:1 

(a)  WIRELESS  SIGNALS. 


Abbrevia- 
tion. 

Genua. 

English  equivalent. 

S 

Schuss 

Hound  (shot). 

SA 

Salve 

Salvo. 

EF 

Einzelfeuer 

Single  rounds. 

Sz 

1st  geschossen  worden? 

Es  wurde  nicht  geschossen. . 
Feuerbereit 

Has  battery  fired? 

N6 

FF 

No  firing  has  taken  place. 
Ready  to  fire. 

DD 

OU 

WBS 

Schiessen  beendet 

Beobachtung  unmogUcfa 

Welche  batterie  steht  zur 
verfugung? 

End  of  shoot  (for  intercommunication 

between  two  stations  this  moans:  The 

station  will  close  down). 
Observation  impossible. 
Which  battery  is  at  my  disposal? 

(6)  SIGNALS  FOR  RANGING. 


z 

Ziel 

Target. 

i  out  it  of  target. 

Right  of  target. 

!  eft  of  target. 

Over. 

Short. 

Right. 

left. 

Target,  hit. 

Proposal  for  change  of  target. 

Not  observed. 

Doubtful. 

ZM 

Zielmitte 

ZR 

Ziel  rechts 

ZL 

Ziel  links 

W 

Weit 

K  .. 

R 

L 

Links    .             

TR 

Trailer 

NZ 

NO 

Vorschlag  sum  slerwechsel . . 

Nicht  beobachtet 

FR. 

Fraglich 

(c)  DESCRIPTION    OF   TAl: 


IM 

IV 

Infanterle  in  manobkolonnc 
[nfanterfe  in  versammlung. . 
Artillerie  in  marschJcoIonne  . 

Infantry  in  column  of  route. 
infantry  concentrating. 

AM 

AF 

Artillery  in  column  of  route. 
Artillery  in  action. 

M\V 

BV 

AT 

EV. 

Marsehkolonne  aller  walfen. 

Bagagen  in  versammhmg.   . 
Ausladung  von  trapper*. 

Column' of  all  arms  on  the  march. 
A  collection  of  transport. 

Troops  detraining. 
Railway  traffic. 

1  The  abbreviations  given  here  are  for  general  OS 

they  must  be  arranged  beforehand. 


If  additional  ones  are  needed. 


137 

(d)  PHYSICAL  FEATURES. 


Abbrevia- 
tion. 

German. 

English  equivalent. 

GB. 

Graben 

Trench. 

PT. 

Punkt 

Point, 

ED..  . 

Eisenbahndamm 

Railway  embankment. 
Wood. 

WD  .. 

Wald 

STR... 

Road. 

(«)  GENERAL  ABBREVIATIONS. 


PA 

NH 

MR  . 

Planquadrat 

Fliege  nach  Flughafen 

Map  square. 
Am  coming  in. 
Engine  trouble. 
Must  land. 
Clouds. 
Mist. 

To  the  North. 
To  the  South. 
To  the  East. 
To  the  West. 

SOS 

Muss  notlanden 

WO 

Wolken 

DU... 

Dunst 

NL 

Nordlich 

SL 

Sudlich 

OL..  . 

Ostlich 

WL.... 

Westlich 

(/)  ABBREVIATIONS  FOR  WIRELESS  COMMUNICATION. 


UM,  UM. 

"Change  over"  signal. 
Understood. 

VE   .. 

Verstanden 

NV 

Nicht  verstanden 

Not  understood. 

US 

BP 

Storungenim  Funkenbetrieb. 

Wireless  is  being  jammed. 

I  am  expecting  your  message. 

Wait  (Message  will  be  continued  imme- 
diately). 

Wait !    I  will  call  again  in  five  minutes 
time. 

Principal  wave  length. 

Wave  length  for  mist, 

More  power. 

Less  power. 

Nothing  further. 

Message  deciphered. 

There  is  an  enemy  jamming  station  here. 

Repeat. 

How  are  you  receiving  my  signal . 

Message  received   from    you   does   not 
make  sense. 

Cipher  message. 

Message  in  wireless  service  cipher. 

End  of  message. 

At  least  10  dots  in  succession = erase. 

AS. 

WA  (5).. 
HH 

Warten 

NN.. 

Nebelwelle 

MG.. 

Mehr  Energie 

WG... 

Weniger  Energie 

NF 

FO 

Hier  liegt  kein  Funkspruch  vor 

FS 

WH 

WPG.... 
OS 

CHI 

ZIF 

AR 

Wie  ist  dort  der  Empfang? . . . 
Das  Empfangene  ist  ohne  Sinn 

Chiffrierter  Funkspruch 

ChifTrierte  Stationsnachricht . . 
Schlusszeichen 

Given  as  MV  in  the  original,  but  this  is  apparently  a  misprint.— G.  S.  I. 


13ft 

II.    GROUND    SIGNALS. 

The  ground  signals  for  signaling  from  the  ground  to  aero- 
planes consist  of  from  one  to  three  variously  placed  strips  of 
cloth  (each  3  to  4  meters  long,  usually  white,  hut  red  when 
snow  is  on  the  ground). 


No  of 
Grouod 
Si(oaJ 

Form 

MrMNtfl 

.Rrrotrki 

1 

V 

Understood" 

% 

=^ 

Battery  is  ready  to  fire. 

If  signal  is  taken  away  this 
means  that  the  observation 
is  ended 

3 



Battery  is  for  the  moment 
not  ready  to  fire. 

4 

V 

Not    understood       repeat 
message 

5 

+ 

Yes 

C 

N 

No 

7 

4= 

Battery  is  changing  target 
as  requested 

8 

u 

Battery  is  now  going  to  fire 
for«effect 

9 

H 

Battery    is    going    to    fire 
single  rounds  again. 

139 

III.  METHODS    OF    INDICATING    TARGETS. 

(a)   Indication  by  means  of  map  squares  or  battery  numbers. 
(&)   Indication  by  means  of  a  given  reference  point. 


200  m. 


(Charley. 

(  8  North. 

( 

(  2  West. 


IV.  METHOD   OF  SIGNALING  THE   RESULTS  OF  A  SHOOT. 

(a)   Reporting  the  burst  according  to  lateral   situation  and 
range. 


Abbrevi- 
ation. 

English  equivalent. 

Remarks. 

L 

R 

z 

Left  of  the  line  battery— target 
Right  of  the  line  battery- 
target. 

Lateral  corrections  are  given  in  figures  so 
long  as  the  bursts  are  outside  the  target. 

ZL. 

In  target,  to  the  left 

ZR 

W 

K 

In  target,  to  the  right 

Over,  i.  e.,  behind  target 

Short,  i.  e.,  in  frotat  of  target. . 

Corrections  in  range  are  given  in  figures 
only  for  the  first  few  rounds. 

Examples : 

Burst  250  meters  to  right  of  target  and  450  meters  in 

front  of  it.    Message :  B  3  K  5. 
Burst  100  meters  to  right,  about  50  meters  in  front  of 

target.    Message:  R1K. 
Burst  right  side  of  target,  about  50  meters  over.    Message  : 

ZRW. 
Burst  in  center  of  target,  direct  hit.    Message:  ZMTR. 


140 

(&)  When  ranging  special  guns  it  may  be  preferable  to  take 
a  photograph  of  the  target  or,  in  exceptional  cases,  a  map.  and 
to  mark  this  as  follows: 


The  bursts  will  be  signaled  according  to  the  squares.  Every 
shot  will  be  marked  on  the  photograph.  This  will  form  a  dia- 
gram of  the  rounds  near  the  target  and  will  in  many  cases 
replace  the  usual  photograph  normally  taken  subsequently. 

Extract  from  Appendix  2. 


1.  This  appendix  consists  of  a  diagram  showing  on  the  TSTsjfjf 
sc.-ile  the  100  per  cent  zones  of  the  following  guns  and  howitzers 
at  various  ranges  and  with  various  charges: 

1.1  cm.  heavy  field  howitzer  ('02  and  '13). 

21cm.  mortar. 

10  cm.  gun  ('04). 


141 


2.  The  following  is  an  example  taken  from  this  table : 


15  cm.  heavy  field  howitzer  ('02  and  '13). 


Range,  7,000  meters. 


Sixth  charge. 


Time  of  flight 

100  per  cent  zones 

Scale  TT^B . . -  - . 

A.  For  single  gun  firing  at  a  single 
point  (x) 


30  seconds. 


7~\ 


B .  For  a  battery  firing  against  a  hostile 
battery  with  a  frontage  of  100 
meters 


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Part  (5. 


COMMUNICATION  BETWEEN  INFANTRY  AND  AERO- 
PLANES  OR  CAPTIVE  BALLOONS. 

(Issued  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Field  Army.) 


I.  Infantry  Aeroplanes. 

1.   IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  INFANTRY  AEROPLANE  SKKVHK. 

It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  for  commanders  and  the  artil- 
lery to  have  constant  information,  in  the  course  of  a  battle,  ;is  to 
the  progress  of  the  infantry  fighting,  the  position  of  the  foremost 
infantry  lines,  and  any  of  the  enemy's  measures  which  may  have 
been  detected. 

In  consequence  of  the  increased  effectiveness  of  artillery  tire, 
transmission  of  information  from  the  front  line  to  the  rear,  in 
spite  of  the  increase  of  and  improvements  in  the  means  of  ground 
communication,  is  becoming  more  and  more  difficult.  For  this 
reason  the  infantry,  when  heavily  engaged,  is  often  unable  to 
obtain  the  requisite  effective  support  from  the  higher  command 
and  the  artillery,  ground  which  has  been  gained  with  difficulty 
lias  been  lost  again,  and  the  enemy's  successes  are  liable  to  ac- 
quire a  dangerous  extension. 

In  many  cases  the  infantry  aeroplane  (contact  patrol)  can 
render  valuable  services  to  the  infantry  in  this  respect.  Plying 
at  a  low  altitude,  the  airman  is  able  to  define  With  great  accuracy, 
on  the  maps  and  by  photography,  the  situation  of  the  front  lines 
as  revealed  to  him  by  the  signals  of  ihe  troops,  and  can  also,  by 
means  of  preconcerted  signs  and  signals  (see  Appendix),  trans- 
mit reports  from  the  infantry,  and  the  results  of  his  observation 
of  the  enemy's  movements  quickly  and  safely  to  the  rear.  Proper 
cooperation  between  infantry  aeroplanes  and  the  troops  will  thus 

(144) 


145 

provide  the  infantry  with  an  additional  means  of  reconnaissance 
and  communication. 

2.    DUTIES  OF  THE  INFANTRY  AEROPLANE. 

(a)  Determination  of  the  intuition  of  our  oicn  front  line. — The 
main  duty  of  an  infantry  aeroplane,  in  every  flight  that  is  under- 
taken, is  to  determine  and  keep  under  observation  the  position 
of  the  front  line.  In  any  case  communication  must  be  established 
with  the  infantry  by  means  of  signals.  Even  if  the  front  line  has 
undergone  no  modifications,  the  consciousness  of  being  in  com- 
munication with  the  aeroplane  strengthens  the  morale  of  the 
infantry. 

(b)  Transmission  of  tactical  reports  from  the  front  line  and 
from  battalion  and  regimental  headquarters  to  the  rear. — The 
heavier  the  lighting,  whether  in  attack  or  defense,  the  greater 
becomes  the  dependence  of  the  infantry  upon  the  aeroplane  for 
the  transmission  of  its  reports.  By  means  of  the  arrangements 
for  communicating  with  the  infantry,  the  infantry  aeroplane  is 
able  to  transmit  to  the  rear,  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  all 
reports  of  special  importance  as  to  the  course  of  the  action  and 
the  conditions  in  the  front  line.  It  is  particularly  important  to 
forward  immediately  any  requests  of  the  infantry  for  barrage 
fire. 

(c)  Tactical  reconnaissance  in  the  sphere  of  the  infantry 
action. — Thorough  familiarity  with  all  details  of  his  sector  en- 
ables the  infantry  airman,  in  addition  to  his  other  duties,  to 
carry  out  very  detailed  tactical  reconnaissance.  From  observa- 
tion of  the  artillery  fire  upon  the  front  line  with  regard  to  the 
fall  of  the  rounds  and  the  volume  and  general  direction  of  the 
fire,  as  well  as  from  observation  of  concentrations,  movements, 
and  bringing  up  of  reserves  in  the  enemy's  trenches,  the  object 
and  direction  of  hostile  attacks  can  he  recognized,  and,  by  an 
immediate  report,  can  be  nipped  in  the  bud. 

:'..  EM  IM.OYMENT   AND   COMMAND   OF   INFANTRY   AEROPLANES. 

On   the  principal    fighting  fronts   special    aeroplanes   will   be 

allotted  to  the  infantry  divisions  as  infantry  aeroplanes.     Their 

number  will  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  fighting  and  their 

employment  will  be  determined  by  the  flight  commander  con- 

0784°— 17 10 


146 

reined,  who  will  receive  his  instructions  from  divisional  bead- 
quarters. 

It  may  be  found  necessary,  in  order  to  enable  the  infantry 
aeroplanes  to  carry  out  their  duties  even  in  the  face  of  hostile 
aerial  activity,  to  assign  special  aircraft  for  their  protection. 
Applications  in  this  respect  should  be  made  to  the  commander 
of  the  aviation  troops  or  to  the  .wing  commander; 

4.  MEANS  OF  COMMUNICATION. 

A.  Communication  from  thk  Ground  t<>  the  Aeroplank. 

(a)  Cloth  signals. — These  cloths  are  colored  white  on  one 
side  and  dark  on  the  other  (for  use  In  snowy  weather)  :  those 
used  at  battle  headquarters  are  2  feet  7  inches  by  8  feet  2  inches, 
and  those  employed  in  the  front  line  2  feet  7  inches  by  S  feet  3 
inches.  It  is  advisable  to  stiffen  the  narrow  sides  by  wooden 
battens  and  to  keep  the  cloths  in  cases  as  a  protection  against 
dirt. 

By  placing  the  cloth  signals,  stretched  to  their  fullest  extent. 
about  55  yards  apart,  especially  at  salients  and  reentrants  of 
the  front  line,  its  outline  can  be  defined.  To  avoid  attracting 
the  enemy's  attention  they  must  be  displayed  from  the  slope  of 
the  trench  which  faces  away  from  the  enemy. 

They  can  be  used  in  certain  combinations  to  convey  tactical 
information.     (See  Appendix.) 

As  against  the  disadvantages  arising  out  of  the  difficulty  <>\' 
displaying  the  cloths  under  hostile  fire  and  of  the  possibility  of 
confusion  being  caused  by  their  nonromoval  must  be  set  the  fad 
that  they  are  easily  recognized  from  an  aeroplane,  can  be  un- 
mistakably reproduced  in  a  photograph,  and.  when  once  ex- 
tended, obviate  the  necessity  for  continuous  observation  on  the 

part  of  Hie  aeroplane. 

(6)  Signal  lamps. — Signal  lamps  (infantry  signaling  appa- 
ratus and  special  aeroplane  Hash  lamps)  are  used  lor  sending 
certin  flashlight  signals  to  the  aeroplane. 

Much  practice  is  required  for  their  operation:  it  is  no  simple 
matter  for  the  aeroplane,  when  hampered  by  difficult  flying  condi- 
tions and  the  Incidents  of  the  battle,  lo  take  the  Signals  so  sent 

This  means  of  communication  is.  therefore,  not  so  reliable :  more- 
over, the  messages  can  not  be  reproduced  photographically. 

(c)  Flares. — The  front  line  can  be  outlined  by  means  of  white 
or  red  magnesium  torches  or  fiares.     The  Hares  or  torches  must 


147 

be  lighted  at  the  bottom  of  the  trench  or  in  shell  craters,  if  pos- 
sible against  a  dark  background  and  screened  from  the  enemy. 
If  much  smoke  is  produced,  they  will  attract  the  attention  of 
the  enemy,  and  must,  therefore,  only  be  used  exceptionally  by 
the  troops  in  certain  circumstances  (attack).  In  the  absence  of 
smoke,  they  are  difficult  to  see  from  an  aeroplane,  and  can  not  be 
photographed. 

When  used  they  must  be  arranged  with  a  certain  amount  of 
regularity  (groups  of  2  or  3  flares  or  torches,  distance  between 
the  groups  55  to  110  yards). 

Signaling  from  the  front  line  must  be  confined  to  the  display 
of  cloth  signals,  flashes  by  signal  lamps,  and  the  use  of  flares. 

Cloth  signals  (see  Appendix)  and  Morse  signals  (see  Ap- 
pendix) on  the  signal  lamp  can  only  be  used  for  the  conveyance 
of  information  from  points  situated  farther  in  rear  (from  the 
company  commander  upward ) . 

B.  Communication  from  the  Aeroplane  to  the  Ground. 

The  infantry  aeroplane  is  distinguished  by  long  black,  white, 
and  red  pennants  at  the  outer  extremities  of  the  lower  plane  and 
flies  at  a  lower  altitude  than  other  aircraft.  The  infantry  aero- 
plane possesses  the  following  means  of  communication  with  the 
ground : 

(4»)  Light-pistol  cartridges. — To  enable  itself  to  be  identified 
by  the  divisions  to  which  it  is  allotted  as  their  infantry  aero- 
plane, and  as  a  request  to  them  to  display  their  cloths,  the  aero- 
plane will  discharge  colored  light  signals  when  near  the  front 
line  (see  Appendix). 

Atmospheric  conditions  and  the  position  of  the  sun  may  render 
it  difficult  to  recognize  and  distinguish  between  the  different 
colors ;  repeated  signals,  moreover,  can  not  be  made,  as  but  few 
cartridges  can  be  carried. 

(b)  Machine- gun  fire. — Failing  any  other  means  of  attracting 
the  attention  of  the  troops,  short  bursts  of  machine-gun  fire  can 
be  delivered ;  in  the  same  way  several  series  of  rounds  from  the 
machine  gun  have  proved  a  useful  method  of  giving  the  "  under- 
stood "  signal  or  the  "  call  "  signal  of  units. 

There  is  danger  of  such  signals  being  misinterpreted  and  of 
the  aeroplane  running  short  of  ammunition  if  engaged  by  an 
opponent. 

(c)  Signal  lamps. — Infantry  aeroplanes  are  equipped  with 
signal  lamps  to  enable  them  to  give  the  "  understood  "  signal 


148 

and  to  repeat  Morse  messages  sent  from  the  ground.    These 

lamps  can  also  be  used  to  transmit  reports  received  from  below 
to  such  command  posts  in  rear  as  are  unprovided  with  wireless 
stations  and  at  which  it  is  Inadvisable  to  drop  The  report. 

(d)  Wireless  apparatus. — Each  division  has  a  wireless  receiv- 
ing station  for  the  receipt  of  argent  messages  requiring  instant 
action;  the  infantry  aeroplane  must  report  to  this  station,  using 
certain  wave  lengths  and  the  preconcerted  "call"  signal. 
Demands  for  barrage  fire,  in  particular,  must  be  transmitted  by 
wireless.  It  is  the  duty  of  divisional  headquarters  to  cause  the 
necessary  telephone  lines  to  be  constructed,  to  keep  them  dis- 
engaged while  the  infantry  llighr  is  in  progress,  and  to  detail  a 
skilled  operator  to  work  the  telephone  at  the  wireless  station 
in  order  that  these  demands  may  be  transmitted,  without  any 
delay,  to  the  proper  quarters. 

(e)  Dropping  reports. — As  reports  which  are  dropped  by  means 
of  the  "  Rauchmeldepatrone "  (smoke  indicator)  very  rarely 
fall  quite  close  to  the  command  post  concerned,  it  is  advisable 
only  to  drop  them  in  those  places  where  there  is  a  certainty  that 
the  enemy's  fire  will  not  prevent  a  search  for  the  reports.  In 
any  case  a  report  should  be  repeated  by  telephone  as  soon  as 
the  aeroplane  has  landed. 

5.   METHOD  OF  CABK1  l\<i  Ol'T  TIIK  DUTIES  Ol     IN!  AN  IKY    A  KUolM.A.N  KS. 

(lateral  observations. — The  infantry  is  confronted  by  the  two- 
fold difficulty  of  identifying  immediately,  out  of  the  large  num- 
ber of  aircraft  visible,  its  own  aeroplane,  which  usually  appears 
unexpectedly,  and  of  often  having  to  display  the  necessary  sig- 
nals to  the  aeroplane  in  circumstances  of  the  greatest  difficulty 
and  under  heavy   hostile  fire. 

Good  will,  vigilance,  consciousness  on  the  part  of  the  troops 
that  the  aeroplane  always  comes  on  their  service  alone  and  for 
their  advantage,  find,  if  necessary,  the  issue  of  drastic  orders 
and  the  display  of  severity  by  commanders,  will  enable  many 
Imaginary  difficulties  to  be  surmounted. 

The  airman,  by  complete  disregard  of  personal  danger,  by 
flying  at  a  very  low  height  and  in  had  weather,  must  prove  to 
the  troOpS  that  they  Catl  rely  on  him  in  their  difficulties.     Where 

confidence  is  mutual  excellent  results  will  be  obtained. 


149 


MEASURES  TO   BE   TAKEN    PREVIOUS   TO   ESTABLISHING 
COMMUNICATION. 


TROOPS. 

1.  Certain  observers  will  be 
posted  at  all  points  where,  sig- 
nals are  to  be  made,  to  keep 
aircraft  under  constant  obser- 
vation. 

2.  The  signaling  apparatus  is 
always  to  be  kept  in  readiness 
by  the  operators. 


1.  Previous  to  starting,  the 
observer  will  be  informed  by 
the  general  staff  officer  of  the 
division  as  to  the  situation  In 
the  front  line. 

2.  He  will  communicate,  the 
time  of  his  intended  departure 
to  the  divisional  wireless  sta- 
tion. 

3.  It  may  occasionally  be  ad- 
visable to  inform  the  troops  by 
wireless  or  by  telephone. 

THE    PROCESS    OF    ESTABLISHING    COMMUNICATION. 

1.  As  soon  as  the  observers         1.  The  aeroplane  will  appear 
recognize     an     infantry     aero-  '  at  such  a  height  as,  in  view  of 

weather  and  other  circum- 
stances, will  enable  the  troops 
to  identify  it  with  certainty 
(generally  speaking,  between 
550  and  1,100  yards).  It  can 
be  recognized  by  long  pennants 
at  both  ends  of  the  lower 
planes.  Unless  the  airman  dis- 
poses of  other  means  of  at- 
tracting attention  by  sound,  be 
can  do  so  by  means  of  short 
bursts  of  machine-gun  fire. 

2.  To  signify  its  desire  to  get 
into  communication  wTith  the 
— th  division,  the  aeroplane 
will  discharge  the  light  signal. 
forming  the  call  signal  of  the 
particular  division. 


plane*,  they  will   keep  a  sharp 
lookout  for  the  anticipated  light 

signals. 


2.  As  soon  as  the  call  signal 
of  the  division  is  recognized, 
the  troops  in  front  line,  com- 
pany commanders,  battalion 
and  regimental  headquarters, 
will  display  the  cloths,  or  re- 
port by  Hash  lamp,  flares,  or 
cloths,  as  to  the  tactical  situa- 
tion. 

Tn  signaling  with  the  flash 
lamp    it    nnist   he   remembered 


150 


that  the  aeroplane  will  devote 
its  nl  tent  ion,  first  of  all,  to  the 
front  line  and  company  com- 
manders, then  to  battalion 
headquarters,  and,  last  of  all, 
to  regimental  headquarters. 

3.  The  signals  will  be  dis- 
played or  repeated  until  the 
aeroplane  has  given  the  "  un- 
derstood "  signal  or  has  obvi- 
ously departed. 


4.  Signaling  is  completed, 
but  the  aeroplane  will  be  care- 
fully observed  as  long  as  it  is 
in  sight. 


.  3.  The  airman  will  photo- 
graph the  front  line  and  Its 
signals.  Should  circumstances 
require  a  sketch  Of  the  front 
line  to  be  brought  back  at  once, 
the  airman  will  draw  it  on  a 
section  of  a  large-scale  map. 
or  on  a  photograph.  If  he 
happens  to  detect  a  remuner- 
ative target,  he  should  report 
it  by  wireless,  giving  the  map 
square  or  number.  It  is  not 
•his  duty  to  observe  tire. 

4.  When  the  airman  has  re- 
ceived all  the  signals,  he  will 
give  the  "understood"  signal 
by  repeating  the  signal  given 
on  the  ground,  by  flashing  the 
"  understood  "  signal  with  the 
addition  of  the  sector  letter, 
or  by  light-pistol  signals.  I'r- 
gent  reports  are  to  be  dropped 
at  headquarters  or  sent  by 
wireless.  They  should  be  ^ent 
in  the  following  order :  Front 
^line,  company  commanders, 
battalion  headquarters  and 
regimental  headquarters,  be- 
ginning from  the  right  of  each 
battle  sector. 

Signals  made  with  the  Hash 
Lamp  are  to  he  repeated  until 
the  "understood"  signal  is 
given   from  below. 

It  is  most  important  to  for- 
ward at  once  requests  for  bat  • 
rage  lire. 


151 

5.  If  the  troops  should  see  5.  The  result  of  the  flight  is 
that,  owing  to  its  being  involved  invariably  to  be  dropped  at 
in  an  air  fight,  the  aeroplane  divisional  headquarters  or  regi- 
is  unable  to  receive,  the  signal  mental  battle  headquarters,  as 
or  that  the  aeroplane  is  with-  the  case  may  be.  The  report 
drawing  temporarily  but  un-  will  be  supplemented  by  tele- 
mistakably,  the  signals  are  to  phone  immediately  after  land- 
be  taken  down  and  not  again  ing.  Photographs  are  to  be 
displayed  till  the  aeroplane  sent  on  to  the  regiments  con- 
again  asks  for  them.  cerned  as  soon  as  possible.     It 

will  be  advisable  at  times  for 
the  aeroplane  to  land  tempo- 
rarily at  a  special  landing 
place  near  divisional  head- 
quarters, in  order  to  complete 
verbally  the,  report  which  has 
been  transmitted  by  wireless  or 
flash  lamp. 

6.    TRAINING    OF    THE    TROOPS. 

The  training  must  conform  to  the  regulations.  Arbitrary 
modifications  are  forbidden,  as  they  lead  to  confusion  and. 
possibly,  disaster  to  the  troops. 

Officers  of  all  ranks  must  make  every  effort  to  insure  that 
troops  are  thoroughly  trained  in  this  most  important  duty. 

It  must  be  explained  to  the.  troops  that  their  fear  of  hostile 
aeroplanes  is  exaggerated;  that  the  visual  signals  and  indi- 
vidual soldiers  can  not  be  seen  from  aeroplanes  at  a  great 
height ;  and  that  the  light  of  the  signal  lamps  is  only  visible  to 
the  aeroplane  with  which  they  are  in  communication.  Every 
officer,  noncommissioned  officer,  and  man  must  be  sufficiently 
acquainted  with  the  regulations  to  enable  him  to  act  inde- 
pendently. 

Officers  of  the  flying  troops  who  have  been  trained  as  infantry 
airmen  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  detailed  to  carry  out  this 
training. 

Each  method  of  signaling  will  be  practiced  as  a  drill. 

The  men  must  be  regularly  drilled  in  displaying  the  cloths, 
lighting  the  signal  flares,  and  reading  light  signals  and  flashes 
from  the  aeroplane,  under  service  conditions,  as  it  is  by  no 
means  easy  to  display  the  cloths  and  receive  the  signals  under 
lire. 


152 

The  men  operating  the  signal  lamps  must  be  taught*  above 
all  else,  to  Signal  Clearly  and  distinctly,  and  not  to<»  hurriedh . 
They  must  be  taught  to  follow  the  movements  of  the  aeroplane 
with  the  lamp,  and  to  continue  the  repetition  of  the  signals 
until  the  aeroplane  gives  the  "understood"  signal  or  repeats 
the  "  call  "  signal. 

Individual  training  must  be  followed  by  regimental  training 
under  war  conditions,  in  which  aeroplanes  should  take  part. 

To  make  the  training  more  realistic,  trenches  must  be  avail- 
able where  the  men  can  operate  the  appliances,  wearing  their 
field  service  kit  and  equipment,  and  in  the  posture  they  would 
be  forced  to  adopt  in  actual  fighting.  The  aeroplanes  taking 
part  in  the  training  must,  as  they  would  do  in  reality,  only  tly 
over  the  position  for  a  short  time,  and  withdraw  temporarily, 
as  if  owing  to  prevailing  wind  conditions  and  the  exigencies  of 
aerial  warfare. 

II.  Captive  Balloons, 

Captive  balloons  may  be  assigned  to  divisions  for  Important 

operations,  in  which,  as  "infantry  balloons"  they  can,  to  a 
limited  extent,  replace  or  supplement  the  Infantry  aeroplane. 

Their  employment  depends  largely  on  weather  conditions 
(storm,  fog). 

The  infantry  balloon  carries  a  conical  pennant  on  the  basket. 
and  accepts  signals  as  long  as  the  pennant  is  living. 

The  signal  apparatus  is  used  for  communication  from  the 
.mound  to  the  balloon,  and  vice  versa,  but  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  if  the  basket  is  very  unsteady  many  light  signals  will 
be  missed.  At  night  the  balloon  works  tike  an  ordinary  signal 
station,  and  must  frequently  send  out  Hashes  to  facilitate  •aim- 
ing*' in  its  direction.  The  signals  to  be  made  with  the  signal 
apparatus  are  identical  with  those  laid  down  for  infantry  aero- 
planes. 

The  balloon  observer  reports  by  telephone  to  the  different  bat- 
tle headquarters.  The  report  should  be  supplemented  later  by 
a  sketch. 

Continual   practices  between  balloons  and   the  front    lines  IK 

necessary;  the  principles  of  training  laid  down  in  Section  1. 
paragraph  6,  hold  good  with  the  necessary  modifications. 


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HINTS  FOR  TRENCH-MORTAR  OFFICERS. 


Policy. 


(a)  To  gain  absolute  superiority  over  the  enemy  in  trench 
mortar  activity.  To  hammer  his  trenches  and  "tender  spots" 
within  reach  whenever  opportunity  offers,  and  to  hit  still 
harder  if  the  enemy  hits  hack. 

(b)  To  remove  the  enemy's  wire  systematically  and  methodi- 
cally. 

(c)  To  be  able  to  act  on  the  defensive,  when  necessary,  by 
so  placing  your  mortars  at  night — if  not  otherwise  required — 
that  they  will  be  able  to  join  in  the  artillery  barrage  or  tire 
onto  our  own  front  line,  should  it  be  captured. 

Grouping. 

You  are  now  grouped  under  the  infantry  brigade  whose  sec- 
tion you  cover.  The  brigadier,  through  your  trench-mortar 
group  commander,  will  instruct  you  as  to  what  objectives  you 
will  engage  from  day  to  day.  If  you  want  anything,  ask  your 
trench-mortar  group  commander,  and  keep  on  asking.  Consult 
with  the  other  trench-mortar  officers  of  your  group  and  ar- 
range to  help  one  another.  Do  you  arrange  your  communica- 
tions so  as  to  facilitate  cooperation  between  yourself,  other 
trench-mortar  batteries,  and  the  infantry? 

Siting  of  Trench  Mortars. 

Continually  reconnoiter  for  new  sites  for  your  trench  mor- 
tars and  consult  with  your  group  commander  when  you  have 
found  likely  places.  Consider  always  the  desirability  of  con- 
centration of  tin\  of  obtaining  full  advantage  of  your  range, 
and  of  easy  access  to  the  position. 

Make  beds  and  place  bed  frames  in  all  approved  positions. 
When  concentrating  many  guns,  register  witli  only  one  gun  at 
a  time  and  at  as  long  intervals  as  times  permit;  otherwise  you 
will  disclose  your  intentions. 

(157) 


158 
Observation. 

It  is  wasteful  to  fire  without  observation ;  it  does  no  barm 
to  the  enemy  and  only  makes  him  laugh  at  you.  K.  A.  (>.  I\*s 
are  always  available  for  your  use,  and  R.  A.  officers  will  gen- 
erally be  able  to  observe  for  .you.  A  telephone  from  you  to 
your  guns  is  not  always  essential ;  some  simple  system  of  visual 
signaling — such  as  on  a  rifle  range — can  be  arranged.  In  such 
cases  it  is  often  helpful  to  arrange  to  signal  "  North,  south, 
east,  or  west."  Do  not  complain  that  you  are  short  of  tele- 
phone wire  and  then  leave  on  the  ground  hundreds  of  yards  of 
wire  obviously  out  of  use. 

Information. 

You  must  know  all  about  the  hostile  trenches  opposite  you. 
There  is  an  abundance  of  information  available  to  you  in  divi- 
sional and  corps  "summaries,"  and  you  can  check  this  and 
other  information  obtained  by  studying  the  aeroplane  photo- 
graphs to  be  found  at  battalion  and  brigade  headquarters.  There 
are  innumerable  targets  to  damage  and  destroy,  and  you  should 
always  display  keenness  to  engage  them  and  to  take  part  in 
any  enterprises  being  carried  out  by  the  infantry  or  artillery. 

Gfn    Positions    and   Cover. 

Are  your  gun  positions  good?  Is  there  proper  cover  for  the 
gun,  ammunition,  and  detachment?  Are  the  dugouts  really 
strong,  and  have  they  got  tiro  entrances?  Have  you  speaking 
tubes  down  to  your  dugouts?     Are  your  magazines  dry? 

Gas  Precautions. 

Do  you  and  your  men  thoroughly  understand  the  order  re- 
garding "gas  precautions"?  Have  you  gol  your  proper  num- 
ber of  gas  masks,  box  respirators,  etc?  Bate  you  got  Ver- 
morel  sprayers  and  solution  properly  stored  lor  them?  Are  the 
gas  blankets  in  position  at  entrances  of  your  dugouts?  Do  you 
Carry  out  "  gas  drill,"  and  do  you  thoroughly  comply  with  the 
orders  for  "Gas  alert  "  period? 


159 
Work. 

Do  your  men  do  a  full  day's  work?  If  the  men  are  allowed 
to  be  lazy,  they  will  only  complain  when  given  work  to  do. 
Men  who  are  worked  hard  and  regularly,  are  properly  looked 
after,  and  who  do  not  see  their  time  and  work  wasted  by  want 
of  forethought  on  the  part  of  their  officers  are  always  con- 
tented. Men  who  are  contented  and  who  have  the  knowledge 
that  they  are  superior  to  the  enemy  are  always  happy. 

Turnout  and  Cleanliness. 

Are  your  men  smart  and  properly  turned  out,  especially  when 
in  billets?  Are  your  emplacement,  dugouts,  guns,  and  stores 
all  kept  thoroughly  clean?  If  your  battery  is  not  clean  and 
smart  Externally,  it  is  a  sure  sign  that  it  is  lazy  and  dirty 
internally. 

Concealment  and  Action  of  the  Enemy. 

Do  you  appreciate  how  easily  German  trench-mortar  em- 
placements can  be  seen  on  aeroplane  photos?  Do  you  take  pre- 
cautions that  yours  are  better  concealed?  Do  you  construct 
dummy  emplacements  to  draw  fire  off  you  onto  unimportant 
spots?  Do  you  take  notice  of  what  our  own  troops  do  on  being 
shelled  by  trench  mortars,  and  do  you  profit  by  assuming  that 
the  enemy  probably  does  likewise  when  you  shell  him? 

Noncommissioned  Officers. 

Your  noncommissioned  officers  should  be  fully  capable  of  car- 
rying on  if  you  become  a  casualty ;  can  they,  and  do  they  under- 
stand your  plans  and  methods? 

Rest. 

When  you  are  in  rest,  do  you  visit  your  D.  A.,  H.  Q.,  D.  T. 
M.  O.,  and  other  trench-mortar  offices  in  rest  to  exchange  ideas? 
Do  you  provide  your  men  with  baths,  amusements,  change  of 
diet?  Do  you  inspect  their  clothing  and  equipment?  Do  you 
drill  and  instruct  your  men  so  as  to  keep  them  well  disciplined 
and  thoroughly  up  to  their  work? 


m 

Liaison. 

Have  you  got  a  close  liaison  with  the  Infantry  and  artillery, 

and  do  you  visit  company  commanders  frequently,  and  also  any 
R.  A.  observers  in  your  vicinity? 

Finally. 

Have  you  got  that  knowledge  of  your  work  winch  brings  <-<>n- 
fidence  to  you?  ('an  you  answer  favorably  all  the  above  ques- 
tions? If  not,  you  must  strive  till  you  can.  Is  your  battery 
better  than  the  batteries  on  either  side  of  it?    If  not,  why  nut  J 


PRELIMINARY  NOTES  ON  THE  RECENT 
OPERATIONS  ON  THE  FRONT  OF  THE 
SECOND  ARMY. 


1.  Raids. 


The  value  of  raids  for  purposes  of  training,  identification,  and 
morale  was  again  proved,  more  particularly  when  carried  out 
by  the  troops  over  the  ground  they  themselves  were  to  attack. 

2.  Liaison. 

(a)  artillery  and  infantry. 

The  principle  which  was  observed  of  having  senior  artillery 
officers  for  liaison  proved  good  and  gave  the  infantry  confidence. 

In  bombardment  each  division  had  either  a  group  or  a  double 
group  of  siege  artillery  working  with  it.  The  work  was  coordi- 
nated by  the  corps,  but  the  divisional  commander  had  always 
a  direct  call  upon  the  group  or  double  group  and  had  a  lieuten- 
ant colonel,  R.  G.  A.,  as  liaison  officer. 

Whenever  artillery  liaison  officers  are  attached  to  formations 
they  should  join  some  days  before  the  operations  begin,  so  that 
plans  may  receive  the  fullest  discussion  and  coordination ;  these 
officers  are  then  able  to  deal  with  artillery  questions  as  they 
arise. 

(B)    OTHER  UNITS. 

It  is  of  great  importance  that  information  as  to  which  units 
and  formations  have  been  selected  for  any  particular  operations 
should  be  given  out  early,  so  as  to  enable  the  brigade  and  bat- 
talion staffs  concerned  to  get  into  touch  with  one  another  and 
arrangements  to  be  made  for  liaison  between  the  flanking  units 
of  both  divisions  and  brigades. 

Arrangements  should  be  made  to  obtain  the  distinguishing 
marks,  code  names,  and  signal  calls  of  the  division,  brigade,  and 
battalion  on  the  flanks. 

j)784°-17 11  (161) 


162 

Wherever  possible,  meetings  should  also  be  arranged  before 
the  attack  between  parties  of  the  officers,  noncommissioned 
officers,  and  men  of  flanking  battalions  of  neighboring  divisions. 

3.  Rehearsals  of  Barrages. 

The  value  of  rehearsals  was  very  great.  Gaps  in  the  barrage, 
errors  in  timing,  and  also  individual  guns  shooting  short  were 
detected  and  put  right.  Air  photographs  helped  materially  In 
this  and  were  a  great  check  upon  ground  observation,  especially 
as  to  where  gaps  really  were  at  different  stages  and  what  gun 
was  systematically  firing  short.  In  corps  and  divisional  prac- 
tice barrages  an  overlap  was  always  made  to  avoid  disclosing 
boundaries  and  also  to  practice  junctions. 

Army  practice  barrages  on  the  whole  front  undoubtedly  drew 
the  German  artillery  fire,  but  machine-gun  fire  should  be  in- 
cluded to  make  them  realistic.  Care  should  be  taken,  however, 
that  the  flanks  of  attack  are  not  clearly  indicated  by  practice 
barrages. 

4.  Camotflage. 

Articles  of  camouflage  were  found  to  be  very  Inflammable. 
The  strictest  precautions  against  fire  should  be  taken  by  all 
battery  commanders. 

5.  Gas  and  Oil  Projectors. 

Considerable  use  was  made  of  projectors  both  for  gas  and  oil 
with,  it  is  thought,  satisfactory  results.  The  tactics  pursued 
were  to  shepherd  parties  of  the  enemy  into  woods  and  leave 
certain  routes  free  from  heavy  shelling  and  then  to  concentrate 
with  projectors  on  such  places. 

6.  Machine-Gun  Barr.\(  i  9. 

(a)  Madkine-gun  barrages  proved  of  nmcli  valne.  They  re- 
quire careful  Coordination  with  both  artillery  and  infantry  and 
should   be  practiced    beforehand    with    artillery    barrages.      The 

Infantry  should  also  know  that  machine-gun  barrages  will  be 

employed,  so  that  there  is  no  chance  of  their  being  under  the 
Impression  thai  hostile  machine  guns  are  tiring.  The  machine- 
gun  scheme  should  be  on  the  simplest  lines  possible 

(b)  The  range  at  which  the  barrage  guns  fired  varied  from 
2,250  to  2,750  yards,  and  although  at  first  there  was  a  certain 


163 

amount  of  nervousness  as  to  the  accuracy  of  the  fire,  all  ranks 
finally  testify  to  the  value  of  the  machine-gun  barrage  and  the 
confidence  with  which  it  inspired  them. 

As  the  attack  progressed  the  "  barrage "  guns  were  moved 
forward  in  bounds.  Each  bound  was  about  800  yards,  and  it 
was  found  that  the  move  could  be  accomplished  and  the  guns 
set  up  in  their  new  position  ready  to  fire  in  one  hour. 

(c)  Belt  filling  was  done  in  some  companies  by  hand,  but  in 
the  majority  belt-filling  machines  were  taken  forward  and  set 
up  under  cover  in  shell  holes. 

(d)  It  is  considered  essential  for  each  gun  in  the  barrage  to 
have  two  new  barrels  for  the  first  24  hours.  The  normal  life 
of  a  barrel  is  25,000  rounds,  but  for  overhead  fire  the  barrel  is 
inaccurate  after  15,000  rounds. 

(e)  It  was  found  that  where  machine  guns  were  sent  forward 
with  the  assaulting  waves  they  almost  invariably  got  knocked 
out  or  suffered  such  losses  of  personnel  as  to  be  practically  use- 
less on  arrival  at  the  objective. 

The  best  solution  with  regard  to  forward  guns  would  seem  to 
be  for  the  sections  to  follow  closely  behind  the  battalion  to  which 
they  are  attached  and  attain  their  objective  by  a  series  of 
bounds,  previously  reconnoitered  in  each  case  by  the  section 
commander. 

(/)  Prisoners'  statements  confirm  the  value  of  continual  har- 
assing fire  by  day  and  night  during  the  period  immediately 
before  operations  take  place. 

7.  Rest. 

Owing  to  the' slight  chance  of  the  troops  obtaining  any  rest 
on  Y/Z  night,  since  they  are  either  on  the  move  or  among  bat- 
teries in  the  forward  assembly  area,  it  was  found  advantageous 
for  battalions  to  arrange  to  have  hours  of  silence  in  their  camps 
on  Y  day. 

If  the  best  value  is  to  be  obtained  from  the  troops,  it  is  essen- 
tial that  their  march  to  the  forward  assembly  area  on  Y  day 
or  Y/Z  night  should  be  only  a  very  short  one. 

8.  Advance  of  Infantry  Under  Bakrauk. 

In  a  few  cases  in  advancing  over  ground  very  broken,  either 
in  configuration,  by  mine  craters,  or  by  heavy  shelling,  waves 
were  found  rather  difficult  to  handle  and  had  some  little  difh- 


164 

culty  in  keeping  up  with  the  barrage,  and  it  was  found  prefer- 
able to  jump  off  in  small  columns  and  to  deploy  subsequently 
under  the  barrage. 

9.  Patrols  and  Consolidation. 

(a)  Patrols  from  divisions  with  distant  objectives  were  sent 
forward  with  the  divisions  to  which  nearer  objectives  were 
allotted  in  order  to  ascertain  and  report  the  latest  develop- 
ments of  the  battle  before  the  launching  of  the  attack  of  their 
own  divisions.  Good  results  were  obtained  from  these,  but  it 
is  considered  that  full  value  can  not  be  expected  unless  the 
patrols  are  lightly  equipped. 

(&)  It  is  a  principle  which  must  never  be  ignored  that  patrols 
are  pushed  out  after  the  gaining  of  the  final  objective.  Even 
if  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  pass  through  the  stationary  "  pro- 
tective "  barrage  at  once,  they  should  always  be  able  to  do  so 
as  soon  as  this  has  slackened  down  to  fire  on  selected  points. 

In  addition  to  infantry  patrols,  use  was  made  of  special 
patrols  consisting  of  one  officer  and  four  other  ranks  from  the 
corps  cavalry  squadrons  attached  to  divisions.  These  followed 
the  method  outlined  in  O.B./1782/A,  dated  May  26,  1917,  and 
were  despatched  with  the  task  of  answering  certain  definite 
questions;  in  spite  of  the  disadvantage  of  working  to  a  limited 
objective,  these  were  of  distinct  value  and  the  information 
obtained  by  this  means  was  most  accurate. 

(c)  Consolidation  of  the  main  ridge  was  intrusted  to  the 
troops  who  had  captured  it,  and  all  arrangements  wore  made 
accordingly.  The  later  advance  to  the  Oosttaverne  line  was 
made  by  fresh  troops  of  other  divisions. 

10.    SOS  Barrage. 

The  aeroplane  wireless  SOS  for  barrage  is  a  very  valuable 
addition  to  other  methods  of  calling  for  SOS. 

Protective  or  S  O  S  barrage  after  gaining  the  final  objective 
should  be  in  great  depth.  In  this  case  a  very  heavy  and  deep 
barrage  of  60-pounders  and  heavy  howitzers  beyond  the  18- 
pounder  barrage  was  provided,  and  the  counter  attack  from  the 
Warneton  line  was  absolutely  crushed. 


165 
.  11.  Transport  of  Water  and  Supplies. 

Much  use  was  made  of  pack  animals  in  the  advance,  and  the 
carrying  of  water  and  tools  to  the  troops  in  front  line  was 
effected  by  this  means  without  difficulty. 

In  some  formations  they  were  used  for  the  issue  of  rations 
to  units  for  some  days  previous  to  zero.  Such  rehearsal  is 
most  desirable  in  order  to  find  out  animals  not  handy  with  pack, 
or  likely  to  gall,  and  faulty  harness  causing  galls. 

Yukon  packs  proved  most  useful  for  the  carrying  up  of 
stores,  etc.  As  regards  water,  it  was  found  that  three  petrol 
tins  could  be  carried  on  one  pack,  but  that  training  is  required 
in  moving  in  the  bent  position  necessary. 

The  carrying  by  each  man  of  two  water  bottles  (one  con- 
taining water  and  one  containing  cold  tea)  was  found  to  be  a 
very  satisfactory  arrangement. 

12.  Salvage. 

All  parties  should  carry  back  salvage  when  returning  from 
the  front  area.  It  should  also  be  regarded  as  a  point  of  honor 
that  no  individual  returns  empty  handed ;  it  is  seldom  realized 
how  important  a  total  of  salvage  can  be  effected  by  individuals 
in  this  way. 

13.   Sign  Boards. 

Sign  boards  having  the  British  name  of  the  trench,  etc., 
printed  clearly  in  block  letters  and  on  both  sides,  and  direc- 
tion boards,  giving  the  way  to  dressing  stations,  brigade  and 
battalion  headquarters,  salvage  dumps,  prepared  previous  to 
the  operation,  were  most  usefuL  (S.  S.  135,  Sec.  IX,  par.  4 
(vi).) 

14.  Congestion  in  the  Forward  Area. 

Salvage,  burying,  carrying,  and  other  working  parties  should 
be  withdrawn  to  their  camps  well  behind  the  forward  area 
when  not  actually  at  work. 

The  congestion  in  the  forward  area  caused  by  such  parties 
is  responsible  for  a  large  increase  in  casualties,  additional 
shelling  owing  to  amount  of  movement,  and  necessitates  extra 
ration  parties  or  transport  and  crowding  in  dugouts  of  men 
not  employed  in  defense  of  the  line. 


tea 

15.  Control  of  Traffic. 

(a)  It  was  frequently  found  that  officers  and  other  ranks 
did  not  pay  sufficient  regard  to  the  authority  of  noncommis- 
sioned officers  in  charge  of  traffic-control  posts  at  important 
cross  junctions.  Considerable  congestion  is  likely  to  result 
from  this  lack  of  discipline,  and  it  rests  with  A.  P.  M.'s  to  in- 
sure by  personal  supervision  that  their  orders  are  carried  into 
effect. 

(b)  The  construction  of  switches  around  villages  and  other 
places  or  points  which  are  known  or  likely  to  be  constantly 
shelled  by  the  enemy  is  a  matter  to  which  close  attention 
should  be  given. 

16.  Tank  Lessons. 

The  general  principles  of  the  employment  of  tanks  as  an 
adjunct  to  the  infantry  attack  require  to  be  carefully  studied 
by  all  commanders.  These,  as  laid  down  in  S.  S.  164,  were  sub- 
stantially borne  out  in  the  recent  operations;  no  new  lessons 
were  learned,  but  fresh  emphasis,  was  laid  on  the  following 
points : 

(a)  There  is  still  a  tendency  for  groups  of  infantry  to  bunch 
behind  tanks  and  follow  them  about.  This  not  only  results 
in  an  increase  of  casualties,  as  tanks  invariably  draw  lire,  but 
also  in  loss  of  direction  and  cohesion. 

(h)  There  is  also  a  tendency  to  endeavor  to  retain  tanks  to 
meet  possible  eventualities;  it  can  not  be  too  strongly  im- 
pressed upon  all  infantry  commanders  that  when  once  the 
infantry  are  firmly  established  on  their  objective,  the  tanks 
should  be  withdrawn. 

Further,  though  tanks  can  render  great  assistance  to  infantry 
consolidating,  their  employment  on  this  duty,  as  long  as  the 
enemy's  artillery  is  active,  is  attended  with  grave  risk  and 
should  be  reduced  to  the  minimum.  The  stationary  employment 
of  a  tank  can  only  be  justified  in  the  most  exceptional  circum- 
stances. (S.  S.  164,  par.  3  (iii).)  On  the  other  hand,  several 
instances  occurred  where  a  derelict  tank  was  successfully  used 
to  form  a  strong  point  In  such  cases  the  Infantry  should  take 
over  the  tank  from  its  crow. 

(c)  Pigeons  from  tanks  Worked  well  and  could  have  been  put 

to  more  extensive  practical  use  had  other  means  of  communica- 
tion' failed. 


167 

17.  The  New  Organization. 

(a)  The  new  organization  worked  very  well  and  completely 
proved  its  value.  There  is  nothing  to  add  to  S.  S.  144,  "  The 
normal  formation  for  the  attack." 

In  all  training  previous  to  6perations  the  cadres  of  platoons 
and  sections  must  be  trained  as  such  and  kept  ready  to  receive 
reen  f  orcements. 

Amalgamation  should  be  resorted  to  when  it  is  obvious  that 
the  unit  will  not  be  brought  up  to  strength  before  the  operations. 

(b)  It  was  found  that  carrying  parties  sent  up  after  the  cap- 
ture of  the  objective  could  find  their  way  through  the  hostile 
barrage  with  fewer  casualties  than  those  following  closely  in 
rear  of  the  assaulting  waves. 

(c)  Heavy  tools  were  in  nearly  all  cases  carried  up  by  special 
parties  and  not  on  the  men  of  the  assaulting  waves. 

(d)  There  is  still  a  tendency  for  infantry  to  rely  on  artillery 
fire  to  deal  with  counter  attacks  rather  than  on  the  use  of  their 
own  fire. 


OBSERVATION  STATIONS. 


1.  To  derive  full  benefit  from  the  accuracy  and  rapid  fire 
of  modern  equipment  and  to  insure  effective  support  to  the  other 
arms,  correct  observation  with  reference  to  the  objective  is  of 
vital  importance. 

The  necessity  for  accurate  fire  on  all  occasions  can  not  be 
overestimated,  and  is  especially  important  in  trench  warfare, 
where  the  opposing  trenches  are  often  in  close  proximity  to  one 
another. 

2.  Although  it  is  possible  to  determine  by  calculation  the  line 
and  range  required  to  be  given  to  a  gun  to  hit  a  target,  and 
although  these  corrections  may  have  been  accurately  worked 
out  and  applied,  yet  it  is  improbable  that  the  maximum  effect 
will  be  obtained  on  the  target  unless  the  actual  fall  of  the 
rounds  can  be  observed. 

To  enable  a  battery  to  engage  a  target  effectively,  either  reli- 
ance must  be  placed  on  observation  from  the  air  or  a  position 
must  be  selected  from  which  the  target  can  be  clearly  seen  and 
the  fire  of  the  battery  accurately  observed  and  controlled. 

This  position  is  called  the  "  Observation  station,"  and  is 
commonly  alluded  to  as  the  "  O.  P." 

3.  The  closer  this  position  is  to  the  target,  and  the  better  the 
view  of  the  ground  in  its  vicinity,  the  easier  it  is  to  determine 
with  accuracy  the  distance  a  shell  has  burst  over  or  short  of 
the  target. 

To  attain  this  accuracy  of  observation,  it  will  usually  be  nec- 
essary to  select  an  observation  station  within  600  yards  of  the 
target. 

Should  it  be  necessary  for  any  reason  to  select  an  observation 
station  which  is  more  distant  than  this  from  the  target,  it  must 
be  realized  that  the  same  accuracy  of  observation  can  not  be 
obtained,  even  when  aided  by  the  best  glasses  and  telescope. 

4.  In  trench  warfare  it  is  the  target  to  be  dealt  with  that 
is  the  controlling  factor  in  the  selection  of  this  position.  In 
every  situation  there  is  probably  one  locality  above  all  others 
from  which  the  best  view  of  a  particular  target  can  be  obtained. 

(169) 


170 

The  finding  of  this  locality  will  often  necessitate  a  prolonged 
and  careful  reconnaissance,  and  officers  must  not  be  satisfied 
until  they  have  assured  themselves  that  all  ground,  buildings, 
etc.,  have  been  thoroughly  reconnoitered  with  this  object  In 
view. 

With  the  accurate  maps  now  supplied  it  should  be  possible, 
more  or  less,  to  foresee  what  points  are  likely  to  give  a  good 
view  of  a  particular  locality,  and  much  time  can  be  saved  by 
studying  the  contours  of  the  map  before  going  out  to  look  for 
an  observation  station. 

The  extent  of  country  included  in  the  reconnaissance  should 
not  be  restricted  to  the  immediate  front  allotted  to  a  battery 
but  should  cover  an  extensive  area,  as  it  is  impossible  to  be  sure 
of  obtaining  the  best  possible  view  of  the  whole  front  or  of  a 
particular  target  (such  as  a  machine-gun  emplacement)  unless 
the  reconnaissance  is  carried  out  thoroughly.  This  is  particu- 
larly the  case  in  undulating  country. 

In  a  moving  battle,  when  time  is  the  controlling  factor,  it  will 
generally  be  found  impossible  to  carry  out  such  an  extended 
reconnaissance,  and,  therefore,  a  position  that  fulfills  the  Imme- 
diate requirements  may  have  to  be  selected. 

5.  It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  definitely  the  distance  an  ob- 
servation station  belonging  to  a  battery  should  be  in  rear  of  the 
infantry  it  is  supporting. 

This  distance  depends  mainly  on  the  shape  of  the  ground. 

When  the  ground  is  concave  in  shape,  the  observation  station 
may  be  some  distance  in  rear,  but  the  necessity  Cor  accurate 
observation  must  not  be  overlooked. 

If  the  ground  is  convex  the  observation  station  may  have  to  be 
sited  in  the  front-line  trench  or  immediately  behind  it.  • 

When  this  is  the  case  it  is  generally  due  to  the  selection  of  the 
infantry  line  having  been  made  without  taking  Into  considera- 
tion the  requirements  of  good  observation  for  the  artillery. 

As  the  position  of  the  observer  in  the  latter  case  renders 
him  liable  to  be  put  out  of  action  by  any  hostile  bombardment 
of  his  portion  of  the  front  line  or  to  interference  caused  by 
the  retirement  of  our  infantry,  or  to  capture  in  the  event  of  a 
successful  attack  by  the  enemy,  or  at  least  to  have  bis  conn 
munications  cut,  it  is  imperative  in  such  a  situation  to  provide 
a  second  or  reserve  observation  station  farther  to  the  roar 
from  which  the  ground  behind  the  front  line  is  visible,  and 
this  station  should  be  maintained  ready  for  occupation  in 
case  such  an  emergency  should  arise. 


171 

If  a  position  can  not  be  found  from  which  the  whole  of 
the  front  is  visible,  and  as  accurate  fire  is  essential,  the  observa- 
tion must  be  from  a  point  which  gives  a  clear  view  of  at  least 
one  datum  point,  so  that  the  error  of  the  day  may  be  corrected. 

In  open  warfare  it  may  be  necessary  to  select  a  position  still 
farther  to  the  rear  so  as  to  obtain  a  more  extensive  view  of  the 
ground  over  which  the  fire  of  any  particular  battery  may  be 
required,  and  also  because  it  may  be  impossible  to  keep  up 
communications  with  an  advanced  observation  station. 

6.  Officers  must  be  able  to  range  their  batteries  at  short  notice 
on  objectives  far  to  a  flank,  and  must  know  where  the  best  view 
of  such  localities  may  be  obtained. 

7.  In  selecting  the  position  for  an  observation  station  the 
following  requirements  must  be  kept  in  view : 

(a)  It  must  be  suitably  sited  to  carry  out  the  task  in  hand. 

(b)  It  requires  to  be  carefully  screened,  so  as  not  to  be  recog- 
nized by  the  enemy. 

(c)  It  should,  if  possible,  have  a  concealed  means  of  approach. 

(d)  It  should  afford  cover  and  protection  to  the  observing 
officer  and  his  assistants. 

(e)  It  should  allow  of  intercommunication  with  the  infantry. 

8.  Observation  stations  may  be  classified  as  follows: 

(a)  Permanent, 
(ft)  Extemporized, 
(c)  Temporary. 

(a)  A  permanent  observation  station  must  be  strongly  con- 
structed and  be  sufficiently  large  to  accommodate  several  ob- 
servers and  their  assistants. 

A  covered  approach  is  a  matter  of  vital  importance.  It  must 
be  provided  with  a  dugout  capable  of  resisting  at  least  a  5.9-inch 
howitzer  shell. 

It  should  afford  an  extended  view  of  the  front. 

It  should  not  be  exposed  to  fire  directed  on  the  infantry  front- 
line system  of  defenses. 

The  dust  and  smoke  and  the  moral  effect  on  the  observer,  if 
posted  in  the  infantry  line,  render  observation  from  it  difficult 
if  not  impossible. 

(&)  An  extemporized  observation  station  is  used  to  carry  out 
a  special  task,  such  as  the  destruction  of  a  machine-gun  em- 
placement or  wire  cutting. 

It  should  be  provided  with  splinter-proof  accommodation  for 
the  observer  and  his  assistants.  The  field  of  view  is  of  sec- 
ondary importance. 


172 

(c)  A  temporary  observation  station  is  used  in  open  warfare 
when  there  is  insufficient  time  available  to  provide  artificial 
cover. 

In  this  case  use  is  made  of  houses,  trees,  haystacks,  trenches, 
and  shell  holes,  etc. 

9.  Every  battery  must  be  provided  with  at  least  one  observa- 
tion station,  for  the  maintenance  and  control  of  which  it  is  re- 
sponsible. This  station  must  afford  a  good  view  of  at  least  one 
or  more  datum  points. 

All  observation  stations  should  be  made  as  strong  as  possible, 
but  the  fact  that  a  battery  is  provided  with  a  strongly  con- 
structed post  must  not  deter  officers  from  utilizing  the  best  places 
available,  irrespective  of  cover,  for  the  observation  of  any  par- 
ticular task  they  may  be  required  to  carry  out. 

10.  An  observer  in  one  observation  station  may  have  little 
chance  of  seeing  more  than  a  limited  extent  of  the  ground  which 
his  guns  can  cover. 

Moreover,  it  is  often  not  realized  that  the  principle  of  con- 
centration of  fire  can  not  be  put  into  practice  unless  batteries 
are  prepared  to  fire  on  the  whole  extent  of  their  arc,  however 
far  it  may  be  outside  their  normal  defensive  zone. 

Arrangements  must  therefore  be  made  to  have  a  number  of 
observation  stations  along  the  front,  so  that  every  possible  part 
of  the  hostile  lines  is  visible  from  at  least  one  post.  A  concen- 
tration of  observation  stations  at  any  one  point  must  be  avoided 
as  far  as  is  possible. 

As  it  is  practically  impossible  to  provide  each  battery  with  a 
sufficient  number  of  stations  from  which  to  observe  the  whole  of 
the  ground  covered  by  the  arcs  of  fire  of  its  guns,  arrangements 
must  be  made  to  form  group  O.  P.  exchanges,  and  these  exchanges 
must  be  connected  up  to  the  exchanges  of  neighboring  groups. 

Such  exchanges  must  be  made  practically  impervious  to  artil- 
lery fire. 

By  this  means  it  is  possible  to  provide  a  telephone  system  that 
will  enable  each  battery  to  be  ranged  on  any  particular  point 
required,  and  an  observer  can  direct  the  tire  of  any  battery  within 
range  on  to  any  target  in  his  zone  of  observation. 

This  arrangement  simplifies  the  concentration  of  fire  on  any 
point,  but,  in  order  to  derive  full  advantage  from  it  and  thus 
inflict  the  greatest  damage  possible  an  the  enemy,  iris  impera- 
tive that  every  ollicer  of  the  artillery  should  he  capable  o\'  send- 
ing hack  observations  for  any  battery.  Irrespective  of  its  Qatar*. 


173 

11.  There  are  several  purposes  for  which  an  observation  sta- 
tion is  required,  which  differ  somewhat  with  the  nature  of  the 
battery,  the  task  to  be  undertaken,  and  the  tactical  situation. 

They  may  be  classified  as  follows : 

(a)  Field  guns. 

The  18-pounder  quick-fire  battery  is  usually  charged  with  the 
direct  support  of  an  infantry  battalion  holding  a  front.  This 
front  is  watched  by  day  and  often  at  night  by  an  artillery  ob- 
server in  order  that  any  movement  of  the  enemy  by  day  may  be 
at  once  seen  and  dealt  with,  and  signals  for  support  from  the 
infantry  responded  to  at  night. 

An  observation  station  for  this  purpose  should  command,  if 
possible,  the  whole  zone  allotted  to  the  battery  without  being 
too  far  back,  but  it  should  not  be  in  the  front  line  if  it  can  be 
avoided.     (See  par.  5.) 

It  should  afford  a  view  of  the  ground  over  which  the  enemy 
must  attack  for  at  least  200  yards  in  front  of  our  own  front 
line,  and  it  should  be  possible  to  overlook  a  portion  of  the 
ground  behind  this  belt  over  which  the  enemy  may  be  expected 
to  move  his  troops. 

If  it  is  near  the  battalion  or  company  headquarters,  the  com- 
munication with  the  infantry  is  facilitated. 

(b)   Field  howitzers. 

The  4.5  inch  howitzer  battery  is  usually  responsible  for  the 
whole  front  covered  by  the  field  artillery  brigade  to  which  it 
belongs,  and,  further,  it  is  required  to  :':pport  the  brigades  on 
the  flanks.  It  is  seldom  possible  to  obtain  an  observation  sta- 
tion with  this  field  of  view.  Observation  from  several  stations 
is  therefore  necessary.  The  usual  custom  is  for  the  battery  to 
have  a  permanent  station  in  some  central  position  and  to  supple- 
ment the  observation  by  utilizing  observers  in  the  other  observa- 
tion stations  belonging  to  the  brigade  and  division.  This  is 
rendered  possible  by  the  provision  of  O.  P.  exchanges. 

(c)  Heavy   howitzers. 

The  siege  battery  may  be  required  to  fire  on  any  portion  of 
the  enemy's  lines  which  the  arcs  of  fire  of  its  guns  can  cover. 

It  follows  therefore  that  officers  of  the  siege  artillery  require 
an  even  more  extended  knowledge  of  our  own  and  the  enemy's 


174 

trout  from  the  point  of  view  of  observation  than  officers  of  the 
field  artillery. 

Furthermore,  the  heavier  the  nature  of  the  artillery  the  more 
important  it  becomes  to  obtain  close  and  accurate  observation 
of  a  target. 

The  provision  of  suitable  O.  P.  exchanges  for  the  siege  artil- 
lery is  even  more  important  than  for  the  field  artillery. 

The  O.  P.  exchanges  of  both  field  and  siege  artillery  should 
be  connected,  so  that  full  advantage  may  be  derived  from  all 
O.  P.'s.     (See  par.  10.) 

(d)  Heavy  guns. 

The  chief  role  of  the  heavy  batteries  is  the  neutralization  of 
hostile  guns,  and  the  searching  of  distant  approaches,  observa- 
tion on  which  is  Impossible  except  from  the  air. 

When  an  aeroplane  is  not  available,  this  shooting  must  usu- 
ally be  done  from  the  map,  the  guns  being  calibrated  from  time 
to  time  on  a  datum  point. 

As  heavy  batteries  are  also  employed  to  enfilade  trenches,  they 
must  be  provided  with  observation  stations  giving  a  good  view- 
not  only  of  the  datum  points  but  also  of  as  much  ground  in  the 
enemy's  front  system  as  possible.  These  stations  must  be  con- 
nected up  to  the  observing  post  exchanges,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
siege  artillery. 

12.  In  addition,  heavy  and  siege  batteries  are  often  required 
to  find  observers  by  day  and  night  to  assist  the  field-survey  i>o-ts 
in  the  spotting  of  flashes  of  hostile  guns.  Such  observing  sta- 
tions are  often  far  bad'-  and  on  the  highest  ground  available. 

13.  An  observation  station  should  contain: 

(1)  A  panorama  sketch  of  the  view  from  it. 

(2)  Orders  as  to  the  procedure  in  ease  of  S.  o.  s. 

(3)  Orders  as  to  the  procedure  in  case  of  a  mis  attack,  par- 
ticularly Instructions  as  to  the  use  of  the  telephone, 

(4)  A  diary  of  what  is  daily  observed  on  the  front,  and  in- 
formation which  may  he  of  Importance  to  a  battery  Which  may 
have  to  take  over  the  zone. 

This  should  include  the  known  and  inspected  positions  of 
trench  mortars  and  machine  guns,  and  localities  where  the 
enemy's  movements  are  visible. 

When  the  observation  station  is  behind  the  reserve  line  of 
trenches,  an  artillery  board  may  be  added. 


•  175 

14.  The  supreme  importance  of  quickly  establishing  forward 
observation  stations  in  the  event  of  a  successful  advance  can 
not  be  too  strongly  impressed  upon  all  artillery  officers. 

It  is  in  such  a  situation  that  the  greatest  advantage  may  be 
reaped  from  the  early  occupation  of  advanced  observation  sta- 
tions and  commanding  heights  beyond  the  original  hostile  front 
line,  which  afford  direct  observation  of  the  terrain  occupied  by 
the  hostile  artillery. 

This  is  especially  important  in  the  case  of  those  batteries  al- 
lotted to  the  counter-battery  groups. 


NOTES  ON  COMMUNICATIONS  DURING  RE- 
CENT OPERATIONS  ON  THE  FRONT  OF  THE 
SECOND  ARMY  (PROVISIONAL). 

(Issued  by  the  General  Staff.) 


1.  Preparatory. 


(a)  A  considerable  number  of  poled  cable  routes  on  perma- 
nent poles  were  used  between  the  open  wires  and  buried  cable 
system  and  proved  their  usefulness. 

Telephones  were  withdrawn  from  in  front  of  brigade  head- 
quarters and  Fullerphones  utilized  as  far  as  possible. 

(&)  The  R.  F.  C.  were  given  their  own  routes  and  exchanges 
throughout ;  they  controlled  their  own  traffic  and  were  able  to 
make  the  best  use  of  these  lines  to  the  mutual  advantage  of  all 
concerned. 

(c)  An  army  report  center  was  established  with  direct  lines 
to- 
All  field  survey  O.  P.'s. 

Special  army  O.  P.'s. 
Forward  kite  balloon  and  K.  B.  sections. 
Army  headquarters. 

Liaison  officers  at  each  corps  and  division. 
Corps  heavy  artillery  headquarters. 
R.  F.  C.  and  antiaircraft  systems. 
Much  information  was  received  on  the  direct  line  from  the 
forward  balloon. 

(d)  Buried  cables:  The  gridiron  system  was  adopted  where 
possible,  with  a  cable  head  in  the  front  line  to  each  attacking 
brigade  sector  averaging  20  pairs.  Forty  pairs  are  recom- 
mended. 

One  corps  buried  a  complete  new  system  for  the  artillery, 
taking  the  old  artillery  lines  into  the  command  system.  The 
corps  allotted  all  lines,  and  the  results  proved  this  to  be  the 
preferable  arrangement. 

9784°— 17 12  (177) 


178 

The  other  corps  added  to  their  old  system  and  the  allotment 
of  lines  was  done  by  the  divisions. 

A  pilot  line  to  all  test  and  junction  points  is  a  necessity,  and 
a  man  who  knows  the  system  should  remain  at  each  such  point 
to  make  the  connections  as  ordered  by  the  signal  officer  i/c  of 
the  bury. 

(c)  Both  in  the  case  of  the  infantry  and  of  the  artillery  the 
schemes  of  communication  should  be  drawn  up  and  orders  is- 
sued by  the  staff,  sufficient  time  being  given  to  the  signal  service 
to  enable  them  to  be  carried  out.  Where  this  principle  was 
adopted  the  results  were  good. 

2.  Dtjbing  the  Battle. 

(a)  The  approved  principles  of  forward  intercommunication 
in  battle  worked  well.  They  should  not  be  rigidly  applied  to 
all  situations,  but  allow  of  sufficient  elasticity  to  meet  the  vary 
ing  conditions. 

( b )  Cable  took  the  majority  of  the  work  back  from  brigade 
forward  stations.  The  enemy  artillery  fire  was,  generally  speak- 
ing, weak,  and  in  consequence  it  was  in  most  cases  possible  t<» 
keep  lines  through  continuously  when  once  established. 

The  lighter  types  of  cable  were  found  most  useful  (D.  II  and 
D.  VII  twisted)  for  the  first  lines.  They  are  lighter  and  more 
portable  and  are  as  likely  to  stand  as  the  heavier  types. 

(c)  The  power  buzzer  produced  some  excellent  results,  ami 
too  much  stress  can  not  be  laid  on  the  neeessity  of  training 
personnel  with  this  apparatus. 

Amplifiers  should  not  be  placed  in  cable  beads  or  signal  offices, 
Where  this  was  done  they  were  jammed. 

{d)  Visual:  The  Lucas  lamp  was  used  extensively  ami  proved 
invaluable. 

Shutters  and  flags  were  used  by  battalions  and  companies. 
Tlioy  arc  n«>t  of  much  use  to  brigade  forward  stations. 

(c)  Pigeons  were  not  much  used,  but  messages  sent  olT  iron 
orally  arrived  in  good  time.     The  supplies  were  good. 

(/)  Oreen  flares  were  easily  seen  until  the  sun  rose.     During 
daylight  they  should  be  lit  in  groups,  as  singly   they  are  most 
difficult  to  pick  up.     Brigade  and  battalion  headquarter- 
are  of  value,  and   if  OlpSSfd   %\ imn   called  for  by   the  contact 
patrol  affect  u  great  saying  of  time, 


179 

3.  After  the  Battle. 

(a)  Communications  after  the  battle  were  maintained  by  the 
system  established  daring  the  flight,  improved  and  enlarged 
until  such  time  as  the  buried  cable  system  could  be  pushed 
forward. 

The  artillery  extended  their  O.  P.  lines  for  necessary  regis- 
tration purposes. 

In  one  corps  a  special  battalion  was  detailed  and  trained  to 
bury  cable  from  "  cable  head  "  immediately  the  objectives  wore 
secured.    This  proved  very  successful  and  is  recommended. 

The  buried  cable  system  to  be  adopted  should  be  laid  down  by 
the  army  and  should  be  continuous  without  thought  of  boun- 
daries. 

(6)  In  one  case  difficulty  was  experienced  where  one  division 
passed  through  another.  It  is  desirable  for  both  to  have  their 
own  lines  to  cable  head  before  the  commencement  of  the  battle. 

The  allotment  of  lines  should  be  made  by  A.  D.  signals  of 
corps,  and  not  by  divisions. 

(c)  Where  possible  it  is  advisable  temporarily  to  enlarge  the 
area  parties.  This  should  be  done  an  appreciable  time  before 
operations  commence,  to  enable  men  to  learn  thoroughly  the 
system  in  their  area. 

(d)  The  advantages  of  the  R.  F.  C.  being  provided  with  their 
own  system  of  communications  were  pronounced.  The  army 
intelligence  report  center  for  the  quick  dissemination  of  informa- 
tion by  direct  lines  was  of  great  value. 

(e)  It  is  desirable  to  have  an  officer  at  cable  head  to  prevent 
confusion  in  picking  up  lines  or  overcrowding  in  the  cable  head 
dugout. 

(/)  A  reserve  of  light  cable  as  well  as  the  armored  squad  for 
the  bury  when  dug  must  be  kept  near  cable  head. 

(g)  The  "A"  detachment  of  brigade  forward  stations  went 
over  if  anything  too  early  and  frequently  became  involved  in 
the  "  mopping  up."     Loss  of  men  and  gear  resulted. 

(h)  The  necessity  of  placing  some  distinguishing  mark  at 
the  entrance  to  a  dugout  when  brigade  forward  station  has  been 
established.  On  one  occasion  our  "  mopping-up  "  parties  bombed 
a  brigade  forward  station. 

(i)  Four-line  exchanges  were  made  with  electric-light  sockets, 
and  plugs  proved  useful  at  relay  posts,  for  listening-in  on  all 
lines. 


180 

(;)  Difficulty  was  experienced  with  code  and  position  calls 
during  the  battle.  Position  calls  for  exchanges  and  test  points 
work  well,  but  when  used  for  units  then;  is  apt  to  be  confusion . 
Code  calls  should  be  used  by  units  after  zero  whether  they  are 
in  our  trench  system  or  no.  Three  or  more  units  may  use  the 
same  headquarters  on  the  same  day. 

(k)  Headquarters  or  formations  should  move  up  into  their 
battle  headquarters  in  sufficient  time  to  allow  signals  to  make 
the  necessary  corrections,  etc.,  to  enable  the  men  to  learn  the 
new  system  before  zero  day.  Where  this  was  not  done  con- 
siderable loss  of  efficiency  was  evident. 

(0  "The  urgent  operation  priority"  prefix  defeated  its  own 
object.  All  officers  sending  information  consider  their  messages 
"  urgent  operation  priority." 

(m)  The  special  officer  named  in  S.  S.  148  ("Forward  inter- 
communication in  battle"),  Section  II,  paragraph  3)  (&),  as  the 
officer  at  the  brigade  forward  office  in  control  of  the  method  of 
transmission  must  realize  that  it  is  his  duty  to  take  the  responsi- 
bility for  marking  really  important  messages,  "  Priority." 

(n)  With  a  limited  objective  it  is  necessary  to  push  the  cable 
head  forward  immediately.  The  artillery  may  require  those 
wires  for  registering  their  batteries  on  new  lines. 

(o)  Sufficient  stress  is  not  yet  laid  on  the  necessity  for  des- 
patching an  important  message  in  duplicate  to  increase  the 
chance  of  its  safe  arrival.  Where  possible  such  messages 
should  be  sent  by  alternative  methods;  when  runners  only  are 
employed  they  should  be  despatched  with  the  duplicated  mes- 
sage at  a  100-yards  interval. 

(p)  Closer  touch  is  desirable  between  battalions  and  the  relay 
system  of  runner  posts  organized  by  brigades.  The  relay  parti 
should  be  marked  so  as  to  be  easily  recognizable  from  a  distance  : 
e.  g.,  with  a  large  colored  flag  by  day  and  with  a  colored  lamp 
by  night.  In  one  instance  it  was  found  useful  also  to  mark 
with  small  colored  flags  the  shortest  route  for  runners  from 
brigade  headquarters  to  the  brigade  forward  station.  Alterna- 
tive routes  should  not  be  marked. 


NOTES  ON  THE  USE  OF  SMOKE. 

(Issued  by  the  General  Staff.) 


Use  of  Smoke  Screens. 

Smoke  screens  may  be  employed  with  one  or  more  of  the 
following  objects  in  view: 

(a)  To  protect  the  flanks  of  assaulting  or  advancing  infantry 
by  preventing  observation  from  enemy  observation  posts,  high 
ground,  and  salients,  or  from  ground  from  which  the  advance 
is  liable  to  be  enfiladed. 

(&)  By  infantry  in  the  attack,  to  blind  hostile  machine  guns. 

(c)  As  a  feint  to  induce  the  enemy  to  expend  ammunition 
needlessly  or  to  put  down  his  barrage. 

(d)  As  a  feint  to  draw  the  enemy's  attention  to  a  front  on 
which  no  attack  is  being  made,  and  thus  hold  his  troops  in  their 
trenches  and  prevent  them  from  going  to  the  assistance  of  the 
front  attacked. 

(e)  In  the  case  of  a  smoke  cloud  used  offensively,,  to  simulate 
gas,  with  a  view  to  lowering  the  enemy's  morale  and  forcing  him 
to  use  his  gas  mask. 

To  make  this  effective  gas  should  occasionally  be  mixed  with 
smoke  in  order  to  drill  the  enemy  into  the  belief  that  it  is  never 
safe  to  remain  in  a  smoke  cloud  without  wearing  his  gas  mask. 

(/)  In  flat  or  open  country  to  conceal  concentrations  of  guns 
and  troops,  and  possibly  to  screen  roads,  forming-up  places, 
and  lines  of  advance.  To  conceal  the  flashes  of  a  battery  which 
is  in  view  from  the  enemy's  observation  posts,  and  to  hamper 
observation  from  the  air. 

Ground  and  troops  can  seldom  be  concealed  from  hostile 
aeroplanes  or  kite  balloon  observation  behind  smoke  screens, 
and  although  they  may  be  concealed  in  smoke  clouds  such 
clouds  attract  the  enemy's  fire  and  are  therefore  dangerous. 

A  smoke  cloud,  however,  may  be  used  with  success  to  inter- 
fere with  any  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  range  accurately  with 
aeroplane  observation  on  one  of  our  batteries. 

(181) 


182 

As  stated  above,  smoke  tends  to  attract  the  enemy's  fire. 
Smoke  screens  should  normally  be  formed,  therefore,  at  some 
distance  (about  400  yards)  from  the  object  to  be  concealed. 

Troops  attacking  through  a  smoke  screen  are  very  liable  to 
lose  direction.  This  fact  should  be  carefully  considered  before 
troops  are  committed  to  such  an  operation. 

When  smoke  is  to  be  liberated  on  the  flank  of  an  assault, 
care  should  be  taken,  by  defining  permissible  wind  limits  before- 
hand, that  the  cloud  does  not  pass  across  the  front  of  the 
assaulting  troops. 

While  the  use  of  smoke  may  conceal  the  position  and  move- 
ment of  our  troops  from  enemy  observation,  it  may  also  hide 
them  from  our  contact  patrol  aeroplanes.  This  must  be  con- 
sidered when  determining  the  nature  and  extent  of  smoke  screens 
and  careful  precautions  should  be  taken  to  preserve  liaison  be- 
tween the  infantry  and  the  flying  corps. 

When  the  use  of  a  smoke  screen  in  operations  is  intended. 
the  enemy  should  be  educated  to  associate  such  a  screen  with 
some  object  other  than  the  real  one,  e.  g.,  he  may,  by  means  of 
a  practice  smoke  screen,  followed  by  no  action,  be  led  to  suppose 
that  the  object  of  the  demonstration  is  to  compel  him  to  expend 
ammunition  uselessly. 

Smoke-Producing    Substances    Available   and   theik   Nokmai. 

Uses. 

The  following  means  of  producing  smoke  are  available: 

(a)  P  bombs  and  No.  27  (white  phosphorus)  grenades 

(b)  Single  smoke  cases,  type  S. 

(c)  18-pounder  and  4.5-inch  howitzer  smoke  shells. 

(<1)  4-ineh  Stokes  mortar  smoke  bombs:  13-pounder  shell, 
range  450  yards;  25-pounder  shell,  range  900  yards. 

In  addition,  experiments  are  being  carried  out  with  smoke 
generators  of  various  descriptions,  and  means  of  producing 
smoke  with  burning  straw  tightly  packed  in  sacks,  damp  hay. 
tar  barrels,  green  wood.  etc.  can  be  improvised. 

P  bombs  are  designed  partly  as  incendiary  and  partly  as 
smoke-producing  articles.  They  are  tilled  with  phosphorus, 
which  is  scarce  and  expensive.  In  consequence  the  supply  is  at 
present    limited. 

The  No.  27  (white  phosphorus)  grenade  is  being  introduced 
to  replace  the  P  bomb.  It  can  be  used  either  as  a  hand  grenade 
or  as  a  rifle  grenade  with  a  range  up  to  about  200  ynrdv       \i 


183 

present  20  per  cent  of  rods  and  cartridges  are  supplied,  but  on 
the  introduction  of  the  new  cup  discharger  all  No.  27  grenades 
will  be  capable  of  use  as  rifle  grenades.  P  bombs  and  No.  27 
grenades  are  primarily  designed  as  infantry  weapons  for  offen- 
sive operations,  and  are  suitable  for  burning  dugouts,  blinding 
machine  guns,  or  screening  small  local  attacks.  Owing  to  their 
scarcity  it  is  very  uneconomical  to  use  them  in  forming  large 
smoke  screens.  It  should  be  noted  that  on  exploding  these 
bombs  scatter  burning  phosphorus  over  a  circle  of  about  15  to 
20  yards  radius. 

Single  smoke  cases,  type  S,  are  more  easily  obtained  than 
P  bombs  or  No.  27  grenades,  and  are  less  costly  to  manufacture. 
As  smoke  producers  they  are  slightly  less  efficient  than  P 
bombs,  and  have  practically  no  incendiary  effect.  They  are 
portable  and  are  designed  for  use  by  infantry  in  active  opera- 
tions. They  are  suitable  for  producing  smoke  which  is  intended 
to  simulate  gas  or  to  be  mixed  with  gas.  They  are  useful  for 
blinding  machine  guns  or  for. screening  local  attacks,  but  are 
not  so  suitable  for  this  purpose  as  P  bombs  or  No.  27  grenades. 
They  may  be  used  for  concealing  concentrations  of  guns  or 
troops,  battery  positions,  or  areas. 

The  following  table  gives  a  rough  idea  of  the  comparative 
weight  of  phosphorus  and  approximate  efficiency  of  the  several 
smoke-producing  articles : 


Article. 


Weight; 


Effi- 
ciency. 


No.  27  grenades 

P  bombs 

18-pounder 

4.5-inch  howitzer 

4-inch  Stokes  (light) . . 
4-inch  Stokes  (heavy) 


14  ounces  white  phosphorus. 

16  ounces  red  phosphorus 

1(H  ounces  white  phosphorus 
4  pounds  white  phosphorus. 
4£  pounds  red  phosphorus. . 
1\  pounds  white  phosphorus. 


Eighteen-pounder  and  4.5-inch  howitzer  smoke  shells  and  4- 
inch  Stokes  mortar  smoke  bombs  are  filled  with  phosphorus  and 
have  a  considerable  incendiary  etfect. 

They  are  suitable  for — 

(a)  Blinding  enemy  observation  points,  both  in  attack  and 
defense. 

(b)  Forming  a  smoke  screen  to  conceal  an  advance  from 
observation  from  a    iiank. 

(c)  Blinding  salients  in  the  enemy's  line  from  which  enfilade 
fire  is  expected. 


184 

(d)  Blinding  commanding  ground  and  suspected  machine- 
gun  positions. 

(e)  Improving  the  screening  effect  in  a  barrage  of  shrapnel 
or  H.E.   (applies  to  gun  and  howitzer  smoke  shell  only). 

The  supply  of  both  shells  and  bombs  is,  however,  strictly 
limited.  Which  should  be  employed  on  any  given  occasion  will 
depend  primarily  on  the  resources  available  and  the  range  to 
the  points  at  which  it  is  desired  to  form  a  screen. 

As  a  general  guide  it  may  be  taken  that  the  following  number 
of  shells  are  required  to  form  an  adequate  smoke  screen  under 
normal  conditions : 

18-pounder  smoke  shell :  Two  rounds  per  10  yards  per  minute. 

4.5-inch  howitzer  smoke  shell :  Two  rounds  per  15  yards  per 
minute.  Successful  results  have  been  obtained  by  firing  groups 
of  eight  shells  at  200  yards'  interval  per  two  minutes  with  a 
flank  wind  of  moderate  velocity. 

The  incendiary  effect  of  these  shells  is  quite  considerable. 
Showers  of  burning  particles  are  scattered  around  within  an 
area  of  about  10  yards'  radius. 

The  stronger  the  wind  the  farther  must  be  the  source  of  the 
screen  from  the  object.  Experiments  have  shown,  however, 
that  a  screen  can  be  formed  even  in  a  strong  wind.  The  best 
wind  for  the  use  of  gun  and  howitzer  smoke  shell  appears  to  be 
one  having  a  velocity  of  about  14  miles  per  hour  (20  foot-sec- 
onds) and  blowing  across  the  object  to  be  concealed. 

One  hundred  yards  per  10  foot-seconds  of  wind  may  be  taken 
as  a  general  guide  as  to  the  distance  from  the  object  at  which 
artillery  smoke  shell  should  be  placed.  The  smoke  will  rise 
to  a  height  of  at  least  200  feet. 

For  the  4-inch  Stokes  a  gentle  wind  of  from  2  to  4  miles  per 
hour  is  the  best. 

In  forming  a  screen  with  the  4-inch  heavy  bombs  10  per  cent 
might  be  burst  in  the  air  and  the  remainder  on  the  ground. 

The  4-inch  Stokes  smoke  bomb  has  a  maximum  range  of  450 
yards  with  the  light  bomb  and  900  yards  with  the  heavy  bomb. 
The  mortar  and  ammunition  are  heavy  and  not  very  portable. 
Cases  have  occurred,  however,  in  which,  by  making  special 
arrangements  for  carrying  parties,  4-inch  Stokes  mortars  have 
been  taken  forward  with  the  advancing  troops  and  have  suc- 
ceeded in  coming  into  action  and  forming  a  Hank  screen  at  a 
suitable  moment  during  the  advance. 


185 

Phosphorous  smoke  is  the  most  persistent  form  of  smoke  avail- 
able. In  a  wind  of  3  to  6  miles  an  hour  the  depth  of  a  cloud 
established  by  4-inch  Stokes  mortars  approaches  2,000  yards; 
with  winds  of  higher  velocity  gaps  are  apt  to  develop  in  the  cloud 
at  distances  over  1,000  yards  from  the  burst  of  the  bombs. 

Considerations  Affecting  the  Quantities  of  Smoke-producing 
Substances  Required  to  Form  a  Screen. 

The  amount  of  smoke-producing  substances  required  to  form 
the  screen  depends  on  many  considerations,  the  most  important 
of  which  are  as  follows 

(a)  The  extent  of  the  screen:  As  a  rough  guide  it  may  be 
assumed  that  the  width  of  the  screen  should  be  from  two  to 
three  times  the  width  of  the  object  to  be  concealed  (as  seen  by 
observers  from  the  points  which  are  to  be  protected  from  the 
enemy's  observation). 

(b)  The  duration  of  the  screen. 

(c)  The  direction  from  which  the  enemy  can  observe  the 
object  or  area  to  be  concealed :  The  greater  the  number  of  points 
from  which  an  object  can  be  observed  by  the  enemy  the  greater 
will  be  the  amount  of  smoke-producing  substances  necessary  to 
conceal  it.  As  a  general  rule  more  smoke  is  required  to  conceal 
an  advance  from  observation  from  a  flank  than  from  observation 
from  directly  in  front  only. 

id)  The  distance  of  the  object  from  the  enemy's  observation 
pasts:  The  greater  this  distance  the  more  effective  the  smoke 
cloud. 

(e)  The  direction  of  the  wind:  The  difficulty  of  concealment 
increases  if  the  direction  of  the  wind  is  variable.  In  such  a 
wind  the  smoke  source  should  be  mobile,  as  it  may  become  neces- 
sary to  change  its  location  from  time  to  time.  Failing  this,  it 
may  become  necessary  to  stop  the  generation  of  smoke  alto- 
gether. 

(/)  The  velocity  of  the  wind :  The  density  of  the  smoke  cloud 
diminishes  considerably  in  proportion  as  the  velocity  of  the 
wind  increases.  In  a  wind  of  over  20  miles  per  hour  it  is  prac- 
tically impossible  to  form  an  opaque  screen. 

It  should  be  noted  that  in  hot  weather  the  smoke  tends  to 
rise  from  the  ground,  and  there  is  a  greater  tendency  for  gaps 
to  form. 


186 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  effect  of  phosphorous  bomb* 
of  all  kinds  is  cumulative,  as  the  globules  of  phosphor . 
tinue  to  burn  on  the  ground  for  from  15  to  30  minutes. 

As  the  c'oud  in  the  case  of  phosphorous  projectiles  is  at  its 
thickest  soon  after  the  burst,  it  will  be  maintained  more  evenly 
by  adding  small  quantities  at  frequent  intervals  of  time  rather 
than  by  adding  large  quantities  at  greater  intervals. 

To  obtain  the  best  results  with  the  greatest  economy  in 
smoke-producing  substances,  it  is  necessary  that  the  formation 
of  the  smoke  screen  should  be  very  carefully  organized.  All 
personnel  required  for  providing  smoke  screens  should  be 
trained  beforehand  in  the  use  of  the  actual  material  which  is  to 
be  employed.  A  simple  rehearsal  beforehand  is  most  valuable. 
The  program  which  is  to  be  followed  should  state  in  detail  the 
rate  of  expenditure  of  the  smoke-producing  substances  and 
should  be  given  in  writing  to  the  personnel  of  each  moki 
source. 

No  definite  rules  can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  exact  quantities 
of  smoke-producing  substances  required  to  form  a  screen,  as 
the  conditions  vary  to  a  very  large  extent. 

The  following  examples  are. given  for  guidance: 

Examples  of  Smokk  S<  kkens. 

(1)  Object  to  be  concealed:  Concentration  area  on  a  front 
of  2,000  yards. 

Direction  of  the  wind :  Parallel  to  the  enemy's  trenches. 

Velocity  of  the  wind  :  Six  to  eight  miles  an  hour. 

Material  available:  Single  smoke  cases,  type  S. 

A  smoke  screen  should  he  formed  4.0(H)  yards  long  and  40t> 
yards  in  front  of  the  forward  edge  of  the  concentration  area. 

Groups  of  two  men  each  should  be  placed  150  yards  apart  on 
the  line  of  the  intended  screen.  Each  group  should  tight  six 
smoke  cases  every  2  minutes.  Thus,  if  the  screen  is  to  be  main- 
tained for  a  period  of  2  hours,  10,800  smoke  cases  will  be 
required, 

Personnel  required,  60  men. 

The  men  should  take  advantage  of  any  cover  available,  and 
each  group,   if  possible,  should  be  provided  with  a  watch. 

(2)  Object  to  be  concealed  :  Ottneentrfttlon  area  on  a  front  of 
2.000  yards. 

.  Direction  of  the  wind:   Toward  the  enemy. 


187 

Velocity  of  the  wind  :  Six  to  eight  miles  per  •hour. 

Material  available :  Single  smoke  cases,  type  S. 

A  smoke,  screen  should  be  formed  4,500  yards  long  and  400 
yards  in  front  of  the  forward  edge  of  the  concentration  area. 

Men  should  be  posted  singly  and  25  yards  apart  along  the 
line  of  the  intended  smoke  screen.  Each  man  should  light  one 
smoke  case  every  2  minutes.  Thus,  if  the  screen  is  to  be  main- 
tained for  a  period  of  2  hours,  10,800  smoke  cases  will  be 
required. 

Personnel  required,  180  men. 

(3)  Object  to  be  concealed:  Concentration  area  on  a  front 
of  2,000  yards,  from  a  balloon  at  an  altitude  of  3,000  feet  and 
6,000  yards  distant.  • 

If  the  smoke  screen  is  formed  400  yards  in  front  of  the  for- 
ward edge  of  the  concentration  area,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
have  a  smoke  screen  200  feet  high  in  order  to  conceal  the  for- 
ward edge  of  the  concentration  area  from  the  balloon,  and  much 
more  than  that  to  conceal  the  rear  edge.  A  certain  amount  of 
screening  effect  might  be  produced  by  bursting  4-inch  Stokes 
bombs  in  the  air,  but  this  method  can  not  be  relied  upon,  and  is 
uneconomical. 

As  already  stated,  therefore,  it  will  seldom  be  possible  to  use 
smoke  successfully  to  screen  areas  or  objects  from  hostile  kite 
balloons,  unless  there  happens  to  be  a  considerable  rise  in  the 
ground  between  the  balloon  and  the  object  to  be  concealed  and 
on  the  top  of  which  the  smoke  screen  can  be  formed. 

P  Red  Phosphokus  Bombs. 

Front  to  be  screened,  150  yards. 

Ten  men  extended  to  15  paces.     Each  has  ready  in  a  sandbag : 

1  P  bomb  with  detonator  and  Brock  lighter. 

8  P  bombs  without  detonators. 

1  strip  sandbag  soaked  in  paraffin. 

1  piece  corrugated  iron  2  feet  by  1  foot. 

1  knife  with  tin  opener. 

1  box  matches. 

On  whistle  signal  the  detonated  P  bombs  are  thrown  15  yards 
down  wind  and  burst.  Each  man  then  opens  a  P  bomb  with 
tin  opener  and  spreads  red  phosphorus  over  square  foot  of  cor- 
rugated iron,  leaving  one  end  free  for  carrying  if  wind  changes. 
The  phosphorus  is  lighted  as  soon  as  possible  by  means  of  the 
strip  of  sandbag  soaked  in  paraffin.     The  contents  of  a  fresh  P 


m 

bomb  are  added  to  each  burning  pile  every  15  minutes.  Fresh 
phosphorus  must  not  be  added  by  every  man  at  the  same  time 
or  the  cloud  will  diminish. 

Duration,  2  hours,  90  P  bombs. 

Note.— P  bombs  must  not  be  opened  previous  to  operations,  as 
the  phosphorus  is  liable  to  catch  fire  spontaneously. 

4.5-Inch  Smoke  Barrage. 

A  method  adopted  on  one  "Occasion  was  as  follows : 
The  four  guns  of  the  battery  were  concentrated  on  a  point 
400  yards  to  windward  of  the  place  where  the  commencement 
of  the  barrage  was  required.  The  ^ind  at  the  time  was  40 
foot-seconds ;  the  relation  of  the  distance,  400  yards,  to  the  wind, 
40  foot-seconds,  may  be  worth  noting. 

The  guns  were  fired  at  battery  fire  (10  seconds)  and  the  re- 
sult was  effective. 


NOTES  ON  SCREENS  (PROVISIONAL), 

(Issued  by  the  General  Staff.) 


Employment. 


Screens  are  extensively  employed  for  the  purpose  of  conceal- 
ing from  direct  observation — 

(a)  Roads,  tracks,  trenches,  or  areas. 

(&)  Ground  which  is  waterlogged,  where  it  is  impossible  to 
dig  communication  trenches,  and  over  which  it  is  necessary  to 
move  troops. 

(c)  Battery  positions  or  gun  flashes. 

(d)  Work  in  progress. 

(e)  Dumps. 

Also  for  the  purpose  of — 

1.  Thickening  hedges  which  are  not  sufficiently  opaque  of 
themselves. 

2.  Encouraging  the  enemy  to  waste  ammunition. 

Their  main  function  is  concealment,  so  that  the  enemy  can 
only  fire  on  the  chance  of  there  being  a  target  behind  them, 
instead  of  at  an  observed  and  definite  object. 

Typks. 

To  be  effective,  screens  should  fulfill  the  following  conditions : 
They  must  be  opaque  enough  to  achieve  the  purpose  for  which 
they  are  erected  and  at  the  same  time  not  susceptible  to  ex- 
tensive damage  by  weather  or  shell  fire.    If  damaged,  they  must 
be  easy  to  repair. 

The  forms  of  screening  generally  found  of  most  value  are : 

1.  Wire  netting  garnished  with  grass,  brushwood,  or  canvas 
strips. 

2.  Brushwood  interwoven  in  horizontal  wires  stretched  be- 
tween rigid  uprights. 

Shell  fire  has  practically  no  effect  on  such  screens  unless  a 
direct  hit  is  obtained,  and  even  then,  if  properly  constructed, 
the  effect  is  very  local.  They  also  stand  the  weather  well. 
Grass  screens  when  dry  are,  however,  somewhat  inflammable. 

(189) 


190 
Other  Forms. 

(A)  In  certain  cases  solid  canvas  screens  are  necessary — 
e.  g.,  to  hide  flashes  or  movement  at  close  range  (up  to  2,000 
yards). 

They  are  highly  susceptible  to  damage  by  weather  or  shell 
fire,  must  be  extra  firmly  supported,  and,  if  possible,  backed 
with  wire  netting. 

(B)  Coir  screening  (which  is  a  generic  term  for  coconut  or 
jute  matting)  in  single  thicknesses  is  transparent  Used  double 
it  forms  an  excellent  and  quickly  constructed  screen.  It  is 
useful  as  a  temporary  expedient,  but  does  not  weather  well.  It 
should  always  be  reinforced  with  longitudinal  wires. 

Opacity. 

It  must  be  recognized  that  perfect  opacity  under  all  conditions 
of  light  and  background  can  only  be  obtained  by  the  use  of 
perfectly  opaque  material,  such  as  corrugated  iron.  Canvas  itself 
is  not  always  opaque — e.  g„  when  the  sun  is  low  behind  it. 

One  must  therefore  be  satisfied  with  a  compromise — a  screen 
that  is  comparatively  opaque  under  normal  conditions;  that  is 
to  say,  one  which  hides  movement  from  anything  but  close  and 
continuous  scrutiny. 

The  screening  effect  is  much  influenced  by  the  background  and 
the  angle  of  view.  A  comparatively  transparent  screen  may  be 
successful  if  the  background  is  of  a  color  generally  similar  to 
the  objects  to  be  screened,  is  broken  by  trees  and  hedges,  or  is 
viewed  from  an  angle  other  than  at  right  angles  to  its  surface. 

Unless  assisted  by  natural  accidents  of  environment  it  is 
necessary  that  three-quarters  of  the  surface  of  the  screen  should 
be  made  of  opaque  material  if  it  is  to  hide  movement  at  medium 
range  (2,000  to  4,000  yards). 

Yisihiijty. 

There  are  two  distinct  categories  of  screens: 

1.  Those  which  are  obvious  to  the  enemy  as  screens. 

2.  Camouflaged  screens,  designed  to  conceal  and  yet  escape 
detection  themselves. 

These  latter  are  either  made  of — 

(a)  Solid  painted  canvas  or  wire  netting  garnished  with  strips 
of  canvas,  grass,  etc.,  colored  in  patches  to  present  a  general 
landscape  effect  or  to  represent  hedges. 


191 

(6)  Solid  canvas  carefully  painted  to  reproduce  a  definite 
locality — brick  wall,  ruins,  and  such  like. 

Camouflaged  screens  can  rarely  serve  their  purpose  for  any 
length  of  time,  and  are  only  in  exceptional  cases  (where  they 
are  only  required  for  a  few  weeks)  worth  the  time  and  trouble 
expended  on  their  manufacture. 

Their  defects  are : 

1.  That  the  effect  obtained  by  painting  will  only  last  a  short 
time  when  exposed  to  weather,  and  will  not  vary  with  the  natural 
seasonal  changes  in  surroundings. 

2.  That  they  require  greater  care  in  construction  and  more 
maintenance,  are  highly  susceptible  to  damage  by  weather  and 
shell  fire,  and  are  inflammable. 

3.  That  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  they  deceive  the  enemy; 
should  they  not  do  so  they  are  only  performing  the  function  of 
an  ordinary  screen,  i.  e.,  that  of  concealment,  but  have  taken 
longer  to  construct. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  they  are  exposed  to  steady  direct 
view  as  opposed  to  the  comparatively  fleeting  examination  from 
an  aeroplane  to  which  camouflage  gun  covers  are  exposed. 

The  following  are  examples  of  the  successful  use  of  camou- 
flaged screens: 

1.  Work  on  exposed  battery  positions  about  1,800  yards  from 
the  enemy's  front  line  was  made  possible  by  the  erection  of 
screens  composed  of  raffia  on  wire  netting.  These  screens  were 
mounted  on  wooden  trestles,  of  a  maximum  height  of  10  feet. 
These  enabled  the  raffia  netting  to  be  put  up  at  a  slope  and  so  to 
simulate  a  bank  or  false  crest.  The  extremities  of  the  screen 
were  sloped  gradually  to  the  ground  by  using  progressively  lower 
trestles.  Both  front  and  back  slopes  were  furnished  with  raffia 
netting,  in  order  to  give  sufficient  thickness  to  conceal  flashes. 
The  top  of  the  screen  was  made  irregular  to  avoid  a  hard  outline, 
and  the  slopes  were  gentle. 

2.  In  another  instance  imitation  brick  walls  painted  on  canvas 
backed  with  wire  netting  were  erected  for  a  similar  purpose. 

3.  Imitation  hedges  were  made  of  a  combination  of  raffia, 
canvas  strips,  and  brushwood  on  wire  netting  to  conceal  a  bat- 
tery position  which  otherwise  would  have  been  in  direct  view. 
In  this  case  an  existing  hedge  that  was  in  rear  of  the  position, 
from  behind  which  the  guns  were  unable  to  fire,  was  removed, 
and  the  imitation  substituted  in  front  of  the  guns. 


192 

It  Is  a  general  experience  that  newly  erected  screens  are 
shelled  by  the  enemy  for  a  short  period  after  erection,  but  that 
he  soon  gives  this  up  if  damage  is  repaired  immediately. 

A  good  example  of  this  can  be  given  in  a  case  where  over 
7,000  yards  of  screening,  consisting  of  hay  bands  interwoven  in 
wire  netting  were  erected  five  months  ago.  No  attempt  was 
made  to  render  the  screen  inconspicuous.  It  was  shelled  to  some 
extent,  but  any  damage  caused  was  immediately  repaired.  The 
screen  is  still  fulfilling  its  purpose,  i.  e.,  that  of  concealing  what 
goes  on  behind  it. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  if  screening  is  carried  out  on  a  com- 
prehensive scale,  and  with  a  continuous  policy,  localities  which 
would  normally  be  under  observation  and  subject  to  deliberate 
shelling  become  practically  immune,  and  this  does  not  depend 
upon  the  invisibility  of  the  screening  erected  but  on  the  dis- 
tribution. 

Siting. 

Roads  running  at  right  angles  to  the  front  line  are  best 
concealed  by  hanging  vertical  screens  between  trees,  houses, 
or  poles  across  the  road. 

For  roads  running  parallel  with  the  front  line  it  is  advisable, 
when  possible,  to  site  the  screens  at  least  50  yards  from  the 
road  in  order  that  shell  fire  directed  at  the  screens  should  not 
cause  damage  on  the  road  and  vice  versa.  Additional  ad- 
vantage may  be  gained  by  varying  the  distance,  and  using 
lengths  of  screen  en  Echelon. 

Such  screens  may  have  to  be  made  specially  high,  but  at 
the  same  time  the  lower  edge  can  be  correspondingly  some  dis- 
tance off  the  ground. 

Short  lengths  of  about  30  yards  placed  en  echelon,  and  over- 
lapping each,  other,  are  preferable  to  long  lengths.  This 
method  permits  of  passage  way,  and  limits  damage  by  shell 
fire,  and  the  line  of  route  screened  not  being  denned,  becomes 
difficult  to  range  on. 

Screens  have  been  used  successfully  to  hide  gun  flashes  from 
the  front  and  from  a  flank  at  night. 

In  one  case  where  the  flashes  were  visible  from  a  flank,  a 
long  solid  canvas  screen  (painted  a  dark  color)  was  placed 
50  to  100  yards  on  the  right  front  of  the  battery.  This  was 
found  difficult  to  maintain,  and  six  small  screens  were  substi- 
tuted, one  about  4  yards  to  the  right  of  the  muzzle  of  each 


193 

gun,  and  running  out  about  8  yards  to  the  front.  They  were 
about  8  feet  high,  of  which  only  the  top  6  feet  was  canvas. 
They  were  dismantled  during  the  day  and  reerected  each 
night  in  socketed  holes. 

Manufacture,  Erection,  and  Maintenance. 

Whenever  possible,  screens  should  be  attached  to  existing 
objects  such  as  trees,  hedges,  houses,  etc.  If  poles  have  to 
be  used  instead,  they  should  be  sunk  well  into  the  ground  and 
well  guyed. 

The  screen  should  be  both  suspended  from  longitudinal 
wires  and  fastened  with  staples  to  the  poles. 

The  following  methods  of  bracing  have  been  found  satis- 
factory : 

1.  The  uprights  joined  by  longitudinal  wires  3  feet  apart 
and  guyed  to  stout  pickets  set  midway  between  each  pair  of 
uprights.  Each  upright  is  therefore  secured  to  four  pickets, 
two  of  which  are  shared  by  the  upright  on  either  side. 

2.  Cross  diagonal  bracing  between  each  pair  of  uprights, 
which  are  guyed  in  the  normal  way. 

Guys  should  consist  of  at  least  four  strands  of  No.  14  gauge 
wire  or  their*  equivalent. 

Uprights  should  be  of  at  least  3-inch  timber. 

It  is  convenient  when  manufacturing  screens  in  back  areas 
to  make  them  up  in  bays  of  30  feet,  with  intermediate  sup- 
ports 10  feet  apart,  30  feet  being  a  fifth  part  of  an  ordinary 
roll  of  wire  netting  and  a  convenient  length  to  handle. 

In  order  to  localize  the  effect  of  shell  fire,  it  has  been  found 
advisable  to  hang  each  longitudinal  width  of  wire  netting  in- 
dependently on  a  longitudinal  wire  between  the  uprights. 

It  is  important  that  the  manufacture  and  assembly  of 
screens  should  be  well  organized,  so  that  the  actual  erection 
can  be  carried  out  rapidly. 

The  adoption  of  a  standard  type  of  screen,  which  suits  the 
locality  and  will  serve  anywhere,  will  result  in  economy  of  time 
and  labor. 

Strips  of  canvas  interlaced  in  wire  netting  will  make  such 
a  screen.  The  strips  should  be  2£  inches  wide,  and  threaded 
through  every  three  or  four  meshes  vertically,  leaving  no  in- 
terval horizontally  except  for  the  twisted  wire  between  ad- 
joining meshes.  The  opacity  is  considerably  increased  by  the 
9784°— 17 13 


194 

use  of  alternate  vertical  bands  of  plain  and  dark-colored  can- 
vas, each  band  being  about  a  foot  wide.  It  is  important  that 
there  should  be  a  strong  contrast  between  the  plain  and  colored 
canvas.     This  screen  is  effective  from  ranges  of  a  mile  upward. 

Still  better  results  can  be  obtained  if  the  color  is  arrange*  1 
on  the  vertical  bands  so  as  to  produce  a  checkered  effect.  This 
can  easily  be  done  in  the  manufacture,  for  the  screens  are 
made  up  of  wire  netting  (which  is  3  feet  wide),  which  arc 
subsequently  joined  to  form  screens  6  feet  or  9  feet  high.  It 
is  simple  to  arrange  either  in  the  manufacture  or  in  the  i 
bling,  that  the  colored  band  on  one  3-foot  width  is  mated  to  a 
plain  band  on  its  neighbor  above  or  below. 

It  is  recommended  that  maintenance  parties  should  be  de- 
tailed to  effect  immediate  repairs,  and  that  a  reserve  dump 
of  material  be  formed  near  any  extensive  range  of  screens  that 
are  likely  to  be  damaged. 


INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  THE  DEMOLITION  OF 
HOSTILE  GUNS  WITH  3-INCH  STOKES 
TRENCH  MORTAR  BOMBS  AND  SPECIAL 
SLOW  FUSE. 

(Issued  by  the  General  Staff.) 


1.  A  slow  fuse  should  be  made  up  of  a  length  of  Bickford 
fuse  with  a  fuse  lighter  fixed  to  one  end  and  a  No.  8  detonator 
crimped  to  the  other  end.  The  fuze  should  be  cut  to  burn  for 
1£  minutes. 

It  has  been  found  convenient  to  pack  the  fuses  in  tins  con- 
taining 10  fuzes  and  4  spare  fuze  lighters.  The  contents  should 
be  labeled  on  each  tin. 

Care  must  be  taken  when  crimping  the  detonator  onto  the 
Bickford  fuze  to  leave  a  space  of  one-fourth  inch  between  the 
end  of  the  Bickford  fuse  and  the  fulminate. 

2.  The  bombs  are  the  ordinary  3-inch  Stokes  bombs  without 
their  fuses  or  components. 

3.  To  demolish  a  hostile  gun : 

(a)  Open  the  breech,  place  the  bomb  in  the  breech  of  the 
gun,  with  a  cartridge  container  forward  as  far  as  it  will  go. 

(&)  Insert  the  detonator  end  of  the  slow  fuse  into  the  gaine 
tube  of  the  bomb  and  press  it  gently  home.  Secure  the  fuse  so 
that  the  weight  of  the  fuse  lighter  does  not  pull  the  detonator 
out  of  the  bomb. 

(c)  When  the  gun  has  thus  been  prepared,  withdraw  the 
safety  pin  from  the  fuse  lighter  and  press  the  cap  down,  at  the 
same  time  turning  it  around.  As  soon  as  the  fuse  is  lit,  take 
cover. 

Note. —  (1)  The  normal  rate  of  burning  of  Bickford  fuse  is 
1  yard  in  90  seconds,  but  this  time  may  vary  by  as  much  as  15 
seconds  in  either  direction. 

(2)  In  taking  cover  the  party  should  spread  out  and  warn 
off  any  approaching  troops.  The  fragments  may  carry  300 
yards. 

(195) 


196 

(3)   If  the  breech  can  not  he  opened — 

(a)  In  the  case  of  a  held  gnu,  place  the  homb  between  the 
gun  and  the  seat  (so  that  it  touches  the  gun)  on  the  muzzle 
side  of  the  shield. 

(b)  In  the  case  of  any  larger  gun,  place  the  bomb  just  inside 
the  muzzle,  taking  care  that  the  bomb  does  not  slide  down  the 
bore. 

DEMOLITION    PARTY. 

A  demolition  party  should  consist  normally  of  one  noncom- 
missioned officer  and  two  men.  The  noncommissioned  officer 
carries  two  Stokes  bombs  and  one  tin  of  slow  fuzes.  Bach  man 
carries  four  Stokes  bombs  in  two  sandbags. 

The  men  should  be  practiced  in  their  duties  before  being  sent 
into  action. 


EMPLOYMENT  OF  3-INCH   STOKES  MORTARS 
IN  RECENT  FIGHTING. 

(Issued  by  the  General  Staff,  June,  1917.) 


The  following  examples  of  the  employment  of  3-inch  Stokes 
mortars  during  recent  fighting  are  published  for  information : 

1.  A  4  minutes'  barrage  was  put  up  preparatory  to  a  brigade 
attack,  with  the  object  of  smothering  five  hostile  machine  guns. 
The  range  was  550  yards,  and  two  ballistite  rings  and  green 
cartridges  were  used.  The  machine  guns  did  not  fire  and  the 
attack  was  successful. 

2.  Twenty  rounds  were  fired  by  a  mortar  on  a  party  of  Ger- 
mans who  had  become  isolated,  whereupon  the  party  left  the 
trench  in  which  they  had  been  holding  out  and  tried  to  escape 
by  retiring.  Range  was  rapidly  lengthened  and  some  rounds 
fired  over  their  heads,  with  the  result  that  they  came  back  and 
surrendered ;  prisoners  taken,  2  officers  and  70  other  ranks. 

3.  During  two  counter  attacks  about  200  rounds  were  fired  at 
the  advancing  enemy ;  when  all  their  ammunition  had  been 
fired  the  detachment  lent  effective  support  to  our  resistance  by 
using  their  rifles. 

4.  A  noncommissioned,  officer  in  charge  of  a  mortar  observed 
some  enemy  working  in  front  of  our  trench ;  by  firing  over 
them  and  gradually  shortening  range,  he  drove  two  of  them 
toward  our  trench  and  compelled  them  to  surrender. 

5.  A  mortar  was  trained  onto  a  party  of  Germans  who  were 
observed  trying  to  get  a  light  Minnenwerfer  into  position. 
These  scattered  at  the  second  round,  leaving  the  gun  in  the 
open.  Eight  carefully  registered  rounds  were  fired  at  the  gun 
and  then  two  bursts  of  fire.  Three  direct  hits  were  obtained 
and  the  gun  was  blown  up. 

(197) 


GERMAN  DOCUMENT— PRINCIPLES  OF  COM- 
MAND IN  THE  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSI- 
TION WARFARE. 

I.  Infantry. 

Energetic  steps  must  be  taken  to  insist  on  the  infantry  in  the 
line  continuing  their  work  on  their  position,  even  during  the 
fighting.  Personal  inspection  by  all  infantry  commanders,  and 
by  the  higher  commanders,  is  necessary  to  insure  this. 

By  night,  and  especially  in  misty  weather,  for  example,  it  will 
often  be  necessary  to  strengthen  the  garrison  of  the  front  line 
or  to  bring  reserves  up  closer  to  the  front  line.  In  foggy  weather 
a  special  form  of  "  readiness  for  action  "  must  be  provided  for. 

Gaps  between  defensive  works  are  a  source  of  danger.  They 
must  be  commanded  by  fire  from  the  rear  and  the  flanks,  and 
be  kept  under  observation  by  the  infantry  and  artillery.  By 
night  and  in  misty  weather  they  should  be  guarded  by  outposts. ' 

The  main  points  to  be  considered  in  the  stationing  of  all 
reserves  are  to  keep  them  concealed,  and  to  distribute  them 
skillfully  over  the  area,  so  as  to  avoid  unnecessary  losses. 
Isolated  farms,  copses,  hollows,  and  roads  which  lie  in  valleys, 
should  be  avoided,  as  experience  teaches  that  they  are  always 
heavily  shelled. 

When  fighting  takes  place  in  open  country  or  in  positions 
which  afford  but  little  cover,  efforts  must  be  made  to  hold  the 
front  line  with  weak  detachments,  while  the  rest  of  the  force 
is  distributed  in  great  depth,  as  would  be  the  case  in  a  strongly 
constructed  position. 

When  a  hostile  attack  begins  with  prolonged  intense  artil- 
lery preparation  by  the  heavy  and  heaviest  calibers  of  artil- 
lery and  trench  mortars,  the  foremost  trenches  are  speedily 
converted  into  shell-hole  positions,  in  which  infantry  "  nests," 
composed  of  isolated  groups,  are  formed  round  the  sentry 
posts  and  dugouts,  wherever  these  still  exist. 

It  is  essential  that  the  men  should  be  trained  to  connect  up 
such  points  with  each  other  and  with  the  trenches  in  rear 
during  pauses  in  the  fighting,  by  night  or  during  misty 
weather. 

(199) 


200 

The  influence  of  the  company  and  subordinate  commanders 
in  fighting  in  such  shell-hole  positions  often  extends  only  to  the 

men  who  are  actually  with  them.  In  such  circumstance*  stout- 
hearted men  with  iron  nerves  form  the  real  backbone  of  the 
defense.  All  commanders  in  the  front  line,  senior  or  junior, 
must,  however,  continually  endeavor  to  keep  their  men  capable 
of  offering  resistance  and  ready  to  make  a  counter  attack  by 
setting  a  personal  example  of  calm  and  courageous  behavior. 

In  fighting  of  this  character  it  is  no  longer  advisable  to 
strengthen  the  garrison  of  the  fighting  line  and  to  reinforce  it 
continually.  The  garrison  sustains  heavier  losses,  which  are 
continually  recurring  and  which,  because  they  are  unnecessary. 
are  bad  for  the  morale  of  the  troops.  The  maintenance  of  the 
foremost  positions,  moreover,  can  not  be  insured  simply  by  a 
rigid  defense,  combined  with  the  reinforcement  of  the  garrison 
of  the  front  line. 

To  secure  this  object,  tactics  of  a  different  character  must 
be  employed. 

The  garrisons  of  the  foremost  trenches  must  be  weak,  but 
they  should  not  be  tied  rigidly  to  one  point  when  they  can  no 
longer  find  cover  and  may,  within  certain  Omits,  change  their 
position  in  order  to  escape  from  a  very  intense  bombardment. 
Experience  shows  that  no  matter  how  carefully  the  enemy 
directs  his  fire  there  are  points  within  every  area  allotted  to  a 
unit  in  which  this  fire  is  less  effective.  It  is,  therefore,  a  ques- 
tion of  observing  the  fall  of  the  enemy's  fire  and  of  avoiding 
the  areas  in  which  it  is  most  intense  by  advancing,  moving  to 
the  flanks,  or  falling  back  on  the  nearest  supports.  The  best 
method  is  to  advance,  as  this  is  the  quickest  way  of  escaping 
from  the  enemy's  fire.  In  movements  to  the  flanks  or  toward 
the  rear  to  the  nearest  supports,  there  is  some  danger  of  the 
continuity  of  the  fire  line  being  broken,  and  of  the  enemy 
establishing  small  nesfs  in  it  unobserved.  Efforts  must,  there- 
fore, be -constantly  made  by  the  detachments  in  the  shell  holes 
not  to  lose  sight  of  one  another,  and  the  front  line  must  be 
continually  under  observation  from  the  rear. 

If  the  enemy  leaves  his  trenches  to  attack  our  lines.  ever\ 
infantryman  must  realize  that  the  most  certain  means  of  re- 
pelling the  attack  are  his  own  rifle  tire,  hand  grenades,  and  the 
bayonet,  and  that  even  a  few  machine  iruns  will  hreak  up  a  hos- 
tile attack.  The  employment  of  artillery  is  a  valuable  assistance 
in  repelling  an  assault,  hut  it  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  repulse 
a  Strong  attack. 


201 

Every  rifle  and  machine  gun  which  can  be  brought  to  bear  on 
the  enemy's  attack,  either  from  the  lire  line  or  from  defensive 
positions  in  the  rear,  must  he  directed  against  it,  in  addition  to 
the  annihilating  and  barrage  fire  of  the  artillery,  trench  mortars, 
and  bomb  throwers  (granatenwerfer). 

If,  in  spite  of  this,  the  enemy  succeeds  in  entering  our  trenches, 
the  task  of  the  artillery  is  to  cut  him  off  from  the  attacking 
waves  and  reserves  which  are  following  him  up,  while  enfilade 
and  frontal  fire  (rifle,  automatic  rifle,  and  machine  gun)  is 
opened  on  the  enemy  who  has  entered  our  trenches,  to  prevent  his 
further  advance.  Trench  mortars  and  bomb  throwers,  in  par- 
ticular, should  be  employed  to  keep  the  enemy  under  fire  while 
he  is  consolidating  the  position,  although  the  artillery  may  also 
take  part  in  this,  if  observation  can  be  insured. 

The  difficult  situation  in  which  the  enemy  now  finds  himself 
must  be  utilized  without  waiting  for  further  orders.  The  de: 
tachments  of  the  trench  garrison  who  are  retiring  to  the  flanks 
and  to  the  rear,  and  the  supports  lying  ready  behind  the  fore- 
most trenches,  whose  task  must  have  been  so  drilled  into  them 
as  to  become  second  nature,  must  counter  attack  immediately 
and  recapture  the  front  line.  They  must  in  some  cases  advance 
under  hostile  artillery  fire.  The  enemy  must  be  annihilated  to 
the  last  man  by  the  use  of  the  hand  grenade  and  the  bayonet  in 
hand-to-hand  fighting. 

An  essential  preliminary  to  the  successful  employment  of  these 
tactics  is  to  make  certain  that  the  infantry  can  observe  the  fore- 
ground and  the  area  between  the  lines. 

Men  detailed  to  guard  particular  points  (emergency  garrisons) 
do  not  take  part  in  counter  attacks. 

If  the  counter  attack  is  successfid,  the  front  line  must  imme- 
diately be  placed  once  more  in  a  state  of  defense,  but  the  garri- 
son must  then  be  reduced  to  its  previous  strength.  These  tac- 
tics cause  the  fighting  to  take  place  not  in,  but  for,  the  front  line. 

It  is  essential  that  the  men  should  be  thoroughly  trained  in 
these  tactics,  and  that  the  subordinate  commanders  and  men  are 
given  clear,  precise,  and  detailed  instructions  as  to  what  they 
have  to  do  on  the  spot.  The  utmost  demands  must  be  made  on 
every  man  who  takes  part  in  the  attack. 

If  the  garrison  of  the  foremost  battle  zone  is  unable  to  eject 
the  enemy  or  hold  him,  a  combined  attack  should  be  delivered 
with  the  general  reserve,  while  the  enemy  is  still  engaged  in 
organizing  the  defense  of  a  strange  system  of  trenches  and  in 
fighting  the  local  reserves  for  "holding  on"  points,  etc.     Every 


202 

man  who  is  fighting  in  the  forward  battle  zone  must  realize 
clearly  that  by  holding  out,  even  if  he  is  completely  surrounded, 
he  makes  it  easier  for  the  counter  attack  which  is  certain  to  be 
delivered,  and  is  contributing  to  his  own  relief.  He  must, 
therefore,  go  on  fighting  so  long  as  he  can  use  his  weapons, 

The  attack  jtself  should  be  delivered  in  waves  in  extended 
order,  assault  detachments  being  employed  at  some  points.  The 
attack  must  be  supported  by  the  fire  of  machine  guns  pushed 
forward  in  echelon,  by  bomb  throwers  and  trench  mortars,  by 
infantry  guns  as  well  as  by  the  artillery  farther,  in  rear.  The 
success  of  the  attack  depends  not  on  the  strength  of  the  forces 
engaged  in  it,  but  on  the  resolution  with  which  it  is  carried 
out,  the  cooperation  of  all  arms,  and  rapidity  of  execution. 

A  decisive  factor  in  the  success  of  an  attack  is  the  selection 
of  the  right  moment  for  the  employment  of  the  reserves  posted 
farther  in  rear.  It  must  be  remembered  that  many  requests 
for  support  from  the  front  line  are,  as  experience  shows,  either 
not  justified  by  the  situation  or  made  too  soon.  If  the  reserves 
are  alarmed  and  brought  up  prematurely,  their  energy  is  frit- 
tered away  and  the  subordinate  commanders  are  tempted  to 
hold  the  front  line  with  too  large  a  force. 

If  an  immediate  attack  does  not  succeed  in  ejecting  or  anni- 
hilating the  enemy  who  has  entered  the  position,  this  can  only 
be  retaken  by  a  methodical  attack. 

Reliefs. — The  frequent  relief  of  the  infantry  is  undesirable 
from  the  point  of  view  both  of  command  and  of  the  troops 
themselves,  as  the  change  prevents  the  troops  becoming  familiar 
with  the  position  and  diminishes  their  keenness  in  working  to 
improve  it. 

Experience  shows  that  confusion  often  arises  while  the  relief 
is  being  carried  out,  and  ground  is  lost  in  consequence. 

Precautions  must  be  taken,  in  advance,  to  insure  that  there 
are  other  communications,  which  have  been  reeonnoitered  and 
clearly  marked  out,  to  replace  routes  which  have  been  discov- 
ered by  the  enemy  and  are  blocked  by  his  fire. 

II.  Aktiu.kkv. 

Searching  and  sweeping  fire  (unless  it  can  be  kept  within 
narrow  limits  by  working  with  the  assistance  of  suitable  regis- 
tration points  situated  close  to  the  target,  combined  with  an 
exact  study  of  the  map)  and  bursts  of  tire  with  II.  E.  shell 
against   groups  of  the  enemy's  guns  are.  as  a  rule,  uselesa 


203 

the  other  hand,  searching  and  sweeping  fire  with  gas  shell  may- 
be very  useful  to  put  artillery  out  of  action  for  the  time  being. 
Gas  shell  are  not  suitable  for  counter  battery  work  which  aims 
at  the  destruction  of  the  hostile  battery. 

When  the  trenches  are  separated  by  medium  distances  (about 
165  to  220  yards),  barrage  fire  should  fall  on  and  close  in  front 
of  the  enemy's  foremost  trenches,  as  otherwise  the  safety  of 
our  own  trench  garrison,  which  is  not  to  be  jeopardized  on  any 
account,  can  not  be  insured.  If  the  enemy's  jumping-off  trenches 
are  so  close  to  our  own  lines  that  barrage  fire  would  endanger 
our  own  infantry,  it  must  be  left  to  the  trench  mortars,  bomb 
throwers,  and  infantry  to  keep  them  under  fire.  The  artillery 
barrage  fire  should  then  be  directed  against  the  enemy's  rear- 
ward positions,  in  order  to  cut  off  his  foremost  waves  of  assault 
from  their  supports  and  to  catch  the  latter  while  they  are  con- 
centrating. If  the  enemy's  foremost  trenches  are  farther  from 
our  lines  (i.  e.,  more  than  330  yards),  the  barrage  fire  must 
follow  the  progress  of  the  enemy's  attack. 

Artillery  action  against  the  enemy's  tanks  is  of  particular  im- 
portance in  the  repulse  of  an  attack,  in  view  of  the  novelty  of 
the  weapon  and  the  small  amount  of  experience  so  far  gained. 

Destructive  and  barrage  fire,  which  is  directed  against  hollows, 
roads,  and  the  enemy's  positions,  will  probably  often  stop  tanks 
by  its  very  intensity,  so  that  only  a  few  will  reach  or  penetrate 
our  lines. 

Artillery  action  against  these  will  be  carried  out  by  infantry 
guns  and  close-range  guns  which  fire  with  direct  laying  at  short 
ranges.  They  are  equipped  with  a  special  projectile  for  this  pur- 
pose. It  is  important  that  these  guns  should  not  open  fire  too 
soon,  so  that  they  remain  concealed  and  are  still  in  action  when 
they  are  needed. 

In  addition  to  these  guns,  heavy  howitzer  batteries  should  be 
detailed  to  engage  tanks.  They  will  have  particular  zones 
allotted  to  them  as  targets — i.  e.,  as  a  rule,  strips  of  ground 
close  in  front  of  our  lines  which  they  can  keep  under  observa- 
tion, and  on  which  they  must  register  when  conditions  are  quiet. 
If  a  tank  enters  the  zone  allotted  to  a  battery,  all  the  guns  should 
be  turned  on  the  tank  and  salvos  should  be  fired  until  it  is  out 
of  action. 

Nothing  but  a  thoroughly  organized  bombardment  such  as  this 
will  be  successful  against  tanks.  General  orders  that  all  bat- 
teries which  observe  tanks  approaching  are  to  ox^en  fire  on  them 
only  lead  to  confusion  and  failure. 


204 

In  exceptional  cases  heavy.  Hat -trajectory  guns,  fire  with 
direct  laying  and  direct  observation,  may  prove  effective,  for 
example,  if  tanks  have  hroken  throtlgh  our  linos. 

Artillery  com  mauds. — The  artillery  allotted  to  armies  to  rcin- 
force  them  for  the  defensive  battle  should,  in  principle,  be  dis- 
tributed amongst  the  divisions  in  proportion  to  the  importance 
of  the  various  divisional  sectors. 

Artillery  should  not  he  massed;  distribution  in  depth  causes 
the  enemy  to  scatter  his  fire. 

III.  Air  Forces    (including  Antiaikckai-t    I>kiknse). 

(a)  It  is  necessary  to  increase  the  air  forces  very  consid- 
erably— reconnaissance  and  artillery  aeroplanes,  single-seater 
battle  planes,  captive  balloons,  and  antiaircraft  weapons — be- 
fore the  actual  defensive  battle,  as  the  first  objective  of  the 
enemy's  attack  will  be  to  secure  complete  mastery  of  the  air. 
This  must  be  stopped  as  soon  as  possible. 

As  soon  as  the  reinforcement  of  the  threatened  front  is 
ordered,  owing  to  the  situation  having  become  clear  and  the 
decision  to  thwart  the  enemy's  plan  having  been  taken,  the  air 
forces  and  antiaircraft  weapons  must  be  further  considerably 
increased.  Less  important  fronts  must  without  hesitation  he 
ruthlessly  denuded  of  aeroplanes,  balloons,  and  antiaircraft 
weapons. 

IV.  Pioneers. 

(a)  Pioneers  are  on  no  account  to  be  employed  on  tasks 
which  the  infantry  is  capable  of  performing. 

(b)  The  pioneer  commander  of  the  division  is  also  in  c«.m- 
mand  of  the  pioneer  battalion  of  the  division.  The  pioneer  and 
minenwerfer  companies  and  the  searchlight  section  of  the  divi- 
sion should  be  under  his  orders,  mid.  as  a  rule,  the  labor  com- 
panies as  well.  The  divisional  commander  will  arrange  lor 
the  command  of  tlio  pioneer  and  minenwerfer  companies  and 
searchlight  units,  which  are  temporarily  attached  to  the  divi- 
sion. 

(c)  In  a  defensive  battle,  mincnwerler  have  a  special  task 
to  perform  in  engaging  tanks.  Special  zones  in  front  of  our 
lines,  which  they  must  be  able  to  keep  under  observation  with 
certainty,  should  be  allotted  to  the  heavy  and  medium  minen- 
werfer. in  Hie  same  way  OS  to  i  he  heavy  artillery.  If  tanks 
enter  these  /.ones  the  minenwerfer  concerned  will  divert  their 
lire  from  nil  other  targets  and  direct  it  on  the  tanUs. 


CONSOLIDATION  OF  TRENCHES,  LOCALITIES, 
AND  CRATERS  AFTER  ASSAULT  AND  CAP- 
TURE, WITH  A  NOTE  ON  RAPID  WIRING. 

(General    Staff,   War   Office.) 


1.  Consolidation  of  a  Captured  System  of  Trenches. 

The  capture  of  a  system  of  hostile  trenches  is  an  easy  matter 
compared  with  the  difficulty  of  retaining  it.  A  thorough  knowl- 
edge of  the  principles,  a  careful  study  and  correct  use  of  the 
natural  features  of  the  ground,  and  a  detailed  preparation  and 
organization  of  the  work  are  necessary ;  but  success  will  only 
result  if  there  is  also  an  absolute  determination  on  the  part  of 
all  ranks  to  get  the  work  done  promptly  at  all  costs. 

The  principles  of  the  consolidation  of  captured  trenches  are, 
briefly,  as  follows : 

(a)  To  establish  a  series  of  strong  points  or  centers  of 
resistance,  wired  all  round  and  mutually  supporting  each  other 
according  to  the  ground.  These  points  should  be  provided  with 
machine  or  Lewis  guns  at  once.     . 

(&)  To  provide  good  communication  to  the  rear  from  these 
points. 

(c)  To  fill  in  all  hostile  trenches  within  bombing  distance  of 
the  points  occupied. 

(d)  To  establish,  if  possible,  simultaneously  with  the  con- 
solidation of  strong  points  in  the  front  line,  a  number  of  sup- 
porting points  in  rear.  These  points  should,  if  the  ground  is 
favorable,  be  placed  to  cover  the  intervals  between  the  works 
in  the  front  line. 

(e)  The  strong  points  can  later  be  connected  to  form  a  con- 
tinuous front  line. 

The  above  principles  must  be  applied  with  due  regard  to  the 
natural  tactical  features  of  the  ground.  The  satisfactory  siting 
and  consolidation  of  a  position  will  largely  depend  on  the  power 
possessed  by  the  officers  on  the  spot  to  recognize  during  the  vari- 
ous stages  of  a  battle  the  minor  features  of  real  tactical  im- 

(205) 


206 
• 
portance.     This  ability  is  only  acquired  by  previous  training, 
and  is  a  quality  which  every  officer  must  study  to  possess.     The 
size  and  trace  of  the  "  strong  points,"  as  well  as  the  intervals 
between  them,  will  vary  according  to  the  lie  of  the  ground  and 
the  plan  of  the  hostile  trenches  captured.     During  the  ]> 
of  consolidation  concealment  from   artillery   observation  is  of 
importance. 

The  first  essential  is  speed  in  rendering  the  captured  position 
strong  enough  to  resist  the  first  counterattacks.  It  is  there- 
fore necessary  that  a  definite  plan  should  be  decided  on  before- 
hand as  to  which  points  first  require  attention.  This  can  be 
done,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  with  great  accuracy  from  maps 
and  aeroplane  photographs  and  from  a  study  of  the  ground  from 
any  point  in  our  lines  which  commands  a  view  of  it.  In  the  case 
of  craters  the  forecast  of  the  tunneling  officers  must  be  obtained. 

Although  it  is  usually  advisable  that  assaulting  troops  should 
be  relieved  as  soon  as  possible,  this  must  not  be  takes  to  imply 
that  the  duty  of  securing  ground  gained  is  the  task  only  of  the 
relieving  troops.  It  is  an  unsound  principle  for  troops  to  expect 
to  be  relieved  immediately  after  an  attack,  as  it  wastes  valuable 
time  at  a  critical  period  when  speed  in  work  is  essential.  It 
must  be  understood  that  troops  which  take  a  position  must  com- 
mence the  work  of  consolidation  at  once. 

The  distribution  of  R.  E.  detachments  requires  to  be  carefully 
considered  beforehand.  In  all  cases  of  an  assault  or  advance, 
where  it  is  intended  to  secure  the  ground  gained,  the  troops 
destined  for  the  purpose  should  include  a  detachment  of  H.  10., 
the  commander  of  which  should  be  detailed  previously  and 
attached  to  the  staff  of  the  unit  or  formation  concerned. 

Garrisons  must  hold  on  to  their  ground  ;  they  have  nothing 
to  fear  from  being  outflanked. 

2.  Consolidation  of  Locai.itii  s. 

During  an  advance,  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  consolidate 

some  locality  of  tactical  Importance,  such  as  a  village  or  wood, 
the  same  general  principles  hold  good  as  in  the  consolidation  of 
a  system  of  trenches.  Some  notes  on  the  particular  points  that 
require  attention  in  the  case  of  villages  and  woods  are  appended. 

TILLAGES. 

Enlargements  from  even  small  scale  maps  give  very  accurate 

plans  of  most   villages  and  make  it   possible  to  plan   the  defense 


207 

in  sufficient  detail  beforehand.  It  is  essential  that  subordinate 
commanders  should  be  provided  with  such  plans  in  order  that 
the  general  idea  of  the  defense  may  be  quickly  and  properly 
understood. 

The  principles  of  the  defense  of  a  village  are  laid  down  in 
Infantry  Training,  section  146.  The  order  of  urgency  of  work 
is  as  follows : 

(a)  Barricade  and  picket  all  exits.  Establish  center  of 
resistance  near  exits  to  cover  approaches  or  any  streams  or 
tracks  which  might  serve  to  guide  a  counter  attack.  Com- 
mence work  on  keep,  preferably  at  village  crossroads.  Barri- 
cade roads. 

(b)  Reconnoiter  for  cellars. 

(c)  Establish  communications,  giving  cover  from  view, 
radiating  from  keep  to  outer  centers  of  resistance,  and  from 
keep  to  the  rear. 

(d)  Construct  bombproofs  in  cellars  at  renters  of  resistance 
and  keep — false  roofs  to  cellars,  etc. 

(e)  Complete  keep. 

(/)  Improve  communications  at  (c)  above,  to  give  cover 
from  fire. 

{(j)  Make  lateral  lines  of  communication  between  centers  of 
resistance. 

Centers  of  resistance  should  be  established,  if  it  is  possible 
to  do  so,  to  the  flank  of  conspicuous  buildings  likely  to  afford 
good  targets  for  hostile  artillery  tire.  In  the  case  of  keeps  in 
villages,  this  is  often  impossible  owing  to  the  presence  of  church 
spires.  It  is,  however,  preferable  to  have  a  keep,  even  with  this 
disadvantage,  that  is  central,  accessible,  and  strong  against  in- 
fantry assault.  It  should  be  remembered  in  this  connection 
that  by  the  time  hostile  infantry  can  assault  a  village  keep 
hostile  artillery  fire  will  necessarily  have  ceased. 

WOODS. 

As  in  the  case  of  villages,  plans  should  be  prepared  of  the 
locality. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  in  the  past  as  to  what  part  of 
a  wood  should  be  occupied.  Experience  has  proved  that,  owing 
to  the  great  advantages  afforded  by  cover  from  view,  the  position 
to  take  up  in  a  wood  is  just  so  far  within  the  outer  edge  as  will 
permit  of  good  view  into  the  open.    In  this  connection  it  should 


208 

be  remembered  that  in  course  of  time  shell  and  ride  fire  thins  out 
the  edges  of  woods  considerably.  It  is  therefore  advantageous  in 
the  first  instance  to  take  up  positions  slightly  in  rear  of  those 
which  may  appear  at  the  moment  to  be  most  advantageous. 

If,  as  is  often  the  case,  the  wood  is  surrounded  by  a  hedge, 
there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  make  trenches  against  this  hedge. 
This  is  to  be  avoided.  A  hedge  forms  a  very  good  obstacle 
against  assault,  with  the  addition  of  a  little  wire.  If  it  screens 
the  view,  it  can  be  quickly  thinned. 

The  order  or  urgency  of  work  is  as  follows : 

(a)  Establish  centers  of  resistance  for  all  round  defense  at 
the  corners  and  salients  of  the  wood.  These  are  the  points 
which  are  most  liable  to  counter  attack.  Establish  central  re- 
serve, reconnoiter,  blaze,  and  clear  communications.  The  de- 
fense of  a  wood  should  be  very  active,  and  counter  attacks 
must  be  launched  against  any  hostile  troops  that  may  reach 
the  edge  of  the  wood  in  order  to  prevent  a  lodgment  that  places 
the  enemy  on  equal  terms. 

(b)  Establish  intermediate  centers  of  resistance  and  lateral 
communications. 

(c)  Establish  central  keep  at  junction  of  rides  or  on  near 
edge  of  clearing. 

In  the  case  of  large  woods  and  forests,  where  the  general  line 
of  defense  runs  through  a  wood,  a  line  of  strong  centers  of  re- 
sistance should  be  established  across  the  wood,  if  possible  be- 
hind a  road  or  other  clearing.  The  near  edge  of  the  clearing 
should  be  entangled,  and  the  intervals  between  the  "centers" 
should  be  swept  by  fire.  As  time  permits  "rays"  should  be 
cleared,  radiating  from  the  centers  of  resistance  and  crossing 
similar  "rays"  from  adjoining  centers,  so  as  to  add  to  the 
depth  of  the  field  of  fire. 

These  rays  should  be  wired  and  obstacles  arranged,  so  as  to 
break  up  an  attack  and  force  the  attackers  into  the  openings. 

A  line  of  intermediate  centers,  communications,  etc.,  should 
also  be  established,  as  indicated  in  (b)  above. 

3.  Occupation  01  Crati 

I.  The  occupation  and  consolidation  of  mine  craters  presents 
many  difficulties,  and  all  ranks  should  understand  the  principles 
to  he  acted  upon  in  the  event  of  the  explosion  of  mines  on  their 

front. 


209 

II.  Craters  are  usually  formed  as  a  result  of  one  of  the  follow- 
ing mining  operations : 

(a)  An  attack  by  us  on  the  enemy's  trenches. 

(b)  An  attack  by  the  enemy  on  our  trenches. 

(c)  Underground  fighting. 

III.  The  possession  of  a  crater  offers  the  following  advantages  : 
(a)   It  can  be  turned  into  a  strong  point  capable  of  holding 

a  small  garrison. 

(5)  It  gives  command  of  the  ground  in  the  vicinity, 
(c)  It  forms  a  considerable  obstacle. 

IV.  (a)  When  mines  are  exploded  by  us  in  connection  with  an 
attack  on  the  enemy's  trenches,  our  object  should  be  to  seize 
and  hold  the  wliole  of  the  mine  crater  or  craters  or  a  line  in 
front  of  them.  The  latter  plan  is  usually  the  best,  and  the 
craters  in  rear  can  then  be  turned  into  strong  points. 

(6)  When  craters  are  formed  as  the  result  of  an  attack  by 
the  enemy  on  our  trenches  or  in  the  course  of  underground  fight- 
ing, our  object  will  usually  be  to  seize  and  hold  the  near  "  lip  " 
of  the  crater. 

Parties  must  be  rushed  out  at  once  to  seize  the  lip.  It  may 
be  impossible  to  open  up  communication  to  these  parties  till 
after  dark.  They  should  therefore  take  sufficient  grenades, 
water,  etc.,  and  must  be  prepared  to  hold  on  though  isolated. 

V.  Before  the  explosion  of  a  mine  a  forecast  should  be  made 
of  the  state  of  affairs  to  be  expected  after  the  explosion,  and  all 
details  of  probable  requirements  should  be  worked  out.  These 
would  include: 

(a)  The  formation  of  dumps  of  engineer  materials  as  close 
up  as  possible. 

(&)  The  organization  of  working  and  carrying  parties. 

Work  should  start  immediately  after  the  explosion  of  the 
mine,  and  no  time  should  be  lost  in  turning  into  account  the 
quiet  interval  which  usually  follows  the  explosion. 

The  personnel  of  R.  E.  field  companies  should  be  freely  used 
for  this  work  under  instructions  given  through  the  general  staff. 

VI.  The  following  are  the  main  points  to  be  attended  to  in  the 
actual  consolidation  of  the  craters: 

(a)  All  trenches  should  be  strutted  as  they  are  constructed. 
Special  frames  for  this  purpose  must  be  made  beforehand. 

(&)  All  works  on  a  crater,  whether  inside  or  outside  the  "  lip," 
should  be  provided  with  a  parados. 
9784°— 17 14 


210 

(c)  Dugouts  should  be  made  by  tunneling  into  the  sides  and 
not  at  the  bottom  of  a  crater. 

(d)  At  least  two  communication  trenches  should  be  con- 
structed leading  into  each  crater.  Entrances  to  craterfl  should 
be  made  at  the  sides  and  not  through  the  rear  *  lip." 

(e)  All  trenches  leading  up  to  a  crater  from  the  enemy's  line 
should  be  straightened  or  filled  in  for  a  distance  of  at  least  40 
yards  from  the  position  of  the  defenders,  so  as  to  keep  the 


*   •*   *     ^L 


t 


$ 


7rench 
Main  front  One 

enemy  bombers  at  a  distance.    This  work  can  usually  be  carried 
out  with  the  least  difficulty  immediately  after  the  explosion. 

(/)  Collapsible  knife  rests.  French  wire,  and  other  forms  of 
portable  wire  entanglement  should  be  brought  up  in  large 
quantities  and  thrown  over  the  "  lip  "  of  a  crater. 

VII.  There  are  two  main  methods  of  holding  craters: 
(a)  Method  A.     (See  sketch  on  p.  6  and  Plate  A.) 
This  method  should  usually  be  employed  after  the  explosion 
by  us  of  a  mine  in  the  enemy's  t  rem  lies  or  in  the  area  where  it 
is  known  that  the  enemy  is  not  engaged  in  mining. 


211 


The  front  "lip"  of  the  crater  is  held  by  means  of  several 
posts.  Two  communication  trenches  lead  into  the  crater,  one 
on  each  side,  and  give  lateral  communication  between  the  posts. 
One  or  two  dugouts  are  constructed  in  the  sides  of  the  crater. 
(b)  Method  B.  (See  sketch  below  and  PI.  B.) 
This  method  should  usually  be  employed  when  the  enemy  has 
exploded  a  mine  in  or  near  our  trenches,  or  when  we  have  ex- 
ploded a  defensive  mine  close  to  our  own  trenches. 


The  rear  "  lip  "  of  the  crater  is  held.  Wire  is  thrown  inside 
the  crater.  One  or  two  loopholes  are  cut  through  the  rear  *  lip  " 
so  as  to  command  the  inside  of  the  crater. 

Plate  C  shows  a  scheme  for  converting  the  area  behind  the  lips 
of  a  series  of  craters,  which  have  been  occupied,  into  a  strong 
post. 

The  importance  of  rendering  the  means  of  access  to  the  lip 
secure  from  bombing  attack  is  not  always  recognized. 


212 

VIII.  Work  should  be  carried  out  in  the  following  order: 

(a)  Construction  of  one  or  two  posts  in  the  lip  of  the  crater. 

(b)  Wiring  the  front  of  posts  and  filling  in  or  straightening 
trenches  leading  from  it  toward  the  enemy. 

(c)  Digging  of  communication  trenches  up  to  the  crater. 
And,  if  far  lip  has  been  occupied: 

(d)  Digging  trench  for  lateral  communication  inside  tin- 
crater. 

(e)  Completion  of  wiring  front  of  crater  and  construction  of 
further  posts  in  far  lip. 

(/)  Construction  of  dugouts. 

(g)   Improvements  to  the  above. 

It  should  usually  be  possible  to  do  (a),  (fr),  and  (c)  together. 

4.  Notes  on   Rapid  Wire  Kma.mii.kmknts. 

One  of  the  first  requirements  in  consolidating  a  position  is  to 
get  some  wire  out  in  front  of  it. 

The  following  general  principles  regarding  the  construction  of 
wire  entanglements  should  be  observed : 

I.  The  rear  edge  of  the  entanglement,  should  be  about  20  yards 
from  the  trench;  if  the  trace  of  the  entanglement  is  Irregular 
and  does  not  follow  the  trace  of  the  trench,  it  will  make  the  task 
of  the  hostile  artillery  more  difficult. 

II.  The  depth  of  the  entanglement  should  be  as  <rre.it  as  pos- 
sible, and  at  least  30  feet.  The  wire  available  should  be  ex- 
pended in  forming  a  deep  entanglement  rather  than  a  "  heavy  " 
one  (i.  e.,  one  with  a  large  amount  of  wire  between  eaeli  set  of 
posts).  The  construction  of  two  belts  witli  an  interval  between 
them,  rather  than  one  belt  of  twice  the  depth,  gives  the  hostile 
artillery  a  deeper  target  to  destroy,  without  increasing  the  mate- 
rial required  for  constructing  the  entanglement,  except  by  one 
row  of  pickets. 

III.  There  will  seldom  be  time  in  rapid  wiring  to  "dig  in" 
the  wire  for  concealment.  Every  advantage  should  be  taken, 
however,  of  natural  folds  in  the  ground,  long  grass,  or  brush- 
wood, or  other  means  of  concealment. 

IV.  Wire  entanglements  should  be  2  feet  6  inches  to  3  feet 
high. 

V.  The  posts  in  a  row  should  be  about  6  feet  from  each  other 
and  the  rows  about  6  feet  apart.  If  wooden  i>ost>  are  used  rhey 
must  be  strong;  light  posts  are  useless. 


213 

VI.  The  difficulties  of  crossing  an  entanglement  are  increased 
if  it  is  not  too  regular ;  e.  g.,  if  the  heights  of  the  posts  above 
ground  and  the  distances  between  them  are  varied.  For  rapid 
wiring  drill,  however,  a  regular  entanglement  is  easier  to  con- 
struct. 

To  insure  that  an  obstacle  can  be  erected  with  rapidity  and  in 
silence,  every  one  of  the  working  party  must  know  what  he  has 
to  do  and  work  so  that  he  does  not  get  in  the  way  of  the  others. 

This  necessitates  some  form  of  drill.  There  are  a  large  num- 
ber in  use,  of  which  a  selection  is  given  on  pages  14  to  20.1  The 
following  notes  and  rules  will  be  found  useful  in  carrying  out 
any  form  of  drill  for  constructing  wire  entanglements : 

I.  The  party  should,  as  far  as  possible,  work  so  that  the  ob- 
stacle is  always  between  them  and  the  enemy.  Each  wiring 
party  should  have  a  double  sentry  lying  down  about  30  or  40 
yards  toward  the  enemy  to  prevent  patrols  sniping  or  bombing 
the  party.  If  circumstances  necessitate  it,  a  special  covering 
party  should  be  provided. 

II.  The  party  should  work  extended  and  not  bunched  to- 
gether. 

III.  Large  parties,  in  which  each  group  of  men  has  only  one 
operation  or  duty  to  perform,  will  erect  entanglements  quicker 
than  a  small  party,  in  which  each  man  has  several  duties  to 
perform  in  succession,  unless  latter  is  very  well  drilled. 

IV.  The  best  unit  of  entanglement  is  about  40  or  50  yards 
long.  Its  construction  can  then  be  controlled  from  one  point. 
This  distance  is  also  a  convenient  interval  to  leave  small  gaps 
for  patrols. 

V.  A  line  of  posts  is  best  laid  out  at  night  by  putting  down  a 
tape  or  string  with  the  intervals  of  the  posts  marked  by  bits 
of  rag  or  sandbag  tied  onto  it. 

VI.  The  end  of  a  coil  of  barbed  wire  will  be  found  secured  on 
the  drum  tucked  under  the  standing  part.  In  the  dark  it  is  very 
hard  to  find  and  release.  Coils  should,  therefore,  be  prepared 
by  daylight.  A  good  method  is  to  attach  a  piece  of  string  to 
the  end,  uncoil  the  roll  half  a  turn,  re-coil  it  on  a  piece  of  old 
sandbag,  and  fasten  it  up  by  the  string.  The  end  of  the  wire 
can  then  be  readily  found  in  the  dark.  The  pieces  of  tin  on 
the  wooden  drums  should  be  removed  to  prevent  noise.     It  may 

*A  French  method  will  be  found  in  Appendix  B,  "  Notes  for  Infantry 
Officers  on  Trench  Warfare." 


214 

be  found  convenient,  to  make  carrying  easier,  to  re-coil  the  barbed 
wire  in  smaller  coils  on  a  stout  stake. 

VII.  Pickets  should  be  made  up  into  bundles  of  one-man  loads. 
They  should  be  firmly  tied  with  plain  wire  or  brought  up  in 
sandbags.  The  latter  is  the  surer  way  of  keeping  them  to- 
gether, at  any  rate  with  small  wooden  pickets.  A  drum  of 
barbed  wire  is  best  carried  over  the  shoulder,  with  a  stout  stake 
passed  through  it,  which  also  serves  for  uncoiling  the  wire. 
Pickets  and  wire  should  be  clumped  by  the  carrying  party  out- 
side the  trench  behind  the  center  of  the  length  to  be  wired. 

VIII.  Mauls,  if  used,  should  be  muffled  by  nailing  on  a  leather 
face  or  with  sandbags.  About  eight  thicknesses  of  sandbag 
material  are  necessary  to  be  of  any  use. 

IX.  Equipment  should  not,  unless  necessary,  be  worn  by  wir- 
ing parties,  as  it  is  liable  to  cause  noise. 

X.  Stays  and  holdfasts.     (See  fig.  1.) 

Forward  stays  are  not  absolutely  necessary  if  the  entangle- 
ment posts  are  well  driven  in.  They  are  usually  required  with 
iron  screw  posts,  which  are  not  very  stiff  unless  driven  in  up 
to  the  bottom  eye.  Forward  stays  can  not  be  put  on,  without 
great  loss  of  time,  until  the  fence  on  the  first  row  of  posts  has 
been  completed,  for  they  would  interfere  with  the  fence  wire 
being  looped  aver  the  posts. 

Back  stays  should  invariably  be  provided  and  anchored  well 
back,  so  as  to  resist  any  attempt  to  pull  the  entanglement  away 
by  grapnels. 

Side  stays  at  the  ends  of  separate  lengths  of  entanglement  are 
usually  desirable. 

Pickets  used  as  holdfasts  for  stays  should  be  "  staggered  " — 
i.  e.,  not  driven  in  vertically,  but  inclined  away  from  the  post 
that  they  stay. 

XI.  When  stringing  horizontal  wires  for  an  apron  on  a  stay 
or  diagonal,  the  latter  should  be  given  a  kink  or  bend  at  ibe 
places  of  crossing,  so  that  there  will  be  less  chance  of  the  wires 
slipping  down.  The  horizontal  wires  may  be  secured  by  bind- 
ing wire  or  by  taking  a  bight  and  looping  it  around  the  stay. 
The  coil  should  not  be  passed  over  and  under,  as  tbis  la  a  slow- 
process. 

NOTES  WITH  REFERENCE  TO  IRON    SCREW   POSTS    AM)   PICK  J 

(a)  Tbe  posts  jire  5  feet  long  with  four  eyes,  tbe  pickets  two 
3  feet  6  inches  long  With  two  eyes,  or  15  inches  long  with  a 


215 

loop  at  the  end.     If  the  ground  is  soft  the  posts  can  be  screwed 
in  2.  feet  deep  or  more.1 

(b)  In  rapid  work  the  wire  can  simply  be  placed  in  the  eye 
by  forming  a  loop  in  the  wire  and  slipping  it  over  the  post.  It 
is  not  intended  that  the  wire  should  be  threaded  through  the 
eye.  If  time  allows,  the  horizontal  wires  can  be  put  on  slack, 
and  when  the  fence  is  strung  the  post  can  be  given  a  complete 
turn  so  as  to  prevent  the  wire  slipping  out  should  it  be  cut,  or 
the  barbed  wire  may  be  twisted  round  the  posts,  through  an 
eye,  as  it  is  put  on,  or  it  may  be  secured  to  the  eyes  by  binding 
wire. 

(c)  To  permit  of  the  loops  being  slipped  over  the  posts,  it  is 
obvious  that  the  lowest  wire  in  a  fence  must  be  put  on  first,  and 
no  forward  or  back  stays  can  be  fixed  until  the  fence  has  been 
completed. 

(d)  Care  must  be  taken  that  all  the  posts  are  originally 
screwed  in  so  that  the  eyes  point  the  same  way ;  otherwise  de- 
lays will  occur  in  the  wiring. 

(e)  Loose  bundles  of  iron  screw  posts  and  pickets  can  not  be 
carried  noiselessly.  It  is  advisable,  therefore,  to  wrap  them 
round  with  a  sandbag,  secured  by  a  light  turn  of  wire,  with  the 
ends  twisted  together.  Enough  end  to  this  wire  should  be  left 
so  that  it  can  be  untwisted  by  hand  without  pliers. 

(/)  Short  stakes  or  bats  must  be  provided  to  fit  the  top  eye 
of  the  posts  in  order  to  screw  them  in.  The  helves  of  the  in- 
trenching implement  serve  the  purpose. 

Examples  of  Wire  Drills. 

Picket  is  used  to  mean  a  short  picket  used  as  a  holdfast. 

Post  is  used  to  mean  a  longer  upright. 

Fence  is  used  to  mean  a  series  of  wires  on  a  row  of  posts. 

The  conventional  signs  used  in  the  diagrams  are  explained 
in  figure  2. 

In  all  the  drills  given,  unless  otherwise  stated,  it  is  assumed 
that— 

(a)  The  length  to  be  erected  is  50  yards. 

(b)  The  stores  required  are  collected  at  a  point  behind  the 
center  of  the  length  in  a  convenient  order. 

(c)  The  line  of  the  fence  has  been  marked  or  indicated. 

iAngle-iron  posts  are  5  feet  10  inches  and  3  feet  6  inches  long. 


216 

(d)  The  drums  of  wire  are  opened  and  the  ends  ready. 

(e)  Bars  or  sticks  are  rim  through  the  drums  so  that  the 
wire  can  be  uncoiled  readily. 

(/)  Short  sticks  for  screwing  in  the  pickets  arc  carried  by 
the  men  requiring  them  (or  mauls  if  wooden  or  angle  iron  pickets 
are  used). 

(//)  All  wirers  have  hedging  gloves  and  wire  cutters,  and 
have  their  legs  protected  by  gaiters  or  sandbags. 

(h)  Each  number  consists  of  two  men,  who  work  together, 
and  the  numbers  commence  work  in  succession  at  a  suitable  in- 
terval (say,  four  posts  apart).  Thus  Nos.  2  move  off  as  soon  as 
Nos.  1  have  the  desired  start ;  Nos.  3  at  the  same  interval  behind 
Nos.  2. 

(i)  All  work  is  commenced  on  the  left. 

0')  The  men  who  put  the  top  wire  on  a  fence  stay  the  end 
post  to  short  pickets. 

( A)  On  completion  of  each  operation  or  "  duty  "  detailed  in  the 
drill,  all  men  should  return  to  a  fixed  place,  in  order  to  prevent 
confusion,  if  some  work  faster  than  others. 

(I)   Spare  men  are  at  hand  to  replace  any  casualties. 

The  drills  are  primarily  intended  for  use  with  iron  screw  poets, 
but  can  be  used  for  wooden  or  angle  iron  posts  with  slight  modi- 
fications. If  the  soil  permits  of  posts  being  screwed  into  the 
bottom  eye,  no  stays  are  necessary,  and  three  horizontal  wires  in 
the  fence,  instead  of  four,  will  be  sufficient. 

No  estimates  of  stores  required  are  given,  as  the  distance  apart 
of  the  posts  and  the  amount  of  wire  used  must  depend  on  what 
is  available. 

DRILL   NO.    1.   DOtTBLB-APRON    ENTANGLEMENT. 

[See  fig.  3.1 

Working  party,  12  men,  exclusive  of  noncommissioned  officers. 

First  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Lay  posts  in  position  on  ground  A. 
N  (Front  rank— assists  Nos.  1. 

'jltoar  rank     holds  up  posts  for  Xos.  .'{  t<>  si  row  in. 
Nos.  3.  Screw  in  posts,  separately. 
Nos.  4.   Lay  front  and  roar  pirkets  in  position. 
Nos.  5.   Screw  in  front  pickets  B. 
Nos.  G.  Screw  in  rear  pickets  C. 


217 

Second  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Bottom  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  2.  Second  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  3.  Third  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  4.  Top  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  5.  Front  diagonal  between  A  and  B. 

Nos.  6.  Rear  diagonal  between  A  and  C. 

Third  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Top  horizontal  wire  on  front  diagonals  A  B. 

Nos.  2.  Second  horizontal  wire  on  front  diagonals  A  B. 

Nos.  3.  Bottom  horizontal  wire  on  front  diagonals  A  B. 

Nos.  4.  Top  horizontal  wire  on  back  diagonal  A  C. 

Nos.  5.  Second  horizontal  wire  on  back  diagonal  A  C. 

Nos.  6.  Bottom  horizontal  wire  on  back  diagonal  A  C. 

This  drill  involves  Nos.  5  in  "  second  duty  "  and  Nos.  1,  2,  and 
3  in  "  third  duty,"  working  in  front  of  the  fence. 

In  the  "  first  duty  "  No.  2  rear  rank  holds  up  a  post  for  No.  3 
front  rank  to  screw  in  until  it  gets  a  bite  in  the  ground.  He 
then  holds  up  a  post  for  No.  3  rear  rank,  etc. 

This  obstacle  and  others  of  the  same  nature  can  be  deepened 
by  adding  similar  bays  behind  it.  The  posts  in  successive  bays 
should  cover  the  intervals  between  those  in  front  of  them.  (See 
fig.  4.) 

If  two  bays  are  made,  the  obstacle  can  be  increased  by  tossing 
loose  wire  into  the  valley  between  the  posts. 

DRILL    NO.    2.    TRIP,    FENCE,    AND    APRON. 

(See  fig.  5.) 

Working  party,  10  men,  exclusive  of  noncommissioned  officers. 
First  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Lay  posts  in  position  A. 

Nos.  2.  Hold  up  posts. 

Nos.  3.  Screw  in  posts. 

Nos.  4.  Bring  up  and  screw  in  front  pickets  B. 

Nos.  5.  Bring  up  and  screw  in  rear  pickets  C. 


218 

Second  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Front  trip  wire  on  pickets  B. 
Nos.  2.  Bottom  wire  on  fence  A. 
Nos.  8.  Second  wire  on  fence  A. 
Nos.  4.  Third  wire  on  fence  A. 
Nos.  5.  Top  wire  on  fence  A. 

Third  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Front  diagonal  between  A  and  B. 

Nos.  2.  Back  diagonal  between  A  and  C. 

Nos.  3.  Top  horizontal  wire  on  the  diagonals  A  C. 

Nos.  4.  Second  horizontal  wire  on  the  diagonals  A  C. 

Nos.  5.  Bottom  horizontal  wire  on  the  diagonals  A  C. 

Nos.  1.  Have  to  work  in  front  of  the  fence  in  M  third  duty." 

DBILL   NO.   3.    TRIP  AND  FENCE. 

(See  fig.  (5.) 

Working  party,  16  men,  exclusive  of  noncommissioned  officer 

First  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Screw  in  posts  6  feet  apart,  A. 

Nos.  2.  Screw  in  pickets  B  and  C ;  B  first. 

Nos.  3.  Trip  wire  B. 

Nos.  4.  Bottom  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  5.  Second  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  6.  Third  wire  of  fence  A. 

Xos.  7.  Top  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  8.  Diagonal  wire  between  A  and  C. 

Second  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Diagonal  wire,  between  A  and  B. 
Nos.  2.  Trip  wire  G. 


x*  S   a    \  Uncoil  loose  wire. 
Nos.  4.  J 

_ .  .     '    I  Toss  in  loose  wire  uncoiled. 
Nos.  6.  J 

•«' ) 


Xos.  7.  . 

„     \  Fasten  loose  wire. 


In  the  "second  duty,"  Nos.  1  have  to  work   in   front  of  the 
fence. 


219 

Nos.  3  and  4  uncoil  the  loose  barbed  wire  on  the  ground  well 
clear  of  the  entanglement.    Six  coils  for  each  25  yards. 

Nos.  5  and  6  with  large  wooden  pickets  lift  the  loose  wire  and 
toss  it  on  to  the  entanglement. 

Nos.  7  and  8  spread  the  loose  wire  out  and  fasten  it  by  twist- 
ing a  bight  at  intervals  to  the  diagonals  and  fence  wires. 

DRILL  NO.   4.   FENCE,    WITH   CROSSED  DIAGONALS   AND  TRIPS. 
(See  fig.  7.) 

Working  party,  14  men,  exclusive  of  noncommissioned  officers. 
The  pickets  are  placed  opposite  the  posts. 

This  drill  involves  four  men  working  on  the  enemy's  side  of 
the  fence. 

First  duty. 

Nos.  1.  Screw  in  posts  A. 

Nos.  2.  Screw  in  pickets,  B  first,  then  C. 

Nos.  3.  Trip  wire  B. 

Nos.  4.  Bottom  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  5.  Second  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  6.  Third  wire  of  fence  A. 

Nos.  7.  Top  wire  of  fence  A. 

Second  duty. 
'    *  I  Prepare  posts  in  next  length. 

Nos.  3.  Front  diagonal  between  A  and  B,  commencing  at 
picket  B,  Bj,  then  to  A2,  B3,  etc. 

Nos.  4.  Front  diagonal  between  A  and  B,  commencing  at  top 
of  post  Ai,  then  to  B2,  A3. 

Nos.  5.  Back  diagonal  between  A  and  C,  commencing  at 
picket  Ci,  then  to  A2,  C3,  A4,  etc. 

Nos.  6.1  Back  diagonal  between  A  and  C,  commencing  at  top 

Nos.  7.  J   of  post  Ai,  then  to  C2,  A3,  etc. 

DRILL   NO.    5.    SUCCESSIVE  ROWS    OF   FENCES. 
(See  fig.  8.) 

Working  party,  12  men,  divided  into  four  groups  of  3  each, 
W,  X,  Y,  Z. 

The  posts  must  be  prepared  by  attaching  binding  wire  to  the 
bottom  eye,  to  this  the  vertical  diagonals  between  the  fences  are 
made  fast. 


220 
First  duty. 

Group  W.  Lay  out  posts  in  row  B. 
Group  X.  Screw  in  above. 
Group  Y.  Lay  out  pickets  in  row  A. 
Group  Z.  Screw  in  above. 

Second  duty. 

Group  W.  Lay  out  posts  in  row  C. 
Group  X.  Screw  in  above. 
Group  Y.  Bottom  wire  of  fence  B. 
Group  Z.  Trip  wire  on  row  A. 

Third  duty. 

Group  W.  Second  wire  on  fence  B. 
Group  X.  Third  wire  on  fence  B. 
Group  Y.  Top  wire  on  fence  B. 
Group  Z.  Front  diagonal  between  A  and  B. 

Fourth  duty. 

Group  W.  Bottom  wire  of  fence  C. 
Group  X.  Second  wire  of  fence  G. 
Group  Y.  Third  wire  of  fence  C. 
Group  Z.  Top  wire  of  fence  C. 

Fifth  diitfi. 

Group  W.  Diagonal  between  B  and  C,  bottom  of  d  to  top  of 
Bi,  bottom  of  C2,  etc. 

Group  X.  Second  diagonal  between  B  and  0,  top  <»f  Ci  to 
bottom  of  Bi,  top  of  C2,  etc. 

Group  Y.  Lay  out  and  screw  in  pickets  1>:  or  lay  out  row  of 
posts  D,  if  the  fences  are  to  be  continued. 

Group  z.  Diagonal  between  G  and  l>:  or  screw  in  above,  etc 

In  "third  duty"  Z  and  in  "fifth  duty  "  \Y  and  X  work  on 
enemy's  side  of  fence. 

In  "fifth  duty"  W  and  X  loop  the  diagonals  over  top  of 
pickets  and  make  them  fast  to  the  bottom  eye  by  binding  wire. 

Instead  of  putting  the  criss-cross  diagonals  between  fences  B 
and  C  as  above,  which   involves  binding  wire  and  takes  some 


221 

little  time,  it  would  be  sufficient  if  time  presses  to  stay  the 
pickets  merely  by  connecting  the  heads.  (See  fig.  9.)  "  Goose- 
berries," etc.,  can  be  thrown  into  the  space  between  B  and  C. 

Another  variation  is  to  put  loose  wire  or  French  wire  between 
fences  B  and  C  and  criss-cross  plain  wire  to  connect  the  tops  of 
the  pickets.     (See  fig.  10.) 

A  further  variation  can  be  introduced  by  placing  the  posts  so 
as  to  form  squares  instead  of  triangles.     (See  fig.  11.) 

DRILL  NO.   6.    DOUBLE  FENCE, 
(See  fig.  12.) 

Working  party,  28  men,  exclusive  of  noncommissioned  officers. 

This  entanglement  is  designed  for  stout  wooden  posts  well 
driven  in  or  screw  posts  screwed  in  down  to  the  bottom  eye ;  no 
hold-fast  pickets  are  then  required. 

The  drill  only  requires  one  duty  from  each  pair  of  men. 

The  apron  is  of  a  different  pattern  to  those  previously  given ; 
the  wires  miss  alternate  pickets. 

Three  horizontal  wires  can  be  used  for  the  fence  instead  of 
the  "  gate  "  pattern  shown. 

Order  of  work. 

Under  superintendence  of  two  noncommissioned  officers,  all 
hands  carry  up  and  place  the  posts  on  the  ground. 
No.  1  drive  or  screw  in  posts  in  front  fence  A. 
No.  2  drive  or  screw  in  posts  in  back  fence  B. 
No.  3  bottom  wire  3  of  fence  A. 
No.  4  diagonal  wire  4  of  fence  A. 
No.  5  diagonal  wire  5  of  fence  A. 
No.  6  top  wire  of  fence  A. 
No.  7  bottom  wire  3  of  fence  B. 
No.  8  diagonal  wire  4  of  fence  B. 
No.  9  diagonal  wire  5  of  fence  B. 
No.  10  top  wire  6  of  fence  B. 
No.  11  apron  wire  11. 
No.  12  apron  wire  12. 
No.  13  apron  wire  13. 
No.  14  festooned  wire  14. 


222 

DRILL    NO.    7.      ORDINARY   LOW    ENTANGLEMENT.1 
(See  fig.  13.) 

Working  party,  30  men,  in  10  groups,  with  a  noncommissioned 

offier. 

Group  A,  front  row  of  pickets  A. 

Group  B,  straight  wire  A  row  of  pickets. 

Group  C,  second  row  of  pickets  C. 

Group  D,  zigzag  wire  Ai,  Ci,  A2,  C2,  etc. 

Group  E,  loose  wire  on  zigzag  Ai,  Ci,  A2,  C2,  etc. 

Group  F,  straight  wire  on  C  row  of  pickets. 

Group  G,  third  row  of  pickets  G. 

Group  H,  zigzag  wire  Gi,  Ci,  G2,  C2,  etc. 

Group  J,  loose  wire  on  zigzag  Gi,  C*  G%  C*  etc. 

Group  K,  straight  wire  on  G  row  of  pickets. 

Pickets  may  be  12  to  18  inches  out  of  the  ground  and  3  feet 
apart. 

DRILL  NO.    S.    FRENCH    WIRE   OBSTACLE. 
(See  fig.  14.) 

The  obstacle  consists  of  two  rows  of  French  wire,  placed  just 
far  enough  apart  for  a  man  to  pass  between  them.  Each  coil  is 
stapled  down  in  five  places — at  each  end,  and  at  one-fourth,  one- 
half,  and  three-fourths  of  its  length.  When  two  coils  meet,  the 
same  staple  fastens  down  both  coils. 

Posts  5  feet  long  are  driven  through  the  center  of  the  coils 
in  five  places,  as  in  the  case  of  the  staples;  the  ends  of  adjoin- 
ing coils  are  interlaced  a  little  so  that  the  post  will  go  through 
both. 

A  strand  of  barbed  wire  is  run  along  the  top  of  each  row  and 
fastened  to  the  posts  with  a  round  turn.  It  is  pulled  as  taut  as 
possible  and  twisted  on  to  the  French  wire  by  a  Staple,  veg,  or 
wire  cutters,  close  to  each  post,  and  in  several  places  between 
the  posts. 

One  or  more  strands  of  bnrbed  wire  are  run  along  to  the  front 
as  an  "  apron." 

Diagonal  wires  are  run  from  the  tops  of  posts  of  the  front  row 
to  tops  of  posts  of  second  row. 

Working  party,  24  men  in  three  parties,  with  noncommissioned 
officer. 

*A  low  entanglement  Is  not,  as  n  rule,  sufficient  by  itself  but  may  be 
combined  wjth  a  high  entanglement.      (See  figs.  15,  16,  17,  18. 


223 
Front  row. 

Party  A.  1  holds  end  of  French  wire  and  staples  it  down;  2 
pulls  wire  out  20  yards ;  3  shakes  wire  clear  of  obstructions  and 
put  in  staples  one-fourth,  one-half,  and  three-fourths  way  long. 

Party  B.  1  mauls  in  anchorage  pickets  and  posts;  2  holds 
posts ;  3  supplies  posts. 

Party  C.  1  uncoils  barbed  wire ;  2  makes  fast  end  to  anchorage 
and  twists  wire  round  tops  of  pickets ;  3  twists  barbed  wire  on 
to  the  French  wire. 

Party  D.  1  runs  coil  of  barbed  wire  along  the  front ;  2  and  3 
twist  it  onto  the  front  of  the  French  wire. 

Back  row. 

Party  E.  Same  as  A. 

Party  F.  Same  as  B. 

Party  G.  Same  as  C. 

Party  H.  1,  with  coil  of  barbed  wire,  moves  between  the  two 
rows,  uncoiling  the  wire ;  2  and  3  move  on  either  side  of  the  en- 
tanglement and  make  this  barbed  wire  fast  to  the  posts  as  the 
diagonal,  while  Hi  holds  the  coil  so  that  H2  and  H3  can  reach  it. 

The  obstacles  described  above  can  be  combined  in  various  ways 
either  by  placing  one  behind  the  others  (see  figs.  15  and  16)  or 
by  placing  a  high  wire  entanglement  over  a  low  one  (see  figs.  17 
and  18). 


Plan 


Plate  A. 

Sketch  of  Front  Lip 

of  Crater  prepared 

for  defence. 


Plan. 


225 


4JJ, 


*D784< 


22(3 


Plate  B. 

Sketch  of  Bau  Lip  of 

Crater  prepared  for 

defence. 


•Cteervat-'O/i   Ti/n/ie/ 


OjssrrottOf)   runr>tt 


227 


CO 

< 

z 
o 

z 
o 

< 

> 

HI 

_J 
UJ 

< 

z 
o 

H 

o 

UJ 
CO 


OQ 


M 

o 

I 


l(Jvtsj     Cj 


'4DV3*u      uC^i^OOninaiLuoj 


228 


229 


Fig.  1. 


Sack  Sfixy 


Section. 


S/c/e  S/ac/y^ 

-• — * — * *- 

1* — * j* — * — n- 

-*- 
-*- 

^^ 

-* — * — « — * — 

-*— 

Elevation. 


230 


Pig.  2. 

Conventional  Signs  used  in  Plates, 

Plan.  Elevation. 


Posts  (long).         Q 
Pickets  (short).      # 


In  fence. 
1  Horizontal  Wire. 


2  Horizontal  Wires. 


4  Horizontal  Wires. 


++ 


TV^wmwwwww 


fr/* 


imm7^777^777$M^ 


V/W/zW/VW/W/AvfrfT/c 


Top  end. 


Inclined  Wire. 


Gate. 


Gate  and  2  Horizontal 
Wires. 


W)&W*&JUWV/®W&> 


231 


Fig.  3. 


Fig.  4. 


oooooooo 


oooooooo 


232 


•>*    /          rV     O 

Fig    7. 

J*— tf-r-y 

D*>  /x       v£v 

233 


Fig.  8. 


Fig.  9. 


Fig.  10. 


234 


Pig.  11. 


Elevation  or  A  and  B. 


Fig.  13. 


235 


Pig.  14. 


9—* n      ■      w     n  ■  ■     » — * — 


,0*er/ap  of  French   l/V/re. 


-Top  Barbed  Wire 


— \/ \.  0 — ^«_* 


0/aponctf  tV/re 


Pig.  15. 


Pig.  16. 


French  W/ne 

■*—** — * — * — #- 


Combined  High  and  Low  Entanglements. 


236 


Pig.  17. 


i 


Fig.  18 


NOTES  AND  RULES  FOR  BARRAGE  FIRE 
WITH  MACHINE  GUNS. 

(Issued  by  the  General  Staff.) 


DEFINITIONS. 

A  barrage  of  fire  produced  by  machine  guns  is  intended  pri- 
marily to  deny  a  certain  area  of  ground  to  the  enemy  by  prevent- 
ing him  crossing  one  or  all  of  the  lines  which  bound  it.  A  bar- 
rage, therefore,  may  be  frontal  or  flanking  (with  regard  to  our 
own  line),  or  both  simultaneously. 


Figure 


-Frontal  barrage. 


ENEMY 


E.- 


A.- 


+  __     111     _    ill     ill     _     ill 
l|l           i|r         l|l  i|i 


(237) 


288 

Figure  II.— r-Obliqur  barrage. 


ENEMY. 

1  1  i 


I,' 


'         s  /  s 

/■  /  s 

s  y  / 


s        ■     *  '  *  ' 


ancle-  or  obliquity. 


EMEMY. 


Figure  III. — Flank  barrage. 
D. 


m  a. 


TJie  production  and  application  of  the  integral  parts  of  a 
barrage — i.  e.,  of  the  conaecutlTe  zones  from  the  gone  eftfagMfr  - 

present  DO  now  problems  at  all.  The  ordinary  methods  of  tiro 
direction  tor  engaging  a  visible  or  an  invisible  target  apply  with 
no  modification  whatever. 


289 

GENERAL   NOTES. 

(a)  Limits  of  front  each  gun  can  cover : 

There  is  a  lower  limit  and  an  upper  limit  to  the  front  which 
each  gun  can  cover  in  producing  a  barrage. 

The  lower  limit  will  produce  a  barrage  of  high  efficacy,  com* 
parable  In  effect  to  a  dense  artillery  barrage,  which  should 
cause  (on  flat  ground)  somewhere  about  50  per  cent  casualties 
to  a  hostile  body  of  troops  passing  through  it. 

The  upper  limit  produces  the  minimum  thickness  barrage 
which  can  be  applied  conveniently  without  gaps. 

These  two  limits  really  define  the  opposite  ends  of  a  scale 
between  which  the  machine-gun  officer  can  operate,  choosing 
whatever  degree  of  efficacy  of  barrage  he  may  consider  necessary 
to  meet  the  tactical  situation,  or  to  produce  the  most  efficient 
barrage  with  the  number  of  guns  at  his  disposal. 

(&)  As  a  rough  guide,  the  number  of  rounds  to  be  fired  per 
burst  may  be  taken  as  twice  the  first  two  figures  of  the  range  in 
yards. 

Example :  Range,  2,100  yards  ;  40-round  bursts. 

REMARKS. 

This  type  of  barrage,  produced  by  using  the  upper  limit,  might 
b»  required,  for  instance,  to  stop  definitely  any  attempted  enemy 
counterattacks,  etc. 

This  type  of  barrage  might  be  employed  when  it  is  required  to 
deter  the  enemy  from  manning  parapets,  escaping  over  the  open, 
or  making  use  of  any  particular  area  of  ground,  etc. 

RULES. 

Rule  I.  For  frontal  barrage. 

Lower  limit  is  obtained  by  multiplying  the  gradient  of  descent 
of  the  bullet  at  the  range  at  which  the  barrage  is  being  produced 
by  4. 

Uppei  limit :  Seventy  yards  for  all  ranges. 

Example :  Range  is  2,100  yards. 

From  Table  I,  column  3  (vide  Infantry  Machine-Gun  Com- 
pany Training),  gradient  of  descent,  1  in  5.5. 

Lower  limit  =  4  X  5.5  =  22  yards  per  gun. 

Upper  limit  =  Y0  ;  -ards  per  gun. 


240 
Rule  II.  For  obVique  barrage. 

Lower  limit  Is  obtained  by  multiplying  the  gradient  of  descent 
of  the  bullet  at  the  range  at  which  the  barrage  is  being  produced 
by  4. 

Upper  limit:  For  all  ranges,  70  yards  plus  2  yards  for  each 
degree  of  obliquity  (vide  fig.  II)  up  to  a  maximum  of  l-~ii>  yards, 
which  must  not  be  exceeded. 

Example:  Range,  2,100  yards;  degree  of  obliquity. 

From  Table  I,  column  3  (vide  Infantry  Machine-Gun  Cora* 
pany  Training),  gradient  of  descent,  1  in  5.5. 

Lower  limit  =  4  X  5.5  =  22  yards  per  gun. 

Upper  limit  =  70  -f(2  X  45)  =  70  +  90  =  160. 

This  is  over  150,  therefore  150  yards  must  be  taken. 

NOTES. 

On  Rule  I.  For  frontal  barrage. 

(a)  Traversing  must  be  employed,  but  there  is  no  advantage 
gained  by  searching  if  only  a  curtain  of  fire  is  required. 

(b)  If  the  ground  slopes  down  and  away  from  the  guns,  both 
limits  may  be  increased,  and  vice  versa. 

On  Rule  II.  For  oblique  barrage. 

(a)  Traversing  must  be  employed,  but  there  is  no  advantage 
gained  by  searching  if  only  m  curtain  of  fire  is  requited. 

{b)  If  the  ground  slopes  down  and  away  from  the  guns,  both 
limits  may  be  increased,  and  vice  versa. 

RULES. 

Rule  HI.  For  ftank  barrage. 

In  this  case  the  limits  become  the  actual  difference!  in  sighting 
elevation  to  be  used  on  the  guns. 

Lower  limit  is  obtained  by  multiplying  the  gradient  of  de 
of  the  bullet  at  the  range  at  which  the  barrage  is  being  produced 
by  4. 

Upper  limit.  150  yards  for  all  ranges. 

Example:  Range  to  nearest  zone,  2.100  yards. 

From  Table  I,  column  3  (vide  Infantry  Machine-Gun  Com- 
pany Training),  gradient  of  descent,  1  in  5.5. 

Lower  limit  =  4  X  5.5  =  22  yards. 

Upper  limit  =  150  yards. 


241 

I.  e.,  for  high  efficacy,  combined  sights  with  25  yards  differ- 
ences; for  thin  but  continuous,  350  yards  differences. 

Rule  IV.  Only  for  ranges  below  1,300  yards. 

Use  the  upper  limit  only,  as  given  in  Rules  I,  II,  and  III,  for 
all  ranges  below  1.300  yards. 

Example  :  Range,  1,200  yards  ;  frontal  barrage,  front,  per  gun, 
70  yards. 

NOTES. 

On  Rule  III — for  flank  barrage. 

•  (a)  It  should  be  observed  that  the  danger  line,  through  which 
an  enemy  has  to  pass,  is  much  less  in  thickness  in  flank  than  in 
frontal  barrages,  as  in  the  latter  case  we  are  dealing  with  the 
width  of  the  zone,  whereas  in  the  former  we  are  concerned  with 
the  depth.  Therefore  it  takes  a  much  shorter  time  for  a  man 
to  pass  through,  and  this  emphasizes  the  necessity  for  continu- 
ous fire  in  flank  barrages. 

As  the  number  of  guns  required  is  not  excessive,  and  others 
may,  therefore,  be  available,  if  a  high  degree  of  protection  is  de- 
sired, a  second  barrage  should  be  formed,  parallel  to  the  first, 
with,  say,  50  yards  separating  them.  The  two  should  not  be 
superimposed,  because  if  by  reason  of  any  ground  formation  or 
artificial  cover  a  part  of  the  ground  was  defiladed  in  the  first 
barrage,  it  is  probable  that  such  defilading  effect  would  not  exist 
at  the  same  distance  from  the  guns  and  a  little  way  to  a  flank. 
In  other  words,  gaps  formed  as  indicated  above  in  both  barrages 
would  probably  be  staggered,  thus  rendering  the  combined  bar- 
rage continuous  throughout  its  length. 

(6)  It  should  be  noted  that  the  rules  for  "combined  sights" 
do  not  apply  to  this  type  of  fire,  e.  g.,  in  this  case  differences  of 
25  yards  or  150  yards  are  permissible. 

On  Rule  IV. 

Reason :  That  although  the  rule  for  obtaining  the  lower  limit 
is  theoretically  correct,  it  gives  large  frontages,  which  each  gun 
can  cover  when  the  range  is  below  1,300  yards.  The  influence 
of  ground  (i.  e.,  slight  obstacles,  undulations,  etc.)  here  becomes 
so  great  that  it  is  not  advisable  to  use  such  large  frontages. 
9784°— 17 16 


242 

MODIFICATIONS    DUE   TO   KATE    OF   EIRE,    SPEED    01    HOSTILE     \!>YANCK, 

ETC. 

(a)  The  rules  given  are  applicable  without  alteration  to  all 
cases  where  the  ratio — 

Rounds  fired  by  each  gun  in  one  minute         1 .    pmiil  to  4 1 
Speed  of  enemy  advance  in  yards  per  minute/       q       T 

(&)  If  each  gun  is  firing  300  rounds  per  minute  (about  its 
maximum),  the  rules  then  will  apply  for  a  speed  of  advance  of 
about  2$  miles  an  hour. 

(c)  If  the  pace,  owing  to  bad  ground,  etc.,  is  less  (than  2* 
miles  per  hour),  then  each  gun  can  lire  fewer  rounds  per  minute 
and  still  produce  the  same  degree  of  efficacy  of  barrage.  (See 
example. ) 

(d)  If  you  have  fixed  beforehand  the  number  of  rounds  to  be 
fired  by  each  gun  per  minute,  and  if  you  have  estimated  the 
probable  speed  of  advance,  the  ratio  (see  No/1,  above)  will  show 
you  how  to  modify  the  rules  to  meet  any  particular  case.  (See 
example. ) 

REMARKS  AND  EXAMPLES. 

(a)  The  factor  4.  which  is  given  in  the  rules,  is  a  good  safe 
figure  to  use  and  should  be  used  in  all  cases  where  there  is  no 
time  to  make  further  calculations. 

(b)  For  example,  2£  miles  an  hour = about  75  yards f  3001  ■* 
per  minute  \     75  J 

(c)  e.g.,  speed  of  advance,  estimated  at  not  more  than  11  miles 
an  hour,  owing  to  mud,  etc.,  this  equals  44  yards  per  minute. 

Number  of  rounds  to  be  fired  by  each  gun  per  minute  can 
therefore  be  found : 

Number  of  rounds  per  minute , « 

44  /"*• 

I.  e.,  number  of  rounds  per  minute  =4X44  174  <<>r  there- 
abouts). 

(</)  Example — frontal  barrage: 

(Juns  are  to  fire  each  250  rounds  per  minute.  Enemy  speed 
estimated  at  not  more  than  li  miles  per  hour. 

1$  miles  per  hour=44  yards  pttr  minute. 

The  ratio  becomes  { 44°}=5-7- 

Your  lower  limit  is  now  o.T  times  the  gradient  (instead  of  4 
times  the  gradient)  for  the  range. 

Your  upper  limit  is  now  70  X  j5^' }  ■-=  1 00  yards  <  instead  of  70 
yards)  for  any  range. 

1  This  is  the  figure  used  for  determining  the  front  per  gun  In  the  rules. 


GERMAN  INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  THE   EMPLOY- 
MENT OF  FLAME  PROJECTORS. 


(A)  Troops  and  Equipment. 

1.  Flame  projectors  (Flammenwerfer)  are  a  new  weapon  for 
trench  warfare.  The  third  guard  pioneer  battalion  (6  Company s) 
has  been  equipped  with  them  and  trained  in  their  use.  They 
are  under  the  command  of  general  headquarters,  and  will  be 
placed  at  the  disposal,  as  a  unit  or  by  sections,  of  particular 
formations  for  a  particular  purpose,  when  they  will  for  the  time 
being  be  entirely  under  the  orders  of  the  responsible  com- 
mander, who,  after  consulting  with  the  flame  projector  com- 
mander and  taking  the  limitations  of  the  weapon  into  con- 
sideration, will  give  the  tactical  orders  for  the  assault.  The  re- 
sponsibility for  their  technical  employment  rests  entirely  with 
the  flame-projector  commander. 

2.  Each  company  of  the  third  guard  pioneer  battalion  is 
equipped  with  20  to  22  large  flame  projectors  (range  of  jet, 
33  to  44  yards).  They  will  be  built  into  sapheads,  advanced 
galleries,  or  the  front-line  position.  In  addition,  each  company 
has  18  small  flame  projectors  (range  of  jet,  16  to  19  yards). 
These  are  easily  portable  and  will  be  carried  on  the  back. 

(B)  Capabilities  of  Flame  Projectors. 

3.  During  a  flame  attack  each  large  flame  projector  (built 
in  at  about  27  yards  distance  from  the  enemy's  trench)  will 
cover  the  enemy's  foremost  trenches  with  flame  on  a  front  of 
about  55  yards.  The  enemy  in  these  trenches  will  either  be 
destroyed  or  driven  off,  or  if  he  happens  to  be  in  deep  dugouts 
will  have  his  morale  so  shaken  that  he  will  allow  himself  to  be 
ciptured  without  resistance.  Machine  guns,  even  if  provided 
with  overhead  cover  or  in  blockhouses,  are  put  out  of  action  by 
directing  the  flames  against  the  loopholes.  The  flame  attack 
lasts  about  one  minute. 

(243) 


244 

4.  The  front  covered  by  a  company  of  the  third  guard  pioneer 
battalion  is  about  1,100  to  1,640  yards.  The  effect,  physical  and 
moral,  of  such  a  flame  attack  on  the  enemy  is  very  great 

5.  The  assault  will  be  made  by  infantry  and  pioneers  Imme- 
diately after  the  flame  attack.  Detachments  with  small  flame 
projectors  will  accompany  the  assaulting  troops  in  order  to 
overcome  any  resistance  which  may  be  offered  by  blockhouse, 
etc.,  and  also  to  spread  the  fear  of  the  flames  to  the  enemy's 
rearward  positions.  Many  successive  positions  can  often  be 
taken  by  assault  at  the  same  time. 

6.  The  small  portable  flame  projectors  may  also  often  be 
employed  with  advantage  in  combination  with  bombers  in 
making  progress  In  the  enemy's  trenches,  and  for  flank  attacks 
on  portions  of  trench,  etc. 

(C)   Necessary  Conditions  for  Flame  Attacks. 

7.  For  large  flame  projectors,  trenches,  sapheada  and  gal- 
leries must  have  been  pushed  forward  to  within  27  yards,  at 
least,  of  the  enemy's  position  at  several  points,  or  there  must 
be  a  prospect  that  they  will  be  able  to  approach  so  near  within 
the  next  few  days. 

8.  For  small  flame  projectors,  the  portions  of  trench  referred 
to  in  paragraph  6  must  be  approached  under  the  cover  of 
trenches  or  saps. 

9.  In  both  cases  (pars.  7  and  8)  an  accurate  previous  recoq- 
noissance  of  the  points  at  which  the  flame  projectors  arc  to 
be  employed  and  of  the  approaches  to  them  is  absolutely  essen- 
tial. This  must  be  made  by  the  officers  of  the  flame-project or 
battalion.  The  reconnoissance,  transport  of  the  apparatus,  and 
other  preparations  take,  as  a  rule,  several  days.  The  building 
in  of  the  Large  flame  projectors  requires  12  hours  and  can  be 
done  without  the  enemy  becoming  aware  of  it. 

10.  The  direction  of  the  wind  has  very  little  influence  on  the 
effect  of  a  flame  attack.  A  postponement  of  an  attack  will 
become  necessary  only  if  there  is  a  very  strong  head  wind. 

(D)   Tactical  Kmim.oyment  ok  the  Flame   PrOJICTOI 

1  M    I   \(   II  MKNT. 

11.  Flame  projectors  must  be  used  offensively,  it  is  forbid- 
den to  build  flame  projectors  in  as  defensive  weapons  in  the 
foremost    lines.      Small    tlame  projectors  may  he  used,   however. 


245 

to  drive  off  counter  attacks  against  positions,  the  capture  of 
which  has  been  facilitated  by  a  flame  attack,  until  such  posi- 
tions have  been  consolidated.  For  technical  reasons  they  cease 
to  be  effective  after  about  48  hours.  In  other  special  and  quite 
exceptional  cases,  when  it  is  proposed  to  use  them  defensively, 
the  commander  of  the  flame-projector  detachment  should  be  con- 
sulted beforehand. 

12.  Flame  attacks  proper  (i.  e.,  sudden  attacks  with  a  num- 
ber of  large  flame  projectors  without  any  special  preparation 
by  artillery  and  trench  mortars)  should  be  the  usual  method 
of  employment.  The  assaulting  troops  (infantry,  pioneers,  and 
the  small  flame  projectors)  must  advance  at  once  (i.  e.,  1 
minute  after  the  large  flame  projectors  have  come  into  action) 
and  take  every  advantage  of  the  panic  caused  in  the  enemy's 
ranks  by  the  flame  attack,  with  a  view  to  capturing  the  second 
and  third-line  positions.  (For  the  action  of  the  artillery  and 
trench  mortars,  see  par.  35. ) 

13.  If  the  commander  of  the  flame-projector  detachment  con- 
siders it  safe  to  do  so,  one  or  more  sections  of  the  front  to  be 
attacked  may  be  left  untouched  by  the  flames  between  the  areas 
covered  by  the  individual  large  flame  projectors  which  have 
been  built  in.  The  length  of  such  sections  may  be  100  yards  or 
even  more. 

14.  The  fact  that  the  enemy  is  taken  by  surprise  by  the  flame 
attack  has  much  to  do  with  making  it  a  complete  success.  It 
is  therefore  of  the  highest  importance  that  the  enemy  should 
not  obtain  information  of  the  arrival  of  a  flame-projector  de- 
tachment in  the  division,  etc.,  or  of  the  sector  in  which  it  is 
intended  to  employ  it.  It  is  consequently  necessary  that  the 
word  "  Flammenwerfer "  should  never  be  mentioned  during  a 
conversation  when  speaking  over  the  telephone  or  in  orders.  A 
code  word  is  to  be  used,  such  as  "  neue  minenwerfer,"  or  some- 
thing similar.  The  detachment  will  not  be  spoken  of  as  a 
"  Flammenwerfer  "  company,  but  as  — th  company,  third  guard 
pioneer  battalion. 

(E)  General  Tactical  Instructions. 

15.  When  giving  orders  for  an  attack  in  wmich  large  flame 
projectors  are  to  be  employed,  the  following  points,  based  on 
previous  experience,  should  be  considered : 


240 

(i)  Object  ire. 

16.  Exact  instructions  must  be  given  how  far  the  attack  is  to 
be  pushed  under  tbe  most  favorable  conditions.  It  has  hap- 
pened that  our  troops,  taking  advantage  of  the  panic  of  the 
enemy,  have  carried  the  advance  too  far,  Thereby  coming  under 
our  own  artillery  barrage 

17.  In  order  to  insure  secrecy  as  much  as  possible  it  is  ad- 
visable that  the  intended  operation  should  be  denominated  by  a 
code  word  (in  writing  or  when  using  the  telephone),  such  as 
"  voitrag,"  "  vorfiihrung,"  *'  verhandlung  "  (lecture,  production, 
negotiation). 

( ii)   Time  of  atiacl:. 

18.  As  a  rule,  half  an  hour,  or  on  dull  days  one  hour,  before 
sunset  is  the  most  suitable  time.  Only  in  exceptional  cast's, 
when,  in  the  course  of  the  day,  the  destruction,  by  artillery  or 
trench  mortars,  of  the  large  llame  projectors  which  are  built 
in  appeal's  to  be  fairly  certain  may  the  attack  be  carried  out 
in  the  early  morning. 

19.  It  is  sometimes  advisable  that  the  day  and  hour  should 
not  be  mentioned  in  the  orders  for  tbe  attack,  but  should  tem- 
porarily be  kept  secret,  and  should  be  referred  to  as  M  X  "  and 
"  Y."  In  later  orders,  which  will  be  issued  in  writing  only 
to  battalion,  artillery,  and  group  commanders  and  the  com- 
manders of  Independent  companies,  inclusive,  the  time  should 
then  be  indicated — for  instance,  as  follows:  "X"  equals  27th 
November;  "Yw  equals  8.20  p.  m. 

t  //'/)  Axxduit'nui  troops. 

20.  The   carrying  out  of   the  preparations    for   the   attack    IS 

often    better    done    if    the    assault     is    not    made    by    the    troops 

occupying  the  trenches,  but  by  a  detachment  which  has  been 

kepi  in  rest  billots.  All  troops  which  up  to  that  time  have 
been  in  the  trenches  will  then  retire  to  the  second  position 
shortly  before  the  assault,  and  as  soon  as  the  attack  by  the 
assaulting  party  lias  begun  again  move  forward  into  the  fore- 
most trenches  previously  held  by  them,  in  Order  to  hold  a  pos- 
sible countered  roko. 

21.  The  size  of  the  assaulting  force  must  not  be  too  great 
The  calculation  should  be  one  (man?)  of  the  assaulting  party 


247 

to  each  meter  of  front.     Each  party  must  have  a  good  second 
in  command  in  addition  to  the  commander. 

22.  The  individual  assaulting  columns  will  be  distributed  in 
four  successive  waves,  as  follows: 

(a)  Assaulting  party,  which  advances  immediately  after  the 
flame  attack  and  occupies  the  enemy's  positions.  In  this  party 
are  included  bombers,  engineers  (for  the  demolition  of  ob- 
stacles), and  small  flame  projectors. 

(b)  Consolidating  party  for  the  consolidation  of  the  enemy's 
trenches. 

(c)  Communication-trench  construction  party,  to  construct 
communication  trenches  from  the  captured  trenches  to  our 
previous  foremost  position. 

(d)  Carrying  party,  which  will  take  forward  material  for 
obstacles,  especially  knife  rests,  sand  bags,  hand  grenades,  and 
ammunition. 

The  attacking  parties  on  the  flanks  will  have  several  bombing 
parties  and  small  flame-projector  detachments  attached  to  them 
to  assist  them  in  clearing  the  trenches  from  the  flanks. 

23.  Assaulting  detachments  and  consolidating  parties  will 
take  up  positions  in  the  saps  or  in  the  front-line  trenches; 
communication  trench  and  carrier  parties  will  be  ready  behind 
them  in  the  communication  trenches.  The  stationing  of  troops 
in  readiness  will  of  course  depend  upon  the  existing  system  of 
saps,  and  will  sometimes  necessitate  previous  reconstruction  of 
this  system. 

24.  The  division  of  the  assaulting  columns  into  these  parties 
is  best  carried  out  well  behind  the  front.  If  no  other  troops 
are  to  be  employed  except  those  manning  the  trenches,  it  is 
advisable  to  relieve  them,  for  a  short  period  at  least,  from  the 
foremost  trenches  for  the  purpose  of  preparation  and  organiza- 
tion. The  troops  will  march  up  to  their  positions  in  the  line 
in  the  order  detailed  for  the  assault. 

(iv)  Preparations  for  the  assault. 

25.  Special  preparations  must  be  made  in  order  that  the 
assaulting  troops  can  mount  the  parapet  rapidly.  Short  ladders 
with  one  pole  about  1  meter  longer  than  the  other  are  the 
most  useful  means.  These  should  be  made  previously  in  the 
engineer  parks  One  ladder  is  required  for  every  three  to  four 
men  of  the  assaulting  party.    When  being  taken  up  to  the  front 


248 

line  they  must  be  carried  horizontally.  They  must  not  be 
placed  in  position  in  the  trenches  until  the  commencement  of 
the  flame  attack. 

26.  All  necessary  material,  such  as  hand  grenades,  loophole 
plates,  sandbags,  knife  rests,  barbed  wire,  entrenching  tools. 
and  light  pistols  with  ammunition  must  be  kept  in  readiness 
either  in  the  communication  trench  depots  or  with  the  assault- 
ing columns. 

27.  Communication  trenches  and  approaches  must  be  divided 
up  and  allotted  to  the  assaulting  columns  and  reserves.  Com- 
munication trenches,  saps,  etc.,  will  be  distinctly  marked  with 
numbers,  letters,  or  names. 

28.  Should  other  troops  than  those  holding  the  trenches  be 
employed  for  the  assault,  their  officers  and  noncommissioned 
officers  must  carry  out  a  thorough  reconnaissance  of  their 
trenches  in  the  early  dawn  and  during  the  day.  No  unusual 
movement,  however,  must  take  place  in  the  trenches  and  there 
must  be  no  loud  talking. 

29.  The  advance  of  the  assaulting  troops  into  the  front-line 
trenches  and  the  relief  of  the  troops  in  the  trenches  must  be 
carried  out  in  complete  silence.  No  talking  is  to  be  allowed. 
rnmvossary  crowding  together  should  be  avoided.  Bayonets 
will  be  fixed  behind  the  lines  and  not  in  the  front  line.  Rifles 
must  be  carried  at  the  trail  as  far  as  possible. 

{v)   The  assault  in  con  junction   irith  a  flame  attack. 

30.  Charges  (long  or  concentrated),  t<>  create  gaps  in  our  own 
ohstaeles,  will  he  exploded  by  the  engineers  at  the  earliest  15 
minutes  before  the  flame  attack,  and  this  work  must  he  com- 
pleted  10  minutes  before  the  flame  attack.  It  will  often  he 
found  sufficient  if,  on  the  night  previous  to  the  attack,  the 
engineers  cut  the  wire  winch  connects  the  knife  rests  in  front 
of  the  foremost  trenches.  This  must  he  done  without  attracting 
attention,  the  knife  rests  being  left  in  their  original  position 
until  the  troops  are  ready  to  attack — i.  e..  Immediately  after 
the  flame  attack — when  the  engineers  will  precede  the  assault- 
in-   force,  swinging  the  knife  rests  round   lengthwise  at   right 

angles  to  the  parapet 

Engineers  will  also  hurry  forward  and  make  gaps  in  the 
enemy's  wire,  should  these  not  have  been  made  previously  In- 
trench mortars  or  engineer  detachments.    Obstacles  which  are 

not  too  strong  can  very  often  he  easily  crossed  by   the  assault- 


249 

ing  troops,  as  after  a  flame  attack  the  enemy  fires  very  little 
or  not  at  all. 

31.  The  duration  of  the  flame  attack  is  only  one  minute.  The 
signal  for  it  is  given  by  a  siren  whistle,  or  at  a  given  time, 
watches  having  been  previously  synchronized.  The  assaulting 
troops  must  be  instructed  that  they  have  nothing  to  fear  from 
the  flames  and  smoke,  nor  need  they  fear  that  they  may  them- 
selves be  caught  by  the  fire  jet,  as  this  is  cut  off  by  simply 
turning  a  tap  previous  to  their  advance.  They  must  understand 
that  they  can  advance  immediately  after  the  cessation  of  the 
spray  without  danger,  as  small  bursts  of  flame  on  the  ground 
or  in  the  enemy's  trenches  will  burn  out  at  once,  and  a  little 
fire  on  the  ground  is  at  once  extinguished  when  trodden  upon. 
It  is  most  important  to  impress  upon  the  troops  that  the  assault 
is  much  facilitated  by  the  use  of  the  flame  projector,  as  it  has 
been  proved  by  experience  that  the  enemy  fires  very  little  or 
not  at  all  after  a  flame  attack. 

32.  The  assault  is  made  immediately  after  the  flame  attack. 
The  assaulting  party  charges,  followed  closely  by  the  consoli- 
dating party.  The  small  flame  projectors  allotted  to  the  as- 
saulting party  attack  any  machine  guns  that  are  still  in  action, 
blockhouses  that  are  still  being  defended,  etc.,  with  short  spurts 
of  fire.  They  are  at  the  disposal  of  the  commander  of  assaulting 
party  for  this  purpose. 

It  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  drive  out  the  enemy  simul- 
taneously to  a  considerable  distance  on  both  flanks  by  means  of 
bombing  and  flame-projector  detachments  (see  par.  22)  and  to 
construct  sandbag  barricades  at  these  points.  Communication 
trenches  which  lead  into  the  captured  position  must  also  be 
cleared  for  a  certain  distance  and  blocked  by  constructing  sand- 
bag barricades  about  27  yards  forward  of  the  position  won. 

The  action  of  the  communication-trench  construction  party 
will  commence  immediately  after  the  nearest  enemy  position 
has  been  taken.  Material  is  brought  up  as  soon  as  possible  by 
the  carrier  party,  which  will  continue  to  bring  up  fresh  material 
from  the  rear  as  required.  Carrier  parties  can  at  times  on 
their  return  journey  also  take  charge  of  prisoners  as  far  as 
the  point  at  which  the  reserves  are  situated  in  rear. 

It  is  especially  important  to  bring  up  and  dig  in  machine 
guns  immediately. 

33.  It  may  be  of  advantage  to  order  a  password  for  our 
attacking  troops,  especially  if  several  successive  positions  are 


250 

to  be  taken,  and  in  the  twilight  of  dull  days.  Words  which 
ihe  enemy  would  find  it  difficult  to  pronounce  are  particularly 
suitable,  such  as  "  Schweineschmalz,"  M Stief elwichse,"  etc. 

(vi)  Action  of  the  artillery  and  trench  mortars. 

34.  In  a  flame  attack  pure  and  simple,  which  is  generally  to 
be  preferred  (see  par.  12),  the  action  of  the  artillery  and 
trench  mortars  will  not  commence  until  about  one  minute  after 
the  projection  of  the  flames,  when  the  more  retired  positions, 
which  it  is  not  intended  to  take,  should  be  shelled.  Barrage 
fire  will  be  opened  on  the  ground  behind  these  positions  and 
on  the  communication  trenches,  etc. 

35.  Should  it  be  impossible,  in  exceptional  circumstances*  tO 
dispense  with  previous  preparation  by  the  artillery  and  trench 
mortars,  only  the  enemy's  rear  positions,  and  not  his  foremost, 
positions,  are  to  be  shelled.  It  does  not  matter  if  this  results 
in  the  enemy  pressing  forward  into  the  positions  nearest  to 
us  in  order  to  obtain  shelter,  thereby,  reinforcing  the  garrison. 
It  must,  however,  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  by  artillery 
and  trench  mortar  preparation  the  enemj  is  warned  of  an  im- 
minent attack,  and  is  thus  enabled  to  take  precautionary  meas- 
ures. 

36.  In  most  cases,  however,  it  is  advisable  to  request  the 
divisions  on  the  right  and  left  to  open  with  artillery  on  the 
enemy's  rear  positions  behind  the  front  which  it  is  intended  to 
capture.  Registration  must  be  carried  out  so  as  not  to  attract 
attention. 

37.  As  a  rule  it  is  advisable  to  detail  a  special  artillery  group 
to  repulse  hostile  counter  attacks.  Its  commander  must  take 
up  his  position  with  the  commander  of  the  attacking  force  and 
must  arrange  for  special  telephonic  communication. 

(vii)   Forces  on  tin    flunks  of  the  froni  of  attack. 

38.  The  effect  of  a  flame  attack  is  sometimes  felt  to  the 
right  and  left  of  the  front  which  is  covered  with  tlame.  Our 
troops  which  are  posted  on  the  Hanks  of  the  actual  front  of 
attack  can  sometimes,  therefore,  gain  ground  by  a  prompt  ad- 
vance in  force,     ii   is.  consequently,  necessary  to  beep  under 

close  ohseiwation  Ihe  enemy's  troops  on  the  thinks  of  the  front 
of  attack,  and,  according  to  circumstances,  either  subject   them 


251 

to  a  heavy  fire  or  attack  them  as  well.  Engineer  detachments 
are  to  be  posted  in  readiness  for  forming  gaps  through  the  ob- 
stacles, should  this  be  necessary. 

(viii)  Equipment,  ammunition,  and  rations. 

The  assaulting  troops  will  wear  "  assault  order."  Each  man 
will  take  his  great  coat,  tent  square,  mess  tin,  full  water  bottle, 
four  days'  rations  in  his  haversack,  and,  in  addition,  at  least 
200  rounds,  two  hand  grenades,  and  rifle  with  fixed  bayonet. 

The  consolidating  parties  are  similarly  equipped,  except  that 
they  sling  their  rifles  (bayonets  not  fixed).  Each  man  will 
carry  a  loophole  plate,  50  sandbags,  and  heavy  entrenching  tool. 

Communication  trench  and  carrier  parties  will  appear  in  their 
usual  order  of  dress.  Only  the  noncommissioned  officers  will 
carry  rifles.  The  men  of  the  communication  trench  party  will 
each  carry  a  heavy  entrenching  tool,  50  sandbags,  and  at  least 
two  hand  grenades.  * 

(ix)   Telephone  eommunieations. 

40.  A  number  of  infantry  telephone  lines  will  be  laid  from 
the  captured  position  to  the  rear  immediately  after  the  assault. 

47.  All  lines  leading  to  the  commander  of  the  attacking  force 
are  to  be  used  solely  for  service  messages  which  concern  the 
attack,  so  that  he  can  bring  his  personal  influence  to  bear  upon 
every  part  of  the  front. 

Additional  Remarks  by  Fourteenth  Reserve  Corps. 

(Fourteenth    Reserve    Corps    headquarters,    la    No.    629,    secret,    dated 
Apr.  28,  1916.) 

On  March  23,  1916,  attention  of  the  divisions  was  called  to  the 
fact  that  information  had  been  received  from  the  Moritz  listen- 
ing apparatus  as  to  practice  by  the  British  with  flame  pro- 
jectors and  lachrymatory  bombs  ( corps  headquarters,  la  No.  4.51, 
secret,  dated  Mar.  23,  1916) .  During  the  raid  against  the  Ninety- 
ninth  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment  on  the  night  of  April  22-23, 
1916,  lachrymatory  bombs  were  employed.  The  enemy  continues 
to  practice  with  flame  projectors  behind  his  front.  Moritz  listen- 
ing post  No.  52  reports  on  such  a  practice  for  the  29th  of  this 
month.  It  is  quite  possible  that  the  enemy  intends  shortly  to 
use  this  weapon  against  us.    Whether  he  will  combine  his  flame 


252 

attack    with    artillery    fire   is    doubtful.      It    is    not    absolutely 
necessary. 

The  troops  are  to  be  instructed  as  to  the  special  features  of 
This  new  weapon  (corps  headquarters  la  No.  1506,  secret,  dated 
Dec.  19,  1915).  Flame  projectors  which  have  been  built  in  in 
the  enemy's  positions  (see  par.  -  of  the  above-mention<Hl  order) 
must  he  destroyed  as  soon  as  possible  by  concentrated  artillery 
fire.  The  small  portable  projectors  constitute  a  danger  to  the 
enemy's  own  troops  if  the  men  carrying  the  apparatus  are  hit. 
Every  effort  must  be  made  to  do  this. 


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